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“The starting point is that local councillors 
are no big heroes, no superior people, no 
king-philosophers; but they are no inferior 
people either, no small-minded power-mad 
persons, no Machiavelli’s in stamp format. 
They tend to be normal people, who have the 
courage, ambition and will to be a 
representative of the people.” 
(Tops & Zouridis, 2002: 15; 
translated quote from Dutch) 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 1 
GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
 
 
1.1. BEYOND THE BALLOT, AWAY FROM THE LIMELIGHT: ANALYZING THE ROLE 
AND POSITION OF LOCAL COUNCILLORS IN BELGIUM1 
Deadline 14/10. It was not a coincidence that the producers of a popular Flemish 
television series chose this title for their whodunit about the disappearance of a little girl. 
The TV-series, taking place against the backdrop of the (fictitious) local elections in 
Belgium’s largest municipality Antwerp, was broadcast in the weeks before the official 
local elections on Sunday 14 October 2012. Somehow this illustrates the build-up to 
those elections. In the months before 14/10, media had continued their tradition of 
extensively covering the battle for the voter. Debate shows, information programs, 
analyses per municipality, interactive devices (e.g. launch and monitor policy proposals, 
test party programs, etc.): they all emerged as signs of what the sociologist Huyse (2012) 
has called a chronic election fever. 
Also outside this media frame, 14/10 reminded citizens of the political process in their 
municipality again. The street scenes were decorated with numerous posters being placed 
in gardens, on billboards and cars. Spread over 3 regions, 589 municipalities and 2.791 
lists, the nearly 60.000 candidates who ran for the council flooded citizens with personal 
leaflets and house visits. They rallied their friends and family members, attended local 
debates, sports games, festivities and the weekly markets. Additionally, the growing 
popularity of the new social media was used as an innovative campaign strategy to launch 
twitter and facebook messages, personalized magazines, websites and even youtube 
spots. 
Judging by the turmoil associated with this election, one would suspect that being a local 
councillor in Belgium should be an important responsibility. And indeed formally this 
claim holds true. Councillors are supposed to be the key actors in local government 
                                                             
1 We use the term local councillor and local council, local council meeting, etc. as synonyms for 
municipal councillor, municipal council, municipal council meeting, etc. throughout the text. 
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(Mouritzen & Svara, 2002). The council, on its turn, is regarded as the bedrock of the 
local system (Plees, 2005; Reynaert & Dobbelaere, 2012). As the focus of local 
democracy, the main function of 14/10 was therefore to select more than 13.000 
councillors to form 589 local councils (Steyvers & Reynaert, 2010)2. 
Even when taking the weight of the elections into consideration, a few reservations are 
noteworthy. First, it was striking how the public attention (particularly in the national 
media) was seldom directed towards the councillors-to-be in person, or the councillor 
office by extension. Rather, the debate centred around more polarizing items such as the 
(direct) election of the mayor, the nationalization of the elections, the health of local 
finances, challenges for municipal policy, pre-electoral coalition agreements, post-
electoral coalition formations and machinations, the implications of the results for 
national politics, etc3. 
Second, once this election tsunami passed by and councillors, executive boards and 
mayors were installed in office, as it could have been predicted, local politics returned to 
the margin of public attention again. What then happens inside the town hall is belittled 
or dismissed as church tower politics, being more like folklore than real politics 
(Reynaert, 2000)4. Hence every six years, the sudden rise in election fever contrasts 
sharply with the relative lack of interest for what councillors do once they have been 
elected. Only in some exceptional cases and in the local media (including the local 
sections of the newspapers) do local politics continue to receive regular attention 
throughout the legislature. Yet when this is the case, the political process is mostly 
identified with (the actions of) the mayor and his/her aldermen (see Box 1.1)5. 
                                                             
2 Simultaneously, 10 provincial councils, 9 district councils and 8 councils of the Public Social Services 
Centre were elected as well. The councillors from these institutions, however, fall beyond the scope of 
our study. 
3 Debates on the number of candidates of foreign descent, single issue parties or single candidates were 
the exception that proved the rule. To some extent, this bias stems from the broader meaning of local 
elections, i.e. as the pathway to (local) power. From this perspective, elections determine the power 
balance between the parties, and indicate which future policies are broadly supported, who will have the 
political responsibility to implement them, and how the old policies have been evaluated, etc. (Steyvers & 
Reynaert, 2010). 
4 For instance, a recent article about the training sessions for newly elected councillors in Flanders 
confirms this stereotype through its heading: “Politics under the parish church tower” (Justaert, 2012). 
5 Examples from the recent political history in Belgium illustrate the polarization between councillors and 
mayors. On one hand, a quote of a political heavyweight from the green party, when leaving the national 
scene in 2010, exemplifies how councillors are (often) perceived: “I stay a local councillor (…), but I 
have closed the political chapter in my life” (De Lobel, 2010; translated quote from Dutch). On the other 
hand, several national politicians claimed to prefer the mayoralty in a (large) municipality over a mandate 
as minister or party president in the weeks before 14/10. 
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Box 1.1. Media coverage of the local council and its actors6 
We measured the media-coverage of the local council and its actors in 7 Flemish 
newspapers and magazines via the online archive Mediargus. The selected period 
(01/01/1999 – 31/12/2012) spans 2 legislatures and 3 elections (October 2000, 2006 and 
2012). The blue line represents the coverage of the council in general. It includes every 
article in which the (Dutch translation of the) headword ‘local council(s)’ 
(“gemeenteraad(-en)”) occurred, i.e. including the terms ‘local elections’, ‘local 
councillor/s’, ‘local council meeting/s’, etc. The purple, green and red lines represent the 
coverage of the council actors: ‘(local) councillor/s’, ‘alderman/-men’ and ‘mayor(s)’. 
 
 The graph shows that attention for the council increases markedly in the election year, 
whilst gradually declining afterwards. Throughout the legislature newspapers and 
magazines still report on the council, even if in their local/regional sections. 
 Further, the graph highlights the massive gap in media attention between the 
councillor(s) and the omnipresent executive politicians, i.e. the mayor(s) and aldermen. 
The latter appear often in the media without reference to the council as such. 
 Moreover, it seems as though media coverage of the councillors has decreased slightly 
in the past decade. We notice an opposite trend in the coverage of the executive 
politicians. Particularly aldermen receive increasing attention, almost closing the gap 
with mayors during the legislature. 
 In the election year, however, media coverage of mayors still peaks much stronger. 
This could indicate that local elections are mainly (and increasingly) covered as a 
personal race for the mayoralty, rather than as the focus of local democracy in which the 
representative body of the locality is elected. 
                                                             
6 Based on Ackaert (2012). The selected media are ‘De Morgen’, ‘De Standaard’, ‘De Tijd’, ‘Gazet van 
Antwerpen’, ‘Het Belang van Limburg’, ‘Het Laatste Nieuws’, ‘Het Nieuwsblad’ and ‘Knack’. 
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As a result, it is unclear for many people what the role and position of local councillors is 
when they meet their election deadline (Reynaert & Dobbelaere, 2012). It is nonetheless 
from the elections onwards that councillors are really put to the test. As elected 
representative, the councillor is entrusted with the fundamental responsibility to run 
his/her municipality. Scholars agree that the present scope of this task reaches beyond the 
designation of church tower politics (Reynaert & Steyvers, 2010). Indeed, municipalities 
have been granted a general competence by the Belgian Constitution to carry out tasks to 
promote local interests, as long as these are not implemented at any other level (Ackaert, 
2005; De Rynck & Wayenberg, 2010). This includes a rich tapestry of policy domains in 
practice: public security, education, sports, culture, social policy, health care, 
environment, economy, urbanism, general administration, etc. (De Rynck & Wayenberg, 
2010)7. By implementing these tasks municipalities are expected to contribute to the 
wellbeing of the citizens and the sustainable development of the municipal territory 
(Flemish Municipal Decree, Art. 2). The councils also have several tools at their disposal 
to achieve this end, such as administering the municipality’s revenues, dispenses, public 
works and companies (Walloon Code of Local Democracy and Decentralization, Art. 
L1113-1). In this capacity, municipalities are definitely not a second-class government in 
Belgium. We should rather consider them as the first administration and democratic base 
of the political system (Reynaert, 2000; Steyvers, 2010a). Accordingly, the quote “All 
politics is local”, expressed by the former American MP O’Neill, might have been 
slightly exaggerated, it does underscore the significance of local politics in our 
contemporary world (Steyvers, 2010a: 15). 
Academics acknowledge the value of studying what happens inside the local authority as 
well:  
“Local Government and Politics is not the subject that is at the forefront of 
everyone’s mind when they think of political science. And yet “town hall 
politics” are the bedrock of political systems. One might well say that as 
municipalities go, so goes modern democracy. That is why the rigorous 
study of local government and politics is so important to our discipline” 
(Trent & Stein, 2006: 7). 
In Belgian political science, attention for the local level has only proliferated in the last 
decades (Reynaert, 2000; Steyvers & Reynaert, 2010). Reynaert (2000; see also Reynaert 
& Steyvers, 2010) identifies five broad streams within this field of inquiry: research on 
local elections (the dominant stream, see also Buelens et al., 2008; Steyvers & Reynaert, 
2010); research on coalition formation; research on municipal size and amalgamations (in 
                                                             
7 Still the authors note that these tasks are often shared with other government levels, while also being 
implemented under supervision of central government. 
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relation to public service provision and political participation); research on local policy 
and inter-governmental relations; and research on the social and professional background 
of local political elites. Recently, some new topics have been added to this agenda: 
research on political participation at the local level (e.g. Daemen & Ringeling, 2000; Pilet 
et al., 2007c; Verlet et al., 2007; Dezeure & De Rynck, 2010), research on local policy 
networks (e.g. De Rynck & Voets, 2006; Verhoest & De Meu, 2008; Block & Steyvers, 
2011), research on political reforms (e.g. Pilet et al., 2005; Plees, 2005; Steen & Wille, 
2005; Olislagers & Ackaert, 2010; Olislagers et al., 2008 and 2009) and research on 
political leadership (e.g. Ackaert, 2005, 2006a and 2006b; Steyvers, 2004; Steyvers et al., 
2006 and 2008a; Valcke, 2010). 
On the other hand, we still have little academic information about the role and position of 
Belgian local councillors in office (Ackaert, 2006b). While the research lines outlined 
above might relate to this subject implicitly or indirectly, they do not address it 
exclusively, directly and/or systematically. As a result, what we know about councillors’ 
role and position is often derived from theoretical or indirect empirical sources (e.g. De 
Rynck, 2000, 2002 and 2007; Mouritzen & Svara, 2002; Kalk & De Rynck, 2003; 
Ackaert, 2005 and 2006b; Plees, 2005). Tops and Zouridis (2002) argue that such 
underexposure is quite widespread. In the meantime, councils and councillors provoke 
mixed feelings: “often maligned, sometimes loved, but above all misunderstood” (Tops & 
Zouridis, 2002: 15, translated from Dutch). These feelings suggest that most observers 
think and talk about the local council and its councillors in normative terms. They are 
seldom evaluated from a descriptive perspective8. 
The goal of our study is to fill a part of this lacuna by investigating the role and position 
of Belgian local councillors from a descriptive and empirical perspective. As such, we 
wish to look beyond the ballot, away from the (traditional political) limelight. In doing 
so, we will pose and examine a wide range of questions: ‘How do local councillors move 
to and in their office?’; ‘How do they conceive and implement their role?’; ‘Which 
differences exist among local councillors?’; ‘Which factors determine councillors’ 
functioning?’; ‘How do local councillors relate to citizens?’; ‘Do Flemish councillors 
differ systematically from Walloon councillors?’; ‘How do councillors evaluate their 
position in the local authority?’; etc.  
This introductory chapter further outlines the research problem that forms the theoretical 
basis of our research. Subsequently, it presents the overall research strategy and the 
fundamental research hypotheses.  
                                                             
8 Egner and Heinelt (2008) extrapolate this conclusion to (European) political science in general. In some 
particular national settings, however, studies on the role/position of local councillors have been carried 
out (e.g. Denters & De Jong, 1992; Rao et al., 1994; Rao, 1998; Hansen, 2005; Brugué & Vallès, 2005). 
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1.2. RESEARCH PROBLEM 
The choice to analyze the role and position of Belgian local councillors was not inspired 
by the public indifference and/or scientific-empirical lacuna solely. It was above all 
prompted by a fundamental research problem. Such a problem qualifies as a given 
question “calling for a response in the form of scientific inquiry” (Frankfort-Nachmias & 
Nachmias, 1996: 52). Basically, our research problem results from the acclaimed friction 
between councillors’ important formal role and position in the local system (the positive 
view) and factors that (could) inhibit them from acting in line with these theoretical 
postulates (the negative view). These opposing views thereby epitomize the title of our 
study: ‘Are Belgian local councillors the symbolic foundation of our local democracy, or 
should we rather consider them to be its fragment?’ Moreover, the salience of this 
(acclaimed) friction has also led Belgian central government to take several measures in 
search for a reinvigoration of the local councils and the local councillors (the 
voluntaristic view). This section discusses these three elements that constitute our 
research problem and will consequently lead our analysis throughout the study. Yet first, 
it briefly sets forth the general perspective that we will use to examine councillors’ role 
and position. 
 
1.2.1. New institutionalism as general organizing perspective 
We draw on a new institutional perspective to frame the analysis of councillors’ role and 
position. New institutionalism, as Lowndes (2010: 71) notes, is “concerned with the 
informal conventions of political life as well as with formal constitutions and 
organizational structures.” It pays attention to the values and power relationships of/in 
the institutions, their obstacles and opportunities. In other words, new institutionalism is 
an organizing perspective which analyzes political behaviour within the contours of 
institutional facts and broader opportunity structures (Goodin & Klingemann in Lowndes, 
2010). The fact that this perspective takes account of both formal institutions and 
informal attitudes and behaviour within a wider opportunity structure (i.e. the larger 
government context), makes it very suitable for contemporary political analysis 
(Heywood, 2002; Bara, 2009; Lowndes, 2010), and the study of political actors in 
particular (e.g. Norris, 1997; Cotta & Best, 2000; Mouritzen & Svara, 2002). 
In the new institutional perspective institutions are not automatically equated with 
political organizations anymore. They are rather conceived as the rules of the game which 
direct individual actors in their behaviour (Lowndes, 2010). These rules may refer to 
formal arrangements (e.g. the rules laid down in laws) as well as informal ones. Yet we 
cannot interpret the latter too vaguely. Not every social fact is an institution or a(n) 
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(informal) rule. Lowndes (2010: 73-74) adopts the concept standard operating 
procedures, proposed by Hall, to define the informal institutional rules of the game. 
Standard operating procedures are more than personal habits or rules of thumb. They 
bear three basic characteristics: (a) they are specific to a particular context, (b) the actors 
within this context also recognize them in such a way and (c) they are tangible for the 
researcher9. 
Thus, if we seek to understand the role and position of Belgian local councillors in 
practice, we must scrutinize the informal rules of the game that fit in this frame, in 
addition to the formal rules of Belgian local politics and its overarching opportunity 
structure. The remainder of the section discusses (the interplay of) these elements. 
 
1.2.2. Councillors’ formal role and position in the local system 
We start the construction of our research problem with an overview of the formal 
conception of the role and position of the councillors in the Belgian local system. This 
theoretical basis consists of five steps: (a) first, we conceptualize the political system and 
its functions in general; (b) then, we interpret the surplus of the local system; (c) third, we 
turn to the classic orthodoxy on councillors’ role and position as central actors in this 
system; (d) fourth, we specify the Belgian setting. The final part of the section (e) 
concludes the argument in a quote and symbolic example. 
 
(a) The political system: conceptual framework and functions 
At least formally, councillors are key actors in the political system on the local level. To 
grasp the substance and relevance of their place in, and contribution to this system as 
individual actors (i.e. the micro-level), we must therefore first understand how this 
system generally works (i.e. the macro-level). This is the purpose of the section. Besides, 
the theoretical framework will not only help us to frame and interpret our research 
problem, but it will also introduce many concepts that will be used throughout the study. 
A standard general theory of the political system has been developed by David Easton 
(Frankfort-Nachmias & Nachmias, 1996; Heywood, 2002; Devos, 2006a; Caramani, 
2011). Easton’s theory is conceived as a conceptual model or framework to empirically 
                                                             
9 Another pertinent distinction that encapsulates the difference between formal and informal rules is 
Ostrom’s distinction between rules in form and rules in use (Lowndes, 2010). 
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analyze the political world (Deschouwer, 1993)10. Caramani (2011: 10) states that the 
concepts of the model have been generally accepted and widely applied in political 
research, insofar as they tend to be used even “beyond quotation” now. The main merit of 
Easton’s conceptual framework is that it allows the inclusion of all the actors and 
processes of a political system. Researchers may consequently rely on the model to 
consider and encompass many aspects of the political world in any given context (e.g. 
governments and institutions, processes of interaction, socialization, culture, 
communication, etc.; Heywood, 2002; Devos, 2006a; Caramani, 2011). This also suits 
our new institutional research approach that will focus on formal rules as well as informal 
ones in the broader opportunity structure of the Belgian system. Therefore, we apply the 
basic concepts and line of reasoning of Easton’s model as building blocks to underpin the 
arguments and analyses of our study. 
Easton sees the political system as a structured set of agencies and institutions that have 
the decisive task of converting public demands and support (i.e. input) from the 
environment into the “collective and authoritative allocation of values” (i.e. output in the 
form of public policy). In doing so, the institutions and agencies shape their environment 
through the policy outputs in a feedback loop (Caramani, 2011; see Figure 1.1). 
The central question that Easton addresses in his system theory asks how political 
systems survive (Deschouwer, 1993). In practice, the author contends, this is assured via 
a dynamic political process which consists of a series of interconnected actions. We will 
discuss the basic proceeding of this process below (based on Deschouwer, 1993; also 
Miller, 1971; Devos, 2006a)11. The process is often triggered by a disturbance in the 
environment in which the system is embedded. This causes stress when the disturbance 
inhibits the system from reaching binding decisions (i.e. allocate the values) and/or 
securing that those decisions are accepted as binding (i.e. do this in an authoritative way). 
The solution for the political system is to respond to the stress by adapting itself. 
Obviously, stress has to be communicated to the actors in the political system first. This 
input may take two basic forms: political demands and support. On one hand, stress is 
conveyed to the system through increasing demands (i.e. the idea that the authority 
should make binding decisions concerning a given problem). These may derive from 
actors in the environment of the system, as well as actors within the political system (i.e. 
withinputs). More specifically, the concept demands is used as an umbrella for all wishes 
(as varied as expectations, public opinion, motivations, interests, preferences and 
                                                             
10 A conceptual framework is appropriate for systematic empirical inquiry because it portrays political 
behaviour and presents explanations and predictions for empirical observations on a large scale 
(Frankfort-Nachmias & Nachmias, 1996). 
11 Easton acknowledges that in practice, many of the concepts, interactions and processes overlap and 
intermingle. However, they are analytically distinct (Deschouwer, 1993). 
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ideologies) that are expressed so that they would be fulfilled by political action. Demands 
cause stress (i.e. demand overload) if they are too numerous (i.e. volume overload) or 
time-demanding (i.e. content overload) to be converted by the (available resources of the) 
system in policy decisions (i.e. output failure). Additionally, unfulfilled demands may 
cause stress by reducing support for the system. 
On the other hand, the system picks up stress through a decline in public support, either 
actively (i.e. visible activities) or passively (i.e. attitudes). This support can be specific or 
diffuse. Specific support results directly and visibly from the policy outputs that meet 
foregoing political demands. Diffuse support is less concrete and tangible. It implies an 
abstract sense of agreement with, or positive attitude towards the outputs. Such support is 
possibly directed at three components of the political system: the political community, the 
regime and the authorities. The political community qualifies as a group of people 
defined by the participation in a structured series of political processes. The regime 
encompasses the values and principles of the system, the daily formal and informal rules 
of the game and the authority structure. The authorities are identified as the actors who 
fulfil the authority roles. A decline in support for (some parts) of the system usually 
stems from output failure. The latter may occur when the system does not meet the 
expressed demands at all, when it does not anticipate future demands and/or when it does 
not fulfil the demands adequately. 
The adaptive value of the political system consists mainly of its capacity to develop 
mechanisms that resolve the possible causes of stress outlined above. First, the system 
might seek to resolve the demand overload. A possible solution is to regulate the 
conversion of wishes into concrete political demands by structural and cultural 
mechanisms. The former refer to the formal rules and structural role differentiations, 
which enable some actors (e.g. political parties, councillors, interest groups, opinion 
leaders, etc.) to play the role of a gatekeeper who regulates the input in the political 
system. The latter are informal norms, attitudes and orientations of the system which 
determine how these mechanisms operate. Furthermore in practice, the demands are often 
collected and combined whilst flowing in the system through organized information 
channels. 
Second, the system can turn to three fundamental mechanisms to increase support. It can 
generate more specific support through concrete policy outputs that fulfil the matching 
needs on the input side of the system. The system may also try to generate diffuse support 
over the long haul by strengthening the bonds with the political community, emphasize 
the general interest over particular needs and enhance the belief in its legitimacy12. 
                                                             
12 Legitimacy may have an ideological source (i.e. operational ideals and values), a structural source (i.e. 
the roles and functioning of the system) and a personal source (i.e. the person who holds the office). 
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Finally in the last resort, the system can use coercion and/or introduce structural changes 
(e.g. via jurisprudence, regime norms, etc.) as a means to increase support.  
In sum, the response of the system consists of producing different outputs directed at the 
world inside and outside the political system. As such, the outputs react on stress from 
the environment while aiming to impact on the environment on the turn. Outputs exist in 
four forms: binding verbal outputs (e.g. laws), binding tangible or intangible activities 
(e.g. services such as roads, order and safety), associated verbal outputs (e.g. speeches) 
and associated activities (e.g. flanking facilities). 
Finally, the way in which the outputs affect the political system is depicted by the 
concept feedback loop. The outputs and their specific outcomes are not the final point of 
the political process, but impact on the environment as well. Consequently, the members 
of the political system respond to these stimuli by changing their demands and/or support. 
The latter then flows back into the political system through communication. The last step 
is that the political system may (or may not) react to this feedback with new output. In 
this way, the feedback loop illustrates the continuous process of adaptation by tuning the 
policy outputs in line with inputs from society. 
 
Figure 1.1. Easton’s conceptual framework of the political system 
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In short, the political system thus converts input from society into output for society. It 
picks up the needs and demands from the citizens to act and decide on policies that are 
offered to fulfil citizens’ needs and demands, hence generating public support. 
Consequently, the political system is widely judged by the extent to which it succeeds in 
fulfilling both functions in the Western world (Scharpf, 1999; Vetter & Kersting, 2003a; 
Steyvers et al., 2006). The criteria used to evaluate these functions can be derived from 
the global definition of democracy as “government of the people, by the people, and for 
the people” (Heywood, 2002: 68). The input function of the political system represents 
the idea of government by the people (Scharpf, 1999). It is fulfilled when public choices 
reflect the preferences of society. Such responsiveness is underpinned and evaluated by 
the integration and participation of citizens in the political process (Vetter & Kersting, 
2003a). Simultaneously at the other end of the system, the output function represents the 
idea of government for the people (Scharpf, 1999). The implementation of this function is 
connected to the effective promotion of welfare in society. This perspective is supported 
and evaluated by the criteria of efficiency and effectiveness (Vetter & Kersting, 2003a). 
Finally, some authors also refer to the throughput function of the system as a third and 
complementary perspective (Haus & Heinelt, 2005; Bekkers & Edwards, 2007). This 
perspective focuses on the quality of the rules that structure the process of decision-
making. It is based and evaluated in terms of transparency and accountability. As such, 
this function may indicate how government of the people should be organized. It focuses 
on what happens inside the political system when translating citizen input into policy 
output. 
 
(b) The surplus of the local system 
Essentially, the political system at the local level has the same structure as the political 
system at other government levels (Judge, 1999; John 2006). When it comes to 
optimizing the input and the output function, many researchers, following the ideas of 
Mill, even underline the specific surplus of the local system (Stoker, 1996; Andrew & 
Goldsmith, 1998; Steyvers et al., 2006, 2007 and 2008b). This surplus essentially 
emanates from its position as the closest political level to the citizens (Judge, 1999; John, 
2001; Vetter & Kersting, 2003b; Steyvers et al., 2006)13. 
Regarding the democratic earmark on the input side, scholars claim that the room for 
participation and education of citizens in the political process is particularly vibrant at the 
local level (Sharpe, 1970; Stoker, 1996; De Rynck & Bouckaert, 2000). The former 
aspect implies that citizens face a lower threshold to enter politics actively and/or contact 
politicians and influence policies which have a direct impact on their lives more passively 
                                                             
13 This idea is commonly framed as the grass roots notion of democracy (Caulfield & Larsen, 2002). 
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(Phillips, 1996; Boogers, 2007). The latter holds that the local arena allows citizens to 
comprehend the system and develop political skills on a smaller scale (Boogers, 2007; 
Steyvers, 2010a). In the same line of thinking, local democracy is often used as a 
laboratory to test new democratic practices – as the need for renovation tends to come to 
the surface at the local level first (Maes, 1997; Vetter & Kersting, 2003b; Pilet et al., 
2005; Boogers, 2007). 
In addition to this surplus on the input side of the system, it is argued that the local 
system holds the capacity to deliver public services more efficiently and effectively on 
the output side as well (Sharpe, 1970; Stoker, 1996; De Rynck & Bouckaert, 2000). 
Indeed, the local system can rely on local capacity (i.e. the multifunctional and 
integrative character of local government), local knowledge (i.e. detecting local needs 
and problems) and local interests (i.e. the optimal territorial bond between the profits of 
public services, the taxes paid for it and the accountability afterwards) to produce optimal 
public services (Steyvers, 2010a)14. 
 
(c) Councillors’ role and position in the local system: the classic orthodoxy 
Now that we have outlined the theoretical functions and proceedings of the political 
system as the frame of our research on the macro-level, as well as the specific surplus of 
the local system, we can go on to specify the role and position of the local councillors as 
central actors of this system on the micro-level. In Easton’s conceptual model, it is 
mainly the political regime of the system that formally determines the behaviour of the 
actors (i.e. authorities) in it. This regime is installed to govern over the community. It 
includes the systems’ (a) general values and principles, (b) formal and informal rules of 
the game and (c) authority structure (Deschouwer, 1993). 
The general values and principles of the system demarcate the domain of the public 
debate and the broad contours of its policies. Most Western countries organize their local 
system on the base of representative democracy and its corresponding principles 
(Mouritzen & Svara, 2002; Haus & Sweeting, 2006a and 2006b; Steyvers et al., 2007; De 
Groot et al., 2010)15. They believe that the interests of the community are served best via 
                                                             
14 A third surplus of the local system is termed in the concepts pluralism and liberty, later also framed as 
local autonomy (Sharpe, 1970; Stoker, 1996; De Rynck & Bouckaert, 2000; Caulfield & Larsen, 2002; 
Boogers, 2007; Steyvers, 2010a). This perspective emphasizes the value of the local system per se. 
According to Pratchett (2004), this value is threefold. First, it entails local freedom and discretion from 
central government. Second, local autonomy implies freedom to tailor policies to the specific local needs. 
Finally from a bottom-up perspective, local autonomy refers more generally to “the capacity to define and 
express local identity through political activity” (Pratchett, 2004: 366). 
15 Hendriks (2002) even argues that many authors consider the institutionalization of representative 
democracy as one of the major accomplishments of Western culture. 
GENERAL INTRODUCTION  |  35 
 
the transfer of authority to a selection of elected representatives. These representatives 
debate and decide on the public cause in the name of the local community. 
The representative model is founded on free and frequent competitive elections. Via such 
elections citizens authorize and mandate a selection of their peers to run the political 
system on their behalf (Stewart, 1991; Beetham, 1996). The principle of political equality 
guarantees that each citizen has an equal voice in this process, as well as the same 
(formal) chance to participate in it (Beetham, 1996; Larsen, 2005). At the local level, 
equality is expressed by the ideal-typical principle of the layman rule, i.e. the active and 
intensive involvement of elected citizens in the process of decision-making (Mouritzen & 
Svara, 2002). Accordingly, the ideal-typical image of the local councillor is that of the 
amateur, part-time politician who devotes him/herself to the higher public cause (Berg & 
Rao, 2005; Larsen, 2005; Steyvers et al., 2007). This principle entails that the council 
should not become a genuine class of professional politicians who need specific skills or 
competences (Larsen, 2005). Rather, it should consist of common, average citizens who 
remain embedded in, and consequently in touch with, local society (Steen & Wille, 2005; 
Boogers, 2007; Pruim, 2010). 
On the basis of these values and principles the system is further shaped by formal and 
informal rules which determine how the actors (may, or should) behave in the political 
system (Deschouwer, 1993). The typical conception of the local system consists of a 
political component (i.e. local government) and an administrative component (i.e. the 
municipal officers). The councillors comprise the central institution of the political 
component: the local council. In their capacity as elected representatives, councillors are 
responsible for local governments’ capacity to express local voice and exercise local 
choice (Stewart, 1991). This entails that they are not just the main products, but also the 
main producers of democracy (Cotta & Best, 2000). 
The role of councillors is thus twofold (Denters & De Jong, 1992; Hansen, 2001; 
Mouritzen & Svara, 2002; Tops & Zouridis, 2002; Berg & Rao, 2005)16. The first aspect 
implies that they should link the interests and opinions of citizens to local government. 
What this boils down to in practice is that councillors pick up needs and demands from 
society, consider them from different perspectives, weigh up the pros and cons of each 
perspective and aggregate them in the optimal policy compromise (Hansen, 2001). 
Hence, councillors’ first task refers to the input function of the political system. In 
addition to this external position on the border between society and the political 
institutions of the local system, councillors have an internal position inside the 
architecture of the political system (Cotta & Best, 2000). This position refers to 
                                                             
16 The formal rules do not distinguish between councillors on the individual plan (Dezeure & De Rynck, 
2010). Ideal-typically, every councillor should thus contribute to the basic tasks of the council (Stewart, 
1991). This equality is ultimately reflected by the equal weight of councillors’ votes (Hansen, 2005). 
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councillors’ task of running the municipality. It implies that councillors should give 
direction to the municipality as an entity of public service delivery (Denters & De Jong, 
1992; Hansen, 2001). To this end councillors determine the main goals of municipal 
policy and control their implementation afterwards (De Rynck, 2000; Steen & Wille, 
2005; Boogers, 2007). As such, councillors substantiate the output function of the 
political system as well17. 
Finally, councillors’ position in the system stems from the authority structure, i.e. the 
differentiation and corresponding power and responsibility of the actors (Deschouwer, 
1993). With regard to this position, the traditional orthodoxy envisages the local council 
as the pivot of a clearly defined authority structure and role differentiation. It derives 
from what Dearlove called the electoral chain of command in representative democracy 
(Denters, 2005; Denters & Rose, 2005; Steyvers et al., 2007; De Groot et al., 2010; see 
Figure 1.2). Exactly because the council is the only directly elected institution in the 
system, it is placed at the top of the institutional pyramid of the regime, which is known 
as traditional local government (Stewart, 1991; Elzinga, 1998; Hendriks, 2002; Top & 
Zouridis, 2002; Steyvers et al., 2007). This position represents the notion of political 
primacy (De Rynck, 2002; Tops & Zouridis, 2002)18. Accordingly, local councillors form 
the starting point and the core of traditional representative democracy (Stewart, 1991; 
Pratchett & Wilson, 1996; Elzinga, 1998). In such a system, “councillors – as popular 
representatives – are primarily responsible for translating local inputs (needs and 
demands) into authoritative decisions” (Denters, 2005: 423). The council’s authoritative 
decisions are subsequently executed by the executive leaders and the local officers (i.e. 
the municipal administration), who run the municipal system of in-house service 
provision as complementary authorities in the system. 
 
  
                                                             
17 The combination of the input function and output function via representation, policy-making and 
control is characteristic of any legislature in the political world (Kreppel, 2011). 
18 Klijn and Skelcher (2007: 590) define political primacy as the principle which “accords ultimate 
decision-making authority to elected politicians within a system of democracy.” 
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Figure 1.2. The traditional model of representative democracy 
 
(Denters, 2005: 423) 
 
In practice, however, the municipal council does not operate in a monolithic way as it 
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possibly diversify this general image. For instance, like any other assembly the council 
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diversification allows councillors to specialize, gain expertise and focus in-depth on 
policy issues they are interested in and/or familiar with (Heywood, 2002). Additionally, 
several gatekeepers can structure the relation between the citizens and the council in the 
political system (Deschouwer, 1993). The local community could set up interest groups 
who mandate their own representatives to transfer needs and demands into the system on 
their behalf. Media and pertinent public opinion makers can exert a similar impact. 
Yet undoubtedly, it is the political party that operates as the most influential gatekeeper 
in our Western democracies. Parties indeed are important intermediary channels between 
citizens and the political system (Putnam, 1976; Denters & Rose, 2005; Steyvers et al., 
2007). Their function in the process is threefold (Devos, 2006b). First, parties engage 
with citizens via communication (meanwhile legitimating and democratizing the system), 
socialization, integration and mobilization. Parties thus enhance the democratic process 
from the political system downwards to society, and from society upwards to the political 
system. Second, parties exert a policy-making function via interest articulation and 
aggregation, policy support and design, and the articulation of controversial standpoints. 
Lastly, parties have a positional function in deciding who will occupy the authoritative 
positions in the political system. This function entails the recruitment, selection and 
instruction of candidates in order to obtain power. Taken together, parties are thus 
important gatekeepers in the system. They channel the input from society to the political 
system while leaving their mark on policy outputs in the system alike. We should, 
therefore, also consider the party and the party groups in the council as an important 
authority and form of internal diversification in the council. 
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In summary, the council and the councillors are conceived as the engine of the political 
system in formal terms. This political system operates as an intricate set of relations and 
continuous interactions between multiple actors, which shape the political process each in 
its own capacity. As John (2006) indicates, these interactions and relations are not 
different from the national level. They basically run as follows: parties select candidates 
from between the citizens to hold office; a council of elected representative then debates 
the policy issues and takes policy decisions; these decisions are implemented by the 
executive structure and administered by the bureaucracy; in the meantime, interest groups 
seek to influence the decisions and citizens participate in the process; and finally, these 
citizens also consume the policy outputs. 
 
(d) Councillors’ role and position in the local system: the Belgian setting 
Also in Belgium, the political regime of the local system is formally organized on both 
the principles and derived practices of representative democracy (Pilet et al., 2005). This 
means that the local council is conceived as the supreme political body of local 
government from a formal and theoretical point of view (Ackaert, 2005; Plees, 2005). 
Since the council is the only directly elected institution in the local authority, it has the 
ultimate responsibility of fulfilling the municipalities’ core tasks as democratic base on 
the input side and first administration on the output side. The council is therefore 
empowered to “decide on all matters of local interest” and administer the delegated 
competences of general interest (Ackaert, 2005: 169). 
For this purpose, all council members should fulfil their basic role-set of representation, 
policy-making and control (De Rynck, 2000; Kalk & De Rynck, 2003; Steen & Wille, 
2005). Several instruments and provisions support the implementation of this role-set: 
public council meetings (at least ten times per year), the right to organize advisory 
boards, citizen consultation and other participatory devices, the right to convene the 
council and set the agenda, install standing committees, support party groups, plan 
strategic long-term policies and, ultimately, pass rules and regulations by majority vote, 
the right to pose oral and written questions, auditing, the right to inspect local 
administrative documents and visit municipal companies (Ackaert, 2005; Plees, 2005; 
Steen & Wille, 2005; see also Section 1.2.4). 
Furthermore, the council should steer and control the institutions of local government 
which are responsible for the municipal policy outputs. The first institution is the 
executive board (i.e. the Board of Mayor and Aldermen, BMA)19. This board is installed 
to prepare and implement the council decisions, run the daily operation of the 
                                                             
19 In Wallonia the executive board is called the Collège communal (municipal college). 
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municipality and execute competences delegated by the council (Steen & Wille, 2005). 
The BMA counts between 2 and 10 aldermen plus the mayor20. Aldermen are usually 
elected by the councillors amongst their members and distributed proportionally over the 
political majority in the council21. In Flanders and Brussels Capital, the mayor is 
(usually) nominated by the councillors amongst their members as well. He/she then has to 
be formally appointed by the central government afterwards. In Wallonia, the mayor is 
semi-directly elected (see also Section 1.2.4). In addition to the role as political leader of 
the majority, mayors hold some additional specific competences (e.g. ultimate 
responsibility for the local administration, policing, representative of central government) 
(Steyvers, 2010b). After their designation, the executive politicians retain their seats and 
votes in the council, the committees and the party group. This practice reflects the 
monistic conception of Belgian local government. Monism implies that executive power 
derives from the council, placing the executive board in a subordinate position in relation 
to the council (Elzinga, 1998; Wayenberg et al., 2010; see also Section 1.2.3). 
The local administration tails the political process in the municipality. The administration 
consists of several institutions that are formally appointed and evaluated by the council. 
In its daily operation, the administration is steered by the executive board. The municipal 
secretary or CEO is the most important and influential figure in the administration 
(Ackaert, 2005). He/she forms the link between the political and administrative branch of 
local government. The task package of the CEO is extensive: he/she leads and 
coordinates the different administrative departments, is policy advisor and the 
municipality’s notary (Steyvers & Bruneel, 2010). Another important figure in the 
municipal administration is the treasurer or financial director. He/she holds the official 
responsibility for the financial management of the municipality (Plees, 2005). In 
Flanders, every municipality is further obliged to install a management team or MAT 
(Steyvers & Bruneel, 2010). The MAT consists of the municipal CEO (who chairs the 
meeting) and the financial director plus some heads of department22. Its main goal is to 
promote the co-operation between the departments of the municipal administration in 
terms of policy preparation, implementation and evaluation. Furthermore, it watches the 
unity, quality and functioning of the municipal services, as well as the internal 
communication (Steyvers & Bruneel, 2010). Finally, the municipal administration counts 
professionally staffed departments that are responsible to carry out specific tasks of the 
municipality’s in-house service provision (Plees, 2005; Steyvers & Bruneel, 2010).  
                                                             
20 Except for the larger cities, the aldermen and mayors function as part-time politicians (Ackaert, 2005). 
21 The BMA usually meets on a weekly basis and is chaired by the mayor. Formally, aldermen have no 
individual competences and all decisions are taken collectively in the collegiate body (Mouritzen & 
Svara, 2002; Plees, 2005; Wayenberg et al., 2010). The president of the public social services centre is 
incorporated in the BMA as well. 
22 The mayor may be incorporated in the MAT as well, albeit without decisive voting right. 
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(e) Summary 
The overview of the formal/theoretical organization of the Belgian system suggests that 
the local councillors hold a dominant position in the political system (see also Mouritzen 
& Svara, 2002; Ackaert, 2005; Plees, 2005; Steen & Wille, 2005). As elected citizens, 
councillors thereby link the local community to the local authority. Simultaneously, they 
run the local system from the inside. Given this key role and position, we can nominate 
Belgian local councillors as the foundation of local democracy. The symbolic example 
in Box 1.2 and the following quotes synthesize this claim: 
“(...) political activity at the outset is essentially a layman activity. The 
essence of democratic rule is that authority emanates from the people: from 
the citizens of a polity” (Larsen, 2005: 196). Accordingly, “councillors, as 
elected representatives, have a potentially rich and invigorating local 
contribution to make. (...) The role is a fundamental pillar of local 
government and democracy” (Stewart, 1991: 26). In doing so, “the council 
is responsible for anything that happens in the authority and all councillors 
share in that responsibility” (Stewart, 1991: 30). 
 
Box 1.2. The Kokpit: the role and position of Belgian local councillors epitomized 
The council chamber of Koksijde, a Flemish municipality by the coast, is portrayed on 
the cover of this book. This chamber is the showpiece of the new prestigious town hall 
that was built in 2007. We selected this picture because the concept of the building aptly 
represents the value of local government, as well as the role and position of local 
councillors within. The town hall consists of two rectangular wings that are connected by 
an atrium. Most offices of the municipal administration are located in the wings. The 
outside of the entire building is constructed in glass to underline the transparency and 
enhance the accessibility of local government. In front of the town hall is a square that 
can be used for public events. 
The council chamber is located in the atrium between the wings, near the administration 
whilst keeping an open view on the municipality and the public square. Its elliptic 
construction is called the Kokpit. This name not only refers to the municipality Koksijde 
per se, but also to the cockpit of the helicopters for which Koksijde is well-known, as 
well as the arena in which the old cockfights were held. Accordingly, the Kokpit 
epitomizes the ideal-typical role and position of local councillors in their municipality. 
Councillors link the locality to the administration. Meanwhile, they are steering their 
municipality, shaping local policies in an open and lively public debate. 
(Het Nieuwsblad, 2007; http://inwoner.koksijde.be; http://www.sigma.be)  
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1.2.3. A role and position under strain 
However, there is a fair chance that people who are familiar with the daily routines of 
Belgian local government would not recognize or interpret the political system as it has 
been outlined in formal terms above. In terms of Easton’s conceptual framework and the 
new institutional perspective, the main reason for this would be that there are some 
disturbances in the political system propelled by three sources of stress. In ascending 
order of scope, these sources of stress are: (a) an ingrained obstacle in the specific 
councillor office in the political system, (b) typical informal rules of the game in the 
aggregated Belgian setting, and (c) recent evolutions in the overarching environment or 
opportunity structure of the local system in general. Arguably, all these elements could 
challenge the ideal-typical role and position of the local councillor in Belgium. We will 
discuss them below, before summarizing the arguments in a quote and (symbolic) 
example (d). 
 
(a) The ingrained ‘obstacle’: councillors’ enduring dilemma dances 
The first disturbance in the system that we wish to address is an inherent obstacle in the 
councillor office. The essence of the obstacle derives from what Goldsmith (1996: 174) 
phrased “the fundamental dichotomy involved in reconciling the competing claims of 
local government to be both democratic and efficient.” Indeed, the enduring challenge for 
a political system to perform and optimize its input and output function poses a 
democratic dilemma for government (Dahl, 1994; Judge, 1999). Since local councillors 
are the system’s key actors in charge of implementing policy input and output, they have 
to find the appropriate balance between (the different aspects of) their roles as a result. 
The difficulties that this quest brings about have been aptly described by Tops and 
Zouridis (2002) as councillors’ enduring dilemma dances. These dilemma dances are 
caused by the formal and informal rules of their office. They compel councillors to make 
constant choices on how to fulfil their office. 
Councillors’ most basic dilemma dance concerns their double role as a link between 
citizens and government (i.e. the input role) on the one hand, and governor of local affairs 
(i.e. the output role) on the other hand (Tops & Zouridis, 2002; see also Figure 1.3)23. 
Some councillors prefer to commit themselves to mainly governing their municipality 
from the inside (i.e. emphasizing the output role). Above all, they are interested in setting 
                                                             
23 Kalk and De Rynck (2003) have explained this dilemma dance with a metaphor on local councillors in 
the Netherlands and Flanders during the 1990s: ‘Dutch councillors are mainly stuck with their noses in 
dossiers at the city hall. Flemish councillors, on the other hand, are stuck in the local bar, preoccupied 
with their system of clientelism. While Dutch councillors should mingle more with the local community, 
Flemish councillors should turn up more in the city hall.’ 
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the main goals of local policy, understand policy dossiers and follow them throughout the 
policy cycle. The main advantage is that such councillors know the procedures of 
municipal policy-making and create stability and trust. They advocate good governance, 
are trustworthy, intelligent and consequent. For that reason governors receive much 
respect from the municipal administration. Yet on the other hand, if these councillors put 
too much emphasis on government and its procedures and bureaucratic rules, they might 
lose affinity with the general interest of society and loose public support. In the eyes of 
the citizens, these councillors have become true bureaucrats. 
On the other hand, some councillors champion their role as representative of the citizens 
in the locality (i.e. emphasizing the input role). The main quality of these councillors is 
that they connect the issues that are on people’s minds to the established world of 
government. Rather than striving for personal success, these representatives support local 
initiatives and bring them to the attention (and on the agenda) of the political world. 
Accordingly, such representatives are appreciated as familiar councillors by the citizens. 
However, when they have too many difficulties in dealing with the bureaucracy, and fail 
to translate the public signals in concrete policy terms, such representatives are often 
discarded as mere populists that cause output failures. 
 
Figure 1.3. Councillors’ dilemma dance between representation and governing 
Dilemma Representation Governing 
Positive familiar councillor good governance 
Negative populist bureaucrat 
(Tops & Zouridis, 2002: 62) 
 
Other dilemma dances complement the above (based on Tops & Zouridis, 2002). For 
instance: which interests should a local councillor hold in mind, and subsequently pursue, 
with his or her actions? Some councillors have a political profile for the most part, while 
others lean more towards the general interest of the locality as a whole. The former group 
is mainly driven by its ideological belief, which often fits in with a particular political 
party. The party then functions as a gatekeeper that assembles, produces and directs 
demands into the system. In the council, such councillors fiercely defend their political 
vision in debates and interpellations. Yet some might feel that these councillors lack a 
broader scope on the needs of the locality. In other words, the political gatekeepers have 
narrowed down the input of demands into the system too much. The opposite group of 
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councillors feel that a councillor is elected to serve the public cause in all its facets. 
Therefore, such councillors always have the locality’s general interest in mind. On the 
other hand, these a-political councillors might come across as rather colourless or 
undecided. 
Another dilemma dance relates more to the way in which councillors fulfil their mandate. 
Some take a voluntaristic approach to it. They run the municipality top-down, following 
and implementing their political vision from above. People know what these directive 
councillors stand for. On the other hand, such councillors might be quite narrow-minded 
and tiresome. The opposite type of councillor governs in co-production with the citizens. 
In doing so, he or she generates public support and engagement. The process of decision-
making may even be more important than the final outcome for him/her. The downside of 
this approach is that coproduction might lead to mediocrity, since it could hinder arriving 
at strong and visionary decisions24. 
Two further dilemma dances follow from the organization of the local council on the 
internal plan. The first concerns the style of the executive board. This board might work 
open and relaxed. Its executives are accessible for the other councillors, who are allowed 
to make a real contribution towards governing the municipality. On the downside, some 
would blame such a board for its lack of authority. The contrasting executive board holds 
true governmental power. This has the advantage of clarity and, often, effectiveness: 
people notice that things are moving in the city hall. Still for many, such a style might 
evoke the image of arrogance of power. The second internal dilemma dance relates to the 
style of the opposition in the council. On one hand, councillors from the opposition have 
a duty to oppose the political majority. However on the other hand, councillors from the 
opposition can work constructively during the course of policy-making as well. The 
advantage of the former style is that the councillors can keep the majority in check and 
alert. Yet likewise, it might invoke rigidity because some governments could become 
afraid of launching any substantial policy proposals in the future. The advantage of the 
latter style is that opposition councillors give a valued contribution to local government. 
Still if they fail to oppose the majority, such councillors might come across as ineffective 
in practice25. 
  
                                                             
24 Obviously, the first group will often launch withinputs. The opposite group more strictly conveys 
community input, preferably with further active involvement of citizens in this process too. 
25 A sixth dilemma dance crosscuts the other ones. It concerns the information whereupon councillors 
base their council work (Tops & Zouridis, 2002). At one extreme, councillors may use documents from 
the administration: these are rational and substantive, but might be too bureaucratic. At the other extreme, 
councillors can rely on information received from citizens: this information is relevant and true to life, but 
might be too emotional. 
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Following from the above discussion, it is clear that no textbook definition exists on how 
to be the best local councillor possible. In an ideal world, councillors would maximize 
both components of each dilemma. The councillor-in-office, however, is confronted with 
all sorts of interests, pressures, roles and tasks that force him or her to constantly make 
the most appropriate choice. Meanwhile, each choice has its pros and cons. In the most 
practical world, therefore, councillors should probably strive to find an equilibrium 
between the extremes of each dilemma. They might do this either personally or as an 
organized institution (e.g. the council as a whole, the party group). Depending on their 
personal preferences and capacities, but also the environment, councillors thus have to 
find the optimal solution for their enduring dilemma dances in office. 
 
(b) Belgian politics: the ‘informal rules of the game’ 
A second possible source of stress for Belgian local councillors derives from two typical 
informal rules of the game (see Fiers, 2006). By impinging on councillors’ position, it is 
claimed that these rules have altered the authority structure in the local authority from far 
back in history. And as a further result, councillors’ political primacy has been called into 
question on a regular basis (De Rynck, 2002; Wayenberg et al., 2010). 
The first example is the strong culture of party loyalty and discipline at the local level 
(Ackaert, 2005; also De Rynck, 2002; Steen & Wille, 2005; Wayenberg et al., 2010). In 
the foregoing theoretical framework we have indicated that the political system is largely 
structured by political parties as gatekeepers or intermediary channels who exert various 
functions in the local system. Parties may also have dysfunctions, however (Dewachter in 
Devos 2006b). The most important dysfunction in the context of our study is the 
(overwhelming degree of) politicizing or partitocratizing26. This concept denotes the 
excessive penetration of political parties in all segments of society, to the extent that 
these parties have become the dominant institutions in the system. 
The Belgian political system is widely considered as a true party government, party-
archy or partitocracy (Devos, 2006b; De Winter & Dumont, 2006; Van Haute et al., 
2012). In this system parties have a strong (and often decisive) voice in the political 
process (Dewachter, 2003; De Winter & Dumont, 2006). They dominate every link of the 
typical electoral chain of delegation/command, reducing the impact of the other actors 
such as the legislature and single politicians (De Winter & Dumont, 2006)27. According 
                                                             
26 The other dysfunctions are: the disintegration of society through the opposition of parties and their 
supporters, the reduction of pluralism, the rigidity of social development and the development of 
oligarchic party leaders (Dewachter in Devos 2006b). 
27 The authors see many causes of councillors’ subordination to the party: a lack of resources for single 
councillors (e.g. staff, offices), the liability to the coalition agreement, voting discipline, the legislative 
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to De Winter and Dumont (2006), excessive party dominance also furthers a decline in 
the system’s legitimacy and governability – i.e. eroding the input and output 
functionality. And in spite of the distinctive nature of party politics in the municipality 
(see e.g. Boogers, 2007; Steyvers et al., 2008b), the essence of party government is thus 
also claimed to be reproduced at the local level. This means that councillors mainly have 
to obey the orders imposed from above, be it the council’s party group or the party 
organization on the outside (Steyvers et al., 2010). Arguably, such an informal rule 
stresses councillors’ formal role and position in the system. 
The second ubiquitous informal rule is the inverted power relation between the 
legislative branch and the executive branch in Belgian (local) government28. The formal 
authority structure of the Belgian system rests on a monistic base. It states that the 
council should instigate the policy process whilst holding the BMA to account for the 
implementation of its decisions and policy choices. Practice, however, is said to work 
exactly the other way around as the executives impose their dictates upon the council 
(Steen & Wille, 2005). The only remaining function of the councillors is then to ritually 
criticize or legitimize decisions that have already been taken elsewhere and beforehand 
(Reynaert et al., 2010; also De Rynck, 2002; Ackaert, 2005; De Rynck & Wayenberg, 
2010; Steyvers et al., 2010). As such, the Belgian local system could qualify more as 
inverted monism in practice (Bakker et al., 1999; Wayenberg et al., 2010; see also Box 
1.3)29. Several reasons might underpin this executive dominance: the weekly contacts in 
the inner circle of the BMA, its information edge over the council, the better statute and 
salary of the executives, their stronger position in the party (because executives are often 
the candidates who received most personal votes in the election), the personal portfolios 
that aldermen manage despite the collegiate conception of the BMA, the council’s lack of 
organization, etc. (De Rynck, 2002; Ackaert, 2005; Steen & Wille, 2005; Steyvers et al., 
2010; Wayenberg et al., 2010)30.  
                                                                                                                                                                                                    
dominance of the executive, the possibility to impose sanctions on rebellions (e.g. warning, expulsion 
from the party group, etc.). 
28 On this subject, the Belgian system seems to deviate from the general trend discerned by Best and Cotta 
in their comparative study on recruitment in eleven European countries over 150 years (2000: 15): 
“During the period examined, parliaments have generally moved from a position of limited influence 
upon the legitimization and recruitment of the governments to a position of dominance.” 
29 This situation is an example of how councillors’ dilemma dance regarding the style of the executive 
board can be settled disproportionately in favour of strong governance. 
30 Several models reflect the relation between the executive and legislative branch of local government 
(Steyvers & Bruneel, 2010). First, there is the legal/formal board or secretary model, in which the 
(collegiate) executive board steers the secretary. The latter directs the heads of department. The model is 
in practice overshadowed by the alderman model, however, in which aldermen (i.e. executive councillors) 
directly steer and dominate the heads of department. The CEO operates as information channel between 
the executive board and the administration. Finally, there is a department heads or management team 
model, in which the (collective) group of heads of department (led by the CEO) directly interacts with the 
(collective) executive board – this model is for instance pursued by the Flemish Municipal Decree. 
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Box 1.3. Monism versus dualism 
The relation between the executive and the legislative body is often termed by the 
concepts monism and dualism. Bakker et al. (1999) and Elzinga (1998) propose the 
following constitutional/legal definitions when focussing on the government system: 
Monism: (a) the competences of the executive body are mainly or entirely derived from 
the competences of the legislative body; (b) moreover, the members of the executive 
body are all or mainly appointed by the representative body and remain members of the 
latter (Bakker et al., 1999: 20). Hence in this system, (c) the local council holds the 
political primacy whilst steering and controlling the executive and the administration 
(Elzinga, 1998). 
Dualism: (a) the executive and legislative body have their own competences assigned by 
law; (b) the members of the executive board are not part of the legislative body; and the 
members of the executive body may derive legitimacy from the legislative body or the 
voters separately (Bakker et al., 1999: 20). In this system, (c) the council’s ultimate 
primacy over the executive makes way for coordination (Elzinga, 1998). 
Still the authors acknowledge that local systems seldom correspond to these archetypes 
completely. Steen and Wille (2005), for instance, consider the Belgian system as a fusion 
of personnel monism and functional dualism (i.e. combining part (b) and (c) of the 
monism definition with part (a) of the dualism definition). Yet even these concepts do not 
entirely cover the complex reality. Indeed, the fact that the council holds a general 
competence actually represents the monistic conception of local government functions. 
On the other hand, the rule that the mayor still has to be formally appointed by central 
government in Flanders and Brussels Capital, whilst being semi-directly elected by the 
citizens in Wallonia, reflects a dualistic nuance in personnel terms (e.g. Elzinga, 1998). 
Besides, the informal practice does not always aligns with the formal theory (Elzinga, 
1998). We might therefore also use the concepts monism and dualism to denote the 
government style (Bakker et al., 1999). As a complement to the pure monistic and 
dualistic style, the authors thereby discern reversed monism as a possible third way. This 
concept implies that councillors barely succeed in initiating local policies or exerting 
power, even though the system is designed to be monistic. Councillors are instead 
subordinate to the aldermen, who develop policies autonomously in the executive board. 
Aldermen give feedback to the councillors in the party group, or at the very end of the 
policy process. Hence, they dominate councillors in the councils, in the committees and 
in the party groups (Bakker et al., 1999: 25). 
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(c) Evolutions in the local system’s ‘environment’ or ‘opportunity structure’ 
The third and final source of stress in our overview originates from the overarching 
environment or opportunity structure of the local system. In fact, it has been frequently 
reported that the latter has undergone several significant changes over the past decades. 
The disturbance caused by these changes has even created a brave new world for local 
government (Denters & Rose, 2005). We do not aim at presenting a full and detailed 
overview of all the changes. Rather, we purposively outline those elements that could 
produce stress on the political system, and consequently impact on the role and position 
of the local councillors. We have arranged them in two categories: stress caused by the 
relation of the councillors with the citizens and stress caused by councillors’ relations 
inside the political system (see also Tops & Zouridis, 2002). 
 
Stress caused by the relation between local councillors and citizens 
First, the modernization of the individual or collective citizenry is said to have drastically 
increased the demands on the political system (Denters & Rose, 2005). This 
modernization has a substantive and a formal side to it. The substantive side implies that 
citizens expect more and more from the political system when it comes to the 
performance of the local government services they rely on (i.e. a possible demand 
overload). The formal side signifies that the increased educational level and personal 
skills of the citizens lead them to search for active ways of participating in the political 
process beyond the passive act of voting (i.e. declining diffuse support for the principles 
of the political regime). As such, we might say that (the performance of) the traditional 
local system (i.e. local government and in-house service production) is questioned in 
terms of its core values of democracy and efficiency (Stoker, 1996). 
In response to citizens’ demand to enhance the input and output functionality of the 
system, the system has adapted itself by initiating a wave of political and administrative 
reforms (i.e. structural changes) (Caulfield & Larsen, 2002; Vetter & Kersting, 2003a; 
Steyvers et al., 2005 and 2006). This wave has gradually complemented the prevailing 
political regime with other values and principles, formal and informal rules and authority 
structures. Haus and Sweeting (2006a and 2006b) discern three major forms that 
constitute a hybrid constellation at the local level: user or market democracy, 
participatory democracy and network democracy. All these forms could stress 
councillors’ role and position in conveying public input into policy output to some extent. 
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• The primary goal of user/market democracy is to enhance local governments’ 
efficiency in producing policy outputs (Haus & Sweeting, 2006a and 2006b). To this 
end citizens are treated as customers and policies are accommodated in relation to 
their demands. Outputs are measured and practices/principles of New Public 
Management incorporated. Amongst the latter, we may think of privatization and 
contracting out of services, public-private partnerships, agencies for service delivery, 
management-oriented governance (e.g. role separation between the political and 
administrative sphere, complaint management, benchmarking), global budgeting, etc. 
(Caulfield & Larsen, 2002; Vetter & Kersting, 2003a; Goldsmith, 2006; Steyvers et 
al., 2006). 
 
• The participatory variant is above all directed at ameliorating political legitimacy on 
the input side of the system (Haus & Sweeting, 2006a and 2006b). It is built on the 
belief that decisions are taken more democratically when they evolve from 
deliberations between government and active citizens. A wide array of participatory 
devices has been installed: information and consultation procedures, local referenda, 
participatory budgeting, e-government, co-decision procedures, (semi-)direct election 
of mayors, etc. (Vetter & Kersting, 2003a; Steyvers et al., 2007). 
 
• Finally, network democracy aims at promoting the effectiveness of decision-making in 
complex and interdependent environments (Haus & Sweeting, 2006a and 2006b). 
This perspective stresses that in the modern world, traditional government, market 
mechanisms or citizens cannot solve problems on their own. Instead, these problems 
require the flexible involvement of all the organizations that possess or control the 
necessary resources. As a consequence, policy is shaped in networks of different 
(often influential) actors. 
Second, there is an acclaimed loss of diffuse support by the citizens for the current regime 
and authorities of the political system too (De Rynck, 2002)31. As formal key actors in 
this system, the councillors are clearly affected by such evolution. Many authors use the 
metaphor of the (widening) gap between citizens and politicians to depict this loss of 
support (Klijn & Koppenjan, 2000; Tops & Zouridis, 2002; Thomassen & Esaiasson, 
2006 in general; Deschouwer, 1998; Stouthuysen, 2002; Verlet et al., 2007; Wauters et 
al., 2010 for Belgium). Three indicators underscore the infamous gap: declining electoral 
turnout (the most active form of declining support), fading political trust (the most 
passive form of declining support) and waning party membership (Stouthuysen, 2002). 
We assess them in the Belgian context with a graph in Box 1.4. 
                                                             
31 Support for the political community as such, however, is still a typical benchmark of local democracy in 
Belgium. 
GENERAL INTRODUCTION  |  49 
 
• First, we address turnout in the local elections. It could be seen as a strong signal of 
distrust towards the political system if people forsake their basic right to vote (hence, 
participate in the system) (Deschouwer, 1998). Yet regarding turnout in the Belgian 
context, we have to consider the fact that compulsory voting is still in place. This 
system implies that turnout is mandatory, and citizens have to register in the official 
bureau on election day32. The effect of mandatory turnout could be compensated, 
however, by a higher degree of citizens who cast an invalid or blank vote 
(Deschouwer, 1998). Therefore, we add both categories of ‘no-voting’ in the graph. 
 
• Second, we consider the trust in the democratic system in general. Arguably the most 
abstract form, a decline in this type of trust could provide the strongest argument to 
uphold the idea of a gap between citizens and politics (Deschouwer, 1998). 
Systematic large-scale measurements on this matter have been carried out by the EU’s 
Euro-barometer since 1976 (Stouthuysen, 2002). Our graph presents the results from 
Belgium: i.e. the proportion of Belgian citizens who are very/fairly satisfied with the 
way democracy works in their country33. 
 
• Third, we examine the number of party members as a possible indicator of the gap 
between citizens and politicians. Political parties have always played an important 
role in the political system as intermediary channels between citizens and politics 
(Deschouwer, 1998; De Rynck, 2002; Denters & Rose, 2005; Van Haute et al., 2012). 
As we have noted above, this is particularly the case in Belgium, where parties are 
fundamental pillars and gatekeepers of the political regime. However the demise or 
decline of parties has been debated for some decades now. The point is then raised 
that parties fail to aggregate public opinions (i.e. input) and convert them into public 
policy output (Deschouwer, 1998; Denters & Rose, 2005). An indication for this 
decline is, amongst others, seen in the decrease in party membership34. This leads to a 
contradictory situation: while parties are becoming increasingly embedded in the 
state, their bond with society is assumed to deteriorate (Deschouwer, 1998; De Rynck, 
2002). Ultimately, this could lead to strong output failures. Our graph represents the 
indicator ‘party membership’ in the form of the ratio of members of all Belgian 
parties to the total electorate (i.e. M/E, adopted from Deschouwer, 1998; Van Haute et 
al., 2012).  
                                                             
32 Still citizens who do not go out to vote are seldom penalized in practice (Deschouwer, 1998). 
33 Unfortunately, the Euro-barometer did not address public satisfaction with local democracy explicitly. 
Yet scholars traditionally believe that political trust is higher at the local level (Ackaert, 1996; Wauters et 
al., 2010). A national study in 2006 underscored this claim (Van Roosbroek & Van de Walle, 2006). In a 
list of 15 institutions, the local institutions (i.e. the mayor, municipal administration and municipal 
council) all ranked in the top-5. 
34 Other indicators are the growing success of non-conformist actions groups, declining party 
identification and growing electoral volatility (Deschouwer, 1998). 
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Box 1.4. The (widening) gap between citizens and politics? 
To inspect the acclaimed gap between citizens and politics in Belgium, we present a 
graph comprising its three main indicators: ‘no-voting’ (i.e. the percentage of none 
participation plus invalid or blank votes in the local elections; data from Ackaert et al., 
2007); ‘satisfaction with (Belgian) democracy’ (i.e. the percentage of citizens who are 
fairly/very satisfied with Belgian democracy; data from Euro-barometer) and ‘party 
membership’ in Belgium (i.e. the ratio of the total number of party members to the 
electorate as a whole, M/E; data from Van Haute et al., 2012). We consider the figures 
for the local election years from 1976 to 2006 (or the closest measurement – depending 
on the available data). For each indicator we equate the figure of 1976 with the index 1. 
Thereafter, this figure is used as the reference point for the subsequent data. As such, we 
are able to observe the longitudinal evolution per indicator and compare the strength and 
direction of the evolution between the indicators. 
 
 First with regard to the percentage of no-voting, there seems to be an increase in the 
trend over the past decades. Still the absolute percentages are surely not alarming yet 
(evolving from 8.9% in 1976 to 11.7% in 2006) whilst the trend markedly declined in 
2006 as well. 
 Second, the graph does not hint at a growing distrust in the democratic system per 
se. Despite some fluctuations, the overall trend even seems to have gone upwards over 
the measured time. The absolute percentages are fairly reasonable as well (evolving from 
53% satisfaction in 1976 to 62% in 2004). 
 Third, the graph clearly demonstrates that party membership has decreased since the 
1990s, thereby following a general trend in Europe (Van Haute et al., 2012). Also in 
absolute numbers, the M/E-ratio has dropped strongly from 8.81 in 1977 to 5.06 in 2007. 
This decline is mostly felt in the traditional, established parties (Van Haute et al., 2012). 
 So generally, we do not find evidence for a systematic widening of the gap between 
citizens and politics over the past decades. As De Rynck (2002) and Stouthuysen (2002) 
argue, the legitimacy crisis appears to be mainly a crisis of the parties in Belgium. 
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Councillors’ stress inside the local system 
In addition to the stress caused by councillors’ external role as link between citizens and 
the political system, councillors are stressed by several factors inside the local authority. 
A first group of challenges stem from disturbances at the macro-level of the system. 
Denters and Rose (2005) single out urbanization, globalization and Europeanization as 
three general forces that have a significant impact. Urbanization refers to the growing 
number of citizens who come to reside in an urban or metropolitan environment. The 
interconnectedness of people and their (increasing) needs and demands fosters 
institutional multiplication in the form of amalgamations, inter-municipal co-operations, 
introducing new tiers of government, etc. Globalization and Europeanization expand the 
urbanization perspective to include the connection of the metropolitan areas (be they 
large cities or regions) in larger networks. The increasing importance of the EU and 
international networks is claimed to reduce the traditional state power. Local authorities, 
in turn, seek for ways to influence the process of decision-making directly at these upper 
levels, while having to implement top-down initiatives from these levels as well. 
The increasing size, scope, opportunities and importance of local government units vastly 
augment the workload of the municipality, and thus the possible demand overload for the 
councillors (Tops & Zouridis, 2002: Reynaert & Steyvers, 2006). Moreover, 
municipalities’ task package is further enhanced by the aim of central government to 
deploy the municipalities as essential instruments of the welfare state (Steyvers et al., 
2007; De Groot, 2009; Reynaert & Steyvers, 2010). In Belgium, this increase is 
accompanied by expanding regulation and functional supervision by the regions as 
supervising governments (De Ceuninck et al., 2005; De Rynck & Wayenberg, 2010; 
Wayenberg et al., 2010)35. 
Second, the professionalization of the local regime works as a challenge that adds to the 
stress on the councillors inside the political system. Professionalization is an internal 
adaptation of the system in order to cope with demand overload outlined above and 
prohibit the system from producing output failures. Mostly, it is directed at improving the 
specific support for the system and its outputs. Professionalization occurs at different 
levels. Partly due to the challenging and complex context discussed above, it is claimed 
that political leaders (i.e. mostly the mayors and executive councillors) and the 
administration, who operate on a (semi-)professional basis, gain more and more control 
over the process of policy-making to the detriment of the council and the non-executive 
councillors (see Tops & Zouridis, 2002; Berg & Rao, 2005; Denters, 2006; Egner & 
Heinelt, 2008; Guérin & Kerrouche, 2008 in general; Ackaert, 2005; Plees 2005; De 
                                                             
35 The Policy-and-Management-Cycle, which is to be introduced in Flemish municipalities from 2014 
onwards, is a good example of this trend. 
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Rynck & Wayenberg, 2010 for Belgium). This could alter the authority structure in the 
local system substantially. Moreover if we consider the council composition over an 
extended period of time in personal terms, socio-demographic representativeness is also 
said to decline in favour of professionalization (Reynaert, 2000; De Rynck, 2002; 
Wayenberg et al., 2010). Such professionalized councillors are not genuine politicians but 
rather capitalize on specific skills and expertise (Tops & Zouridis, 2002). They are better 
educated, come from selective professions and/or are recruited and trained within the 
party ranks (Cotta & Best, 2000). Finally also in their careers, councillors may work 
more professionally, i.e. dedicating more time and efforts to the internal part of the office 
(Guérin & Kerrouche, 2008). However, such professionalization might also narrow down 
the input from the community in the system too much. Besides, it obviously contradicts 
with the idealistic conception of the council as an elected assembly of amateurs who are 
placed at the helm of the representative system on the base of equality (Caulfield & 
Larsen, 2002; Mouritzen & Svara, 2002; Larsen, 2005). Consequently, 
professionalization could bring about a decline in diffuse support and, as a result, produce 
output failures. Meanwhile, by modifying the fundamentals of the local system 
professionalization challenges the typical role and position of the councillors in it as well. 
 
The response from the local system: from local government to local governance? 
In response to the stress caused by the environment, the local system has adapted itself 
profoundly over the last decades. This adaptation has altered the political regime in terms 
of its core values and principles, formal and informal rules and authority structure. It also 
introduced new authorities into the system. This change has been termed as the evolution 
from the traditional regime of local government to the modern variant of local 
governance (Andrew & Goldsmith, 1998; John, 2001; De Rynck, 2002; Denters & Rose, 
2005; see also Box 1.5). In short, this evolution implies that decision-making is moved 
away from the traditional system to a broader and more flexible setting (De Rynck, 2002; 
Steyvers, 2010a). The former is based on the clear electoral chain of command that 
directs the institutions of traditional hierarchical local government and its in-house 
service production in the representative setting. As we have discussed above, councillors 
are envisaged as playing the first fiddle in such a system – which further includes the 
executive board, the mayor and the municipal administration. The latter setting entails the 
growing importance of a form of decision-making wherein different authorities 
(individual or collective; public, private or voluntary) engage on a loose and 
interchangeable basis. As a result, the attention in the process of decision-making shifts 
from the actions of the council(lors) and other traditional institutions to the actions of 
multiple actors in partnerships and networks that extend beyond traditional organizational 
structures (Denters & Rose, 2005; Hambleton, 2005). 
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Governance is thus “the process that takes place in governance networks” (Klijn, 2008: 
511). Different examples of this regime have been mentioned above in this respect, 
stemming from different forms of democracy (e.g. networks, citizen participation, market 
democracy) and their corresponding practices (e.g. participatory budgeting, referenda, co-
decision procedures, inter-municipal cooperation, PPS, strategic alliances, etc.). Many 
authors believe that governance places additional stress on the role and position of the 
councillors (Andrew & Goldsmith, 1998; Denters & Rose, 2005; Benz & Papadopoulos, 
2007; Steyvers et al., 2007). Indeed, councillors are no longer the sovereign authority in 
this new context as they were (supposed to be) in the classic model (Sörensen, 2006; 
Sörensen & Torfing, 2009). Besides, governance implies that councillors have to 
exchange their (preferred) task of mastering the daily and very operational provision of 
public services for the more abstract task of strategic policy steering (De Rynck, 2002). 
This task, however, seems far more suited to the likes of the political leaders and 
professional administrators in the local authority – two authorities that could already 
outshine councillors in traditional government (De Rynck, 2002; Sörensen, 2006). 
Moreover, the dominance of the executives is further enhanced by the (purposive) 
strengthening of political leadership in the governance regime (Berg & Rao, 2005; 
Larsen, 2005)36. 
 
  
                                                             
36 On the other hand, some also advocate a new role for councillors in governance processes – based on 
their position as the only elected actors in the process (Pratchett & Wilson, 1996; Hambleton, 2005). 
Essentially, this new role consists of facilitating and safeguarding the democratic process of decision-
making in governance (Hansen, 2005; Sörensen, 2006; see also further Chapter 3 and Chapter 7). 
Moreover, in many cases operational tasks can still be executed (and problems can still be solved) on the 
basis of the traditional logic of local government (De Rynck, 2002; Jacobsen, 2009; see also Box 1.5). 
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Box 1.5. Local government versus local governance 
We may broadly define local governance as a “polycentric system in which a variety of 
actors are engaged in local public decision-making processes” (Denters, 2011: 313). As 
an ideal-type, local governance stems from four sequential and mutually reinforcing 
elements of change (John, 2001: 15-16): (a) institutional reforms (i.e. institutional 
multiplication in the form of new agencies and government levels; institutional 
restructuring in the form of PPP’s and contracting out), (b) new networks (i.e. horizontal 
networks between the state and private actors; cross-national networks between 
localities), (c) new policy initiatives (i.e. local innovation and capacity building to face 
complex problems; revived central state initiatives) and (d) responses to co-ordination 
and accountability dilemmas (i.e. new mechanisms to augment public control on, and 
accountability of, decision-making outside the classic representative arena; more 
pronounced executive leadership). 
Accordingly, several characteristics set governance apart from government in practice 
(Benz & Papadopoulos, 2007: 2-3): (a) instead of complying with a clear hierarchy, 
several decision centres work together in networks; (b) the boundaries of these networks 
are functional and fluid, rather than territorial and fixed; (c) elected politicians are no 
longer the sole political actors, other public actors, experts and private actors are included 
as well; (d) actors may operate individually and collectively (e.g. interest groups); (e) 
control and coordination of policy-making is not only exerted by unilateral decisions, but 
often by negotiation; (f) decision-making is less formal and originates from less visible 
structures. 
Still the rise of governance does not imply that old government structures are set to 
disappear completely or irreversibly. Indeed as Hambleton (2005: 194) puts it, 
government refers to “the formal institutions of the state” whilst governance “involves 
government plus the looser processes of influencing and negotiating with a range of 
public and private sector agencies to achieve desired outcomes.” In daily political 
practice, this means that traditional government structures and modern governance 
networks often coexist and intermingle (Jacobsen, 2009). 
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(d) Summary 
The overview of the stress on the contemporary local system turns out to be quite 
pessimistic for local councillors in Belgium. In fact, they face a constant challenge to 
implement their role in the most optimal way. Meanwhile in the Belgian system, 
councillors’ position at the top of the institutional pyramid is (allegedly) challenged by 
strong party discipline and executive dominance. And also in the wider opportunity 
structure, an interplay of evolutions (e.g. increasing citizens demands, diminishing citizen 
support, increasing system demands, professionalization, local governance, etc.) might 
further exacerbate the distortion between theory and practice. Taken together, 
councillors’ position in the heart of the local system (i.e. political primacy) is called into 
question, as is their double role in it (i.e. linking citizens to government and running the 
system). 
Following from this overview, we could hypothesize that Belgian local councillors do not 
function as the foundation, but rather as a fragment of local democracy in practice. Box 
1.6 shows how attending a council meeting could aptly exemplify the lack of impact of 
the local base office (see also De Rynck, 2000; Tops & Zouridis, 2002). Additionally, the 
following quotes summarize the scepticism about the role and position of local 
councillors in twenty-first century: 
“Heroic visions of councillor life have come under increasing scrutiny. (...) 
Sometimes, only a handful of politicians have enough information and 
oversight to be able to exert real influence” (Larsen, 2005: 200). 
Councillors “seem to be passive bystanders, while local politics and policy 
making goes on anywhere but at the level of central goal steering of local 
councils and councillors” (Hansen, 2001: 199). The result is that “councils 
may have become less attractive. Parties find it more difficult to recruit 
people to stand as candidates, as there is little prestige in being a 
councillor. Turnover between elections is high in some countries, and 
service as councillor has become less of a stepping-stone for obtaining 
political positions at regional or national level” (Larsen, 2005: 200). 
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Box 1.6. The council meeting: unveiling councillors’ role and position in practice? 
An impression of a council meeting in a medium-sized Flemish municipality in 2011 
might illustrate the strain on councillors in practice. Obviously, this example is not 
illustrative of every meeting or every council. Still, is demonstrates how councillors’ 
room for manoeuvre might be curtailed by executive dominance, mayoral 
entrepreneurialism, party discipline (as each party group votes with strict unanimity), and 
the multi-actor context in which some dossiers are settled outside the traditional 
structures of local government. We report on the council meeting in four phases. 
 First, the council decides to add an urgent topic to the agenda. It concerns the 
municipalities’ participation in a large financial inter-municipal structure which has come 
under severe pressure due to the financial crisis. The topic is discussed at the end of the 
meeting (i.e. approving the agenda and appointing a representative for the general 
meeting of the inter-municipal structure). 
 Then, discussions are held about councillors’ questions directed to the BMA. The 
opposition seizes this opportunity to make a statement on its core business via critical 
questions about the current affairs (e.g. traffic, public safety, etc.). The questions from 
majority councillors come across as opportunities for the aldermen (of the same party) to 
showcase a particular dossier of their portfolio (e.g. festivities, pollution). 
 Subsequently, the council votes on topics that need clarification by the executive 
board without fundamental debate (e.g. street lights and names, spatial development, 
grants, bonuses for personnel, etc.). On most points the opposition agrees with the 
decisions. However, it does not agree with the BMA’s method – as the latter is accused of 
using the council as a mere formality to pass decisions that have already been taken in 
advance (e.g. appointing representatives in inter-municipal co-operations). 
 Thereafter, the council debates on the remaining topics of the agenda. Three topics 
stand out. The first is a large, important project on public infrastructure, co-funded by the 
public transport company and other governments. The opposition criticizes the expensive 
prestigious project upon which the council has little impact. An alderman and mayor 
defend the project by emphasizing the window of opportunity opened by the available co-
funding. The second topic is an agreement with a private company and the public 
transport company. The opposition denounces the fact that information pamphlets were 
already distributed at the city hall while the council had yet to give its formal approval. 
The alderman admits that in such dossiers, it is often the public transport company which 
has the final say. The third topic concerns the application for a grant to hire experts who 
would counsel a large participation project. Again, the opposition accuses the BMA of 
having initiated and elaborated this expensive project without the council’s awareness 
and approval beforehand. They discard the project as election propaganda. The mayor, 
who initiated the project, defends it as an attempt to enhance citizen involvement in the 
municipality. Despite fierce debate, all topics pass the majority vote in the end. 
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1.2.4. Institutional attempts to reinvigorate local councils and local councillors 
Finally, the aforementioned formal orthodoxy and the acclaimed stress upon it are not the 
only elements that need to be taken into account in a current and realistic analysis on the 
role and position of Belgian local councillors. At the intersection of both we should 
consider a third aspect of the research problem. This aspect concerns formal structural 
changes by central government on the meso-level. The changes are designed explicitly to 
reinvigorate the traditional role and position of local councils and councillors on the 
micro-level in order to improve the performance of the political system on the macro-
level. In this section we will discuss (a) the logic behind such a line of reform and (b) the 
Belgian implementation of it, before (c) concluding the argument in an exemplary quote. 
 
(a) Reviving representative democracy 
In many European countries, attempts have been made to improve the political system by 
adapting the classic representative base model in addition to the introduction of modern 
(forms of) citizen participation and New Public Management (De Rynck, 2002; De 
Groot, 2009; Steyvers et al., 2005 and 2007; Steyvers, 2010a). Such attempts were often 
various in outlook and objective (Vetter & Kersting, 2003a). For instance, they could 
include changes to the electoral laws with the intention of increasing turnout. Examples 
are found in personalizing the electoral system in order to enhance the impact of citizens’ 
votes, e-governance (e.g. electronic voting) or reducing the voting age. With regard to 
this form, Belgium has introduced and encouraged electronic voting. Further, foreign 
citizens were enfranchised on certain conditions, the impact of personal votes was 
increased and gender quota was introduced to boost the participation of women in the 
political process. 
More important in the context of our study, however, was the revision of the role of the 
local council and councillors as part of the reforms. The direction of this revision differed 
per country as well (Denters & Rose, 2005; De Groot, 2009; De Groot et al., 2010). In 
some countries (e.g. Poland and Germany), the introduction of a directly elected mayor 
caused a de facto decline in the council’s power. In Italy, the impact of the council has 
even been deliberately curtailed in order to empower the directly elected mayor. Another 
group of countries (e.g. the Netherlands, the UK, the Nordic countries) sought to redefine 
and/or re-establish the roles of the council and the other actors in government. Belgium 
stood out from these countries by its explicit purpose of reinvigorating the traditional 
primacy of local councils and councillors through institutional innovation (Denters & 
Rose, 2005). 
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(b) Restoring the political primacy of the local councils and local councillors in 
Belgium 
Until the start of the twenty-first century, the subordination of the local councils and 
councillors had almost been taken for granted by the Belgian government (De Rynck, 
2002). It was the regionalization of the basic legislation on local government in 2001 that 
proved an important formal lever for a radical change of direction37. From 1 January 
2002 onwards, the regions Flanders (308 municipalities), Wallonia (262 municipalities) 
and Brussels Capital (19 municipalities) were entitled to organize and implement their 
own local government systems. The regions seized this opportunity to (try to) improve 
their political system at the local level. The Flemish region is considered as the 
forerunner in terms of the speed and impact of its new legislation. Wallonia is said to 
implement less drastic changes at a slower pace, while Brussels Capital is far behind the 
three regions in innovative terms (Wayenberg et al., 2010). A possible reason for the 
latter’s restraint is its specific context, with very influential mayors and in-built 
mechanisms of linguistic balance between French-speakers and Dutch-speakers (Pilet et 
al., 2005; Wayenberg et al., 2010). 
One of the key elements of the reforms has been the rehabilitation of the local councils 
and councillors. Indeed, the regions have acknowledged that a mismatch had developed 
between the formal rules of the game and the informal rules in practice. In the words of 
De Groot (2009: 14), the reforms consequently demonstrate how “institutions change in 
response to their environments.” We can discern two phases in the reform wave. 
The first phase was integrated in the new local government acts (and their modifications) 
that the regions adopted in the wake of their newly granted competence. The new 
Flemish act (the Municipal Decree) was officially promulgated in 2005, the new act in 
Wallonia (the Code of Local Democracy and Decentralization) one year later, while 
Brussels Capital largely retained the old federal act (the New Municipal Act) (Wayenberg 
et al., 2010)38. The Flemish Decree not only introduced elements of New Public 
Management and participatory democracy, it also sought to restore the primacy of the 
local council and strengthen the position of the councillors vis-à-vis the mayor, the 
executive board and the administration explicitly (Leterme & Keulen, 2005; Vlabest, 
2011). The most important elements in this respect were the designation of the council 
                                                             
37 Before this date, three competences had already been transferred from the federal state to the regional 
level as part of the state reforms: the supervision on the municipalities (1980), the municipal fund (1988) 
and the inter-municipal cooperation (1993) (Wayenberg et al., 2010). The 2001 state reform resulted from 
the Lambermont Agreement of 16 October 2000 and was enacted on 13 July 2001 (Steyvers & Reynaert, 
2003). 
38 Dates refer to the publication in the Belgian law gazette. In 2004, the Walloon Code was introduced as 
a formalization of existing legislation. The political reforms were then incorporated in a revision of the 
Code that was officially promulgated in 2006 (Wayenberg et al., 2010). 
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president and the introduction of delegation rights (Olislagers et al., 2008). The former 
entails that mayors no longer automatically preside over the council – as this was the case 
before. The councillors obtained the right to elect a president who is no member of the 
executive board. This new authority was meant to foster an open and lively debate in the 
council, and a greater impact of the councillors. Additionally, the mayor and aldermen 
are no longer allowed to preside over council committees. The delegation right allowed 
the councillors to delegate detailed matters of local policy-making to the executive board. 
In this way, councillors gained more space and time to focus on their core tasks of 
representation, control and defining the general goals of local policy. The council was 
also expected to approve an internal deontological code and internal regulations. In 
addition to these rules of the game, the Decree lists the instruments provided to the 
councillors to fulfil their role (e.g. convene the council, set the agenda, ask questions, 
visit municipal agencies, consult official documents, ask for information, organize 
committees and citizen participation devices, etc.). 
The Walloon Code was inspired by different principles. For instance, it did not strive for 
a management-oriented style of government at all, nor was it designed to improve 
citizen’s participation in the political system (Pilet, 2008). Yet on the other hand, the 
Code sought to improve councillors’ positions. Consequently, it mainly aimed at 
improving the democratic quality of local government, hanging on to the political 
primacy even more (De Rynck & Wayenberg, 2010; Wayenberg et al., 2010). The two 
most important elements of renewal were the semi-direct election of the mayor and the 
introduction of councillors’ right to cast a constructive no-confidence vote (Pilet, 2008). 
The main device of these elements was to reconsider the balance between the mayor, the 
council and the executive board in the political system. On one hand, the semi-direct 
election of the mayor means that the candidate who obtains most preferential votes on the 
strongest list of the political majority/coalition, becomes mayor automatically. This new 
designation method sought to create a parliamentary model which is based on a strong 
political leader. The mayor becomes a local quasi-president who can convert his/her 
electoral legitimacy in a stronger position in the executive board, meanwhile reducing the 
impact of political parties in the local process. On the other hand, strengthened political 
leadership goes hand in hand with strengthened control by the local assembly. A 
constructive no-confidence vote is meant to empower councillors to hold the mayor and 
the executives to account and bring the latter’s (sense of) sacrosanctity to an end. The 
system implies that during the legislature councillors can dismiss an alderman, the mayor 
or the collective executive board by a simple majority vote. This vote should be 
accompanied however by the proposition of (a) replacement(s)39. Finally, also the 
                                                             
39 Additionally, there is also a possibility that the BMA resigns collectively (Bollen & Vander Borght, 
2012). 
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Walloon Code lists the further rights of the councillors (e.g. consultation, agenda-setting, 
information, visitation, questioning, committees, participation, etc.). 
Nevertheless, observers were sceptical about the possibility of these reforms to 
effectively rehabilitate the local councils and councillors (Steyvers & Reynaert, 2003; 
Steen & Wille, 2005; Bataille et al., 2007; Pilet, 2008; Vlabest, 2011; Wayenberg et al., 
2010; see also Chapter 7). Central government seemed to realize that more measures 
could be taken as well, and instigated a new round of reforms over the past years. In 
Flanders, the second reform phase figured as an element of the Internal State Reform of 
Flemish government. It was laid down in a revision of the Municipal Decree in 2012. The 
reform entailed, amongst others, the compulsory discussion of the policies of formal local 
governance networks in a council committee, a procedure to re-establish the 
governability of the municipality when there is a permanent conflict in the executive 
board40, electronic information rights, more flexible possibilities for councillors to 
convene the council, reducing the number of aldermen with one from the next legislature 
onwards (Bourgeois, 2011). 
In Wallonia, reforms were implemented as adaptations to the Code of Local Democracy 
in 2012 (Bollen & Vander Borght, 2012). In addition to a stronger emphasis on citizen 
participation and the management of formal governance networks, some new elements 
were introduced regarding councils and councillors41. For instance, councillors’ question 
rights were enlarged to include questions about the municipality’s current affairs. A new 
formula also guaranteed better representation of the council’s party groups in formal 
governance networks, as well as visit and reporting rights for the councillors who 
participate in the networks. By analogy with the Flemish Decree, the council became 
entitled to elect its own president (and committee presidents) as well. Further, some 
clarifications or detailed adaptations were made to the process of constructive no-
confidence vote and the semi-direct election of the mayor (e.g. only use the collective no-
confidence vote twice per legislature, allow semi-directly elected mayors who refuse the 
mayoral office to become an alderman if they had no position in the top-3 of their party 
list). 
Lastly, also the Brussels Capital Region started (cautiously) to empower the local 
councils and local councillors. An edict of 2009 enhanced the role and independence of 
                                                             
40 This provision is strongly regulated (only to be used once per legislature, not in the year before the 
local elections, the provincial governor has to mediate first). 
41 The comment on these reforms by the Union of Walloon Cities and Municipalities (Bollen & Vander 
Borght, 2012) illustrates the continuous tension between the quest for input and output legitimacy in the 
local system. Indeed, for the authors the costs of the new participation procedures in particular are 
difficult to reconcile with the pursuit of an efficient and effective governance style. 
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municipal committees (Schmidt, 2009). And in 2012, the council’s right to elect its own 
president was introduced. 
 
(c) Summary 
The above overview of structural changes has illustrated that Belgian governments are 
well aware of the need to reinvigorate the local councils and local councillors as central 
authorities in the local system. Notwithstanding the inclination towards enhanced citizen 
participation on the input side and management-principles and practices on the output 
side, the governments feel that strengthening the traditional local regime would help to 
revive the democratic process as well. We summarize this attempt and its accompanying 
discourse with the following quote. It was expressed by the director of the Flemish 
association of cities and municipalities (VVSG) in his plea to rehabilitate the local 
councillor office: 
“We need a wind of change to blow through the local councils. (...) More 
effort should be put in changing the political culture and strengthening the 
individual councillors. (...) The main goal of one’s political commitment 
should be to become a strong councillor, not an alderman. We should, 
therefore, revalue this role and function instead of conceiving it as a 
steppingstone to an executive office” (Suykens, 2012: 9, translated quote 
from Dutch). 
 
1.3.  RESEARCH STRATEGY AND FUNDAMENTAL RESEARCH HYPOTHESES 
This chapter has put forward the fundamental research question of our study, which reads 
as follows: ‘What is the contemporary role and position of Belgian local councillors in 
practice?’ The elaboration of the research problem that underpins this question has 
generated two tentative and opposite answers. Both will guide and structure our analyses 
as fundamental research hypotheses in the study. 
The null hypothesis originates from the classic orthodoxy on the role and position of local 
councillors in the local system. We find this orthodoxy in theoretical expositions, but also 
in the official discourse and policy initiatives of Belgian government. The orthodoxy 
postulates that councillors should function as the pivot of local democracy. The null 
hypothesis consequently states: 
 H0: ‘Belgian local councillors are the foundation of local democracy.’ 
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The opposite hypothesis voices the idea that the role and position of Belgian local 
councillors has been put under strain by a combination of possible causes, varying from 
general obstacles in the local system to the informal rules of the Belgian system and/or 
evolutions in the wider opportunity structure. As a consequence of this alleged strain, our 
opposite hypothesis states: 
 H1: ‘Belgian local councillors are fragments of local democracy.’ 
Both fundamental hypotheses derive from the current state of the art with regard to the 
functioning of local councillors. However, the latter is mainly constructed normatively 
and has not yet been tested systematically and empirically. Our contribution to the state 
of the art is, therefore, to test these hypotheses on the basis of empirical, scientific 
inquiry. As such, we search for a balanced and comprehensive insight in the role and 
position of the Belgian local councillors. 
This means first of all that we will refine and operationalize our fundamental research 
hypotheses. In fact, it is very likely that the image of the councillors as depicted by the 
symbol of the Kokpit on the one hand or the report of the council meeting on the other, is 
above all an extreme which does not necessarily cover all the aspects of councillors’ role 
and/or position in practice. We will pose several questions to nuance these fundamental 
hypotheses: ‘Is there a problem regarding councillors’ role and position?’; ‘How big is 
this problem, and what are its implications?’; ‘In which aspects of councillors’ role and 
position do the problems occur most?’; ‘Which factors cause the alleged problems?’; 
‘How much variation is there in councillors’ role and position, and what determines the 
latter?’; etc. 
Second, our research strategy implies that we focus on the local councillors in a direct, 
empirical and systematic way. The study draws on research data that have been collected 
amongst the Belgian local councillor population for this purpose. These data address a 
wide variety of sub-themes, allowing us to run several statistical analyses and construct a 
multifaceted picture of the contemporary situation as it is perceived by the councillors in 
person. 
In sum, our aim is to consider the local political process beyond the ballot, away from the 
traditional limelight of political research and public attention. Our research strategy 
thereby holds the middle between the two extremes in political research: problem-driven 
research on the one hand and methods- and theory-driven research on the other 
(Baldersheim & Wollmann, 2006). The former type is concerned with important 
problems in the (political) reality. The research methods and theoretical points of 
departure are accommodated to the practical problem under study. Such problem-driven 
research is often ordered by governments in the format of particular policy evaluations, 
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advice and recommendations. The latter type places the analytical rules and explanatory 
methods first in striving for cumulative knowledge and general scientific insights42. 
According to Baldersheim and Wollmann (2006), however, contemporary local 
government research often combines – and should combine – both extremes. Such 
research “aims at testing theories on data that reflect practical problems and issues of the 
day or is motivated by a desire to develop theories that can make sense of current 
challenges” (Baldersheim & Wollmann, 2006: 123). Our focus lies mainly on the first 
part of this statement. By testing political theories on the role and position of local 
councillors in the Belgian setting, we seek to gain knowledge on a practical issue or 
problem in Belgian local democracy. From this perspective, we should emphasize that 
our study is thus not directed at evaluating the institutional changes of central 
government vis-à-vis the councils and councillors as such. Likewise, its primary purpose 
is not to develop universal theories on councillors’ role and position either. 
The remainder of the study counts seven parts. In Chapter 2 we specify our research 
methodology, paying attention to the added value of the approach, as well as to its 
limitations. Subsequently, the empirical analyses each deal with a particular aspect of the 
research question. Chapter 3 examines the recruitment process and the political career of 
the Belgian local councillors. Chapter 4 tackles their classic role-orientation, while 
Chapter 5 focuses more profoundly on councillors’ role as representative of the locality. 
Chapter 6 then presents the role and position of the Belgian local councillors in a 
broader, international comparative perspective. In Chapter 7 we bring these analyses 
together by drawing general conclusions, discussing their possible implications for 
Belgian local councillors in the future and raising some suggestions for further research. 
Finally, the Appendices compile additional secondary analyses and information. 
                                                             
42 Critics of this school argue that such analyses tend to be too sterile and fail to capture the complex 
reality and the broader perspective of the political world. 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 2 
METHODOLOGY 
 
 
2.1. INTRODUCTION: THE RESEARCH PROCESS 
The second chapter of our study is concerned with the general research methodology, 
defined by Frankfort-Nachmias and Nachmias (1996: 13) as the “system of explicit rules 
and procedures upon which research is based and against which claims for knowledge 
are evaluated.” For Landman (2008: 17), the research methodology thus basically 
“concerns the ways in which knowledge of the political world is acquired.” 
Even though such research of the political world is not a fixed and rigid process, it does 
draw upon some common steps and methodological issues (Theodoulou, 1999a). The 
choice for these steps and issues depends on the overall approach of research. In political 
science, the latter is usually normative (discussing what should be) and/or empirical 
(discussing what is) (O’Brien, 1999; Landman, 2008). The introductory chapter has 
shown that discussions about local councils and local councillors have been mainly 
embedded in the normative sphere thus far. Meanwhile, they often lacked a reliable 
systematic empirical basis – a claim that holds particularly true in the context of Belgian 
local government. Therefore, the main goal of our study is to fill a part of this empirical 
void. We aim to achieve this goal by describing the role and position of the local 
councillors in Belgium whilst looking for underlying patterns in, and explanations for, the 
results that come forward. Hence, our work primarily seeks to add to the descriptive and 
explanatory knowledge of the political world (Danziger, 1991). Regarding the third type 
of political knowledge, i.e. prescription, we refer to our general conclusion in Chapter 7, 
in where we connect our empirical results with the normative debate on local councillors 
by discussing some perspectives for the future. 
In order to structure our study, we apply the general research methodology of deductive 
empirical research. This method is conceived as a cyclic process that tests theoretical 
claims on the basis of empirical analysis in seven stages, presented in Figure 2.1 below 
(Frankfort-Nachmias & Nachmias, 1996). The first two steps of the process, i.e. the 
research problem (in casu the acclaimed strain on the role and position of Belgian local 
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councillors) and the fundamental research hypotheses (councillors are the foundation of 
local democracy versus councillors are fragments of local democracy), were outlined in 
the foregoing introductory chapter. In this chapter, we focus on the subsequent phases: 
the research design, measurement, data collection and the basic principles of our data 
analysis. This forms the methodological platform for the specific data analyses that are 
presented in Chapters 3 to 6. Finally, the conclusive Chapter 7 completes the research 
cycle by generalizing the empirical results to sow the seeds of further elaboration(s) in (a) 
new research cycle(s). 
Prior to commencing with our discussion, the following section offers an orientation of 
the general setting in which our research has been conducted. In the final section of the 
chapter, we also reiterate the limitations of our methodological approach in general. 
 
Figure 2.1. The main stages of the research process 
 
 
 
(Frankfort-Nachmias & Nachmias, 1996: 20) 
  
Problem
Hypothesis
Research 
Design
MeasurementData Collection
Data Analysis
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2.2. RESEARCH SETTING: THE MAELG PROJECT 
The empirical results in our study are based on the Belgian contribution to a European 
comparative research project. In 2006, a number of scholars of the established research 
group Euroloc decided to extend their series of comparative local government study with 
a quantitative analysis of local councillors in Europe. As such, the Euroloc project 
completed the study of the “local power triangle”, consisting of the key administrator or 
CEO (addressed by the “Udité Leadership Study”, see Klausen & Magnier, 1998; 
Mouritzen & Svara, 2002), the political leader or mayor (addressed by the “Polleader” 
project, see Bäck et al., 2006) and the representative assembly or council (Egner et al., 
forthcoming). The project was titled Municipal Assemblies in European Local 
Governance, or simply MAELG1. 
Sixteen countries participated in the project. They represent a fair extent of cultural and 
structural diversity in terms of local government. These countries are, in alphabetical 
order: Austria, Belgium, Croatia, the Czech Republic, France, Germany, Greece, Israel, 
Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and the United 
Kingdom. The common research strategy across these countries took shape in several 
workshops (Ghent 2006, Madrid 2008, Zurich 2009, Darmstadt 2010 and Madrid 2012). 
First, a standard survey and a corresponding SPSS data input-file were developed. The 
survey covered a wide array of councillor-related themes that suited the research interests 
of the different partners in the project (see further in Section 2.5.1). Per country, a group 
of scholars then translated and, if necessary, contextualized the basic version of the 
questionnaire (which was written in generic English). Given the comparative purpose of 
the project though, each country was asked to retain as many questions of the original 
standard version as possible. Furthermore in order to compare the comparable, the group 
decided to include councillors from municipalities with more than 10.000 inhabitants 
only2. Subsequently, each country drew up a representative sample of councillors – often 
using a cluster sample of municipalities (Egner et al., forthcoming), and sent the 
questionnaires to the councillors of this sample. 
The combination of this cross-national research framework/method with the national 
implementation and funding allowed the MAELG project to overcome the most important 
obstacles for systematic comparative local government research, i.e. the lack of large-
scale co-funding and the tendency to focus on descriptive country reports or few-country 
                                                             
1 Currently, a new comparative research project has been initiated by the Euroloc group under the header 
Second tier of Local Government in Europe. This project addresses the actors of the intermediate tier of 
government (in casu the governor, CEO, deputies and councillors of the (Belgian) provinces). 
2 In some countries (e.g. France, Italy), this threshold significantly narrowed down the scope of research. 
For the study at hand however, which is directed at gaining insights into the general population of the 
Belgian local councillors, we have included councillors from municipalities below this threshold in our 
survey (see Section 2.5.2). 
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comparisons as a consequence of the latter (John, 2006)3. The general results of the 
MAELG project are presented in the book The European Councillor, which is organized 
in several thematic chapters (Egner et al., forthcoming). Additionally, further in-depth 
thematic analyses were carried out and published in special issues of academic journals 
(see Lex Localis – Journal of Local Self-Government, 2012, 10 (1) and Local 
Government Studies, iFirst). 
 
2.3. RESEARCH DESIGN 
The third section of our methodological chapter sets forth the research design of the 
study, i.e. “the logical structure of the research inquiry that the political scientist is 
engaged upon” (Burnham et al., 2008: 39). Following from the general goal of research, 
the research design structures the analyses to obtain answers to the initial question(s). 
According to Burnham et al. (2008), the choice for a particular design is not only 
determined by objective criteria (‘Which research strategy is most likely to yield answers 
to the research question, and test the corresponding hypotheses?’) but also by the 
scientist’s personal interests, training and skills. Additionally, some practical limitations 
(e.g. available funding and/or time) must be taken into consideration. 
Constructing a research design has two major purposes (Burnham et al., 2008). First, to 
draw up the operational research plan by developing specific researchable/measurable 
questions, key concepts and hypotheses whilst organizing them in a logical order. The 
second (and most familiar) function of the research design is to define the procedures 
which are applied within this plan to obtain valid and objective results. 
 
2.3.1. Operational plan 
The fundamental research question (FRQ) of our study has been phrased in the general 
introduction (Chapter 1) as follows: ‘What is the role and position of local councillors in 
contemporary Belgian local government’? We formulated tentative answers to this 
question in the form of two opposing hypotheses. The null hypothesis reads that local 
councillors are the foundation of local democracy (H0). Its antipode holds that local 
councillors are fragments of local democracy (H1). Since such metaphorical hypotheses 
are obviously too broad and vague to scrutinize empirically, the next step in the research 
process should specify them into researchable questions and operational hypotheses 
(Theodoulou, 1999a). Based on the theoretical starting point and ensuing research 
problems extracted from the literature review in Chapter 1, but also practical 
                                                             
3 The Belgian research was funded by the Special Research Fund of Ghent University. 
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considerations (e.g. the questionnaire developed by the MAELG project) and personal 
interest, we disentangle the FRQ and corresponding hypotheses into four specific themes. 
Each theme, in turn, includes a number of applied research questions (ARQ). 
 
(a) Political recruitment and career 
The first theme of our operational plan deals with the recruitment process and the 
political career of the local councillors (Chapter 3). Whereas the former concept refers to 
the route to the local base office, the latter denotes the way in which councillors give 
shape to it afterwards. Both aspects relate to the core of our democratic representative 
system, which states that citizens are to be ruled by their equals (see Chapter 1). In 
almost any local democracy, this principle is epitomized by the layman rule, i.e. the 
effective and intensive involvement of amateur politicians/citizens in the process of 
decision-making (Mouritzen & Svara, 2002)4. Regarding political recruitment and career, 
it implies openness and equality. Principally, “any fellow-citizen should be able to come 
forward as a candidate for political office” whilst afterwards, “politics should not be a 
separate sphere of society” (Steyvers & Verhelst, 2012: 4). 
In political science, the above principles express the discussion on descriptive (or 
demographic/microcosmic) representation (Pitkin, 1967; Norris & Lovenduski, 1993). 
Descriptive representation entails that the assembly of elected representatives should 
comprise a cross-section or mirror of its locality. To put it simply: different groups of 
local society should be adequately represented in the council. The principle follows the 
assumption that who governs, matters, from either a symbolic/normative point of view, or 
a more functional counterpart5. Regarding the symbolic/normative side, descriptive 
representation appeals to general democratic feelings such as equity and fairness (Norris, 
1997)6. These feelings assure the symbolic legitimacy of the representative body – and, 
subsequently, public support for the political system. In addition to these normative 
arguments, some claim that political recruitment and career also impact on the outcomes 
of public decision-making at the functional end of the political system. According to this 
view, different types of representatives could bring distinct priorities, perspectives, styles 
and behaviour to the political arena (Norris, 1997). A balanced council composition 
                                                             
4 As such, the layman concept refers to the statute of the councillor as part of the people, and not to its 
lack of competence (Pruim, 2010). 
5 This statement, for instance, underpins the (sometimes contested) concept politics of presence. The 
concept states that on the basis of common life experiences and a subordinate position in society, certain 
subgroups (in casu often women or politicians from foreign descent) will be more prone to defend the 
interests of their subgroup in political office (Phillips in Wauters, 2010). Simultaneously, they could 
enhance the symbolic legitimacy of the system from the perspective of these subgroups.  
6 It might also figure as the second-best option compared to the unfeasible ideal of direct democracy 
(Judge, 1999). 
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would then produce balanced policy outputs and prevent output failures. Besides, the 
amateur citizen-councillor who stands with his/her both feet in society should be better 
positioned to pick up pertinent public feelings, and express them in the political arena too 
(Petracca, 1991; Steen & Wille, 2005; Pruim, 2010). 
The analysis in Chapter 3 seeks to verify whether the recruitment process and political 
career of Belgian local councillors correspond to these idealistic postulates. In fact, in 
many (local) democracies an ongoing and far-reaching degree of professionalization is 
observed in political recruitment and career (Eliassen & Pedersen, 1978; Cotta & Best, 
2000; Caulfield & Larsen, 2002; Guérin & Kerrouche, 2008; Steyvers & Verhelst, 2012). 
Professionalization implies that both components tend to be reduced to a selective and 
closed process, which is directed at bringing area-specific routines and expertise to the 
council to enhance its functional capacity (Steyvers & Verhelst, 2012). Obviously, the 
very essence of professionalization does not sit well with the ideal-typical layman rule. 
Its disputable connotation encapsulates “the essence of the tension between the demand 
for calibre and the need for greater (‘sociological’) representation” (Rao, 1998: 21). In 
addition to the descriptive reconstruction of councillors’ recruitment process and political 
career in terms of the layman-professional contraposition, the chapter searches for 
underlying patterns in the population of Belgian local councillors. Finally, the 
explanatory part of the analysis scrutinizes whether there is a path-dependent funnel of 
professionalization, leading from a professionalized recruitment process to a 
professionalized career later on. 
 
(b) Classic role orientation 
Our second research theme delves deeper into the centre of our research problem by 
scrutinizing the role orientation of the local councillors (Chapter 4). In a representative 
local democracy, the latter is an important aspect of the system’s performance. But as we 
have mentioned at the outset (Chapter 1), elected representatives are in a constant 
straddle between the local community on the one hand and the world of governance on 
the other (Denters & De Jong, 1992). Councillors should thus simultaneously represent 
the interests of local citizens in the political arena (i.e. conveying citizen input) while 
administering the local affairs (i.e. producing policy output). As such, their straddle 
covers the basic and classic role-set that comprises (1) representation, (2) policy-making 
and (3) policy control (De Rynck, 2000; Denters, 2005; Steen & Wille, 2005). 
Chapter 4 focuses on several facets of this classic role-set. First, it assesses the role 
attitudes of the councillors, i.e. the degree to which they personally support the three 
roles under study. Such attitudes are not only important determinants for role behaviour 
in office (Denters & Klok, 2003), but may also provide clues for possible paths of 
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political reform if necessary (Denters & De Jong, 1992). Second, the chapter analyzes 
councillors’ acclaimed role behaviour, i.e. the way in which councillors feel that they 
contribute to their classic role-set in practice. This second component will indicate 
whether or not Belgian local councillors (claim to) act as they are formally supposed to. 
Third, the chapter examines the role discrepancies experienced by the councillors in 
terms of representation, policy and control. The role discrepancy refers to the gap, or 
congruence, between councillors’ role attitude (i.e. importance of the role) and role 
behaviour (i.e. acclaimed contribution to the role). This last component might also 
provide us with important information on the position of the local councillors in the 
system. Indeed, it will indicate whether councillors are able to implement their role as 
they would wish to, or whether certain factors impede them from doing so. Finally, the 
fourth component of the analysis seeks to clarify the general descriptive picture by 
looking for underlying mechanisms that account for the variation in the role attitude, 
behaviour and discrepancy of the councillors. The explanatory analysis selects three sets 
of possible determinants for this purpose: place, personal characteristics and the informal 
decision-making culture. 
 
(c) Political representation 
The third theme of the operational plan (Chapter 5) focuses on the way in which 
councillors envisage and (claim to) fulfil their mandate as elected representatives of the 
people7. As such, the chapter tackles substantive representation as the complementary 
side of the theoretical discussion on political representation. This perspective stresses 
“what councillors do, and how they should act, rather than who they are” (Rao, 1998: 
35). One of the main causes of the perceived gap between citizens and politics, as well as 
the strain on the councillors, lays exactly in the fact that many citizens no longer feel 
represented by their representatives in a legitimate way (Pruim, 2010). Accordingly, the 
quality of substantive representation is as vital for the performance of the local system as 
its descriptive counterpart (Steyvers et al., 2007). Scholars of the substantive perspective 
summarize several reasons why their view should be preferred over the descriptive one. 
Basically, they claim that the latter often turns out to be impractical, undesirable and 
impossible (Judge, 1999). The first argument holds that elections are (too) complex 
instruments to generate representative assemblies altogether8. According to the second 
                                                             
7 In this way, the concept political representation differs from the representational role outlined in the 
previous operational theme. It reflects how councillors generally fulfil the mandate they have received 
from the community to run the political system (and this task, in turn, consists of representing citizen 
input, and defining and controlling policy output). 
8 For instance, some electoral systems might give more weight to personal votes whilst others favour 
winning lists. In some systems particular list quota are obliged whereas this is not the case in others. 
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argument, the essence of political representation lies exactly in the division of political 
action through the specialization of a group of citizens who develop political skills. 
Hence, it is above all important to pay attention to the way in which these citizens take up 
their responsibility in practice. The third argument implies that there are simply too many 
relevant subgroups in society to be represented proportionally9. 
In our empirical study, the first component of the analysis describes the attitudes of the 
Belgian local councillors towards substantive political representation. The subsequent 
analysis assesses their acclaimed behaviour. Finally, an explanatory analysis searches for 
variation in these attitudes and behaviour according to the political and personal profile 
of the councillors, their contact/communication pattern and the local government context. 
 
(d) Comparative framing 
The final part of the operational plan broadens and deepens the research scope developed 
hitherto (Chapter 6). On one hand, the research scope is widened in two ways. First, the 
chapter synthesizes some of the analyses that will have been carried out in the previous 
chapters whilst including some new facets, such as the self-placement in the local 
hierarchy, the relationship with citizens and citizen participation, and possible turnover 
motives10. As such, the analysis reconstructs a large part of the multifaceted cycle of the 
councillor to and in office. Second, the study takes an international comparative approach 
by comparing the results from Flemish and Walloon councillors to their French and 
Dutch colleagues (see also Section 2.3.2). Indeed as Keman (1999: 3) argues, “the ‘art of 
comparing’ is (...) one of the most important cornerstones of the development of 
knowledge about society and politics and insights into what is going on (...).” Within our 
frame of research, the international comparative approach might not only help us to 
generalize the findings. It also allows us to test the current hypothesis that local 
government (in casu the role and position of the councillors) on both sides of the Belgian 
language border has drifted apart towards the Dutch and French system respectively (De 
Rynck & Wayenberg, 2010)11. Furthermore, the comparison might produce some clues 
                                                                                                                                                                                                    
Besides, citizens do not (necessarily) have the need for descriptive representation when they cast their 
votes. 
9 Furthermore, some authors question the acclaimed relation between the (personal) characteristics of the 
representatives and their subsequent behaviour in office, just as they question the conception of 
descriptive representation as being the second best solution compared to direct democracy (Andeweg, 
2003). 
10 Only the issue of substantive representation (Chapter 5) is not dealt with in the comparative study. This 
is mainly due to the complexity and specificity of its conceptual framework and corresponding 
operationalization, which makes it difficult to address this subject in a brief section of the chapter. 
11 For formal reasons (i.e. the format of the chapter as an independent academic paper), the chapter is 
developed from the starting point of this hypothesis. 
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on the future perspectives of the role and position of the Belgian local councillors, which 
we will discuss in Chapter 7. 
On the other hand, the international comparative perspective compels us to deepen the 
research scope of the study. Indeed, given its dualistic structure only non-executive 
councillors were surveyed in the Netherlands. Moreover, the size-threshold set by the 
MAELG project confined the scope of the international study to the urban setting (i.e. 
municipalities that have at least 10.000 inhabitants). To maximize the comparability of 
our data, we will therefore limit our international comparison to the non-executive local 
councillors from an urban setting. 
In summary, the comparative study focuses on the recruitment process, role orientation, 
self-placement in the local hierarchy, relation with citizens and citizen participation, and 
future political ambitions and turnover motives of non-executive urban councillors in 
Flanders, Wallonia, the Netherlands and France. In so doing, it raises three applied 
research questions: (1) ‘Have Flanders and Wallonia indeed diverged, following the path 
of their respective reference countries (i.e. the Netherlands and France)?’; (2) ‘Do the 
results from Belgium, France and the Netherlands reflect the path-dependent legacy of 
each system?’; and/or (3) ‘Do the results for the four regions/countries rather converge?’ 
 
(e) Summary 
Through the interplay of these four themes, our operational plan seeks to present a broad, 
multifaceted picture of the role and position of the Belgian local councillors in relation to 
the research problem and the general research question outlined in Chapter 112. It tackles 
the characteristics and the functions of the councillors, their styles, their impact in the 
local authority and their relation with the citizens. Accordingly, the operational plan deals 
with different aspects of the councillor office on the input side, throughput side and 
output side of the political system. Figure 2.2 summarizes the different components of 
this operational plan. The four operational themes are presented in the format of an 
academic study per chapter. Obviously, each study further develops its own 
operationalization(s) and specific research hypotheses. If some extra analyses have been 
run in comparison with the original (published or reviewed) papers in order to contribute 
to the transversal story of the study, these are presented in the general appendices and/or 
added in a footnote to the chapter. All bibliographical references are presented at the end 
of the study.  
                                                             
12 For an analysis or discussion of the interconnectedness of (some aspects of) this multifaceted research 
problem in other political systems, see e.g. Denters et al. (2005) or Drouin (2006). 
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Figure 2.2. Operational plan: FRQ, research themes and applied research  
questions 
 
  
1. POLITICAL RECRUITMENT AND CAREER
(Chapter 3)
•To what extent is the recruitment process of the local 
councillors professionalized? (ARQ1)
•To what extent is the political career of the local 
councillors professionalized? (ARQ2) 
• Is there a path-dependent relation between 
professionalization in political recruitment and 
career? (ARQ3)
2. ROLE ORIENTATION
(Chapter 4)
•How do local councillors envisage their classic role-
set? (ARQ4)
•How do local councillors (claim to) implement their 
classic role-set? (ARQ5)
• Is there a discrepancy between councillors' role 
attitude and role behaviour? (ARQ6)
•Which factors determine councillors' role attitude, 
behaviour and discrepancy? (ARQ7)
3. POLITICAL REPRESENTATION
(Chapter 5)
•How do local councillors envisage their role as 
representative of the people? (ARQ8)
•How do local councillors (claim to) implement their 
role as representative of the people? (ARQ9)
• Is there a discrepancy between the representative 
attitude and behaviour of the local councillors? 
(ARQ10)
•Which factors determine councillors' representative 
attitude and behaviour? (ARQ11)
4. COMPARATIVE FRAME
(Chapter 6)
•Do the role and position of Flemish and Walloon 
local councillors diverge, resembling the Dutch and 
French model respectively? (ARQ12)
•Do the role and position of the local councillors 
reflect the path-dependent legacy of the three 
countries? (ARQ13)
• Is there a convergent pattern in the role and position 
of local councillors in Flanders, Wallonia, France 
and the Netherlands? (ARQ14)
"ARE BELGIAN
LOCAL
COUNCILLORS THE
FOUNDATION OR A
FRAGMENT OF
LOCAL
DEMOCRACY?" 
(FRQ, Chapter 1 & 7)
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2.3.2. Research procedure 
In light of the operational plan we have just set out, we will now expound on the most 
suitable research procedure to obtain tangible answers to the questions raised. The 
research procedure deals with two key questions: (a) ‘Who should we study? and (b) 
‘How should this be done?’ 
The first question concerns the selection of the appropriate units of analysis (Landman, 
2008). In our study, we are interested in the Belgian local councillors as key actors of 
local democracy13. We therefore choose to address these councillors directly and 
personally. Such an actor-centred approach is believed to be a valuable paradigm in 
contemporary local government research that is both theory- and problem-driven 
(Baldersheim & Wollmann, 2006). For us, it provides an opportunity to assemble the 
varied and extensive data called for by the operational plan (e.g. neutral information on 
councillors’ personal characteristics, as well as subjective information on role fulfilment, 
political representation, etc.). Meanwhile, the setting of the MAELG project has provided 
the practical opportunity to focus on the councillors. A final motive is theoretical. By 
inquiring local councillors as individual actors, our results will probably reflect their role 
and position in the wide context of contemporary local governance (i.e. including their 
experience in the council, but also in council committees, inter-municipal co-operations, 
the party group, informal interactions with citizens and the administration, etc.), rather 
than the narrow institutional and formal setting of the council as such. 
The focus on the individual level, however, implies that the individualistic (or 
reductionist) fallacy is a possible research pitfall (Burnham et al., 2008; Landman, 2008). 
The individualistic fallacy implies that “inferences about groups, societies, or nations are 
drawn directly from evidence gathered from individuals” (Frankfort-Nachmias & 
Nachmias, 1996: 55). In our research design, this means that we can draw valid 
conclusions about the population of local councillors in Belgium, rather than conclusions 
about the local councils or the local government system on the aggregate level. 
The subsequent question of the research procedure addresses how these units of analysis 
can be surveyed in the most appropriate way. We opt for the quantitative method as basic 
approach. Quantitative research in social sciences aims at being objective and scientific 
through statistical analysis (Bara, 2009). Therefore, it tends to generate large amounts of 
data (the large-N design), which allow one to extrapolate the specific findings to a 
broader setting (Theodoulou, 1999b; Hopkin, 2010; John, 2010). In local government, the 
numerosity of possible research units (i.e. municipalities and/or municipal councillors) 
foster such large-N research in particular (John, 2006). Additionally, quantitative 
                                                             
13 This perspective is extended with councillors from France and the Netherlands in the comparative 
study. 
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research aims at reducing bias in the research process and identify relationships between 
the concepts and variables under study (Theodoulou, 1999b). Together these qualities 
make the quantitative strategy the most suitable one to study the population of Belgian 
local councillors across a wide variety of themes, while testing a set of general and 
applied research hypotheses. On the downside, and compared to the qualitative method as 
its analytical counterpart (Burnham et al., 2008; Landman, 2008; Bara, 2009; John, 
2010), the quantitative method also has some limitations. As Bara (2009) and John 
(2010) point out, quantitative analysis produces only estimates or approximations of the 
complex reality in the political world. Scholars should therefore pay close attention to the 
process of data collection (Section 2.5) and the treatment of the data (Section 2.4) in 
order to minimize the distance between reality and its empirical observations. The 
limitations of our approach are also discussed further in Section 2.7. 
Selecting the specific research method from within the quantitative umbrella is the next 
step in the research procedure. This choice depends on the research question, but also on 
resources (e.g. time and money) and the desired validity (Theodoulou, 1999a). Burnham 
et al. (2008) discern five different types of research design: the experimental design, the 
cross-sectional design, the longitudinal design, the case study design and the comparative 
design. We prefer to construct a combined design which consists of a cross-sectional 
basis and a comparative complement. Such a method is referred to as methodological 
triangulation and has the main advantage that it “may provide complementary data which 
can strengthen the findings” (Burnham et al., 2008: 40). 
The basis of our design is cross-sectional. In a cross-sectional design, information is 
gathered amongst a large number of cases at a particular moment in time (Burnham et al., 
2008). Subsequent analyses then look for associations and relations between the variables 
in the data-set. Due to the vast amount of data collected, the design is often used in 
quantitative analysis. As a result, it is also one of the most popular research designs in 
social sciences, particularly in those cases where experiments are not feasible (such as 
our research setting) and/or conclusions should go beyond the specific context of one 
case study. Burnham et al. (2008) mention its restricted scope in terms of time, and thus 
applicability, to be the main disadvantage of the cross-sectional design. Scholars who 
wish to scrutinize evolution over time, for instance, often use a longitudinal design. Since 
we foremost want to collect a large amount of data on the contemporary population of 
Belgian local councillors concerning several thematic subjects, the cross-sectional design 
still seems the most appropriate way to proceed. Accordingly, this design structures the 
first three research themes of the analysis, providing information on (a) recruitment and 
career, (b) councillors’ role orientation, and (c) political representation (Chapters 3 to 5). 
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In addition to the cross-sectional basis of research, we have selected an international 
comparative design to structure the final thematic analysis (Chapter 6). As Bara (2009: 
45) notes, “the process of comparing lies at the very heart of analysis.” Through the 
careful selection of cases a comparative design might provide an academic surplus in four 
ways (Burnham, 2008; Landman, 2008). First, it promotes contextual description. In our 
case, this implies that the international comparative study may give us a deeper 
understanding of the Belgian findings by framing them in a broader perspective. This 
approach should enhance the validity and objectivity of our results (Bara, 2009; Hopkin, 
2010).  
Second, a comparative design helps to classify the political world. Classification as such, 
however, is not a primary earmark of our study. Rather, it is subsidiary to the third 
function of the comparative design: hypothesis-testing. As noted above, our study will 
test three general and common hypotheses on comparative local government systems 
(Goldsmith & Page, 2010). The hypotheses hold that local systems (a) further drift apart 
(divergence), (b) reflect a path-dependent legacy (path-dependency), or (c) move in the 
same direction (convergence). Obviously, we apply these hypotheses to the role and 
position of the local councillors within these local systems. We have found this the most 
feasible method to tackle the basic hypothesis that, in terms of councillors’ role and 
position, local governments in Flanders and Wallonia are heading in different directions 
(i.e. by following the path of their neighbours the Netherlands and France, see De Rynck 
& Wayenberg, 2010; see also Section 2.3.1). Indeed, our cross-sectional design does not 
allow for longitudinal analysis, nor do we dispose of comparable data on local councillors 
from previous studies. Hence the comparative approach, including the purposive 
selection of the Netherlands and France as theoretical reference cases, enables us to test 
the basic comparative research hypotheses. Since the Netherlands and France are 
theoretically opposed (i.e. most different from each other) whilst both have some 
characteristics in common with the (formal) Belgian model (i.e. most similar to 
Belgium), we refer to our comparative design as a most similar/most different design (see 
Landman, 2008)14.  
Finally, the fourth function of the comparative method is prediction. Based on the 
comparison of different countries, the scholar might predict outcomes in other countries, 
or future developments in the specific country under study. Particularly the latter 
perspective is important for us. In fact, the information on the French and Dutch 
councillors might help us to interpret and discuss the results from the Belgian case, while 
introducing some (possible) future perspectives in the general conclusion (Chapter 7). 
  
                                                             
14 Hopkin (2010) argues that large-N studies at the individual level (such as ours) are particularly suited 
for such designs. 
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2.4. MEASUREMENT 
The next step in the methodological process is to establish the measurement of research, 
i.e. “the assignment of numerals or numbers to objects, events, or variables according to 
rules” (Frankfort-Nachmias & Nachmias, 1996: 156). This step thus determines how 
characteristics of certain objects will be ascertained (Brinkman, 2000). As a logical 
extension of the operationalization of our research plan, the measurement is specified per 
theme in each study. The general measurement of the variables has been set in the 
standard questionnaire of the MAELG project. It varies from the nominal level (e.g. 
gender, profession, party affiliation) and the ordinal level (e.g. degree of support for 
certain reforms in/of local democracy) to the ratio level (e.g. experience, inhabitants of 
the municipality, age). For analytical (or sometimes theoretical) purposes, however, we 
may also transpose these data to a lower level of measurement in the study (e.g. rescaling 
a continuous variable in a number of categories, grouping certain items by factor 
analysis). 
The central criteria for the quality of measurement are reliability and validity 
(Kleinnijenhuis, 1999; Burnham et al., 2008). In short, reliability means that repeated 
measurements of the same variable produce consistent results (Kleinnijenhuis, 1999). 
Validity, on the other hand, implies that the measurement actually measures what the 
researcher intends to measure (Brinkman, 2000)15. In each chapter, we pay attention to 
the specific operationalization(s) and subsequent measurement and treatment of the 
variables, as well as to the statistical techniques applied in order to maximize the 
reliability and validity of our research. 
 
2.5. DATA COLLECTION 
Once the research design has been developed and the measurement has been set, the 
research data can be collected. In this section, we discuss the specific procedure which 
we have used to collect our data (i.e. the mail survey, the sampling procedure and the 
survey procedure), as well as the outcome of this process (i.e. the response and 
representativeness of the survey). 
 
  
                                                             
15 For instance, a recurring pitfall for our study is the analysis of councillors’ behaviour. Since we do not 
measure their actual behaviour, but only a personal (hence, indirect) opinion of the latter, we must be 
careful when interpreting these data (i.e. as self-reported behaviour). 
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2.5.1. Mail survey 
We opted to use the standard MAELG mail survey as the instrument to collect our 
research data. In political science, surveys are frequently used for quantitative large-N 
research on the individual level (John, 2010). Kleinnijenhuis (1999: 79) defines a survey 
as “a standard list of questions that will be posed to a great number of individuals.” 
Instead of directly observing political behaviour, the survey asks for the respondents’ 
self-identification in terms of attitudes and behaviour (Theodoulou, 1999a). It thus 
measures the political world in an indirect way. 
Sending out the survey per mail has some important advantages which made this method 
the most appropriate one to collect the vast amount of data needed for our research in a 
standardized way (see Frankfort-Nachmias & Nachmias, 1996; Billiet & Carton, 2006). 
First, mail surveys render the process of data collection relatively cheap and time-saving 
because they do not require the employment of a large staff of interviewers. Second, this 
method reduces biasing errors that might occur during the personal contact and 
interaction between interviewer and interviewee. Accordingly, the mail survey also 
augments the standardization of research. Third, mail surveys give the respondents a 
stronger feeling of anonymity. This might be particularly important with regard to 
personal or sensitive questions (e.g. age, gender, party affiliation, ideological affiliation). 
Fourth, mail surveys allow for more flexibility and consultation by the respondent. 
Indeed, he/she is free to complete the questionnaire at the best possible moment and, if 
necessary, he/she can consult certain information or relevant sources. Finally, mail 
surveys increase the accessibility of the research population. Sending out questionnaires 
by mail is therefore a feasible option to reach an extensive or geographically dispersed 
population such as the population of local councillors in Belgium.  
On the other hand, mail surveys have some disadvantages or limitations that we should 
keep in mind as well (Frankfort-Nachmias & Nachmias, 1996; Billiet & Carton, 2006)16. 
The first set relates to the lack of flexibility. Indeed, mail surveys (can) only include 
simple and straightforward questions. Interviews, as opposite instruments of data 
collection, allow (a) probing for further clarifications and complete/adequate answers, (b) 
altering the order of the questions, (c) asking specific knowledge questions or complex 
tasks and (d) register non-verbal behaviour and spontaneous reactions. The second 
disadvantage is that mail surveys provide no control over the response process and 
setting. They provide no information on the time and duration of response either. Finally, 
the third and most important disadvantage of mail surveys concerns the low response 
rate, defined as “the percentage of respondents in the sample who return completed 
                                                             
16 The advantages of the personal survey or interview are typically considered as the disadvantages of the 
mail survey, and vice versa (Billiet & Carton, 2006). 
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questionnaires” (Frankfort-Nachmias & Nachmias, 1996: 226). According to the authors, 
the typical response rate of mail surveys is situated between 20 and 40% only, whereas 
this percentage substantially augments in personal interviews. The danger of such a large 
non-response is that the group of non-respondents significantly differs from the group of 
respondents. Therefore, careful attention should be paid to maximizing the response rate 
of the survey and testing the representativeness of the research sample and response (see 
following sections). 
The actual questionnaire for our research was drawn up by the joint team of researchers 
from the Euroloc group in the context of the international comparative MAELG project. 
As indicated before (see Section 2.2), each national team of academics was asked to 
retain as many original questions of the base version as possible. The questionnaire 
consists of 5 thematic components: (a) questions about the council and actors in local 
democracy, (b) questions about the role as a councillor, (c) questions about the view on 
local democracy and local policy, (d) questions about the political career and party and 
(e) questions about the (personal) background. Most questions are closed (or closed-
ended) questions, often presented in a response matrix. The main advantage of such 
questions is that they advance the reliability and comparability of the data. On the 
downside, these questions force respondents to choose a particular answer which might 
not always perfectly fit with their specific opinion or situation (Brinkman, 2000). 
Therefore further clarifications or specifications are sometimes foreseen in the form of an 
open-ended question or category whilst a couple of Likert-scales are used as well. The 
questionnaire (written in generic English) is added in Appendix A. For our study, we 
translated this version into Dutch and French – omitting some questions or variables 
which were not relevant for our context17. Each respondent was surveyed in his mother 
tongue. 
 
2.5.2. Sampling procedure 
In 2008, the total population of Belgian local councillors consisted of 13.281 individual 
cases18. Since practical concerns (time, money, manpower, the numerosity of the 
councillor population) inhibited us from surveying this entire population, we had to select 
a sampling procedure which guaranteed a representative image of the latter. Ideally, a 
sample is “a group that accurately reflects the makeup of the population” (Theodoulou, 
1999a: 146). 
                                                             
17 This concerns question 4 (not relevant since there are always agreements on policies and distributions 
of posts in coalition governments in Belgian local government), question 12 (councillors always receive a 
remuneration per council meeting), question 32 (we know that the weight of personal votes has been 
increased in the Belgian legislation) and variable 164, 171 and 204 (contextualized). 
18 The district councillors from Antwerp are not included in the research population and survey sample. 
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We selected our research units by means of a stratified random sample. The technique of 
random sampling ensures that, independently from each other, every unit of the research 
population has the same chance to be included in the sample (Burnham et al., 2008). The 
main advantage of random sampling is that it tends to generate a representative sample 
that enables the researcher to extrapolate his/her conclusions to the population as a whole 
(Theodoulou, 1999a). A stratified random sample is constructed when the researcher 
expects that the results of the analyses might fundamentally differ between certain 
subgroups of the population (Frankfort-Nachmias & Nachmias, 1996). He/she therefore 
divides the population into a number of subgroups or strata on the basis of these 
characteristic parameters (Kleinnijenhuis, 1999; Burnham et al., 2008). Each stratum 
should be internally as homogenous as possible whilst the difference between the strata 
should be maximized. Obviously, the criteria or parameters for the stratification should 
relate to the topic of interest and should not create too many subgroups either (Frankfort-
Nachmias & Nachmias, 1996). Finally, once the strata have been composed, the 
researcher draws a simple random sample from each stratum. Together the selected cases 
comprise the final sample (Theodoulou, 1999a). 
Practical considerations (i.e. the absence of a detailed list of Belgian local councillors 
with their personal characteristics whereupon our stratification could be based) did not 
allow us to draw a stratified sample from the population of Belgian local councillors 
directly. Therefore, we sought to create a representative sample indirectly, by stratifying 
on the municipal level. Unlike individual councillor characteristics, these municipal 
parameters were and are available and freely accessible. As such, we stratified the 589 
Belgian municipalities on the basis of three parameters that might (possibly) influence the 
role and position of their local councillors. 
The first parameter is municipal ‘size’19. Size not only figures frequently as a theoretical 
determinant in political analysis (Reynaert, 2000), it is expected to impact on the 
acclaimed strain on local councillors as well – indeed, some authors assume that the latter 
is more tangible in large(r) cities (Gabriel et al., 2000; Haus et al., 2005; see Chapter 6). 
We divided the Belgian municipalities into two groups: a group of municipalities that 
count more than 10.000 inhabitants (N=342 or 58%) and a group of municipalities that 
count 10.000 inhabitants or less (N=247 or 42%). This threshold had been set by the 
international MAELG project in order to maximize the comparability of research. For our 
study however, omitting councillors from municipalities with less than 10.000 inhabitants 
                                                             
19 The division is based on the official population numbers for 1 January 2007, consulted on the website 
of Belgian federal government (http://www.statbel.fgov.be/downloads/pop200701com.xls). 
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would fundamentally have narrowed the research scope and reduced the generalizability 
of the research findings20. 
The second parameter of the sampling procedure is the ‘region’ in which the municipality 
is located. In the general introduction (Chapter 1), we have outlined how the Belgian 
regions Flanders (308 municipalities), Wallonia (262 municipalities) and Brussels Capital 
(19 municipalities) differ in some cultural and structural traits regarding their local 
systems. The regionalization of the constitutive framework on local government from 
2002 onwards has formalized and further triggered this evolution. Including councillors 
from the three Belgian regions was thus an absolute necessity in our research. 
Accordingly, the two initial groups that had been created by the parameter size were 
further divided in subgroups according to the parameter region. 
Regarding the third and final parameter, we sought to classify the municipalities on the 
base of their ‘socio-economic profile’. Again, this could help to create a representative 
sample of the Belgian municipal landscape whilst we might also expect that the socio-
economic character of the municipality (partly) determines the functioning of its local 
councillors21. To classify the municipalities, we have used a typology developed by the 
Dexia bank22. Dexia is an official partner of Belgian government, particularly in terms of 
local statistics. Furthermore, it was the only available typology that classified the three 
Belgian regions in a uniform way. The typology includes 7 broad categories and several 
subcategories (see Box 2.1). Accordingly, the groups that had been created by the 
parameters size and region were further divided on the basis of the 7 broad categories of 
the typology. Finally, in order to obtain a balanced number of strata which each include 
approximately 10 municipalities on average, the groups were divided for a final time on 
the basis of the subcategories of the typology, and, if necessary, ascending municipal 
size. 
 
  
                                                             
20 For instance, the average municipal size and the proportion of municipalities with more than 10.000 
inhabitants differed strongly between the 3 Belgian regions in 2007: Flanders (average size 19.861, 71.1% 
above 10.000), Wallonia (average size 13.114, 39.7% above 10.000) and Brussels Capital (average size 
54.274, 100% above 10.000). 
21 For instance in a small rural village, the recruitment process or bond between the representatives and 
the represented might be different than that found in a strongly urbanized central city. 
22 DEXIA, Lokale Financiën. Sociaaleconomische typologie van de gemeenten 
(http://www.dexia.be/NL/Professional/PublicFinance/oursector/Publications/SpecialStudy). The current 
name of Dexia bank in Belgium is Belfius Bank. 
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Box 2.1. The socio-economic profile of Belgian municipalities: Dexia typology 
(1) Residential municipalities (N=170): 
residential municipalities in rural zones, residential municipalities on the outskirts of the 
town (or border zones), conurbations with tertiary activity, residential suburbs with high 
incomes, residential municipalities in southeast and northwest Brussels. 
(2) Rural municipalities or urbanized rural municipalities (N=165): 
little agrarian municipalities, very rural municipalities with strong ageing, rural 
municipalities or urbanized rural municipalities with strong demographic growth, 
predominantly agrarian rural municipalities with weak touristic activity, predominantly 
wooded rural municipalities with weak touristic activity. 
(3) Municipalities with a concentration of economic activity (N=79): 
rural and agrarian municipalities with industrial activity, urbanized rural municipalities 
with industrial activity and demographic growth, cities and conurbations with industrial 
activity, municipalities with economic activity in rural or semi-urban zones, 
municipalities with economic activity in urbanized or conurbation zones. 
(4) Semi-urban municipalities or conurbations (N=67): 
little urbanized municipalities with demographic decline, strongly urbanized 
municipalities with low incomes, weakly urbanized municipalities, suburban cores or 
conurbations. 
(5) Central municipalities (N=91): 
medium-sized cities, regional cities, large cities and regional cities, central municipalities 
and touristic centres, small cities, central cities in rural environment, medium-sized cities 
with high incomes. 
(6) Touristic municipalities (N=8): 
coastal municipalities. 
(7) Strongly urbanized central municipalities (N=9): 
municipalities from the first belt, large municipalities from the canal zone, employment 
centre. 
 
The end result of this process was the identification of a group of 59 strata each 
comprising 8, 9, 10 or 11 municipalities. An exception was made to ensure that the large 
cities of the three regions were adequately represented in the sample23. Every stratum was 
internally homogenous regarding the size, region and socio-economic character of its 
municipalities. The difference between the strata on the other hand was maximal. 
                                                             
23 The largest cities of the three regions (Schaarbeek, Anderlecht, Brussels; Antwerp, Ghent; Namur, 
Liège and Charleroi) counted far more inhabitants than the other municipalities of their original stratum. 
Since it was important to ensure that at least one large city of each region was included in the sample, 
these cities have been placed exceptionally in separate (sub)strata. 
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Depending on the size of the stratum, 2 or 3 municipalities per stratum were subsequently 
selected at random by the statistical computer program SPSS. The sampling procedure 
thus aimed at being proportionate, selecting the same number of units from every stratum 
(Frankfort-Nachmias & Nachmias, 1996; Theodoulou, 1999a).  
In the end, this procedure resulted in a final sample of 180 municipalities (see Appendix 
B). Together these 180 municipalities comprise 4.096 local councillors or 30.8% of the 
total population of Belgian local councillors24. To verify whether our final sample 
adequately represents the total landscape of Belgian municipalities in terms of size, 
region and socio-economic profile, we ran a Chi-square (χ²) test with SPSS25. The test 
confirmed that our sample is perfectly representative for the total landscape of Belgian 
municipalities in terms of size (χ²=.005, df=1, sig=.942), region (χ²=.212, df=2, sig=.900) 
and socio-economic profile (χ²=.208, df=6, sig=1.000). 
 
2.5.3. Survey procedure 
The review of the mail survey above (Section 2.5.1) has singled out a low response rate 
as the main problem associated with this type of research. Dillman (1978) therefore 
developed a specific method, called the Total Design Method (TDM), which seeks to 
minimize non-response for mail surveys (Hoddinott & Bass, 1986; Frankfort-Nachmias 
& Nachmias, 1996; Billiet & Carton, 2008). In 2000, Dillman slightly modified this 
method into the Tailored Design Method (TDM, Dillman, 2000). The latter replaced the 
old universal method with a new tailored one that considers contextual elements of 
research such as specific sponsorship, the research population and the content of the 
survey. Essentially, Dillman’s method combines an attractive layout with a thorough 
follow-up of response. It rests on the theory of social exchange. This theory states that 
social action is determined by its expected and anticipated advantages. The researcher 
                                                             
24 The sample comprises of 75 municipalities below 10.000 and 105 municipalities above 10.000; it 
comprises of 6 municipalities from the Brussels Region, 97 municipalities from Flanders and 77 
municipalities from Wallonia; finally, it comprises of 51 municipalities from the socio-economic category 
1, 52 municipalities from category 2, 24 municipalities from category 3, 21 municipalities from category 
4, 27 municipalities from category 5, 2 municipalities from category 6 and 3 municipalities from category 
6 (see Box 2.1 for the categories). 
25 This test indicates the significance of the difference between observed frequencies (in casu the 
frequency distributions of our parameters size, region and socio-economic profile in our research sample) 
and expected frequencies (in casu the frequency distributions that our parameters size, region and socio-
economic profile would have in the sample if they would be perfectly representative for the population of 
Belgian municipalities at large). For our sample to be representative, there should thus be no significant 
difference between the observed and the expected frequencies, i.e. between the actual sample and the 
theoretical sample (as a representative map of the total population). We use the common significance 
level .05 as critical value (John, 2010).  
METHODOLOGY  |  85 
 
should thus increase the expected benefices for the respondents whilst minimizing the 
expected costs and establishing a relation of trust (Dillman, 2000). 
The first element of our survey procedure is the composure of a respondent-friendly 
questionnaire. The original questions had been phrased by the Euroloc research group in 
the context of the MAELG project (see Appendix A). Regarding the layout of the survey, 
we organized and printed the questionnaire in the form of a booklet, the preferred format 
by Dillman. This booklet counted 19 pages in total, which is quite lengthy. However 
given the overarching international setting of research, it was impossible to substantially 
reduce the size of the questionnaire. The front page of our questionnaire included the title 
of the survey, the logos of the participating universities (i.e. Ghent University and 
University College Ghent) and the names of the promoters of the study. At the end of the 
questionnaire, we provided space for additional comments by the respondent. The back 
page included a word of thanks and contact details. 
In addition to a respondent-friendly questionnaire, the survey implementation is at least 
equally important to increase response. Even though there is no single magic formula to 
carry out the survey in the most successful way, Dillman (2000) has determined four 
(complementary) conditions that often significantly augment response: (a) four contacts 
with the respondent, (b) including return envelopes in the survey package, (c) 
personalizing the correspondence with the respondents and (d) token financial incentives. 
In our study we did not foresee financial incentives on deontological grounds, and 
because we wanted to guarantee the objective and scientific character of the study. 
Besides, such incentives would have significantly augmented the research expenses. As 
for the rest, we have aimed at complying with Dillman’s conditions as much as possible. 
Our first contact with the respondents was the original questionnaire mailed on 6 June 
200826. It included a cover letter, the questionnaire and a return envelope. The cover 
letter counted one page. It mentioned the date, a salutation of the respondent, the goal of 
the survey, the importance of the respondent’s participation (in casu stressing the value 
for Belgian research and the European research program), a guarantee of anonymity and 
confidential treatment of the data, an enclosed return envelope, a signature in ink from 
the project leader and contact details. The return envelope counted a DA-postal code 
which replaced the traditional stamp. On the back of the envelop, a number was added in 
order to monitor response whilst at the end of the questionnaire, we asked for the postal 
                                                             
26 Dillman suggests that the researcher might send a brief pre-notice letter to the respondents prior to this 
contact. Such letter attends the respondents on the upcoming survey, meanwhile encouraging response. 
This has not been done in our survey, mainly due to the time pressure. Indeed, we aimed at organizing the 
original first survey (i.e. mailing plus time for response) before July – which marks the start of the 
summer holidays for most municipal councils. Postponing the entire process to September would have 
made it problematic to deliver the Belgian data in time for the Euroloc research group. 
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code of the respondents’ municipality as well (for the same reason). The total package 
was sent to all the local councillors, aldermen and the mayors of the 180 municipalities 
included in the sample to their official address at the city hall. Respondents were asked to 
return the completed questionnaire by 30 June 2008. 
The ensuing contact that Dillman suggests is a Thank You/Reminder postcard which 
refreshes the memory of the respondents, usually one week after the original mail-out. 
We did not directly address the councillors again, but contacted the municipal secretary 
(CEO) by e-mail. The main reason for this procedure was practical: many councillors do 
not pass by the city hall on a weekly base, whereas the CEO is quite easy to contact. 
Furthermore, the municipal CEO is often a neutral and influential person in the 
municipality. His/her co-operation and moral authority might therefore encourage 
councillors to respond. 
The third contact was to re-send the survey integrally on 6 August 2008. This contact 
intended to further urge the participants to respond. As Dillman notes, the tone of the 
cover letter of this contact is usually more insistent, stressing the importance of the study 
even more. In our case, we did not only send these questionnaires to the non-respondents 
but also to the other councillors who had already returned a completed questionnaire. The 
reason for this was twofold. On one hand, it was a possibility to thank the respondents 
personally for their co-operation in the survey. On the other hand, it was an attempt to 
further stress the anonymity of the research27. Indeed in the first round, we received some 
complaints from councillors about the personal information asked (since the combination 
of the postal code with personal information such as political party, gender and age could 
lead us to identify the respondent). Therefore, the cover letter also stressed the 
confidentiality of the research again. Due to practical considerations, the method was also 
slightly different in the second round of surveying. Since most municipal councils have a 
summer holiday in July-August, we decided to contact the councillors at their private 
addresses. When it was available, we sent the questionnaire to the e-mail addresses of the 
councillors. The latter were often available on the municipal websites and this is 
obviously a cheaper method as well. Furthermore, the questionnaire could be completed 
electronically, so the efforts for the respondents were reduced28. The deadline for this 
second survey round was set on 1 September 2008. For the group of respondents who did 
not have a public e-mail address (or from whom we were not able to retrieve the address), 
                                                             
27 Obviously, we stressed the fact that councillors who had already returned a completed questionnaire in 
the first round did not need to do this again. With the help of the ID on the return envelope, we could 
ensure that no responses were included twice in the data-set. 
28 In this sense, the contact also fits with the fifth contact proposed by Dillman, i.e. invoking special 
procedures. 
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we sent out the survey package by mail to their private addresses29. This was done on 6 
September 2008 with a return date set on 1 October 2008. 
Finally, we organized a fourth contact round in October 2008. This round consisted of a 
personal rappel by e-mail (when possible), and a phone call to the municipal CEO of 
those municipalities with a very low response rate up to that point to ask them to 
encourage councillors to participate in the survey. We closed the survey procedure during 
November 2008. Figure 2.3 summarizes the different steps of this process. 
 
Figure 2.3. The survey procedure 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                             
29 When the e-mail addresses or home addresses were not freely accessible, we contacted the 
municipalities in order to receive a list of councillors’ contact details. 
1
• 6 June 2008
• Personal postal mail of the survey to the councillors at the city hall
• Deadline: 30 June 2008 
2
• 1 week later
• E-mail to the municipal CEOs (reminder of the survey)
3
• 6 August & 6 September 2008
• E-mail or postal mail of the survey to the councillors at their private (home) addresses
• Deadline: 1 September & 1 October 2008 
4
•October 2008
• Phone call to the municipal CEOs (reminder of the survey)
• End of survey: November 2008
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2.5.4. Response 
The survey procedure outlined above resulted in a total response of 856 single units or 
cases. Compared to the initial research population of 4096 units, this equals a response 
rate of 20.9%30. Considering the total amount of time and effort invested, this result was 
fairly disappointing. It seems that several factors might account for the reluctance of local 
councillors to participate in our survey. They basically stem from a form of 
inaccessibility or a plain refusal to co-operate (Brinkman, 2000). 
First, low response rates remain a typical drawback of mail surveys generally (Brinkman, 
2000; Burnham et al., 2008). Accordingly, there is no fixed standard for the minimal 
response rate needed in survey research (Frankfort-Nachmias & Nachmias, 1996). 
Brinkman (2000) hereby indicates that despite efforts to maximize response, researchers 
might be content if they obtain a response rate of 25 to 40% by using mail surveys. 
Second, some practical obstacles prevented us from applying the complete Total/Tailored 
Design Method developed by Dillman. For instance, deadlines set by the MAELG project 
made it difficult to postpone the survey to the period after the summer holidays, or send a 
pre-notice letter to the councillors. The absence of detailed contact lists in some 
municipalities (particularly in the smaller municipalities in Wallonia) made it almost 
impossible to directly contact some respondents in the second or third contact round as 
well. Besides, the questionnaire in itself was quite difficult and lengthy (see also Egner et 
al., forthcoming) and contained sensitive personal information (e.g. age, party affiliation, 
vision on local democracy, etc). Further, given the large number of municipalities 
included in the sample, it was not possible to personally attend a council meeting in 
which the survey could be explained and completed. Handing out (and elucidating) the 
questionnaire on site is seen as a fruitful approach to enhance response (Brinkman, 
2000)31. 
A final set of possible explanations relates to our research population in particular. Many 
scholars note that the latter’s personal involvement with the research subject is key to 
achieve a high response rate (Frankfort-Nachmias & Nachmias, 1996; Brinkman, 2000; 
Dillman, 2000). In this respect, a certain response fatigue could occur amongst the 
population (Brinkman, 2000). Belgian politicians, for instance, tend to be surveyed quite 
frequently on a wide variety of topics. Besides, some councillors indicated that they did 
not wish to participate because they were/are strongly disillusioned with the way in 
which local democracy works in their municipality, or because their party prohibited 
                                                             
30 After the first survey round, this percentage was 10.9% (N=446). Councillors who returned an empty 
questionnaire, as well as double responses, are not included in this total. 
31 For instance, we applied this method in a (smaller but similar) survey amongst the provincial 
councillors in Flanders (see Olislagers et al., 2011). It indeed resulted in considerably higher response 
rates, varying from 51,2% to 88,1% per province. 
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them from doing so. And obviously, the fact that many councillors fulfil their mandate in 
addition to a fulltime occupation makes such research an intensive endeavour. 
Bearing the above in mind, our response rate is thus not an exception for mail survey 
research in political science. Moreover, if we compare our result with the figures of the 
other partners in the MAELG project (see Table 2.1; figures refer only to the response of 
the councillors from municipalities with more than 10.000 inhabitants), the Belgian 
response rate does not appear to be out of order regarding the European peloton. Only in 
Sweden were the researchers able to collect completed questionnaires from a majority of 
the research population. This could suggest a limited interest and/or involvement of local 
councillors in our research topic in se32. 
 
Table 2.1. Response rates of the MAELG project  
Country Response rate (%) N 
Sweden 
The Netherlands 
Switzerland 
Norway 
Spain 
Italy 
Israel 
Belgium 
Germany 
Greece 
Austria 
Poland 
Czech Republic 
France 
United Kingdom 
Croatia 
General 
63.1 
38.6 
37.7 
37.1 
25.9 
23.8 
23.5 
22.4 
22.0 
21.2 
19.9 
15.6 
12.6 
12.1 
11.5 
10.3 
23.1 
1.346 
1.222 
1.616 
1.134 
520 
1.201 
147 
634 
894 
235 
408 
328 
624 
720 
700 
233 
11.962 
(Egner et al., forthcoming) 
 
A final remark concerns our obtained dataset of 856 individual cases. Burnham et al. 
(2008) indicate that 300 cases is a frequently used minimal sample size in statistical 
theory. Hence, our total sample of 856 cases has allowed us to run all the statistical tests 
required. Besides, if we consider the total local councillor population in Belgium 
                                                             
32 This was also put forward by Kerrouche (2005) in his analysis of the response of French mayors in the 
European Polleader-project. 
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(N=13.281), our dataset represents a fairly large sample fraction of 1:16. Such a large 
fraction is a typical advantage of mail surveys. Indeed, even though the response rate of 
mail surveys might be lower than in other types of research, the original accessibility of 
the research population was significantly larger to start with (Billiet & Carton, 2006). 
 
2.5.5. Representativeness 
The main problem with high non-response is that the group of non-respondents might 
significantly differ from the group of respondents (Frankfort-Nachmias & Nachmias, 
1996; Brinkman, 2000). This obviously hinders the generalization of the research 
findings. Therefore, it is important to analyze the representativeness of the response too. 
Since non-response ultimately remains under the radar of empirical research, scholars 
should look for certain estimates to determine the representativeness of the dataset 
(Brinkman, 2000). As Billiet and Carton (2006) state, a practical way of doing this is to 
compare response with non-response. This method is only feasible if particular 
information on the characteristics of the total research population was available at the 
start of the sampling procedure, for instance in the case of stratified samples like ours33. 
To analyze the representativeness of our response, we first ran a Chi-square (χ²) test with 
SPSS again. This test verified whether our final dataset (N=856) represents the initial 
stratified research sample (N=4.096) in terms of the stratification parameters size, region 
and socio-economic profile34. The analysis shows that our dataset is not perfectly 
representative in terms of municipal ‘size’ (χ²=7.270, df=1, sig=.007). There are more 
respondents from the larger municipalities in our dataset than in the original stratified 
research sample. A similar over-representation emerges regarding the second parameter 
‘region’ (χ²=30.861, df=2, sig=.000). Here, councillors from Flanders are over-
represented in the dataset. On the other hand, the response has turned out to be perfectly 
                                                             
33 Other methods (see Billiet & Carton, 2006) of testing the representativeness of response (e.g. 
comparing data to the original population at large, addressing non-respondents and looking for bias, 
analyzing the response characteristics from the different survey rounds) were not feasible in our context 
(e.g. no data on the total Belgian councillor population were available; deontological reasons prohibited 
addressing non-respondents; the different moments of response overlapped in practice due to the summer 
holidays in between). 
34 The data file comprises of 222 cases from municipalities below 10.000 and 621 cases from 
municipalities above 10.000; it comprises of 33 cases from municipalities in the Brussels Region, 565 
cases from municipalities in Flanders and 252 cases from municipalities in Wallonia; finally, it comprises 
of 221 cases from municipalities in the socio-economic category 1, 211 cases from municipalities in 
category 2, 121 cases from municipalities in category 3, 98 cases from municipalities in category 4, 160 
cases from municipalities in category 5, 12 cases from municipalities in category 6 and 20 cases from 
municipalities in category 6 (see Box 2.1 for the categories). In some cases we could not identify the size, 
region and/or socio-economic profile of the responses because all the references to the respondent’s 
identity (e.g. postal code, response code on the return envelope, etc) had been removed. 
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representative in terms of the ‘socio-economic profile’ of the municipalities (χ²=4.153, 
df=6, sig=.656). 
To further analyze the skewed response in terms of region and size, another statistical 
parameter is at our disposal. In fact, the Chi-square tests indicate whether the response is 
representative for the research sample or not, but they do not tell us how substantial the 
eventual bias in response is. Comparing the non-response with the response on the 
parameters size and region by means of a Cramer’s V test is a possible way of assessing 
the strength of the over-representation of councillors from the larger municipalities and 
the Flemish municipalities35. The value of Cramer’s V varies from 0 (no association 
between the variables) to 1 (perfect association between the variables) (see Box 2.2 
below). 
 
Box 2.2. Interpretation of the strength of relationship coefficients 
Coefficients    Description       
0.00     No (linear) association 
0.01 – 0.09    Trivial (linear) relationship 
0.10 – 0.29    Low to moderate (linear) relationship 
0.30 – 0.49    Moderate to substantial (linear) relationship 
0.50 – 0.69    Substantial to very strong (linear) relationship 
0.70 – 0.89    Very strong (linear) relationship 
0.90 +     Near perfect 
(De Vaus, 2002: 259) 
 
  
                                                             
35 Cramer’s V is frequently used to test the association between two nominal variables in large(r) tables, 
and to indicate the strength of the association between these variables (den Boer et al., 1994; 
Kleinnijenhuis, 1999). In our case, we analyze the association between the variables ‘size’ (i.e. above 
10.000 or equal/below 10.000) or ‘region’ (i.e. Flanders, Wallonia and Brussels) on the one hand and the 
variable ‘response’ (i.e. response versus non-response) on the other. 
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Figure 2.4 presents a graphic picture of the skewed response in our data file. The first 
graph of the figure demonstrates that councillors from the larger municipalities are 
slightly over-represented in the data file: they make up 73.7% of the respondents while 
they comprise 68.3% of the non-respondents. The Cramer’s V value for this association 
is .047 (p=.002). Accordingly, there is a significant association between size and 
response, even though the strength of this association is just trivial. The second graph in 
Figure 2.4 shows a stronger skewed response in terms of region. Flemish councillors are 
over-represented in our dataset: they make up 66.5% of the respondents while their group 
represents just 54.6% of the non-respondents. The graph further shows that particularly 
councillors from Wallonia have participated less in our survey. The Cramer’s V value for 
this association is .098 (p=.000). This means that the association is highly significant, but 
still rather low (see Box 2.2). This is why we will not weigh the different categories for 
the analyses further on36. However, we should keep this bias in check when discussing 
and interpreting the results for the general population. 
 
Figure 2.4. Representativeness of response in terms of size and region 
    
 
 
  
                                                             
36 An exception will be made for the comparative analysis in Chapter 6, where we will weigh the dataset 
to include an equal share of Flemish, Walloon, French and Dutch councillors. 
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2.6. DATA ANALYSIS 
The data from the questionnaires were inputted to a standard SPSS computer file created 
by the German team of the MAELG project. All data analyses have been carried out on a 
quantitative base by the statistical software program SPSS (George & Mallery, 2010). 
Landman (2008: 20) notes that “quantitative methods are based on the distributions these 
data exhibit and the relationships that can be established between numeric variables 
using simple and advanced statistical methods.” 
A combination of these approaches underpins the thematic analyses of the cross-sectional 
studies in our study (Chapter 3 to 5). The first step is always descriptive. Descriptive 
analyses of the data provide valuable information on the research matter (Burnham et al., 
2008; John, 2010). This is usually done by unravelling the observations and looking for 
proportions which reduce and simplify the information (Frankfort-Nachmias & 
Nachmias, 1996; John, 2010). In our research, we prefer to present the frequency 
distributions of the variables under study, i.e. a list of the observations in each category of 
the variable, as well as their mean value and standard deviation to indicate the dispersion 
of the results37. These frequency distributions, mean values and standard variations are 
presented in tabular form. The tables thus reflect the univariate analyses, scrutinizing one 
variable at a time. A complementary way of presenting descriptive statistics is to use 
graphs such as pies, bar charts, etc. John (2010) argues that these graphical presentations 
are (too) often neglected in political research, despite the rich results and insights that 
they can provide. Given the format of our studies (i.e. as academic papers), we often 
lacked space to include such graphs initially. For the final book version, however, we 
have added relevant descriptive graphics, as well as additional analyses to complement 
the transversal story of the study, as appendices to the chapters. 
A second surplus of descriptive analyses is that they may lay the basis for more 
sophisticated explanatory complements (Burnham et al., 2008). The latter form the 
subsequent step in our cross-sectional study. Indeed, the specific operationalizations of 
our fundamental research question entail a number of specific hypotheses to be tested. In 
most cases, these hypotheses relate to the impact of several (groups or levels of) variables 
on the concept under study. Indeed, “the social and political worlds are multi-causal, 
which makes it hard to identify one specific relationship” (John, 2010: 275). These 
explanatory analyses are thus multivariate (Theodoulou, 1999b). Accordingly, we apply 
the technique of multiple regression analysis to test our hypotheses on the explanatory 
level. This technique allows us to verify the impact of the independent variables, both 
collectively and individually, on the dependent variable under study (John, 2010). The 
confidence or significance level used to interpret the relation between the variables is 
                                                             
37 Often, we only present the frequency distribution of the most relevant categories.  
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generally set on the most common level of .05 (i.e. a 95 per cent confidence interval; 
John, 2010)38. Yet in the analyses that include many variables (e.g. Chapter 3 and 5), we 
further distinguish between the 0.1, 0.05 and 0.01 confidence interval to gain finer 
insights in the complex relation between these numerous variables. 
Finally in the comparative study (Chapter 6), we apply a slightly different analytical 
approach. In order to test the comparative hypotheses, we present bivariate cross-tables 
which depict the relation between the variables under study (e.g. councillors’ role attitude 
or recruitment process) and the different countries/regions (i.e. Flanders, Wallonia, the 
Netherlands and France). Meanwhile, statistical tests are used to scrutinize the strength 
and significance of these associations and patterns. Also for this chapter, graphical 
descriptive analyses are added as appendices. 
 
2.7. LIMITATIONS OF THE RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
This chapter has set forth the overall research methodology of our study. The latter has 
been designed to answer the fundamental and applied research questions in the most 
relevant and feasible way. The research strategy was thus contingent upon both 
theoretical and practical claims. Yet simultaneously, some of the choices that have been 
made inevitably limit the scope of our study. In the final section of the methodological 
chapter, we summarize these limitations. 
The first fundamental choice we made concerned the operationalization of the 
fundamental research question into a more specific and measurable plan. The four 
components of our broad and multifaceted plan fitted into the theoretical framework and 
the problem setting developed in the introductory chapter, as well as into the practical 
research context offered by the MAELG project and personal research interests. Yet 
inevitably, some other perspectives have also remained underexposed or less developed, 
or other research lines untold. For instance, it could have been interesting to reconstruct 
the proceedings of the recruitment process as the interplay of different phases via path-
analysis, or to sketch the contact patterns and the daily activities of the councillors in 
detail. It would also have been interesting to dig more deeply into the matter of 
representation – which is usually worth a full-blown study in itself (e.g. tackling 
geographical representation, symbolic representation, etc). Or to analyze councillors’ 
perceptions of different democratic models more profoundly. Further, some elements of 
the comparative chapter (e.g. notions on participatory democracy, the local power 
                                                             
38 This value (i.e. the p-value) indicates the possibility that the relation between 2 or more variables is not 
random (John, 2010). Accordingly, the significance level indicates whether the results apply to a larger 
population (Theodoulou, 1999b). 
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hierarchy) might have deserved a separate analysis. The comparative analysis could also 
have been elaborated by using more sophisticated statistical techniques (e.g. regression 
analyses per theme), or by adding more countries from the MAELG project. 
The other elementary choice was to select an appropriate research procedure. This choice 
not only comprised the selection of the relevant units of analysis and research method. It 
entailed a specific method of data collection as well. In sum, our choice was to focus on 
individual councillors in a quantitative and cross-sectional way via mail survey, while 
deepening the research findings by means of a comparative complement. Within the 
methodological limits, this choice should allow us to generalize our empirical results to 
the population of Belgian local councillors. On the other hand, it has confined our 
research scope in four possible ways. 
First, the selection of councillors as individual units of analysis renders the systematic 
scrutiny of the role and position of local councils, as institutional bodies on the aggregate 
level, invalid. In fact, the latter is probably subject to specific customs and a particular 
form of (context-bound) group dynamics, interactions and (power) configurations. The 
analysis of the latter could yield particular results which may put the discussion on the 
local system in a different perspective. We could for instance imagine that some councils 
function quite well due to both the institutionalized and informal mechanisms of power, 
and the relations between the councillors. In this way, the meso-level can contribute to a 
democratic and efficient political system on the macro-level. Analyzing the role and 
position of the council would obviously have required a different research method than 
the one applied in our study (e.g. orienting the questionnaire towards the council instead 
of the councillors, applying techniques such as participant observation of council and 
committee meetings and processes of decision-making, content analysis of the council 
agenda, interpellations and voting patterns, etc.). 
Second, the generalization pursued by the quantitative approach inevitably reduces the 
depth of the research findings to some extent. Burnham et al. (2008: 166) in this respect 
indicate that “quantitative data (...) can never constitute more than a limited aspect of a 
complex political reality. The particular criticism that is often made of statistics is that, 
as a form of information, they fail to capture the richness and complexity of the political 
world.” We thus have to realize that our choice for comprehensiveness and generalization 
can never really capture all the complex realities behind the statistical numbers (Bara, 
2009; John, 2010), even though the explanatory analyses do search for deeper patterns 
below the general surface. This means that the general picture painted in our study will 
probably diverge in practice according to the specific context in/of every municipality. 
More fine-grained observations and specifications would require qualitative techniques 
such as in-depth personal interviews with different actors in local democracy, focus 
groups and/or participant observations (Bara, 2009). These techniques would have 
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allowed us to further probe into the research matter beyond the fixed response categories 
included in our standard questionnaire. Still, and particularly given the lack of available 
data on Belgian local councillors in the first place, we feel that our approach must be 
taken (and therefore, interpreted) as a necessary basic first step that creates some order 
and structure in an academic wasteland hitherto. 
A third limitation is caused by the research design, consisting of a cross-sectional base 
and a comparative complement. Even though some diachronic notions can be introduced 
cautiously per theme (e.g. evaluating professionalization by comparing current data to 
previous ones), the overall cross-sectional nature of the study confines the time frame to 
the local councillor population in 2008. Hence, we are not able to verify whether the role 
and position of local councillors has substantially exacerbated or, on the contrary, 
ameliorated over time. The cross-sectional design should also lead us to be careful with 
the explanatory analyses, in which the influence of independent variables upon the 
dependent variable is examined. John (2010) argues that such explanatory inferences can 
be made, as long as the independent variables are not related too strongly to each other, 
and there is a logical ground to assume that one variable precedes the other39. 
The last limitation relates to the specific method of data collection and its outcome. John 
(2010: 270) is quite clear on this subject: “No perfect set of data exists.” This is also the 
case in our research. Some limitations follow from the mail survey method as such (see 
Section 2.5.1). The most important one to keep in mind is probably the fact that our data 
represent personal opinions of the councillors, and not objective observations. 
Accordingly, the data may be liable to traditional bias such as guided questions, social 
desirable answering and carryover effects (i.e. adjusting answers on one question to the 
answers on previous questions) (Billiet, 2006). Our auto-evaluations, however, are the 
most practicable way to collect the (wide variety) of information required. Besides, 
several authors stress the value of actor-centred attitudinal research in political science 
(Denters & Klok, 2003; Baldersheim & Wollmann, 2006), as well as the congruence of 
its results (e.g. measuring the perceived influence of certain actors) with more objective 
analytical counterparts (Denters, 2006; Jacobsen, 2009). A final limitation was obviously 
the low response rate of the survey procedure (even though it has still resulted in a total 
dataset of 856 cases), and the slight overrepresentation of Flemish councillors and 
councillors from larger municipalities in the final dataset. This should be reckoned with 
when results from the general population are interpreted. 
Keeping these limitations in mind, we will now proceed with the empirical analysis of the 
role and position of the local councillors in Belgium. Chapter 3 addresses the recruitment 
                                                             
39 Each multivariate regression analysis has been tested to ascertain that there was no multicollinearity 
between the independent variables. The logical order of the variables in the analyses is discussed and 
hypothesized in each chapter. 
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process and the subsequent political career of the councillors, paying particular attention 
to the degree of professionalization in both. Chapter 4 tackles the basic councillor role-
set, which consists of representation, policy and control. Chapter 5 is concerned with 
political representation from a substantive point of view whilst Chapter 6 frames the role 
and position of the Belgian local councillors in a wider, international comparative 
context. 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 3 
NECESSARY ASYMMETRY OR UNDEMOCRATIC IMBALANCE? 
PROFESSIONALIZATION IN THE RECRUITMENT AND CAREER OF  
BELGIAN LOCAL COUNCILLORS1 
 
 
Abstract 
Like national politicians, local representatives are claimed to become increasingly 
professionalized. The alleged professionalization of the local councillor underpins a 
fundamental debate on the state of local politics. Does professionalization entail an 
asymmetry in the councillor population that is necessary to govern localities in the 
twenty-first century, or is it hard to comply with the very nature of representative local 
democracy – creating an undemocratic imbalance between professionals and laymen in 
local government? This chapter seeks to contribute to the debate by outlining the extent 
of, and relation between, layman politics and professionalization in the recruitment and 
career of Belgian local councillors. After scrutinizing these elements separately in a 
descriptive section, both are linked in a subsequent explanatory analysis, verifying 
whether professionalized recruitment in a given political system results in 
professionalized careers afterwards. The chapter uses quantitative survey data gathered 
from a selection of 856 Belgian local councillors. 
 
Key Words 
Professionalization – recruitment – career –– local councillors – Belgium  
  
                                                             
1 This chapter is based on an article co-authored by Prof. dr. Herwig Reynaert and Prof. dr. Kristof 
Steyvers. It has been accepted for publication in Local Government Studies. 
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3.1. PROFESSIONALIZED REPRESENTATIVES: CONDITIO SINE QUA NON OR 
CONTRADICTIO IN TERMINIS? 
Even on the local level which might be considered as the cradle of amateurism, 
representative politics is claimed to professionalize (Caulfield & Larsen, 2002; Guérin & 
Kerrouche, 2008). Yet as professionalization is proceeding, so is debate and controversy 
(Petracca, 1991; Hibbing, 1999): are professional representatives a necessary reality or do 
they conflict with the underpinning values of (local) democracy? Whilst the concept has 
moved to the centre of attention in studies of local government in general, and political 
recruitment and career in particular (Patzelt, 1999; Mouritzen & Svara, 2002; Guérin & 
Kerrouche, 2008), it has received scarce academic attention in Belgian literature thus far. 
To fill this void our chapter provides an account of professionalization in Belgian local 
government. More particularly, it tackles the symbolic question whether professionalized 
local councillors are a necessary asymmetry or an undemocratic imbalance. 
Before we elaborate on the content of this debate and its ramifications for local 
democracy, however, we should conceptualize professionalization first. According to 
Eliassen and Pedersen (1978), professionalization contains multiple dimensions. The first 
dimension relates to the process of political recruitment, advantaging certain groups of 
candidates in their race to office. In this line of thought we can distinguish between 
intellectual and political professionalization. The former refers to councillors’ calibre, 
furthering the odds of candidates who are higher educated and come from selective or 
facilitating professions (e.g. teachers, lawyers, journalists). The latter stands for “the 
process by which social status gives way to political status as the basic criterion for 
legislative recruitment” (Eliassen & Pedersen, 1978: 291). Particularly, political parties 
come to structure recruitment by training and rewarding loyal party activists (Soule & 
Clarke, 1970; Eliassen & Pedersen, 1978; Cotta & Best, 2000). The second, and probably 
most familiar, dimension of professionalization occurs in the aftermath of recruitment 
during the actual political career. The notion of a professional politician stems from 
Weber’s distinction between politics as an avocation and politics as a vocation (Eliassen 
& Pedersen, 1978; Norris, 1997). The latter category denotes those citizens who are not 
only living for, but also from politics. For them, being a local councillor is “a ‘career’ or 
even a ‘profession’, overturning the traditional image of voluntary or amateur local 
government representatives devoting themselves to the service of the public cause” 
(Guérin & Kerrouche, 2008: 180). A professional career is then marked by an exclusive 
focus on the office and a longitudinal perspective (Guérin & Kerrouche, 2008; Steyvers 
& Verhelst, 2012). 
Professionalization is thus a multi-faceted concept that relates to both political 
recruitment and political career. On the local level it may seem a practical and rational 
response to the changing and challenging government context – captured in terms such as 
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local governance (e.g. multiplication of horizontal and vertical governance structures) 
and new public management (e.g. efficiency-driven reforms such as planning, 
benchmarking and budgeting). It is supported by the expectation that professionalized 
councillors would be equipped to govern in an increasingly professionalized surrounding 
and rebalance relations with other actors in governance (e.g. local administration, private 
firms) (Hibbing, 1999). Considering the ubiquity and irreversibility of these evolutions, 
Caulfield and Larsen (2002: 17) even wonder if the days of the traditional amateur 
politician are numbered altogether. Yet simultaneously professionalization is contested 
from a democratic point of view (Norris, 1997). Indeed, the above conceptualization 
implies a substantial degree of selectivity and differentiation between councillors which 
runs counter to the principles of layman politics that often underpin local government, for 
instance in Belgium (Mouritzen & Svara, 2002)2. Layman politics rests on the premise 
that each citizen should have the opportunity to govern his fellow citizens on the basis of 
three sacrosanct principles: a voluntary basis to serve the public cause, the equality of all 
councillors in the eyes of the law and amateurism in holding office (Guérin & Kerrouche, 
2008: 180). 
Professionalization may contravene these principles in three ways: 
First, professionalization in political recruitment imposes selection criteria that 
systematically advantage a limited group of privileged candidates – either in terms of 
education and profession (intellectual component) or party affiliation and commitment 
(political component). In this sense neither the process of professional recruitment nor its 
outcome are legitimate, democratic, open and fair (Norris, 1997). 
Second, considerable problems may also arise from professionalization in political 
careers. Not only are they antipodal to the principle of amateurism, professional careers 
are in practice often the prerogative of a particular minority of executive councillors, 
contrasting with councillors’ legal equality as well (Guérin & Kerrouche, 2008). 
Finally, it is plausible that there is a path-dependent logic between both dimensions of 
professionalization. Since political careers do not unfold out of the blue, professionalized 
recruitment patterns may bring about professional careers. For instance, we could 
imagine that high calibre councillors are more suited to grow a professional career, or, 
likewise, party soldiers obtain more incentives. As such the interplay of both dimensions 
might generate “an autonomous breed of professional politicians” that stands out from 
traditional laymen (Best & Cotta, 2000: 22), and by extension the local community at 
large. Petracca (1991) argues that these professional politicians are therefore 
                                                             
2 Since the paramount raison d’être of Belgian local democracy consists of the political expression of 
community identity (De Ceuninck et al., 2005), Belgian local governments are theoretically and formally 
organized as representative entities based on layman politics (Mouritzen & Svara, 2002). 
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incompatible with – or even contradictory to – the nature of representative politics as it is 
commonly institutionalized in most western democracies3. 
 
3.2. RESEARCH QUESTION, METHODS AND DATA 
The aim of this chapter is to tackle the symbolic and seemingly normative research 
question whether professionalization in Belgian local government reflects a necessary 
asymmetry or an undemocratic imbalance. Obviously no definite or undisputed standards 
for such assessments have been established and providing clear-cut answers falls beyond 
the reach of this chapter. However, applying the perspective of the three criticisms raised 
above, and linking our data to the literature, should enable us to gain a fair understanding 
of the proceedings and implications of professionalization in our given context. To this 
end we use both descriptive and explanatory analyses. 
The descriptive part deals with the first two criticisms of professionalization, referring to 
the acclaimed unfairness and restrictedness in recruitment, and the inequality in career 
development. Since professionalization is distinguished from layman politics by its 
degree of selectivity and differentiation, both concepts should be conceived as two ideal-
types or poles on a continuum with varying stages in between (Fiorina, 1994). Discerning 
univariate professionalization patterns and singling out bivariate associations within the 
recruitment and career dimensions provides useful clues to address these criticisms. In 
order to practically organize and structure the analyses, the chapter relies on the 
conceptual framework of recruitment developed by Norris (1997; see also Norris & 
Lovenduski, 1995). Norris’ framework outlines the proceedings and the most important 
elements and phases of recruitment leading towards a political career4. 
  
                                                             
3 In fact, the layman principle is typically considered to be an asset of the councillor office on the local 
level (Steen & Wille, 2005). In the Netherlands, for instance, reducing the need for professionalized 
councillors by introducing administrative support (as a part of the Dualism Act) aimed to encourage a 
wider variety of social groups to become a councillor (Denters et al., 2005). 
4 According to Patzelt (1999), this theoretical model is likely to become the main paradigm for research 
on political recruitment. In this respect, studies make use of the conceptual framework and phasing of the 
model to structure analyses of recruitment in a given context (see e.g. Oxley & Fox, 2004; Van 
Liefferinge & Steyvers, 2008). In this chapter, we explicitly differentiate between the process of political 
recruitment and the political career (as a logical extension of the latter) to address the first two criticisms 
on professionalization. In order to address the third criticism, we treat recruitment as an independent 
variable to study the political system in terms of professionalization in councillor careers. 
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We thereby choose to specifically address the relation between professionalization and 
layman politics in three distinct stages. The first stage is the opportunity structure of the 
political system in place, consisting of the legal system, the electoral system, the structure 
of party competition and the political culture (Section 3.3). Within this general contextual 
stage, the actual process of political recruitment unfolds. According to Norris, this 
process resembles a funnel in which a large group of eligible citizens are gradually 
filtered out to become candidates for office. Important filters are citizen’s social 
background, activation, apprenticeships and the system’s gatekeepers (Section 3.4). 
Finally, after being recruited and elected, councillors embark on a political career at the 
ultimate stage of the process (Section 3.5). 
On the other hand, the third criticism on professionalization (regarding the hypothesized 
path-dependent relation between professional recruitment and career) requires an 
explanatory analysis. In this respect a multivariate regression model illuminates the 
relation between recruitment and career in the context of Belgian local government. It 
verifies whether or not professionalized recruitment results in professionalized careers 
afterwards (Section 3.6). Finally, the conclusive section summarizes the arguments in 
response to the general research question and criticisms on professionalization posed at 
the onset of the chapter (Section 3.7). 
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The chapter uses quantitative data from 856 local councillors in Belgium, selected on the 
basis of a stratified random sample of 180 municipalities5. These data were collected 
through a standard postal survey in 2008. Although this fairly large and representative 
data set allows us to generalize much of our findings, three qualifications are in order. 
First, the model of Norris depicts recruitment as a process of supply and demand in which 
the interaction of citizens pursuing a political career with the demands of established 
political actors configures recruitment. However, since our research scope and data are 
confined to the specific group of elected councillors solely, some aspects of the 
recruitment process cannot be dealt with (e.g. candidates dropping out, voter preferences, 
party demands)6. Second, the survey asked councillors to personally assess their 
recruitment and career. Consequently some distortions could interfere with response (e.g. 
experience in office, social desirability). Finally, our cross-sectional research design does 
not allow a comprehensive hold on the longitudinal dimension that marks 
professionalization. Yet linking results to the literature might partly resolve this problem. 
 
3.3. THE OPPORTUNITY STRUCTURE OF POLITICAL RECRUITMENT AND CAREER: 
LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN BELGIUM 
According to Norris (1997; see also Norris & Lovenduski, 1995), studies of recruitment 
and career should start by considering the broader context of the political system. This 
system determines the framework in which recruitment takes place, and structures 
candidates’ opportunities of being selected and elected into the council. Meanwhile, such 
an overview allows readers to familiarize themselves with some particularities of Belgian 
local government that (might) figure as important determinants of professionalization in 
recruitment and career. 
 
  
                                                             
5 This sample was representative in terms of municipal size, region and socio-economic character. From 
4096 councillors addressed, 856 or 21% returned the questionnaire after two reminders. Response is 
representative in terms of socio-economic character. Councillors from Flemish and larger municipalities 
are slightly over-represented, but not to the extent that it fundamentally distorts the general 
representativeness of research. Possible causes for the low response rate are survey length and a general 
survey reticence that seems typical for local councillors. Indeed, this survey is part of the European 
research project Municipal Assemblies in European Local Governance (www.maelg.eu). From this 
comparative perspective, many countries in the project tend to have low response rates (results of the 
comparative project are forthcoming). 
6 Voter preferences, however, seem to be less important to explain bias in representativeness. Indeed, 
literature suggests that they do not systematically cause or reproduce selective political elites (Norris, 
1997; Rallings et al., 2010). 
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3.3.1. The legal system 
A first element of the opportunity structure consists of the legal system and its 
institutionalized provisions. Although the legal system about local government is enacted 
at the regional level in Belgium, provisions on recruitment and career run parallel 
throughout the federal state. The legal system is structured as follows. On the one hand, 
few eligibility criteria have been established regarding political recruitment. In order to 
be allowed to stand for office citizens have to be at least 18 years old, hold all civic 
rights, hold the Belgian nationality or the nationality of an EU country, and officially 
reside in the municipality they aim to govern. 
In terms of career, on the other hand, the legal system sets the capacity for councillors to 
develop a professional career (Hibbing, 1999; Guérin & Kerrouche, 2008). A 
professional legislature is marked by abundant resources such as salary, staff, 
committees, dual mandates and multiple terms allowed in office (Squire, 1992; Fiorina, 
1994; Norris, 1997; Hibbing, 1999; Berry et al., 2000). In Belgium no formal restrictions 
are placed upon the number of terms in office. Since one term equals six years, 
incumbents can build long and stable careers. The number of councillors depends upon 
the size of the population in the municipality, and ranges from 7 to 55. Councils are also 
entitled to appoint independent staff members for parties and executives, as well as to 
establish standing committees. Additionally, unlike numerous countries where the 
accumulation of political mandates across governmental levels is prohibited, Belgian 
local councillors are permitted to combine their mandate with an office at the provincial, 
regional or national level – unless they hold several executive functions simultaneously7. 
Hence, councils and councillors seem to have enough legal scope for governing 
effectively and professionally. 
Nevertheless, two other provisions indicate that the legal system still considers most 
councillors as layman politicians. First, non-executive councillors receive no more than a 
small remuneration per council meeting, fixed by the council within limits set by central 
government. Since councils meet on average ten times per year, holding a non-executive 
mandate provides little financial space for professionalism. Second, the absence of a 
genuine statute (e.g. system of political leave) for non-executive councillors makes it 
quasi impossible to operate as fully-fledged professionals on a daily base. Executives and 
mayors, however, receive a full salary and statute. They often function as part-time or – 
in larger municipalities – even as full-time politicians (Wayenberg et al., 2010). 
 
                                                             
7 Councillors are entitled to occupy an office on the European level as well, but this item was not included 
in the questionnaire. 
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3.3.2. The electoral system 
The electoral system is a second element of the opportunity structure. Belgian local 
councillors are elected every six years in one district that covers the entire municipality. 
The ballot structure stipulates that citizens can vote for both a party list and individual 
candidates from the same party list. Voting for (candidates on) different party lists is thus 
prohibited. Council seats are allocated according to the Imperiali-system which uses a 
quotient that explicitly favours winning parties, and results in strong(er) majorities. 
Consequently, a large number of Belgian localities are governed by a single party with an 
absolute majority of council seats. The distribution of the latter within a party is based on 
candidates’ individual votes and the number of party votes, which are allocated to the 
candidates according to their position on the party list. As such the electoral system 
empowers political parties in selecting candidates, paving the way for a politically 
professionalized recruitment process. This party dominance continues during councillors’ 
careers as well and confirms Belgium as a typical party government. Accordingly, party 
politics partly explains why councillors from the opposition often fail to fulfil their 
designated role as representative, policy-maker and scrutinizer (Verhelst et al., 2011). 
 
3.3.3. The structure of party competition 
The structure of party competition figures as the third element of the opportunity 
structure. A first peculiarity distinguishes between typical local lists and (local branches 
of) national lists. In Belgian local government the latter started to proliferate in the 
aftermath of the last amalgamation gulf of 1976 (Steyvers, 2004; Reynaert et al., 2006). 
This evolution confirmed the acclaimed positive relation between urbanization and 
political professionalization as such (Eliassen & Pedersen, 1978). Typical local lists that 
tend to be less politically professionalized still occur, although predominantly in small(er) 
municipalities (Reynaert et al., 2006).  
A second characteristic of the structure of party competition consists of the competition 
between parties of different ideological background. According to Eliassen and Pedersen 
(1978), typical party soldiers (i.e. politically professionalized office holders) originally 
emerged from within the ranks of the socialist parties. Garraud (1989) affirms this 
argument in his study on French mayors: socialist candidates appeared to rely more often 
in the party as a compensation for the lack of social status8. In Belgium socialist parties 
often dominate the municipal landscape in the Walloon region. The catholic party on the 
other hand has a longstanding powerbase as the leading party in Flanders.  
                                                             
8 Nevertheless, the author claims that over an extended period of time, the differences between left and 
right mayors will gradually evaporate. 
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3.3.4. The political culture 
Norris refers to the political culture as the fourth constituting element of the opportunity 
structure. In the Belgian context three particularities are important for recruitment and 
career. A first particularity is the federalization process. The fifth state reform 
empowered the regions Flanders, Wallonia and Brussels Capital to organize their local 
government system from 2002 onwards9. Meanwhile, Flanders (2005) and Wallonia 
(2006) have installed a new local government act. Whereas the Flemish act incorporates 
much efficiency oriented elements that may call for professionalization (e.g. introduction 
of a management team, systematic planning and benchmarking), the Walloon act 
predominantly focuses on enhancing the democratic capacity of local government (e.g. 
constructive motion of distrust vis-à-vis the executive, semi-direct election of mayors) 
(De Ceuninck et al., 2005; Pilet, 2008). 
The variance in political culture according to the size of the municipality could be a 
second determining element. The last round of amalgamations in Belgium (1976) resulted 
in a considerable up-scaling of local government10. This amalgamation discourse was 
underpinned by the acclaimed positive relation between professional governance and 
size. In fact, larger municipalities differ from smaller ones in terms of governance 
culture. Research in the Flemish region for instance has affirmed that committees and 
staff personnel are more frequently introduced in larger municipalities (Olislagers et al., 
2008).  
Finally, the inverted power relation between the executive body and its legislative 
pendant is a third distinctive element of the Belgian political culture. The council is 
formally conceived as the supreme body of Belgian local government11. Yet whilst the 
system of personal monism was intended to preserve council primacy, reality seems to 
have worked the other way around. Research has revealed that non-executive councillors 
are often marginalized in practice due to the dominance of a strong executive (Verhelst et 
al., 2011). Additionally, it is generally acknowledged that these groups also profit more 
from recruitment bias as experienced and popular figures on the local scene beforehand 
(Wayenberg et al., 2010). 
 
                                                             
9 Flanders has 308 municipalities, Wallonia 262 and Brussels Capital 19. 
10 Nevertheless from a comparative point of view, Belgian municipalities are rather small with an average 
population of around 18.000. In Brussels, the average population is above 50.000, whilst this number is 
around 19.500 in Flanders and around 13.000 in Wallonia. 
11 Executive functions are transferred to a selection of councillors who comprise the executive body, the 
Board of Mayor and Aldermen (i.e. functional dualism). These executives are elected by the council but 
retain their council seat and legislative mandate as well (i.e. personal monism). As such they remain 
theoretically under the scrutiny of – and thus subordinated to – the council. Only exceptionally are 
members appointed outside the council. 
108  |  CHAPTER 3 
 
3.4. POLITICAL RECRUITMENT OF LOCAL COUNCILLORS IN BELGIUM 
Within this contextual setting citizens are recruited to become elected politicians. 
Literature commonly conceives political recruitment as a process of intertwined filters 
that gradually delineate a political elite (Prewitt, 1970; Budge & Farlie, 1975; Norris, 
1997). As such the concept denotes “the process by which citizens are mobilized into 
politics” (Brady et al., 1999: 153). 
The basic and probably most documented filter is the citizens’ social background (Norris 
& Lovenduski, 1995). Studies of descriptive representation have profusely indicated that 
recruitment generates a political elite that seldom mirrors the population at large (Pitkin, 
1967; Rush, 1992). Albeit local politics provides more room for equity (Phillips, 1996: 
26), local politicians are still predominantly drawn from the dominant stratum of male, 
middle class, middle aged, autochthonous and locally anchored candidates (Norris & 
Lovenduski, 1993 and 1995; Aars & Offerdal, 1998; Steyvers & Reynaert, 2006; Rallings 
et al., 2010). Additionally, intellectual professionalization has emerged as a new form of 
selection. This means that high calibre candidates, i.e. highly educated and/or coming 
from talking and brokerage professions (e.g. teachers, lawyers), are increasingly 
advantaged in recruitment (Eliassen & Pedersen, 1978; Norris & Lovenduski, 1993: 384-
385). 
A second filter consists of citizens’ political activation and apprenticeships (Levine & 
Hyde, 1977; Steyvers & Reynaert, 2006). This filter refers to citizens gradually 
developing an interest in politics, and/or acquiring political skills and contacts. 
Motivation is such an important activating factor. Different motives may spur political 
activism, ranging from conscription and ideology to party service and career planning 
(Aars & Offerdal, 1998; Fox & Lawless, 2005; Copus, 2008). Hence motivation is clearly 
linked to the process of professionalization (Black, 1970; Soule & Clarke, 1970). The 
upbringing in a political family may activate citizens as well (Prewitt, 1970; Braud, 
1996). According to Van Liefferinge and Steyvers (2008), this influence should no longer 
be interpreted in an archaic and nepotistic way embodied in political dynasties. Rather 
candidates profit from this selective background by acquiring a taste for politics and 
learning the tricks of the trade at a younger age. Political families meanwhile serve an 
apprenticeship by passing on contacts and positions in vested selection networks (e.g. 
political parties, media). Finally, citizens can build on apprenticeships in organized 
community life (Moss & Parker, 1967; Prewitt, 1970; Norris, 1997). Although there are 
no formal schools for politics, associations often figure as informal schools (Kjaer, 2006). 
Indeed, citizens pick up organizational and communicative skills in this setting, allowing 
them to expand and draw on personal and political networks (Moyser & Parry, 1986). 
Laymen are thereby usually embedded in organizations of their local community whilst 
political parties offer outstanding apprenticeships for professionalized councillors 
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(Eliassen & Pedersen, 1978). Consequently, parties are claimed to be the perfect 
steppingstone towards a political career (Moyser & Parry, 1986; Meadowcroft, 2001; 
Lazarus, 2008). 
At this point aspirant-councillors still have to pass the gatekeepers as the final filter in 
recruitment, before presenting themselves to the voters (Norris, 1997)12. This implies that 
the supply of aspirants has to meet the demands of the established actors in the political 
system (i.e. the selectorates). Given the perceived strain on the councillor function, it is 
often expected that citizens will become less enthusiastic to come forward as candidates 
for election (Larsen, 2005). As a consequence, it is likely that this selectorate function 
will become more important, but also more challenging, in the recruitment process in the 
future (e.g. Rallings et al., 2010)13. When the demands of the selectorates are met, 
councillors may receive considerable support from the gatekeepers during elections. For 
professional councillors this support is typically situated in the party sphere whilst 
laymen theoretically draw on support from the local community. 
Table 3.1 quantifies this recruitment process for our research population of Belgian local 
councillors in terms of traditional social background variables; motivations organized in a 
continuum of professionalization (citizen duty or the pure layman desire to serve the 
public cause, general interest in politics, the professional motive to serve the party and 
the desire to establish a political career); socialization in a political family; 
apprenticeships in the local community and political party; and gatekeeping through the 
support from the locality and party14. 
  
                                                             
12 Elections and the impact of voting, however, are not considered is this study. 
13 Our study confirms the important role of the selectorates in the Belgian system: 75% of the councillors 
indicate that they have been asked by others to stand for election the first time they were nominated. One-
fourth came forward on their own (original question (Q9): “How did you become a candidate the first 
time you were nominated? – I proposed myself/I was asked by others”). 
14 ‘Starting age’ and ‘local roots before mandate’ were calculated based on councillors’ age, number of 
years lived in the municipality, and the experience in the council. In terms of motivations, councillors 
were asked to rate the importance of each motive before their first candidacy on a 0-4 scale. ‘Political 
family’ (socialization) represents councillors who had a family member over the last two generations that 
had a political office. The apprenticeship variables represent computed scores for the membership of/and 
elective office in: trade unions and business/professional organizations, humanitarian, sport, women, 
environmental, ethnic minority, religious and neighbourhood organizations on the one hand; and political 
party on the other hand. For the gatekeeping variables, an exploratory factor analysis on a list of 12 
variables resulted in two additive indices (scale 0-4): ‘support locality’ and ‘support party’. ‘Support 
locality’ includes support from ‘local prestigious person’, ‘trade union’, ‘local business group’, ‘women 
organization’, ‘local media’, ‘the church’, ‘local association’ and ‘ethnic groups’; ‘Support party’ 
includes support from ‘national party organs’, ‘party fraction’, ‘party at the local level’ and ‘national 
politician’. 
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Table 3.1. Political recruitment of Belgian local councillors 
Filter Variable Category Value 
So
ci
al
 B
ac
kg
ro
un
d 
Gender (N=845) Male  
Female 
72.4 % 
27.6 % 
Starting age (N=841) < 30 years 
30 – 60 years 
> 60 years 
Mean (stand. dev.) 
19.7 % 
76.4 % 
3.9 % 
39.8 years (10.9) 
Local roots before mandate (N=840) < 15 years 
15 – 35 years 
> 35 years 
Mean (stand. dev.) 
14.6 % 
48.7 % 
36.7 % 
30.2 years (13.7) 
Ethnic roots (N=843) National 
Foreign 
92.9 % 
7.1 % 
Education (N=844) Elementary school 
Secondary school 
University/equivalent 
3.3 % 
32.4 % 
64.3 % 
Profession before mandate (N=766) Civil servant 
Teacher 
Liberal 
Business manager 
Professional politician 
Other (not talk./brok.) 
14.2 % 
14.1 % 
6.8 % 
5.1 % 
3.1 % 
56.7 % 
A
ct
iv
at
io
n 
Citizen duty motive (N=834) Very/utmost important 
Mean (st. dev.), scale 0-4 
40.2 % 
2.1 (1.2) 
Political interest motive (N=839) Very/utmost important 
Mean (st. dev.), scale 0-4 
68.7 % 
2.9 (1.0) 
Party duty motive (N=837) Very/utmost important 
Mean (st. dev.), scale 0-4 
49.8 % 
2.4 (1.0) 
Political career motive (N=835) Very/utmost important 
Mean (st. dev.), scale 0-4 
12.1 % 
1.1 (1.1) 
Political family socialization (N=845) No  
Yes 
68 % 
32 % 
A
pp
re
nt
ic
e-
sh
ip
s 
Local community (N=743) No member /office 
Member only 
Member and office 
6.9 % 
37 % 
56.1 % 
Political party (N=767) No member /office 
Party member only 
Party member and office 
12 % 
25.3 % 
62.7 % 
G
at
e-
ke
ep
er
s Support locality (N=793) (Very) strong 
Mean (st. dev.), scale 0-4 
2.5 % 
0.8 (0.7) 
Support party (N=806) (Very) strong 
Mean (st. dev.), scale 0-4 
35.5 % 
1.9 (0.9) 
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Table 3.1 suggests that traditional social bias remains deeply rooted in Belgian 
municipal councils. Despite gender quota for party lists that have made the electoral odds 
more even (Pilet et al., 2007a), men still dominate most councils. The average councillor 
is also middle-aged (40 years) when first entering office and has strong local roots – 
expressed by the number of years he/she resided in the municipality prior to this office 
(30 years on average). The ethnic stereotype is affirmed by the small share of our 
research population (7 per cent) who were born abroad, or have parents who were born 
abroad15. In addition to these traditional biases, we find clear signs of intellectual 
professionalization as well. The majority of Belgian local councillors (64 per cent) are 
highly educated and nearly half of the councillors had a talking or brokerage profession 
prior to their first mandate. 
In terms of activation, Table 3.1 shows that layman motives still outweigh professional 
counterparts, both in the centre (‘political interest’ versus ‘represent party’) and at the 
extremes (‘citizen duty’ versus ‘professional career’) of our continuum. Still, one-third of 
the councillors have been socialized and activated in a political family. Frequency 
distributions also underline that the local community remains an important 
apprenticeship for Belgian local councillors: 37 per cent are (or were) mere members, 
and 56 per cent hold (or held) office in at least one local association. Yet the proliferation 
of political parties is equally vast: over 60 per cent of the local councillor population 
were party members before entering office and are (or had been) a member of the party’s 
organization at the (supra-)local level. Only a minority have not been socialized in the 
sphere of party politics at all. Finally, parties are important gatekeepers in recruitment 
too. Belgian councillors clearly indicate having received more support from the party 
than from the local community during elections. 
In summary: Belgian local councils are not representative of the population at large. 
Ancient stereotypes such as the underrepresentation of women and young citizens and the 
importance of family ties persist, although literature shows that they are incrementally 
decreasing over time (Devos et al., 1997; Reynaert et al., 2006). Further, the 
entrenchment in the local community and layman motivations remain important assets in 
recruitment. Yet simultaneously professionalization is advancing, both in its intellectual 
and political form (Reynaert et al., 2006). How should we perceive the impact of 
professionalization on the recruitment process? In order to answer this question we will 
consider the associations between the variables of recruitment16. Effects of 
professionalization seem ambiguous: 
                                                             
15 After granting non-EU citizens – who are residing in their municipality for at least 5 years – the right to 
vote in local elections from 2006 on, we could expect that this percentage will increase. 
16 In order to decrease the sparseness of the analyses (the cross-tables of the original variables produced 
many empty cells), we use the re-coded dummy variables (see further in the regression analysis) to 
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• To some extent, intellectual professionalization may hold emancipatory potential. For 
instance, traditionally underprivileged groups such as women and councillors without 
strong local roots tend to be higher educated than their counterparts (Phi=.10, p=.01; 
Phi=.21, p=.00). High education also compensates for the lack of party motivation 
(Phi=-.08, p=.02) whilst councillors who had a talking or brokerage profession prior 
to their first mandate were more inspired by citizen duty (Phi=.10, p=.01). 
 
• Political professionalization on the other hand rather enforces existing bias in 
recruitment, or creates new selective pathways to the council. Men and autochthonous 
councillors were for instance slightly more embedded in the political party before 
their first mandate than women and councillors with foreign roots (Phi=.09, p=.01; 
Phi=.08, p=.03). Besides, councillors who felt strong support from the party during 
elections already relied more on local and political apprenticeships (Phi=.10, p=.01; 
Phi=.17, p=.00), a motivation to represent the party (Phi=.21, p=.00), high education 
(Phi=.11, p=.00) and support from the locality (Phi=.25, p=.00). Councillors driven by 
professional party and career motives felt more support from the locality in the 
election as well (Phi=.11, p=.00; Phi=.11, p=.00). 
 
• Finally, substantial differences arise between older and younger first-time councillors. 
Older novices are less professionalized in terms of political career motive (Phi=-.14, 
p=.00), education (Phi=-.13, p=.00), party apprenticeship (Phi=-.08, p=.02) and party 
support (Phi=-.07, p=.04). They feel they have had less support from the local 
community in the election (Phi=-.07, p=.04) as well, but more often rely on a talking 
or brokerage profession (Phi=.11, p=.00) and local community apprenticeships 
(Phi=.08, p=.03). 
 
  
                                                                                                                                                                                                    
calculate the associations. These dummies reduce the original variable into two categories: the 
professional (or most selective) group of councillors versus the other councillors. Significant associations 
are only mentioned insofar as they contribute to answering the research question. 
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3.5. POLITICAL CAREER OF LOCAL COUNCILLORS IN BELGIUM 
The second dimension of professionalization refers to the political career that councillors 
establish once they have been recruited and elected. Whilst its sense may seem a matter 
of course, Guérin and Kerrouche (2008) argue in favour of being reticent about defining a 
‘professional career’. They suggest using indicators as a means to operationalize the 
concept. A first indicator is the time councillors dedicate to councillor work (Eliassen & 
Pedersen, 1978; Guérin & Kerrouche, 2008). Whereas professional councillors have to 
decide whether to sacrifice (a part of) their external career or not, the key question for 
laymen is whether they are able to combine council work with the external career 
(Fiorina, 1994: 307). Incumbency is a second indicator. Councillors who develop long 
careers via successive terms in office gain experience and skills to function as 
professionals (Eliassen & Pedersen, 1978; Cotta & Best, 2000; Guérin & Kerrouche, 
2008). From the opposite point of view, turnover is considered to be an indispensable 
feature of layman politics (Fiorina, 1994)17. A third indicator of professional careers, 
particularly in Belgian governance, is the cumul des mandats. Accumulating mandates is 
typical for countries in which local government’s limited capacity to deliver public 
services in an autonomous way is compensated for by politicians’ access to central 
level(s) of decision-making (De Ceunink et al., 2005). Finally, a fourth indicator is 
councillors’ ambitions at the end of their mandate (Guérin & Kerrouche, 2008). 
Professionals typically hold static or – above all – progressive ambitions, aiming to 
prolong their mandate or continue their career in a higher office. Amateur-politicians are 
more likely to return their mandate to society and make room for new citizen-legislators 
after their mandates are completed (Petracca, 1991).  
Taken together, these indicators present an ideal-typical image of both the focus of the 
councillor office (i.e. an exclusive political career in terms of time and multiple offices 
for professionals versus a career on the side for laymen) and the perspective of the 
councillor office (i.e. lengthy careers and static or progressive ambitions for professionals 
versus shorter careers and discrete ambitions for laymen). 
 
  
                                                             
17 As Petracca (1991) argues, the advantages of rotation in office are manifold: not only does it guarantee 
the circulation of layman citizens, it also ensures the necessarily representative link between society and 
government whilst safeguarding society from ‘permanent’, undemocratic and unmediated governments. 
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Table 3.2. Political career of Belgian local councillors 
Variable Category Value  
Time in office (N=798) < 30 hours/month 
30 – 59 hours/month 
60 – 89 hours/month 
90 – 119 hours/month 
> 119 hours/month 
Mean (Stand. Dev.) 
53 % 
30.7 % 
8.2 % 
3.6 % 
4.5 % 
41.1 hours/m (43.2) 
Incumbency (N=848) 1st term (< 3 years) 
2nd term (3 – 8 years) 
3th term (9 – 14 years) 
4th term (15 - 20 years) 
> 4 terms (> 20 years) 
Mean (Stand. Dev.) 
36.4 % 
25 % 
16.3 % 
11.9 % 
10.4 % 
9.9 years (9.1) 
Cumul des mandats (N=804) Never 
Legislative office in past 
Executive office in past 
Legislative office at present 
Executive office at present 
90.7 % 
3.5 % 
0.9 % 
4.5 % 
0.4 % 
Future ambitions (N=759) Discrete 
Static 
Progressive  
25.7 % 
42.5 % 
31.8 % 
 
Table 3.2 shows that despite claims of progressing professionalization, the career of the 
average Belgian local councillor is still situated at the layman end of our continuum. 
Nevertheless we find large variation between and within the variables. Councillors spend 
on average 40 hours per month on council work, varying from a modest two to an 
acclaimed 400 hours per month18. Elite circulation is apparent as well: turnover rate 
amounts to 36 per cent whilst the average councillor has ten years of experience, 
equalling less than two terms in office. Yet 20 per cent of the research population also 
stay for more than three terms in office. Furthermore, a minority of the councillor 
population (are able to) accumulate elective mandates: for 90 per cent of our research 
population political commitment is confined to local politics19. Finally, in terms of future 
                                                             
18 In Appendix C, we present a detailed overview of councillors’ time spent on the office. The overview 
shows that councillors spend most time on the council and committee meetings (23%), as well as on desk 
work preparing those meetings (16%). Also the party (14%) and the party group (11%) seem important 
aspects of the office. Other activities account for 14% of councillors’ time spent on the office. A wide 
variety of representative tasks forms the largest group of this category. Finally, councillors spend 9% of 
their mandate to public debates and meetings, 7% to meetings with the administrative staff and 6% to 
field visits to municipal institutions. 
19 This low rate is not a real surprise since the total number of local mandates (approx. 13.000) largely 
exceeds the total number of supra-local mandates (approx. 1.300). If we would consider the cumul des 
mandats the other way around, i.e. politicians at the supra-local level simultaneously holding a local 
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ambitions professionalization is more outspoken. Nearly one-third of the councillor 
population hold progressive ambitions, consciously conceiving their local mandate as a 
steppingstone towards a career in higher office or provincial, regional or national politics. 
The majority seek to stay in office whilst one out of four councillors expresses the 
intention to leave. 
Thus, referring to the Belgian local councillor in terms of political career would be too 
blunt and vague. Some councillors are obviously far more professionalized in certain 
aspects of their career than others. Again this evokes the question whether 
professionalization occurs systematically, crosscutting councillor equality and creating an 
undemocratic imbalance in the local council. Analyses of the associations between our 
career variables suggest that this is partly the case20. The group of experienced 
councillors spend slightly more time in office and more often hold dual mandates than the 
group of less experienced councillors (Phi=.08, p=.02; Phi=.25, p=.00). Likewise, 
councillors who spend much time in office more often have progressive ambitions for 
their future career than councillors dedicating less time to council work (Phi=.12, p=.00). 
These results might imply that professionalization further develops during councillors’ 
career, gradually moulding a political elite of professionalized councillors. On the other 
hand, experienced incumbents tend to hold less progressive ambitions at the end of their 
mandate (Phi=-.15, p=.00), although the age-effect probably accounts for this result as 
well. 
 
3.6. PROFESSIONALIZED PASSAGES TO POWER? AN EXPLANATORY ANALYSIS OF 
THE RELATION BETWEEN POLITICAL RECRUITMENT AND POLITICAL CAREER IN 
BELGIAN LOCAL GOVERNMENT 
The disentangled study of recruitment and career has demonstrated that there is 
substantial selectivity in the Belgian local councillor population in terms of 
professionalization. To complete our analysis we will now tackle the path-dependent 
criticism on professionalization, verifying whether councillors who develop a 
professional career are products of a preceding professionalized recruitment process. 
We will use a binary logistic regression model to scrutinize this relation. Following 
Norris’ model of recruitment (1997) we assume that careers result from a series of 
intertwined filters that structure recruitment within the overreaching opportunity structure 
of Belgian local government. The dependent level of analysis, political career, is 
                                                                                                                                                                                                    
mandate, high figures would stand out, confirming localities as the base office of Belgian politicians (Pilet 
et al., 2007c). 
20 Associations have been calculated based on the dummy variables that are used in the regression 
analyses further on in order to reduce the sparseness of the analyses. 
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operationalized through the variables ‘time in office’, ‘incumbency’, ‘cumul des 
mandats’ and ‘future ambitions’ which have been re-coded into dummies (assuming 
value 0 or 1). The value 1 represents the professional (or most selective) group of 
councillors. On the dependent level these are the councillors who spend a lot of time in 
office, develop a long career, combine(d) several mandates and hold progressive 
ambitions21. 
The first set of variables on the independent level covers the opportunity structure of 
Belgian local government. In the theoretical overview ‘region’ appeared to be an 
important asset of both the political culture, structure of party competition and legal 
system in Belgian local government. ‘Party position’ refers to the impact of parties in the 
electoral system and beyond (e.g. power gap between majority and opposition). ‘Party 
type’ and ‘party ideology’ serve as indicators for the structure of party competition, 
pointing to the difference between national lists and local lists, and the (acclaimed) 
singularity of socialist parties. Finally, political culture is embodied by the variables 
‘size’ and ‘mandate’22. 
Social background represents the second set of independent variables in the analysis. 
Typical characteristics are ‘gender’, ‘age’ (before the first mandate), ‘local roots’ (i.e. 
numbers of years lived in the municipality before the first mandate) and ‘ethnic roots’ 
(i.e. being born or having a parent who was born abroad). ‘Education’ and ‘profession’ 
(prior to the first mandate as a councillor) represent intellectual professionalization. 
Activation and apprenticeships are operationalized through the motives ‘citizen duty’, 
‘political interest’, ‘represent party’ and ‘political career’, the socialization in a ‘political 
family’, and ‘local community apprenticeship’ and ‘political party apprenticeship’. 
Finally, ‘support locality’ and ‘support party’ represent the system’s gatekeepers23. Table 
3.3 presents the results from the regression analysis. 
                                                             
21 We chose to re-code these variables into dummies based on their skewed frequency distributions (see 
Table 3.2), and in order to enhance the model’s parsimony and comparative strength (some variables are 
nominal or ordinal). Dummies are: ‘Time in office [High]’: councillors spending > 60 hours per month in 
office, N=130 or 16.3%; ‘Incumbency [Long]’: councillors with > 14 years of experience, N=189 or 
22.3%; ‘Cumul des mandats [Yes]’: councillors who hold/held at least one additional mandate, N=75 or 
9.3%; ‘Future Ambitions [Progressive]’: councillors who hold progressive ambitions, N=241 or 31.8%. 
22 These variables have been re-coded into dummies for similar reasons (skewed univariate frequency 
distributions, enhancing the model’s parsimony and comparative strength). Dummies are: ‘Region 
[Flanders]’: councillors from a Flemish municipality, N=565 or 66.5%; ‘Party position [Majority]’: 
councillors from a majority party, N=518 or 63.7%; ‘Party type [National party]’: councillors elected on a 
list of a national party, N=616 or 72.9%; ‘Party ideology [Socialist]’: councillors from a socialist party, 
N=165 or 21.5%; ‘Size [Populous]’ : the third of respondents from the biggest municipalities in terms of 
inhabitants, N=284 or 33.7%; ‘Mandate [Executive]’: councillors who hold/held an executive mandate, 
N=277 or 33.3%. 
23 These variables have been re-coded into dummies for similar reasons (skewed univariate frequency 
distributions, enhancing the model’s parsimony and comparative strength). Dummies are: ‘Gender 
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[Male]’: male councillors, N=612 or 72.4%; ‘Age [Elder]’: councillors older than 44 years at the start of 
their first office, N=281 or 33.4%; ‘Local roots [Strong]’: councillors residing for at least 37 years in their 
municipality prior to their first elective mandate in that municipality, N=283 or 33.7%; ‘Ethnic roots 
[Yes]’: councillors who (or whose parents) were born abroad, N=60 or 7.1%; ‘Education [University]’: 
councillors with a university degree, N=543 or 64.3%; ‘Profession [Talking/brokerage]’: Professional 
politician, Civil servant/teacher and Liberal/Business, N=332 or 43.3%; Motivational dummies represent 
councillors who gave a score ‘3’ or ‘4’ (scale 0-4) to the motives ‘Citizen duty’ (N=335 or 40.2%), 
‘Political interest’ (N=576 or 68.7%), ‘Party duty’ (N=417 or 49.8%) and ‘Political career’ (N=101 or 
12.1%); ‘Political family [Yes]’: councillors who had a politically active family member in the last two 
generations, N=270 or 32%; ‘Local community apprenticeship [Strong]’: councillors active in at least one 
local association and its organization, N=417 or 56.1%; ‘Political party apprenticeship [Strong]’: 
councillors active in the party and its organization, N=481 or 62.7%; ‘Support locality [Strong]’: the third 
of councillors receiving most support from the locality in the election, N=260 or 32.8%; ‘Support party 
[Strong]’: the third of councillors receiving most support from the party in the election, N=286 or 35.5%. 
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Table 3.3. The impact of political recruitment on political career in Belgian local  
government. A multiple logistic regression analysis 
 Time in office 
[High] 
Incumbency 
[Long] 
Cumul des 
mandats [Yes] 
Future 
ambitions 
[Progressive] 
Exp 
(B) 
Sign Exp 
(B) 
Sign Exp 
(B) 
Sign Exp 
(B) 
Sign 
Opportunity structure  
Region [Flanders] 
Party position [Majority] 
Party type [National party] 
Party ideology [Socialist] 
Size [Populous] 
Mandate [Executive] 
 
2.22 
2.16 
1.05 
2.31 
1.37 
6.23 
 
** 
** 
 
** 
 
*** 
 
.72 
.48 
1.08 
.61 
.94 
7.90 
 
 
** 
 
 
 
*** 
 
.66 
.54 
1.02 
1.41 
2.65 
4.20 
 
 
 
 
 
*** 
*** 
 
.81 
1.19 
1.23 
.60 
1.01 
.81 
 
 
 
 
* 
 
 
Social background 
Gender [Male] 
Age [Elder] 
Local roots [Strong] 
Ethnic roots [Yes] 
Education [University] 
Profession [Talking/brokerage] 
 
.88 
.95 
.90 
1.07 
.79 
.88 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4.18 
.25 
.82 
.57 
.33 
1.24 
 
*** 
*** 
 
 
*** 
 
 
1.96 
1.00 
.51 
2.07 
.73 
1.94 
 
 
 
 
 
 
* 
 
1.99 
.41 
1.03 
1.76 
1.93 
1.16 
 
** 
*** 
 
 
** 
 
Activation/Apprenticeships 
Citizen duty motive [High] 
Political interest motive [High] 
Party duty motive [High] 
Political career motive [High] 
Political family [Yes] 
Local community appr. [Strong] 
Political party appr. [Strong] 
 
.78 
1.09 
2.26 
.69 
1.17 
.92 
1.45 
 
 
 
** 
 
 
 
 
 
1.12 
.61 
.72 
.65 
.97 
1.51 
1.42 
 
 
* 
 
 
 
 
 
 
.90 
1.01 
1.52 
.98 
1.21 
1.12 
2.85 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
** 
 
.84 
1.58 
.95 
3.02 
.86 
1.06 
1.62 
 
 
* 
 
*** 
 
 
* 
Gatekeepers 
Support locality [Strong] 
Support party [Strong] 
 
1.85 
1.07 
 
* 
 
 
1.70 
.77 
 
* 
 
1.23 
2.25 
 
 
** 
 
.88 
1.10 
 
Model 
N 
Nagelkerke R² 
 
472 
.31 
 
 
*** 
 
501 
.38 
 
 
*** 
 
490 
.25 
 
 
*** 
 
445 
.17 
 
 
*** 
(Level of Significance: *** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.1) 
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3.6.1. Time in office 
The explanatory power of our model is quite high in terms of time councillors spend in 
office: political recruitment accounts for 31 per cent of the total variance on the 
dependent level. However, much more than the actual process of political recruitment, it 
is the opportunity structure that matters for predicting councillors’ time in office. 
Councillors from Flanders, councillors from majority parties and councillors from the 
socialist party have twice as much chance to dedicate a lot of time to their mandate than 
councillors from Wallonia and Brussels, councillors from the opposition and councillors 
from the other parties. Yet the best predictor is councillors’ mandate. Executives have six 
times more chance to dedicate a lot of time to council work than non-executives. 
Although this result may not come as a surprise due to the supplementary executive 
responsibilities which extend their council work, the impact is quite large. Social 
background characteristics, on the other hand, do not seem to have a direct impact upon 
time spend in office. With regard to the activation and apprenticeships, one additional 
direct effect emerges: councillors who were strongly motivated by the desire to do a good 
job for their party in the council have twice as much chance to spend a lot of time in 
office than less party-driven councillors. Finally, councillors who feel they have received 
strong support from their local community in the election tend to spend more time in 
office than councillors who lacked this strong community support. This result shows that 
typical layman assets in recruitment may lead towards a (part of a) professional career 
after all. 
 
3.6.2. Incumbency 
The model’s goodness of fit for incumbency is even higher, amounting to 38 per cent. 
Again we might attribute a fair share of this explanatory power to the opportunity 
structure, although this time only two variables produce strong and significant effects. 
First, turnover is surprisingly high amongst councillors from majority parties, whilst 
councillors from the opposition have double the chance of developing a long career in 
office. Second, one particular group forms a strong exception to this trend. Indeed, above 
all, executive councillors – who are de facto almost always member of the political 
majority – tend to establish lengthy careers in office, hence strongly correspond to the 
professional type again. Holding an executive mandate turns out to be the best guarantee 
for incumbency. We may interpret this result in two directions which probably both hold 
true to some extent. On the one hand, executives are often promoted after they have 
gained some experience in the council – and have made a name and reputation for 
themselves. On the other hand, executives probably develop longer careers in office once 
they are elected as aldermen as well. Furthermore, councillors’ social background also 
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offers substantial explanatory power. Men have a far greater chance of acquiring a lot of 
experience in office whilst elder newcomers’ chances are significantly smaller. Education 
has a surprisingly reversed impact on incumbency since higher educated councillors tend 
to establish shorter careers in office. Again we could interpret these results in two 
directions: they may reflect on the reluctance of women, elder newcomers and highly 
educated councillors to grow long careers – or factors preventing them from doing so 
(e.g. disenchantment due to lack of time or influence, time effects for elder newcomers). 
However, we may also interpret these effects the other way around, i.e. as signals of the 
general rejuvenation trend and increasing intake of women and higher educated 
councillors. Considering the conclusions of the descriptive section, this explanation 
probably holds true as well. In terms of activation and apprenticeships then, councillors 
who were strongly motivated by a general interest in politics tend to stay shorter in office. 
Finally, councillors who feel they have received strong support from the locality in the 
election stay generally longer in office than councillors who lacked this support. 
 
3.6.3. Cumul des mandats 
Our model of political recruitment explains 25 per cent of the total variance in 
councillors’ cumul des mandats. The analysis reaffirms the opportunity structure of 
Belgian local government as a significant determinant of professionalization. In line with 
common assumptions, councillors from larger municipalities accumulate mandates across 
governmental levels more often than councillors from smaller municipalities. Not only 
are these councillors attractive to the party due to their larger constituency and greater 
recognisability, they probably have more experience with large-scale policy as well. We 
might interpret the effect of councillor mandate alike. In fact, executives are four times 
more prone to hold plural mandates than non-executive councillors, moving even further 
up to the professional end of our continuum. On the social background level only one 
variable produces an effect on cumul des mandats which is both strong and significant: 
councillors from the professionalized talking and brokerage professions have almost 
twice as much chance of accumulating mandates as councillors coming from another 
profession prior to their first mandate. Activation and apprenticeships produce one 
significant result as well. More specifically, the professional apprenticeship in a political 
party often results in a professional career in terms of cumul des mandats afterwards: 
councillors who were elected on a party list and are (or were) active in the party 
organization have nearly three times more chance of holding an elective political mandate 
in addition to their local office. Finally, gatekeepers determine the cumul des mandats 
insofar as councillors who feel they have received large support from their party in the 
election more frequently accumulate political offices afterwards. In sum, these results 
reveal a professionalized and quite closed and selective core route towards a professional 
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career which consists of several elective offices. This route seems far less permeable for 
traditional layman councillors who are deprived of party apprenticeship and support, or 
profit less from a favourable occupational background and the opportunity structure of 
Belgian local government. 
 
3.6.4. Future ambitions 
The results for councillors’ future ambitions complete the multivariate analysis. Our 
model of political recruitment succeeds less in explaining the dependent level under study 
(R2=.17), suggesting that more additional factors are at play. Since future ambition is a 
highly subjective and evolving matter it is probably determined as much by experiences 
inside and outside office than the recruitment process preceding it. Still quite a few strong 
and significant results emerge. Contrary to the previous analyses the opportunity structure 
does not account directly for the majority of them. The only significant relation holds that 
socialist councillors tend to have less progressive ambitions. We could explain the 
absence of an executive mandate as a significant predictor by the executives’ position in 
the political constellation: since they already occupy a high office on the local political 
level and often accumulate this office with another mandate on the supra-local level, 
progressive ambitions may seem redundant. Yet there is another side to this story since 
non-executive councillors do not hold more progressive ambitions either. We would be 
inclined to consider this as a further hallmark of amateurism or layman politics in Belgian 
local government. Apparently the majority of non-executive councillors do not 
particularly strive for higher office in the political realm. Social background, on the other 
hand, is a very good predictor of future ambitions. Three strong and significant relations 
stand out: men, younger novices and highly educated councillors are more inclined to 
hold professional (i.e. progressive) ambitions at the end of their mandate. Further, 
professionalized activation and apprenticeships predict professional ambitions as well. 
Councillors who were strongly inspired by a general interest in politics and had the 
explicit goal of entering a political career, and councillors who are (or were) firmly 
embedded in the political party, are more prone to pursue a political career in higher 
office. Finally, gatekeepers do not seem to matter. 
 
3.6.5. Summary 
Should we infer from these analyses that professionalized careers originate from 
professionalized passages to power? At first sight we cannot corroborate this hypothesis 
straightforwardly. Indeed, the four indicators of a professionalized career result from 
different underlying recruitment mechanisms. Time in office is mainly determined by a 
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selective opportunity structure whilst professional components and layman counterparts 
balance each other out. Incumbency results from a selective recruitment process in terms 
of opportunity structure and social background, whilst professional paths and layman 
paths matter alike. The analysis of the cumul des mandats did point towards a 
professional path-dependency in support of the hypothesis. Whether councillors develop 
a professional career that consists of several elective mandates across governmental 
levels or not depends on both intellectual professionalization and political 
professionalization. The opportunity structure further adds to the selectivity. Finally, 
councillors’ future ambitions also stem from such a professionalized passage to power. 
Whilst the opportunity structure has less impact, a selective social background, 
professional activation and party apprenticeships predict progressive ambitions. 
Hence we could argue that a professionalized career is possible for councillors who were 
deprived of professional recruitment paths, as long as this career is confined to the local 
base office. Professionalized careers beyond the latter, however, seem to unfold mainly 
on the basis of a selective and professionalized recruitment process. On the other hand, 
these findings are mitigated by one transversal conclusion that truly stands out, both in 
terms of impact frequency, strength and significance. Indeed, it is above all the executive 
mandate, as a determining feature of the Belgian opportunity structure, that enables or 
prompts councillors to establish a truly professional career. As such a clear dichotomy in 
the Belgian councillor population comes forward between the group of executives that 
systematically develop a professionalized career and the majority of non-executive 
councillors who predominantly function as laymen. Additionally, these executives profit 
more from traditional recruitment bias as well24. They tend to be male (Phi=.12, p=.00), 
come from a talking or brokerage profession (Phi=.12, p=.00), and have slightly less 
foreign roots (Phi=-.07, p=.04). Furthermore, they were more often embedded in the 
political party before their mandate (Phi=.08, p=.04), and even felt more support from the 
locality in the election (Phi=.10, p=.01), although surprisingly not from the party. 
Executive councillors also entered the council at a younger age than their counterparts 
(Phi=-.16, p=00). Finally, unlike this paramount influence of councillor mandate, some 
particular variables of our recruitment model (party type, local roots, ethnic roots, citizen 
duty, political family and local community apprenticeship) did not seem to matter 
directly and significantly for predicting professionalization in local councillor careers. 
 
  
                                                             
24 Associations have been calculated based on the dummy variables that were used in the regression 
analyses in order to reduce the sparseness of the analyses. 
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3.7. CONCLUSION: REBALANCING LAYMEN AND PROFESSIONALS? 
This chapter addressed the alleged professionalization in the recruitment and career of 
Belgian local councillors based on survey data from 856 councillors. In order to draw 
some general conclusions we turn back to the democratic debate that surrounds 
professionalization. The debate is subsumed in the following quotes. On the positive side, 
one could posit that “over time the ‘abstract egalitarian principles’ of ‘legislatures in 
their primitive states’ give way to ‘the emergence of asymmetries’ necessary for a 
legislature to do its job” (Krehbiel, quoted in Hibbing, 1999: 163-164). However on the 
downside, “legislatures are designed to be in tune with their environment, not to develop 
boundaries cordoning off that environment” (Hibbing, 1999: 161). As such the 
professionalization controversy exemplifies what Dahl (1994) has phrased as the 
democratic dilemma governments face trying to reconcile system effectiveness with 
citizen participation. Professionalization empowers localities to govern effectively and 
efficiently, but true professionalism does not comply with the underpinning ethos and 
principles of (Belgian) local government. Since no standards have been set to establish 
when the optimal equilibrium between layman politics and professionalism is reached, 
we interpret our findings in the light of the criticisms posed at the outset of the chapter. 
The analysis of councillor recruitment demonstrated that Belgian local councils do not 
constitute a representative cross-section of society. The process of political recruitment is 
thus not truly democratic, open and fair. Ancient social bias has historically decreased, 
but still exists, advantaging a privileged group of citizens in the race to office. Whilst 
traditional layman features remain important assets for councillors-to-be, 
professionalization is rising simultaneously. Yet only a minority of our research 
population corresponds to the image of the pure professionalized office-seeking 
politician. Meanwhile, the impact of professionalization is equivocal. Political 
professionalization adds mainly to recruitment bias and leads to new selective pathways 
to the council – as feared by its critics. On the other hand, intellectual professionalization 
might produce emancipatory effects, although we must consider that in this respect, old 
biases make way for new ones as well. 
The analysis of councillor careers has demonstrated that there is ample variation in terms 
of professionalization. The average local councillor in Belgium still corresponds to the 
layman archetype in terms of career focus (i.e. time dedicated to council work, cumul des 
mandats) and incumbency. His or her ambition as a part of the career perspective, 
however, is often static, or even progressive, thus tending towards the professional type. 
Simultaneously, evidence indicated that some councillors substantially deviate from this 
general picture, holding office in a truly professionalized way across the different aspects 
of their political career. From this point of view professionalization might have rendered 
the principles of amateurism and, particularly, equality already obsolete in practice. 
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Finally, do recruitment and career relate in a path-dependent way? The multivariate 
analysis has underscored variation in councillor careers which is hardly distributed 
randomly. To some extent professionalized careers result from professionalized 
recruitment paths, especially in those aspects of the political career which surpass the 
local base office, such as the cumul des mandats and future ambitions. Nevertheless, 
much more than being a systematic corollary of recruitment as such, professionalized 
careers are rooted in the Belgian opportunity structure. In fact, it is particularly the group 
of executive councillors that is overwhelmingly and systematically professionalized. 
Since the latter profits more from traditional recruitment bias as well, we are inclined to 
conclude that a fairly large asymmetry between executive and non-executive councillors 
has arisen. These results might partly explain why bias in recruitment and career not only 
contrast with formal local government principles, but interfere with daily practice too. 
Indeed, research has revealed that exactly this asymmetry causes a democratic deficit in 
Belgian governance – with non-executive and opposition councillors failing to assume 
their role as a foundation of local democracy (Verhelst et al., 2011). 
As such, the analysis confirms that professionalization does not come without important 
implications for local democracy. Since elements of Belgium’s legal system create the 
preconditions for a large asymmetry in the council, reframing some formal provisions of 
this legal system (e.g. adjusting the remuneration system, equipping councillors with a 
full legal statute) could mark a first step in rebalancing and reconciling layman politics 
and professionalization. Yet the dominance of the executive is deeply nested in the 
Belgian political culture and institutional structure as well, and altering the latter is 
obviously much harder to accomplish. 
As a concluding remark, we would like to point out that although the analysis aimed at 
shedding light on multiple dimensions of professionalization, some aspects fell beyond 
the scope of research. Accordingly, follow-up research seems indispensable to scrutinize 
the longitudinal dimension and impact of professionalization. Taking the perspective of 
the selectorate and/or voters could add some additional pieces to the puzzle as well. 
Furthermore, the impact of professionalization on the concrete behaviour of councillors 
in office, such as voting and policy preferences, forms another interesting line of enquiry. 
Indeed, studies have already demonstrated that recruitment might fundamentally impinge 
on politicians’ behaviour in office (Patzelt, 1999; Back, 2006; Kjaer, 2006). Finally, 
transposing our results to qualitative research could help to gain more fine-grained 
insights, particularly in terms of councillors’ personal perception of the proceedings and 
impact of professionalization. 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 4 
FOUNDATION OR FRAGMENT OF LOCAL DEMOCRACY? 
EMPIRICALLY ASSESSING THE ROLES OF LOCAL COUNCILLORS  
IN BELGIAN GOVERNANCE1 
 
 
Abstract 
It is often argued that the modern context of local governance conflicts with the 
traditional prescribed functioning of local councillors. From this perspective, we could 
even wonder if councillors have become fragments of local democracy instead of the 
foundation they are supposed to be. This chapter empirically assesses the role orientation 
(i.e. attitude, behaviour and discrepancy) of local councillors in Belgian governance 
towards their classic role-set (i.e. representation, policy and control). Besides pointing at 
a gap between theory and practice, it underlines a substantial discrepancy between 
councillors’ role attitude and subsequent behaviour. This democratic deficit seems to be 
mainly due to the informal decision-making culture in Belgian (local) government, i.e. 
the dominance of the executive board and stringent party discipline, rather than place or 
councillors’ personal characteristics. 
 
Key Words 
Local councillors, role-set, governance, democratic deficit, Belgium 
                                                             
1 This chapter is based on an article co-authored by Prof. dr. Herwig Reynaert and Prof. dr. Kristof 
Steyvers. It has been published in Lex Localis – Journal of Local Self-Government, 2011, 9 (2), pp. 103-
122. 
126  |  CHAPTER 4 
 
4.1. INTRODUCTION: FROM FOUNDATION TO FRAGMENT... AND BACK? 
“Network society and representative politics cannot live together, nor can 
they stay apart” (adapted from Hendriks, 2002). 
It is often claimed that the shift from government to governance has had a fundamental 
impact on the institutions of local representative democracy (Pratchet, 1999; Hansen, 
2005). Particularly the local council and the councillors would be affected (Hendriks, 
2002; Sörensen, 2006). Indeed, the municipal council is historically conceived as the 
heart of local representative democracy along the lines of classic institutionalist 
parliamentary theory (Andrew & Goldsmith, 1998). Councillors are supposed to 
personalize this political primacy based on the prevalence of the layman rule in Belgian 
local government (Mouritzen & Svara, 2002). Hence, they are considered to be the 
foundation of local democracy. 
This classic institutionalization was envisaged to ensure traditional democratic 
government. However, the emergence of governance is often said to conflict with this 
institutionalization. Governance originated from the perceived government failure in 
dealing with complex problems (e.g. the reformed welfare state, issues of scale, the 
individualization of citizens) that involve different and often conflicting values (Klijn & 
Koppenjan, 2000; Sörensen, 2006; Steyvers et al., 2006; Klijn, 2008). These challenging 
issues called for local policy coordination that included different actors at different levels, 
both public and private, incorporating those different values (Klijn, 2008). Consequently, 
local councillors were no longer the sole sovereign rulers in local politics, and they lost 
their ultimate political primacy (Sörensen, 2006). Councillors therefore associate 
governance with losing power (Aars & Fimreite, 2005). In Belgium, the emergence and 
growth of policy-networks have placed these layman-politicians under pressure to the 
extent of being “marginalized” (De Rynck & Voets, 2006: 60). Instead of acting as the 
foundation of local democracy, councillors may have become fragments of the latter:  
“more and more, ordinary councillors find themselves playing a role that 
implies simply overlooking from afar the political decisions decided upon, 
whilst they are increasingly removed from the reality of those decisions” 
(Rao, cited in Guérin & Kerrouche, 2008: 183). 
This alleged democratic deficit might be a good example of what Pratchett (1999) has 
called the failing government institutions in governance. Since this debate touches upon 
some fundamental principles of local democracy, there is a growing concern – both 
theoretical and legal – about the expected behaviour of councillors (Tops & Zouridis, 
2002). As a response, “a search is on for new ways and means to bring elected 
councillors ‘back on stage’ and to the centre of local decision and policy making” 
(Hansen, 2001: 119). Belgian reforms at the turn of the millennium tried to strengthen the 
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position of local councillors as well. For instance, in Flanders the council became 
authorized to elect its own president and councillors acquired information and delegation 
rights whilst in Wallonia a constructive motion of distrust vis-à-vis the executive was 
introduced2. Re-empowering the council and councillors was thus an explicit goal of the 
new regional local government acts (Suykens, 2001; Pilet, 2008)3. However, in spite of 
the promising ambitions of these reforms, results seem to be more of a renovation than 
the real revolution that was deemed necessary to change things around. 
We feel that in order to implement successful changes, a thorough empirical analysis of 
the problem and its causes is indispensable first. Yet, the alleged democratic deficit of 
councillors’ defective role-fulfilment has rarely been scrutinized empirically. Although 
there is a rapidly growing body of literature concerning governance (Klijn, 2008), it often 
focuses on political leaders only (see Steyvers et al., 2006 for Belgium; or Bäck et al., 
2006 for a comparative European perspective). Still, the importance and relevance of 
empirically studying the role of local councillors in governance is stressed as well (Aars 
& Fimreite, 2005). Furthermore, the studies that do focus on local councillors in 
governance often take a qualitative approach (Klijn, 2008). In Belgian literature direct 
empirical assessments of local councillors’ roles in the context of modern governance 
seem scarce too. 
This chapter tries to fill this gap by assessing the role orientation of local councillors in 
Belgium both theoretically and empirically. Such an approach mainly exemplifies the 
governing tradition of governance studies, which focuses on the connection of 
governance networks to traditional institutions (Klijn, 2008)4. In doing so, the analysis 
seeks to find an answer to the following question: ‘Do local councillors in Belgian 
governance act as the foundation of local democracy, or are they rather a fragment of it?’ 
 
  
                                                             
2 Meanwhile, Wallonia and Brussels Capital have introduced the possibility for the councillors to elect the 
council president as well. 
3 Flanders introduced the Municipal Decree in 2005, and Wallonia introduced the Walloon Code of Local 
Democracy in 2006. The Brussels Capital region has not introduced a genuine new local government act 
yet. 
4 Our aim is not to analyze councillors’ role orientation in a specific governance network (e.g. inter-
municipal cooperation) or to analyze the impact of governance in a longitudinal way, however. Rather we 
consider local governance as the overarching environment or opportunity structure in which 
contemporary policymaking takes place, and which determines the way in which councillors fulfil their 
basic role-set (e.g. through interaction with citizens, other government levels, private actors, etc.). 
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4.2. RESEARCH GOALS, METHODS AND DATA 
The symbolic nature of this fundamental research question requires us to specify more 
precise research goals and derived measurable questions. The goal of this chapter is 
twofold. It aims to (1) to explore councillors’ role orientation in practice and (2) to 
expose its underlying factors. 
First, we describe the role orientation of Belgian local councillors as the combination of 
their role attitude, role behaviour and role discrepancy. To interpret the role attitude and 
role behaviour we compare councillors’ empirical self-evaluations with the formal-legal 
demands of the local system. As such we are able to refute or confirm the claim that 
Belgian local councillors do not assume their assigned roles of political primacy, thus 
testing the presumed democratic deficit in their functioning. We consider both principles 
(i.e. role attitude) and practices (i.e. role behaviour) to that end. Attitudes and behaviour 
are two constituting aspects of a role, defined as “the sum of institutionalized expectations 
with regard to the behaviour of the actors in question” (Sörensen & Torfing, 2003: 624). 
Indeed, several authors recognize the importance of councillor attitudes as a prior step 
towards democratic role behaviour (Klijn & Koppenjan, 2000; Denters & Klok, 2003). 
This holds particularly true in governance: “what stands in the way for a strong 
representative democracy under conditions of governance is first and foremost the way 
many politicians perceive the politician’s role” (Sörensen, 2006: 99). Subsequently, we 
address the discrepancy between both role-aspects by quantifying the difference in role 
attitude and role behaviour. 
Second, we expose the underlying factors of this role attitude, behaviour and discrepancy. 
More specifically, we verify if place, personal characteristics and the typical informal 
decision-making culture matter in predicting local councillor roles in Belgium. This 
analysis is based on concrete research hypotheses, developed further in the chapter 
(Section 4.5). 
Our data stem from the Belgian contribution to a European comparative research project 
MAELG that is concerned with municipal councils and councillors. After selecting 180 
municipalities on the basis of a stratified random sample, a questionnaire has been sent 
out to every councillor of those municipalities – creating a representative sample of 4096 
councillors. We ended up with a research population of 856 cases5. The questions 
enquired upon personal assessments of the councillor roles. Notwithstanding some degree 
                                                             
5 The population of Belgian municipalities (589) was grouped in 62 strata on the base of three selection 
variables: population, region and socio-economic character. The strata were internally as homogenous as 
possible, whilst being externally maximally heterogeneous. Three (or exceptionally two) municipalities 
were randomly selected from each stratum. Mayors and aldermen were also addressed as they retain their 
seat in the council whilst being executives. The questionnaires were sent out in June 2008. Afterwards, 
two follow-ups (September 2008 and October 2008) increased response to 21%. 
FOUNDATION OR FRAGMENT OF LOCAL DEMOCRACY?  |  129 
 
of subjectivity that is inherent to such self-evaluations, results of this type of analysis are 
often shown to be consistent with more detailed counterparts of decision-making 
processes (Denters, 2006). 
The chapter continues by outlining the formal role-set of local councillors in Belgium 
(Section 4.3), before examining this role-set in practice (Section 4.4). Afterwards, it 
discerns a set of factors that could account for the variance in councillor roles (Section 
4.5) before tackling the explanatory research goal (Section 4.6). In the conclusion 
(Section 4.7), we present the general results and raise some tentative perspectives for the 
future. 
 
4.3. THE CLASSIC COUNCILLOR ROLE-SET 
The role of local councillors is to a large extent determined by the institution in which 
they function, i.e. the municipal council (Sörensen & Torfing, 2003). As the only directly 
elected body of local democracy, the council’s role is contingent upon local 
government’s conception as “an important link between the political-administrative 
system and the citizens” (Vetter & Kersting, 2003a: 12). As such, all local governments 
serve two main functions: the production of public services for citizens (i.e. the output 
function), and the integration and education of citizens in politics (i.e. the input function). 
Whilst the former establishes local government as a first administration, the latter turns it 
into a democratic base for the local community (Steyvers & Reynaert, 2003). 
The demands for local government to be both democratic and efficient in implementing 
these functions are transposed to the classic role-set of the councillors. On the input side 
of the system, they have a role as representative of the citizens (Rao et al., 1994). They 
translate the needs and issues from society in political actions and establish a reliable and 
effective link between citizens and politics (Heywood, 2002). The output function of 
local government results in a double role as administrator of local affairs (Rao et al., 
1994). On one hand, councillors should set general policy goals and direct public service 
delivery. On the other hand, councillors are expected to control the implementation of 
local policy afterwards as well. The combination of representation, policy and control has 
been crystallized as councillors’ classic role-set from way back up to now (De Rynck, 
2000; Steen & Wille, 2005). It theoretically and ideal-typically places councillors in 
charge of all aspects of municipal governance as “sovereign rulers who hold all the 
power, and, therefore, all the responsibility” (Sörensen & Torfing, 2009: 254). 
It is argued, however, that Belgian local councillors fail to assume this designated role-set 
in practice, especially in the output side of their mandate. The main argument is that “the 
municipal council no longer controls the executive and is failing to dominate the local 
130  |  CHAPTER 4 
 
policy process” (Steen & Wille, 2005: 445). The representative role, on the other hand, 
would be less affected due to the nature of Belgian local government (Kalk & De Rynck, 
2003). Indeed, from a comparative perspective Belgium is classified amongst the 
Southern-style countries in which the notion of political localism prevails. As such, its 
local governments are first and foremost conceived as political communities with a 
distinctive identity, rather than being first-hand service providers (Andrew & Goldsmith, 
1998; Steyvers, 2007). 
 
4.4. BETWEEN PRINCIPLE AND PRACTICE: ROLE-DISCREPANCY OF LOCAL 
COUNCILLORS IN BELGIUM 
The classic role-set of local councillors in Belgium entails three basic roles: 
representation, policy, and control. Our questionnaire included three variables that served 
as indicators for these roles: 
• ‘Representing the requests and issues emerging from the local society’; 
• ‘Defining the main goals of the municipal activity’; 
• ‘Controlling the municipal activity’. 
The respondents were asked to indicate (1) the importance they attach to the roles, 
reflecting their ‘role attitude’; and (2) their personal contribution to the roles, reflecting 
their ‘role behaviour’. Scores could vary from 0 (i.e. no importance/contribution) to 4 
(i.e. very great importance/contribution). The results from these questions allow us to 
quantify the alleged democratic deficit in local councillors’ role-fulfilment: (1) to what 
extent do the councillors support their designated role-set and (2) to what extent do they 
(claim to) act accordingly? Furthermore, we constructed a new variable (‘role 
discrepancy’) that reflects the discrepancy between role attitude and role behaviour. 
Scores on the variable could vary from -4 (minimum score for attitude, maximum score 
for behaviour) to 4 (maximum score for attitude, minimum score for behaviour). Whilst 
the negative scores do not pose many problems from a democratic point of view directly 
(as councillors contribute more to a role in practice than the importance they initially paid 
to it), positive scores do. The respondent namely attaches a certain importance to the role, 
but is not able to fulfil it to the same extent. 
Table 4.1 presents the mean scores, standard deviations and percentage support (i.e. high 
or very high importance/contribution) for the classic role-set at the attitudinal and 
behavioural level. For the role discrepancy, we display the mean scores, standard 
deviations and the percentage of respondents who substantially fail to match their role 
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attitude with corresponding role behaviour (i.e. rating their role behaviour 2 to 4 points 
lower than their role attitude)6. 
 
Table 4.1. Role attitude, behaviour and discrepancy of Belgian local councillors 
 Attitude Behaviour Discrepancy 
 X 
[0-4] 
S 3-4 
% 
X 
[0-4] 
S 3-4 
% 
X 
[-4 - 4] 
S 2-4 
% 
Representation 3.3 0.7 88.3 2.8 0.8 66.3 0.5 0.9 11.8 
Policy 3.1 0.9 77.9 2.2 1.1 39.2 0.9 1.2 27.2 
Control 3.1 0.8 80.2 2.6 0.9 52.2 0.5 1.0 15.5 
(Representation: N=844, 842, 833; Policy: N=836, 841, 826; Control: N=839, 846, 830) 
 
In terms of their role attitude, local councillors definitely acknowledge their triple role. 
Indeed, they think that all three components of their role-set are at least ‘important’ on 
average. The representative role generates the strongest support, confirming our 
foregoing theoretical arguments. The vast majority of Belgian local councillors (88.3%) 
believe it is (very) important to represent the requests and issues emerging from local 
society. Furthermore, 77.9% of the councillors underline the importance of defining the 
main goals of municipal policy as well, while controlling this policy is an important task 
for 80.2% of the respondents. Thus, local councillors in Belgium seem to principally 
comply with the notion of democratic foundation that both theory and legislation impose 
on them. 
However, the analysis of councillors’ role behaviour shows a different picture. Whilst 
the reciprocal relation between the three roles is confirmed generally, the substantial 
lower scores and the larger mutual differences between the roles in practice is striking. 
The representative role is best fulfilled in practice too (with a ‘great’ contribution to the 
role on average), followed by control (‘moderate’ to ‘great’ contribution on average) and 
policy (‘moderate’ contribution on average)7. Whereas still 66.3% of the councillors see 
                                                             
6 Graphical presentations of the role attitude and role behaviour are also presented in Appendix D. 
7 Still, the dominance of the representational role does not imply that councillors spend most of their time 
in office to outward-looking activities (see Appendix C). In fact, the representational role might, for 
instance, entail specific case-work (as strategic policy-making is clearly less dominant in the council) or, 
more generally, the politics of presence or debate in the council. By calling attention to very specific 
dossiers which relate to people’s daily lives and their own sphere of interest, councillors then act as a 
conduit between the local community and the political system. 
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themselves actually representing requests and issues from local society, only 52.2% of 
the respondents answer the same regarding control. Furthermore, no more than 39.2% 
define their actual contribution to local policy making as (very) great. These results 
confirm the claim pointing at the limited influence of Belgian local councillors in 
practice. They do not seem to function as a democratic foundation, revealing a 
democratic deficit between theory and practice. 
The third variable underscores the discrepancy between role attitude and role behaviour. 
Councillors face the lowest role discrepancy in terms of representation and control. Still, 
more than one out of every ten councillors (11.8% for representation and 15.5% for 
control) strongly feel that they cannot contribute as much to these roles as they would 
want to. The most problematic role is policy-making: more than one out of every four 
councillors (27.2%) feel a strong discrepancy in this role. Hence, the Belgian councillors 
do not practice what they preach, reflecting a second democratic deficit in the system. 
Over and above the gap between theory and practice, the difference between councillors’ 
role attitude and role behaviour is remarkable. In our view, the latter should even cause 
more concern, as it implies that certain factors hinder councillors from assuming their 
prescribed and internalized role-set. Scrutinizing these factors and their impact is the 
second, explanatory, goal of this chapter8. 
 
4.5. DEMOCRATIC DEFICIT AS THE RESULT OF A CHANGING LOCAL GOVERNMENT 
SYSTEM? 
In order to select the factors that could predict local councillors’ role orientation, we turn 
to evolutions in the wider opportunity structure of the local system and the informal rules 
of the game in the Belgian (local) system. First, we address the question if place and 
personal characteristics matter (see e.g. Rao et al., 1994). Evolutions on these levels 
could help to explain and substantiate the influence of the shift to local governance, 
which is claimed to have substantially exacerbated the problem of councillors’ role-
fulfilment (Guérin & Kerrouche, 2008). Afterwards, we verify the influence of the 
Belgian informal decision-making culture, for “successful reform depends as much on 
cultural change as on structural and procedural measures” (Steen & Wille, 2005: 460). 
This culture partly acknowledges the historic continuity of local councillors’ functioning 
in Belgium (see De Rynck, 2007), but is claimed to have intensified in modern 
governance as well (De Rynck & Wayenberg, 2010). 
The selected variables serve as predictors for a regression analysis. Therefore, we 
transpose them over to specific research hypotheses. These hypotheses are applied to the 
                                                             
8 The discrepancy between role attitude and role behaviour is also graphically presented in Appendix D. 
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analysis of both role attitude and role behaviour, as the latter two are supposed to 
coincide on a theoretical-formal base (the hypotheses are summarized in Box 4.1 further 
on)9. On the other hand, we expect the analysis of councillors’ role discrepancy to be 
somewhat different. In fact, this variable is the resultant of the empirical comparison of 
councillors’ role attitude and role behaviour. Consequently, we could for instance expect 
that the effect of one variable upon councillors’ role attitude is compensated or 
overturned by the impact of other variables upon councillors’ role behaviour, and vice 
versa. This is why we do not explicitly apply our research hypotheses to the analysis of 
councillors’ role discrepancy. 
 
4.5.1. Place 
The first variable of the general environment or opportunity structure of the Belgian local 
system that could affect councillors’ role orientation is ‘region’. According to the 
traditional local government typologies, local government in Belgium has limited 
functions, low discretion, and high access to the centre (Page & Goldsmith, 1987). 
Moreover, its input function outweighs the output oriented public service delivery, 
rendering local government foremost a political expression of the local identity (Hesse & 
Sharpe, 1991). Typologies are not always clear-cut, however, as especially modern 
federal states such as Belgium are difficult to fit into this picture (Goldsmith & Page, 
2010). 
The Belgian federal state is comprised of three regions (Flanders, Wallonia and Brussels 
Capital) which are functionally and legally equal to each other – and to the federal state. 
Meanwhile, regionalization has been one of the most important political trends of the past 
decades in Belgium (Plees, 2005). Since the state reform of 2002, the main local 
legislation powers have been transferred to the regions. Subsequent reforms revealed a 
diverging focus between these regions: whereas Flemish reforms were far more 
administration-driven, Brussels and Wallonia principally continued to advocate local 
governments’ representative input function (Pilet, 2008)10. This leads us to wonder 
whether Flanders is drifting away from the Southern system towards a more Northern 
public service-directed local government system, translated in new goals of efficiency 
and effectiveness. As such, ‘region’ is the first predictor in our analysis. We expect that: 
                                                             
9 Basically, the hypotheses are phrased in light of councillors’ endurance of the basic dilemma dance in 
office, i.e. the trade-off or delicate balance between representation on the input side of the political system 
and administration/governing on the output side of the system. 
10 Recent changes in the local system of these regions however have sought to enhance the efficiency and 
effectiveness of the municipal governance as well. 
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 ‘Councillors from the Flemish region will tend more towards the output roles 
‘policy’ and ‘control’ (H1a) and less towards the input role ‘representation’ 
(H1b) than councillors from the other regions.’ 
A second place-bound predictor could be the ‘scale’ of local government in terms of the 
municipal population number. Urbanization, albeit its longstanding historical roots, is 
considered to be one of the most influential evolutions in the overarching local 
government context during the last fifty years (Denters & Rose, 2005). Based on an 
efficiency-driven and output oriented logic a gulf of amalgamations has swept the 
European continent (Vetter & Kersting, 2003a). In Belgium the last round of 
amalgamations goes back to 1976-1982, reducing the number of municipalities from 
2.586 to its current number of 589 (Plees, 2005). However, whereas urbanization may 
enhance the output legitimacy of local government, it threatens to weaken its input 
legitimacy alike11. A larger scale could enlarge the distance between citizens and 
politicians, meanwhile multiplying the local interests which councillors ought to 
represent12. Smaller municipalities, on the other hand, could just facilitate representation 
(and its particular casework) on the input side through informal and personal contacts 
between citizens and politicians. Simultaneously, councillors from smaller municipalities 
could be less preoccupied with the strategic output roles. We therefore hypothesize that: 
 ‘Councillors from bigger municipalities will tend more towards the output roles 
‘policy’ and ‘control’ (H2a) but less towards the input role ‘representation’ (H2b) 
than councillors from smaller municipalities.’ 
 
4.5.2. Personal characteristics 
Apart from socio-economic and political trends on the macro-level of the political 
system, evolutions on the micro-level – meeting the increasing participatory and 
instrumental demands of citizens – could also impact upon councillors’ role orientation in 
governance (Denters & Rose, 2005). 
For instance, reforms introducing (elements of) direct democracy (e.g. local referenda, 
public meetings, neighbourhood councils, etc.) sought to re-engage citizens in the 
political process, hence particularly aimed at strengthening the input legitimacy of local 
governance (Vetter & Kersting, 2003a). Yet on the downside, directly empowering 
citizens as political actors the political system might impinge on the representative input 
                                                             
11 Moreover, it is expected that particularly in bigger cities the stress on local councillors deems to make 
the municipal council a fragment of local democracy in general (Haus et al., 2005). 
12 In this respect, we also notice that the total number of local councillors in a municipality does not 
follow the municipal size in a linear way. 
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function of the local councillors as intermediate agents between the citizens and the 
state13. Councillors’ support for citizen participation (‘participation’) therefore serves as 
third predictor in our model. We expect that: 
 ‘Councillors who support citizen participation will tend less towards the input role 
‘representation’ than councillors who support citizen participation to a lesser 
extent (H3).’ 
Furthermore, citizens’ instrumental demands for efficiency on the output side of local 
governance has led to the introduction of New Public Management-arrangements 
(planning, benchmarking, PPS, etc.) and other networks (e.g. inter-municipal co-
operations), meanwhile increasing the workload for the councillors (Vetter & Kersting, 
2003a; Denters & Rose, 2005). Taken together, these trends and their inherent 
requirement for technical skills and expertise resulted in the professionalization of the 
local councillor office (Cotta & Best, 2000). In such a context, the concept refers to the 
increasing calibre of councillors that empowers them as actors in governance14. 
Accordingly, the traditional qualities of representative politicians (i.e. the voluntary base 
of the political involvement, the legal equality of the councillors and the amateur statute) 
have lost their ground, and a new type of councillor has emerged – perceiving his/her 
mandate as a career or profession (Guérin & Kerrouche, 2008). ‘Professionalization’ is 
our fourth predictor in the analysis. We consider highly educated councillors, 
experienced councillors and councillors who have a selective talking or brokerage 
profession as professionalized councillors15. We hypothesize that: 
 ‘Professionalized councillors will tend more towards the output roles ‘policy’ and 
‘control’ than less professionalized councillors (H4).’ 
 
4.5.3. Informal decision-making culture 
Despite the plausible and universal influence of the abovementioned evolutions in the 
environment of the political system, we should also consider the singularity of Belgian 
informal politics in our analysis. Indeed, the Belgian political system is marked by its 
informal way of decision-making, operating as an informal rule of the game. 
                                                             
13 An opposite, more positive, hypothesis could seem plausible too: councillors might perceive citizen 
participation as an element of democratic behaviour, hence embrace it as a useful complement to their 
representative role. 
14 The complementary meaning of professionalization refers to the growing impact of political parties in 
councillors’ recruitment process and career development (see also Chapter 3). 
15 The talking or brokerage professions denote certain professions that facilitate political office since they 
involve negotiating, speaking in public, etc. (e.g. teachers, lawyers) (Norris & Lovenduski, 1993). 
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A first particular characteristic would be the influence of political parties that are “at the 
centre of the councillors’ assumptive world” (Copus, 2008: 602) without having a formal 
role-specification in local government legislation (De Rynck, 2000). As such, parties 
function as formalized informalities (Copus, 2008). Political parties may enhance the 
democratic calibre of a system by harmonizing policy with public demand and acting as 
intermediary institutions between citizens and the state (Putnam, 1976). However, the 
exceeding collusion of parties and government may transform representative democracies 
into “partitocracies” or party governments (De Winter & Dumont, 2006: 957). Belgium 
is widely considered to be such a partitocracy (De Winter & Dumont, 2006). Stringent 
party discipline can diminish the political debate if majority parties unilaterally take all 
important decisions (Steyvers et al., 2010). Controlling the local policy, on the other 
hand, could then turn into a prerequisite for the opposition as members of the political 
majority will find it very hard to (publicly) march against the party orders. This majority 
logic leads us to include councillors’ ‘position’ (i.e. belonging to the majority or 
opposition) as a fifth predictor in the analysis. We presume that: 
 ‘Councillors from the majority will tend more towards ‘representation’ and, above 
all, ‘policy’ (H5a) but less towards ‘control’ (H5b) than councillors from the 
opposition.’ 
A second distinctive feature of Belgian politics is the dominance of the executive body 
over the legislative pendant (Steyvers et al., 2010). Formally, the council instigates the 
executive (the Board of Mayor and Aldermen, BMA). The latter operates as a collegial 
body whilst its members retain their seat in the council (Mouritzen & Svara, 2002). As 
such, the BMA should merely implement the council decisions. In reality, however, this 
personal monism works the other way around (Steen & Wille, 2005). Whilst the BMA 
develops its own dynamics as a separate political body (i.e. functional dualism), the 
power-relation between council and executive is inverted (i.e. reversed monism). The 
executive then often functions as the dominant decision-making body, surpassing or 
bypassing the council at large (Steyvers et al., 2010). Consequently, councillors’ function 
or ‘mandate’ (i.e. having experience in the BMA or not) is the final predictor in the 
analysis16. We assume that: 
 ‘Executive councillors will tend more towards ‘representation’ and, above all, 
‘policy’ (H6a) but less towards control (H6b) than non-executive councillors.’ 
 
                                                             
16 We consider the councillors who held an executive mandate beforehand as executive as well. In fact, 
their experience in the BMA (and inherent calibre) is very likely to colour their role in the council, 
particularly in comparison with the ordinary councillors who do not have such executive experience. 
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4.6. THE INFORMAL DECISION-MAKING CULTURE MATTERS! 
Belgian local councillors are thus confronted with several evolutions in, and 
characteristics of the local government system in which they function. We have selected 
eight factors on the theoretical basis outlined above to predict the scores on the different 
councillor roles (representation, policy, control) by means of a binary logistic regression 
analysis17. All variables have been re-coded in dummies (i.e. assuming the value 0 or 1) 
in order to capture maximal variance from a theoretical perspective. The results of the 
regression analysis are presented in Table 4.2. Data reflect the strength (Exp B) and the 
significance (S) of the association between high scores on the predictors on one hand and 
high scores on role attitude, behaviour and discrepancy (in terms of representation, policy 
and control) on the other. The total predictive value of the model is shown by the 
Nagelkerke R² scores. 
 
  
                                                             
17 ‘Flanders’ represents councillors from a municipality in the Flemish region and is constructed by the 
authors based on the respondents’ municipality (N=565 or 66.5%); ‘Populous’ represents the third of 
respondents of the biggest municipalities in terms of inhabitants, i.e. >19.357, created by the authors 
based on the respondents’ municipality (N=284 or 33.7%); ‘Support’ represents respondents who gave a 
score >2 (scale 0-4) on the question ‘People have different ideas about how local democracy should 
function. Please indicate how important for local democracy you feel the following requirements are: 
Residents should participate actively and directly in making important local decisions.’ (N=354 or 
42.3%); ‘Talking/brokerage’ represents the professional categories Professional politician, Civil servant, 
Business manager, Teacher and Liberal profession (N=439 or 52%); ‘University’ represents respondents 
with University/college or equivalent as highest completed education (N=543 or 64.3%); ‘Experienced’ 
represents the third of respondents with most experience as councillors, i.e. >13 years (N=285 or 33.6%); 
‘Majority’ presents respondents who are member of a party of the political majority in the council, 
created by the authors based on the comparison of the respondents’ political party and the political 
majority in the municipality (N=518 or 63.7%); ‘BMA’ represents respondents who presently hold or 
previously held a mandate as a Member of the executive board (N=277 or 33.3%). The dependent 
variables represent respondents who gave a score >2 on the question on ‘role attitude’ (For 
Representation N=745 or 88.3%; For Policy N=651 or 77.9%; For Control N=673 or 80.2%) and ‘role 
behaviour’ (For Representation N=558 or 66.3%; For Policy N=330 or 39.2%; For Control N=442 or 
52.2%); and respondents with a score >1 on the newly created variable ‘role discrepancy’ (For 
Representation N=98 or 11.8%; For Policy N=225 or 27.2%; For Control N=129 or 15.5%). 
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First we consider councillors’ role attitude. For all three roles, the predictive value of the 
total model is rather low. Representation is weakly (and not significantly) predicted by 
our model of independent variables, whilst the results for policy and control are 
significant but only faintly stronger. Since the role attitude did not vary that much 
amongst our research population initially (i.e. most councillors supporting their three 
roles to a large extent), it seems logical that this role attitude differs to a lesser extent 
according to evolutions in/and characteristics of Belgian governance as well. Looking at 
the influence of the predictors per analytical level, ‘place’ only matters partially. Flemish 
councillors do pay more importance to the output roles, confirming hypothesis 1a, but 
value representation as much as councillors from Brussels and Wallonia, rejecting 
hypothesis 1b. ‘Scale’ does not matter in any significant manner. Hence, we cannot 
accept hypotheses 2a and 2b as well. The second level, councillors’ ‘personal 
characteristics’, matters even less. Only ‘experience’ impacts significantly upon 
‘control’: experienced councillors endorse their control role almost twice as much as less 
experienced councillors18. Yet on the other hand, profession and education have no 
significant impact. Consequently, we cannot accept hypothesis 4 entirely, nor can we 
accept hypothesis 3. 
Finally, does the ‘informal decision-making culture’ act upon councillors’ role attitude? 
Hypotheses 5a (partially) and especially 5b can be accepted. Councillors from majority 
parties attach significantly more importance to the policymaking role than councillors 
from the opposition. Yet no significant difference occurs in terms of representation. 
Opposition councillors for their part place more than twice as much emphasis on control. 
Such pattern intuitively complies with the common notion of checks and balances in the 
local authority. Hypotheses 6a and 6b, however, cannot be confirmed. Executive 
councillors attach substantially less importance to representation than non-executives. 
The ordinary councillors, who have no experience in the executive board, mainly endorse 
a role representing local issues and problems in the local authority. No significant results 
emerge concerning the output roles. In sum, the informal decision-making culture thus 
matters most in explaining councillors’ role attitude, albeit the influence of these informal 
rules of the game is not very strong and significant. 
Second, do these findings apply to councillors’ role behaviour as well? Considering the 
democratic deficit revealed in the descriptive analysis of councillors’ role behaviour, the 
stronger and significant results produced by the explanatory models as such seem 
legitimate. Representation, policy and control are moderately/strongly predicted by our 
model of independent variables. ‘Place’ first of all does not matter in predicting the role 
                                                             
18 Moreover, if we would have applied the same (more detailed) significance levels as in the other 
regression analyses in the study (see Chapter 3 and Chapter 5), we could also conclude that experienced 
councillors are more likely do endorse the other facets of their role-set (i.e. representation and policy). 
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behaviour of Belgian local councillors. Hypotheses 1a, 1b, 2a and 2b are thus rejected. 
The second level of analysis, i.e. councillors’ ‘personal characteristics’, offers more 
explanatory value. Contrary to the expectation phrased in hypothesis 3, councillors who 
support direct citizen participation do not contribute less to representing the local requests 
and issues in the political system themselves. Rather, they (claim to) exhibit more 
representative behaviour19. Accordingly, an open mind to active citizen input in the local 
authority seems to align with strong representative behaviour, rather than being antipodal 
to it. Further, highly educated and experienced (and thus professionalized) councillors 
contribute significantly more to controlling the municipal policy as we expected. As the 
other expected relations (regarding the policy role and councillors’ profession as a 
determinant of role orientation) are neither strong nor significant, however, we cannot 
accept hypothesis 4 entirely20. 
Third, the table clearly demonstrates that the impact of both place and personal 
characteristics is outweighed by the impact of the ‘informal decision-making culture’. 
Councillors from the political majority and councillors with executive experience indicate 
to contribute far more to representation and policymaking than non-executives and 
opposition councillors. Hypotheses 5a and 6a are consequently confirmed entirely. 
Furthermore, whilst councillors’ ‘position’ does not affect control significantly, rejecting 
hypothesis 5b, executives also contribute substantially more to controlling local policy 
than non-executives. This result leads us to reject hypothesis 6b. Obviously, such a 
pattern does not fit with the general notion of checks and balances in the local authority 
anymore. As such, it is mainly the typical decision-making culture of Belgian local 
politics that predicts local councillors’ role behaviour. Two formalized informalities, 
cutting across both democratic principles and legal prescriptions, determine councillors’ 
role behaviour and provoke a democratic deficit in councillors’ functioning. 
Finally, which factors account for the second democratic deficit, i.e. the role discrepancy 
that has emerged from the empirical comparison between principal attitude and practical 
behaviour? The table shows that all three models are (moderately) strong and significant. 
Policy thereby exceeds control and representation in terms of the proportion of variance 
in councillors’ role orientation accounted for. The analysis per analytical level shows 
only one significant result on the macro-level ‘place’. Flemish councillors feel a stronger 
discrepancy in their policymaking role than councillors from Brussels and Wallonia. 
                                                             
19 And, from a wider statistical perspective, they also contribute more to the definition of general policy 
goals in the political system. 
20 From a wider statistical perspective, we can also conclude that experienced councillors contribute more 
to representing local requests and issues in the political system. This suggests that the awareness of what 
it takes to be a good councillor, as well as the practical implementation of this awareness, might develop 
over time. 
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Hence, the outward-oriented conception of the mandate of the Flemish councillors does 
not lead them to exert a stronger impact in the domain of policymaking in practice too. 
On the micro-level, the significant relations found in the analyses of councillors’ role 
attitude and role behaviour evaporate in the analysis of councillors’ role discrepancy. 
‘Personal characteristics’ do not seem to determine whether councillors face a 
discrepancy between principle and practice. It is above all the ‘informal decision-making 
culture’ that appears to be the determining factor again. Both ‘position’ and ‘mandate’ 
significantly and substantially determine if councillors experience a substantial 
discrepancy between their role attitude and role behaviour in terms of representation, 
policy, and control. The gap between the importance attached to representation and the 
extent to which this role is fulfilled in practice, is clearly less felt by councillors from the 
majority and especially councillors with executive experience compared to non-
executives and opposition members. This implies that the discrepancy between role 
attitude and role behaviour is more than twice as strong for ordinary councillors. 
Furthermore, the role-discrepancy in the policymaking role is much smaller for 
executives and majority councillors as well, whilst the analysis for control produces 
similar results. Thus, executives and councillors from the majority are without a doubt 
less subjected to the democratic deficit than their colleagues. They seem empowered to 
act in line with the legal provisions and their personal beliefs, i.e. as the foundation of 
local democracy. Besides, results for ‘mandate’ are even stronger than results for 
‘position’. This implies that these factors probably enhance each other21. Majority 
councillors and particularly councillors with executive experience form a specific elite 
which is able to play its role to the detriment of the other councillors22. 
Table 4.3 summarizes the total predictive value of the independent variables in our 
regression analysis. A quick glance at the table immediately indicates which factors 
provoke the democratic deficit in local councillors’ role-fulfilment. Both ‘place’ (3/18 
significant relations, ratio 1:6) and especially the ‘personal characteristics’ of the 
councillors (4/36 significant relations, ratio 1:9) do not really seem to matter 
systematically. The ‘informal decision-making culture’ (14/18 significant relations, ratio 
1:1.3), on the other hand, does exert a systematic influence upon councillors’ role 
orientation. Consequently, we would argue that it is above all the typical Belgian 
                                                             
21 Formally, the executives are elected by the council. Yet in practice the majority parties distribute the 
executive mandates. As such, the executives-in-place are almost always member of a majority party. 
22 In Appendix D, we present two additional analyses to underscore this supremacy. First, we show that 
councillors with executive experience and, above all, councillors from the majority have a more positive 
opinion on the effectiveness of the councillor instruments in office, as well as the information they 
receive from the municipal administration. Second, we underline that councillors with experience in the 
executive board also tend to have (or had) a stronger position in their party on the local and supra-local 
level. 
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informal decision-making culture that determines local councillors’ functioning and the 
democratic deficit within. The research hypotheses are summarized in Box 4.1. 
 
Table 4.3. Councillors’ role orientation: strength of the individual predictors 
Predictor Analytical Level Significant relations 
[X/9] 
Majority Logic 
Mandate 
Region 
Experience 
Education 
Participation 
Profession 
Scale 
Informal decision-making culture 
Informal decision-making culture 
Place 
Personal characteristics 
Personal characteristics 
Personal characteristics 
Personal characteristics 
Place 
7 
7 
3 
2 
1 
1 
0 
0 
 
Box 4.1. Role attitude and behaviour: overview of the research hypotheses 
Hypothesis 
Place 
H1a    Flanders more policy/control 
H1b    Flanders less representation 
H2a    Big size more policy/control 
H2b    Big size less representation 
Personal characteristics 
H3      Support citizen participation less representation 
H4      Professionalization more policy/control 
Informal decision-making culture 
H5a    Majority more representation/policy 
H5b    Majority less control 
H6a    Executives more representation/policy 
H6b    Executives less control 
Attitude 
 
/ 
 
/ 
 
 
 
/() 
 
/ 
 
/ 
 
Behaviour 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/ 
 
/ 
 
/ 
 
(: hypothesis confirmed, : no significant result, : hypothesis reversed) 
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4.7. CONCLUSION 
This chapter was inspired by the claim that local councillors find it increasingly hard to 
function in their role as the foundation of local democracy in the complex local 
governance context of the twenty-first century. In Belgium local councillors are 
conceived as the emanation of representative democracy. Hence their classic role-set of 
representation, policy and control should empower them as key actors in local 
government and local governance. And even if councillors’ role fulfilment has been 
questioned beforehand as well, it is often argued that the shift to governance further 
threatens to make councillors mere fragments of local democracy, failing to fulfil their 
typical role-set (even more). 
Our study has designated that at least in terms of role attitude Belgian local councillors 
still correspond to the theoretical and legal demands of the political system. Councillors 
pay significant importance to the classic roles policy, control and especially 
representation. We did perceive a democratic deficit in their role behaviour, however. 
Belgian councillors seem to contribute far less to this role-set in practice than they are 
expected to. Furthermore, the comparison between the role attitude and role behaviour 
has resulted in a significant discrepancy. As such, the democratic deficit seems twofold: 
councillors’ role behaviour deviates from the theoretical and legal provisions, as well as 
from their personal role attitudes. In our view, attention should be directed at the 
underlying causes of these deficits if councillors ought to be re-empowered in an 
effective way. 
Therefore, a regression analysis aimed at exposing the factors that determine local 
councillors’ role-fulfilment, and consequently the democratic deficits within. Whereas 
place and personal councillor characteristics did not seemed to matter strongly or 
systematically, the typical informal decision-making culture of the Belgian local system 
did substantially. The executive dominance (as proof of the reversed monism) and the 
power of political parties – two formalized informalities or informal rules of the game – 
overwrite both democratic theory and councillors’ personal role attitudes with a strong 
political ink. On one hand, a selective group of councillors obtains power to act as the 
foundation of local democracy, defining and controlling policy whilst representing 
requests and issues from society. On the other hand, ordinary councillors seem to be 
reduced to mere fellow travellers, if not fragments of democracy in this system. As such, 
the democratic deficit is mainly due to factors that contradict the ideal and formal notion 
of democratic governance. 
Based on these empirical findings, what perspectives for the future could be raised23? If 
Belgian local councillors are to be re-empowered as a democratic foundation, further 
                                                             
23 These perspectives are further elaborated in the conclusive chapter of this study (Chapter 7). 
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local government reforms seem inevitable. Literature distinguishes two paths to tackle 
this problem (Hendriks, 2002; De Rynck, 2007). The first turns to traditional institutional 
reforms, strengthening representative democracy and its actors. We could doubt, 
however, if the current path chosen by Belgian regional governments would be sufficient 
to achieve this goal. Not only do councillors seem far from re-empowered at this 
moment, we expect the effects of the implemented structural reforms to be insufficient to 
cope with the dominant influence of the informal culture over an extended period of time 
as well. 
The introduction of dualism could be part of the solution, as this system has proven to be 
quite effective in the Netherlands (De Groot, 2009). In this way, executive powers would 
be formally transferred to the executive body made up of (semi-) professionals who no 
longer participate in normal council work. Ordinary councillors, on the other hand, could 
focus more on their core-tasks. This personal and functional separation partly fits with the 
present reality. Indeed, the persisted prevalence of the layman rule no longer seems in 
harmony with the reality of diverging local mandates. The latter reflects a strong 
dichotomy between ordinary powerless councillors and a local powerful elite. However, 
whilst dualism could counter the executive dominance, it might not be sufficient to 
overturn the partitocratic nature of the Belgian local government system. 
The alternative path advocates a new role for local councillors adapted to the new context 
of local governance: the role of metagovernor. This role implies linking governance 
networks to representative government and is considered the optimal way to ensure the 
democratic legitimacy as well as the effectiveness of network decision-making (Hovik & 
Vabo, 2005; Sörensen & Torfing, 2009). In a nutshell, councillors act as managers of 
democracy in those networks instead of being the cornerstone of the latter (Sörensen, 
2006). Accordingly, councillors no longer act as key actors in the process of governance 
by means of their traditional roles, but facilitate and safeguard its democratic proceeding 
on the base of their electoral legitimacy. 
However, some problems with this concept might still exist. First, most metagovernance 
theories and studies seem to be inspired by a normative underpinning whilst systematic 
empirical research is yet to catch on. Hence it is difficult to predict the viability of this 
role in the Belgian context. Second, metagovernance seems a predominant North-
European (and especially Scandinavian) phenomenon. Since governance authors point to 
the institutional context as a fundamental precondition for metagovernance (Klijn & 
Koppenjan, 2000; Wälti et al., 2004; Sörensen & Torfing, 2009), we could doubt if this 
concept complies with the typical Belgian setting. In fact, Belgian legislation still 
strongly emphasizes its preference for traditional local government and the inherent 
councillor role-set. Third, our descriptive analysis has revealed that councillors largely 
support their own classic role-set. It is first and foremost the informal decision-making 
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culture that instigates the democratic deficit in councillors’ role-fulfilment. Hence, it is 
doubtful whether councillors would be willing to exchange their political primacy for a 
new role as metagovernor. Finally, even in the changing context of governance traditional 
government and its institutions are hardly to become obsolete: “traditional government 
structures are still very much present, and in many instances, government seems to be a 
more appropriate concept than governance” (Jacobsen, 2009: 237). Within the course of 
traditional government, the classic councillor role-set could then be more suitable than 
the new metagovernor role. 
Therefore, follow-up research is needed to further our insights in the effects of 
government reforms, and to map out and evaluate the optimal path to establish 
democratic governance. Nonetheless for the time being it is apparent that we can hardly 
concur that Belgian local councillors function as the foundation of local democracy. 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 5 
POLITICAL REPRESENTATION IN LOCAL GOVERNANCE 
A SURVEY ANALYSIS OF COUNCILLOR ATTITUDES  
AND BEHAVIOUR IN BELGIUM1 
 
 
Abstract 
Recent evolutions in Western societies have sparked renewed interest in the study of 
political representation. Academics particularly stress the need to develop a modern 
understanding of the concept that acknowledges its dynamic nature. This chapter aims 
for such an approach in the context of Belgian local governance. Drawing on a 
multifaceted typology developed by Andeweg and Thomassen (2005), it empirically 
outlines the notions of 856 local councillors on political representation at the attitudinal 
and behavioural level. Furthermore, it searches to explain variation in the latter 
according to councillors’ political and personal profile, contact pattern and the local 
government context. The chapter paints a balanced picture. The largest group of 
councillors pays equal importance to authorization, accountability, delegation and 
responsiveness as basic styles or modes of political representation. Nevertheless, we 
perceive a clear shift from councillors’ attitudes, in which delegation takes the upper 
hand, to their acclaimed behaviour, which becomes more entrepreneurial as 
hypothesized. Furthermore, councillors’ personal profile and contact pattern seem the 
most important determinants of political representation. 
 
Key Words 
Political representation, local councillors, attitudes, behaviour, Belgium  
                                                             
1 This chapter is based on an article co-authored by Prof. dr. Herwig Reynaert, Prof. dr. Kristof Steyvers 
and Prof. dr. Filip De Rynck. It has been submitted to Acta Politica and is currently under review. 
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5.1. INTRODUCTION 
Political representation is often considered to be an important touchstone for the quality 
of democracy (Eulau et al., 1959; Urbinati & Warren, 2008; Vieira & Runciman, 2008). 
In fact, since legitimate and democratic government requires at least some congruence 
between public policy and citizen demands, a central question asks how politicians 
should act to obtain the latter (Rao, 1998). Answers are sought by studying councillors’ 
representative style, or “the particular criterion of judgement the representative ought to 
use in deciding on legislative issues” (Rao, 1998: 30)2. The goal of this chapter is to 
investigate the latter in the context of Belgian local governance. It tackles three basic 
questions: (a) ‘How do local councillors envisage their representative role?’; (b) ‘Do they 
claim to behave accordingly?’; and (c) ‘Which factors determine (the variation in) 
councillors’ representative style?’ 
It is remarkable how recent evolutions in Western societies (e.g. differentiated political 
decision-making, growing power of executives and unaccountable bodies, fading political 
trust, declining electoral turnout) have sparked concern on the current state of political 
representation (Urbinati & Warren, 2008; Saward, 2010; Alonso et al., 2011). Also 
Hannah Pitkin (2004: 339), arguably one of the most influential academics in the field, 
takes a gloomy view on the subject: 
“Our governors have become a self-perpetuating elite that rules – or 
rather, administers – passive or privatized masses of people. The 
representatives act not as agents of the people but simply instead of them. 
We send them to take care of public affairs like hired experts, and they are 
professionals, entrenched in office and party structures (...) and insulated 
from the ordinary realities of their constituents’ lives (...).” 
Although Pitkin’s claim refers to national politics in the United States, we could draw 
some clear parallels with local politics in Europe. Local government, traditionally shaped 
by an electoral chain of command from citizens to politicians (Dearlove, 1973), is often 
criticized for its exclusive character, lack of accountability and transparency too. These 
criticisms are epitomized by the metaphorical gap between citizens and politics (Klijn & 
Koppenjan, 2000). It includes, amongst others, declining levels of electoral turnout and 
                                                             
2 In addition to the question how councillors should represent the people, a complementary classic 
question asks who they should represent. This question is captured by the concept representative focus 
(Rao, 1998). Formally and theoretically, Belgian local councillors are expected to act as the representative 
of the local community at large. Appendix E presents an overview of councillors’ opinion on this subject. 
It confirms that almost every councillor wishes to represent his or her entire municipality in office. 
Additionally, councillors also consider themselves as the advocates of (several) subgroups of the local 
community (e.g. workers, less resourceful citizens, a particular geographical area of the municipality, the 
middle class, etc.). 
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party membership, fading political interest and trust (Borraz & John, 2004; Bogason & 
Musso, 2006; Franzke et al., 2007). Besides, the introduction of New Public 
Management-arrangements in combination with an increased task package and 
corresponding workload has added further to the pressure on local representatives. One of 
the paramount effects of these evolutions is the professionalization of the councillor 
office (Caulfield & Larsen, 2002; Guérin & Kerrouche, 2008). Arguably, 
professionalized councillors might further enhance the gap between citizens and the 
political system by behaving more autonomously from their constituents (Petracca, 1991; 
Herrick, 2011). 
Yet likewise, it is argued that the typical qualities of local government facilitate political 
representation at the grassroots. For instance, a lower threshold renders local government 
the most accessible arena of the political sphere, either actively (by assuming a political 
mandate) or passively (by participating in policy-making via other channels) (Phillips, 
1996; Pitkin, 2004; Pratchett, 2004). Additionally, local government allows to adjust 
public policy better to specific local needs, for policy is shaped by actors who tend to 
have a direct stake in it (Stoker, 1996). And perhaps most importantly, the close 
geographical distance between citizens and politicians at the local level promotes 
personal contacts, hence better representation and higher levels of political trust (Rao, 
1998; Judge, 1999). Based on the above surplus, and in response to fading political trust 
and citizen emancipation, Steyvers et al. (2007: 18) take a rather optimistic stance on 
political representation3: 
“Representation thus no longer equals enlightened judgement, shared 
social interest or party mandate. The current state of representation might 
actually come closest to delegation, and this is also true at the local level. 
In this scenario representatives act because of clear guidance and 
instructions conveying the views of those they represent, thus leaving more 
room for popular participation and even direct rule by the people.” 
Still, we must also bear in mind the changed context in which political representation at 
the local level takes place nowadays. In fact, local government has become increasingly 
entrenched in local governance, which is defined as a “polycentric system in which a 
variety of actors are engaged in local public decision-making processes” (Denters, 2011: 
313). This new context might affect representation in several ways. In governance, the 
policy arena is extended with new actors and processes but simultaneously, linkages 
within are intensified. Since governance has increased the need for strategic decision-
making and long-term planning, its accountability has been questioned in terms of a 
closed, technocratic or elitist character of decision-making (Wälti et al., 2004; 
                                                             
3 The authors argue that such modern representation evolves in interaction with citizen participation. 
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Papadopoulos, 2007). On the other hand, some argue that governance might reinvigorate 
democratic representation exactly because representatives also have to engage with 
citizens and local stakeholders in the course of policy-making (Klijn & Skelcher, 2007). 
In the literature, most of the empirical studies have focused on the representative style of 
political leaders in local governance hitherto. Haus and Sweeting (2006b), for instance, 
have shown how European mayors prefer a moderated style of political representation 
which holds the balance between outright trusteeship, pure delegation and direct citizen 
participation. Belgian mayors, albeit playing an entrepreneurial role in specific 
governance networks (De Rynck & Voets, 2006; Block & Steyvers, 2011), correspond to 
this general picture as well (Steyvers et al., 2006). Furthermore, John and Cole (1999) 
demonstrated that the representative style of mayors is contingent on the interplay 
between institutional structures, party organization and political culture. 
However in contrast with such profuse attention for political leadership, few studies have 
empirically substantiated the classic debate on political representation at the local base 
office in the context of modern governance. An exception can be found in the Spanish 
context, where Brugué and Vallès (2005) have underscored a growing degree of the 
entrepreneurial style amongst local councillors. In Belgian literature, such empirical 
insights are not yet available. This is why our chapter attempts to fill this gap. First, it 
provides an overview of the research methods and data (Section 5.2) before elaborating 
on the analytical framework and operationalization we use to study political 
representation (Sections 5.3 and 5.4). The following section discusses the contextual 
setting of the Belgian research (Section 5.5). Thereafter, the descriptive and explanatory 
sections analyze councillors’ attitudes and behaviour in terms of political representation 
(Section 5.6 and 5.7). Finally, the conclusion (Section 5.8) summarizes our findings and 
connects them to the theoretical debate on political representation in local governance. 
 
5.2. RESEARCH METHODS AND DATA 
Our goal is to examine political representation in Belgian local governance, focussing on 
the representative style of its councillors. To this end we have combined descriptive 
research questions with an explanatory agenda. The former research questions outline 
councillors’ attitudes towards representation and the perception they have of their 
behaviour in office. The latter agenda seeks to explain variation in these attitudes and 
behaviour according to the political, relational, personal and contextual profile of the 
research population. By doing so, we apply a multifaceted typology on political 
representation established by Andeweg and Thomassen (2005; see also Andeweg, 2003). 
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This empirical approach has been made possible by the quantitative method of data 
collection. The chapter draws on survey data collected from Belgian local councillors as 
part of the European research project Municipal Assemblies in European Local 
Governance, conducted in 2008. In 180 municipalities, an anonymous and standard 
postal questionnaire was sent to all the councillors, the aldermen and the mayor. The 
aldermen and mayors were included since they retain their council seats in the Belgian 
monistic local government tradition. The 180 municipalities were randomly selected from 
a total of 589 Belgian municipalities, which were stratified in terms of municipal size, 
region and socio-economic profile. After two follow-ups, a research population of 856 
cases (equalling 21%) was obtained4. In addition to questions on political representation, 
the survey required information on the councillors’ personal characteristics, political 
careers, their (attitude towards) local democracy and their municipal settings. 
Throughout the analyses we have been careful to consider our results as role orientations, 
i.e. concerning the very personal opinions of the respondents expressed as attitudes and 
behaviour. Such orientations obviously hold a certain degree of subjectivity. 
Nevertheless, they form a key to understanding (and modelling) concrete behaviour in 
office (Cooper & Richardson, 2006; De Groot et al., 2010). 
 
5.3. ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK: A MULTIFACETED APPROACH TO POLITICAL 
REPRESENTATION 
Probably the single most uncontested fact on representation is its multifarious meaning 
(Vieira & Runciman, 2008). In the context of political studies, representation is 
concerned with the relation between citizens/constituents (i.e. the represented) and 
politicians/legislators (i.e. the representatives) (Eulau et al., 1959; Jewell, 1983). More 
specifically, political representation is meant to establish a reliable and effective link 
between politics, citizens and society (Heywood, 2002). Hence, we define political 
representation as the “relation between two persons, the representative and the 
represented or constituent, with the representative holding the authority to perform 
various actions that incorporate the agreement of the represented” (de Grazia quoted in 
Rao, 1998: 20)5. 
The traditional orthodoxy of scrutinizing this relation goes back to the mandate-
independence controversy (Fairlie, 1940; Pitkin, 1967), operationalized by Eulau and his 
                                                             
4 Although this response rate is rather low, the research population represents the population of Belgian 
local councillors in terms of the socio-economic character of the municipality whilst it is nearly 
representative in terms of municipal size and region. 
5 Some contemporary approaches disconnect political representation from this normative loading, 
focussing on representation outside common frameworks of legitimacy (Rehfeld, 2006; Saward, 2010). 
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colleagues (1959). It revolves around a fundamental dichotomization. Should 
representatives act as delegates, instructed and bound by a mandate from society (i.e. the 
Madisonean view)? Or should they govern independently as trustees, relying on free, 
independent and mature judgement (i.e. the Burkean view)? Amid this continuum, Eulau 
and his colleagues (1959) have placed the politicos, who adjust their behaviour to the 
circumstances in place and/or fluctuate between trustees and delegates. Later, this 
typology was complemented with the partisans. Indeed in Western parliamentary 
democracies, there is little doubt that political parties function as basic units of political 
representation (Birch, 1971; Rao, 1998; Andeweg, 2003; Copus, 2004). 
Our survey includes a question that incorporates this classic orthodoxy. It is phrased as 
follows: “How should members of the council vote if there should be a conflict of 
interests between the own conviction, the opinion of the party group and the opinion of 
the voters?” Respondents were asked to choose one of three options, identifying 
themselves as trustee, partisan or delegate. As Table 5.1 shows, most respondents claim 
that the party line should be councillors’ main directive in the case of a conflict of 
opinion6. Furthermore, the majority of councillors who would vote against the party whip 
think that they should follow their personal opinion then. Hence, only a small minority of 
the Belgian local councillors qualify as true delegates in the classic conception of the 
term. 
 
Table 5.1. Classic orthodoxy on representative style 
How should a member of the council vote if there should be a 
conflict of opinion? 
% 
According to his/her own conviction 42.0 
According to the opinion of the party group 48.8 
According to the opinion of the voters 9.2 
(N=822) 
 
However, this classic orthodoxy poses some problems on how to interpret political 
representation as it unfolds in practice. For instance, councillors’ voting behaviour in the 
council is often just the crystallized result of a much more informal process of 
negotiation, bargaining and alliance-seeking that takes place behind the council scene, in 
the party sphere or elsewhere (Thomassen & Esaiasson, 2006). Further in modern 
                                                             
6 As such, the classic orthodoxy further underscores the party discipline in the Belgian councils. 
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societies, the pure paternalistic Burkean notion of representation is deemed outdated and 
even undesirable (Judge, 1999; Vieira & Runciman, 2008). Pure delegation, on the other 
hand, is difficult to achieve in practice. It requires the existence of clear instructions and 
relations between citizens and politicians, as well as the belief that the latter ought to 
strictly obey these instructions (McCrone & Kuklinski, 1979). When stretched to the 
extremes, both ends of the continuum even fail to be representation any longer (Pitkin, 
1967; Jewell, 1983). A final critique is empirical. Often, politicians are neither pure 
trustees nor delegates, or classify themselves as politico (Cavanagh, 1982; Cooper & 
Richardson, 2006). Hence, Jewell (1983: 312) argues that “the more thoroughly 
representative roles are explored, the more complex the relationships become and the 
less useful it seems to simply classify legislators in terms of the traditional trustee-
politico-delegate categories.” The classic orthodoxy might therefore “fail to capture the 
complexity of the representative process in the empirical world” (Cavanagh, 1982: 127). 
Nowadays, academics agree that accounts of political representation should envisage the 
relation between citizens and politicians as a dynamic and functional process (Cavanagh, 
1982; Andeweg, 2003; Saward, 2010; Alonso et al., 2011). For Pitkin (1967), a 
representative should act on behalf of the people, in the interest of the people, and 
according to the wishes of the people. As such, representation encapsulates a delicate 
balance between discretion and liability. It unfolds once citizens authorize representatives 
to act on their behalf. Throughout the process these representatives remain accountable 
whilst afterwards, the results of the process should reflect citizens’ interests (Rehfeld, 
2006; Urbinati & Warren, 2008). In sum, political representation entails authorization, 
accountability and responsiveness (Beetham, 1996)7. 
Our analytical framework should thus conceive of political representation as a dynamic 
and reciprocal process between the represented, who authorize and instruct, and the 
representatives, who act responsively and accountably (Pratchett & Wilson, 1996; 
Andeweg, 2003; Parkinson, 2003; Vieira & Runciman, 2008). Benz and Papadopoulos 
(2006) contend in this respect that legitimate and democratic governance requires a 
circular relationship between citizens and representatives. 
We have found a theoretical and analytical framework that encompasses these different 
conditions in the work of Andeweg and Thomassen (2005; see also Andeweg, 2003). The 
framework is based upon two interlocked dimensions of the representative relation 
between citizens and politicians. The first dimension is the direction of the representative 
relation (see also John & Cole, 1999; Brugué & Vallès, 2005). Representation ‘from 
                                                             
7 Beetham adds representativeness as the fourth criterion of democratic representation. Since our research 
question concerns the substantive side of political representation, however, this descriptive aspect is not 
considered in the chapter. For a descriptive analysis of political representation in Belgian local 
government, see Reynaert et al., 2006 and Verhelst et al., forthcoming. 
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below’ adopts a popular perspective, since the relation starts from the perspective of the 
citizens who have and express clear policy views. The mission of politicians is to convey 
these views into public policy. Representation ‘from above’ takes a more elitist stance. 
Representatives – either individually or organized in political parties – instigate the 
relation by presenting (and seeking support for) their own views to the citizens. The 
second dimension of the analytical framework asserts the possibilities for citizens to exert 
control over the representative relation in order to prevent policy outcomes from 
conflicting with their interests, or preferences (see also Vieira & Runciman, 2008). As 
such, this dimension captures the reciprocal dynamics of political representation. More 
particularly, it concerns the “moment of popular control” from the citizens on the actions 
of their representatives (Andeweg, 2003: 153): ‘ex ante’ controls precede on the (actions 
of the) representative relation, ‘ex post’ controls follow on the latter.  
 
Figure 5.1. Andeweg/Thomassen typology on political representation  
 Control 
Ex Ante Ex Post 
Direction     From Above Authorization Accountability 
                     From Below Delegation Responsiveness 
(Andeweg & Thomassen, 2005: 512) 
 
The intersection of both dimensions yields a quadruple typology of political 
representation with four basic modes or styles (see also Figure 5.1): 
• Delegation: arguably, representation from below and ex ante appeals most to our 
traditional and idealistic picture of political representation (McCrone & Kuklinski, 
1979). The relation starts from citizens who have clear demands and policy views 
and instruct politicians beforehand (how) to implement them. Nevertheless this 
mode is complicated and demanding in practice because citizens must have clear 
preferences whilst the policy agenda should be predictable in order to steer the 
relation before decisions have to be taken. 
 
• Responsiveness: as an ideal-type, representation from below and ex post tends to 
be driven by the desire to please the constituency or the fear of removal from 
office. Again, politicians foremost follow citizen views, but prefer popular control 
after they have taken their decisions. This mode demands that representatives are 
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able to interpret (changes in) popular preferences in order to act in accordance 
with these preferences. 
 
• Authorization: representation from above and ex ante holds that politicians present 
their views to the citizens who can exert control on the relation beforehand. This 
mode is exemplified by the Responsible Party Model, according to which parties 
submit their manifesto to the citizen/voters who grant a mandate which authorizes 
them to implement its policies. 
 
• Accountability: in representation from above and ex post, representatives act as 
political entrepreneurs who proactively implement decisions whilst citizens pass 
judgement on them afterwards. Even though Andeweg (2003) admits that this 
mode is more elitist, he expects it to become the main paradigm in the future. 
Indeed, the increasing uncertainty about citizens’ preferences and the rising 
importance of political parties foster representation from above. Besides, the 
growing unpredictability of the political agenda calls for citizen control ex post8. 
 
5.4. OPERATIONALIZATION 
In their original model, Andeweg and Thomassen (2005: 514-515) measured political 
representation through the following questions. The first question deals with the 
representative direction, the second concerns the representative control: 
• “In their relationship with their voters, politicians may emphasize different 
aspects. Which of these two aspects do you think is most important?  
(a) translating the political views of citizens into policy as accurately as possible; 
(b) seeking support from the voters for the political views of their own party.” 
 
• “In our political system, elections have various functions. Which of these two 
functions do you think is most important?  
(a) in elections, politicians account to the voters for their actions in the past;  
(b) in elections, politicians put their plans for the future to the voters.” 
We operationalized the typology of Andeweg and Thomassen on the basis of four 
specific items in our survey (see Table 5.2). Yet unlike the original model, we did not ask 
our respondents to choose the most important item per dimension. Instead, we asked 
them to rate every item on a scale from 0 (none) to 4 (very great). Furthermore, we asked 
the respondents to assess the importance of every item, as well as their acclaimed 
                                                             
8 Andeweg mentions Europeanization as a complementary factor that enforces the other factors. 
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contribution to it in practice. Whereas the former aspect represents councillors’ attitude 
towards political representation (research question 1), the latter maps out councillors’ 
acclaimed behaviour (research question 2). 
 
Table 5.2. Operationalization of the dimensions of political representation 
Dimension Item Description 
Direction Item 1 “Implementing the program of my political party/movement” 
(‘program’) 
 Item 2 “Representing the requests and issues emerging from the local 
society” (‘society’) 
Control Item 3 “Explaining decisions of the council to the citizens” 
(‘explanation’) 
 Item 4 “Publicizing the debate on local issues before decisions are 
taken” (‘debate’) 
 
Item 1 and 2 represent the direction of the representative relation between citizens and 
councillors in our typology. Comparing the respondents’ scores on both items creates 
three basic categories for the direction of political representation: from above (program > 
society), neutral (program = society) and from below (program < society). Item 3 and 4 
then represent the way in which citizens (are allowed to) exert control on the 
representative relation. Again, comparing the respondents’ scores on the items creates 
three basic categories for the control on political representation: ex post (explanation > 
debate), neutral (explanation = debate) and ex ante (explanation < debate). Finally, the 
combination of the dimensions direction and control yields a model with nine possible 
positions: the ideal-types delegation, authorization, accountability and responsiveness, as 
well as five neutral categories in between (see further Section 5.6). 
Such operationalization aims at being dynamic and nuanced. First, the items do not 
confine representation to the elections in which citizens transfer their authority to the 
politicians. Instead, they focus on representation beyond the electoral arena. 
Contemporary academic writing agrees on this point: “elections do not put an end to the 
representative process” (Alonso et al., 2011: 6; see also Saward, 2010). In fact, the 
circular process of representation in practice is moulded by constant communication and 
information between representatives and represented (Klausen & Sweeting, 2005; Benz 
& Papadopoulos, 2006). Therefore, our items grasp the way in which politicians claim to 
represent the locality during their mandate inside the political system day in, day out. 
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Second, by asking our respondents to rate both items of each dimension, instead of 
choosing the most important one (as did Andeweg and Thomassen), we created a 
nuanced account of political representation. This need has been recognized by Andeweg 
and Thomassen themselves. For instance, councillors might argue that their party 
program concurs with the most important issues from local society, hence fail to choose 
between item 1 and item 2. Such councillors would rate representation from above as 
important as representation from below, hence have a neutral opinion. This logic applies 
to representative control as well. In our model, the different modes of representative 
direction and control are thus not mutually exclusive9. Furthermore, this allows us to test 
the theoretical claim that legitimate representation encapsulates both authorization, 
accountability, responsiveness and delegation. Throughout the analyses, therefore, we 
interpret our results as nuances/preferences for a representative style, rather than clear-cut 
antagonisms. Yet before we proceed to these analyses, the following section outlines an 
important determinant of political representation, namely the contextual setting of our 
research. 
 
5.5. CONTEXTUAL SETTING AND DESCRIPTIVE RESEARCH HYPOTHESES: POLITICAL 
REPRESENTATION IN BELGIAN LOCAL GOVERNANCE 
In Belgium the rationale of political representation, and councillors’ inherent formal 
primacy, have always occupied a pivotal position in the local system. The council, which 
is popularly elected every six years, forms the theoretical base of local democracy (Plees, 
2005). It is ideal-typically comprised of layman-citizens who are elected in their 
municipality at-large. Local government is organized in a collective form (Mouritzen & 
Svara, 2002). Executive councillors are chosen by, and usually from, the council whilst 
retaining their base office in the council. So too the mayor, who is proposed by the 
council and formally appointed by central government in Flanders and Brussels Capital, 
and semi-directly elected in Wallonia. Together, the mayor and aldermen form the 
executive board which is expected to implement the local policies as they have been laid 
down by the council10. 
Which factors could determine political representation in this institutional setting? Some 
elements could lead us to reject Pitkin’s claim at the outset, hence confirm the adverse 
                                                             
9 As Table 5.8 and Table 5.9 in Appendix E show, this is the case in practice. Indeed, we find a 
moderately positive correlation between respondents’ scores on all items, on both the attitudinal and 
behavioural levels. The mean scores for all items are above average too. This implies that councillors 
seldom explicitly prefer/claim to contribute to one or more items, hence style of representation, to the 
detriment of the other(s). 
10 Yet in practice, the executive has a strong hold on municipal affairs throughout the policy process (De 
Rynck & Wayenberg, 2010; Verhelst et al., 2011). 
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quote (Steyvers et al., 2007) which states that contemporary representation mainly takes 
the form of the popular mode of delegation. In fact, Belgian local councillors are not only 
obliged to reside in the municipality they govern, but tend to be firmly rooted in the 
social and associational life of their local community as well. Close, informal contacts 
between citizens and councillors are, therefore, evocative of the Belgian local system 
(Plees, 2005). Such traits also reflect the prevailing system of political localism. 
According to the latter, municipalities are primarily the territorial expression of their 
local community, rather than efficient entities of public service delivery (Andrew & 
Goldsmith, 1998). Several indicators underscore positive effects of this system. For 
instance, studies have demonstrated that citizens place more trust in their local authorities 
than other political levels (Van Roosbroek & Van de Walle, 2006). Preferential voting is 
usually higher and more influential in local elections too whilst local government is the 
political level citizens are most familiar with, and most strongly identify with (Ackaert, 
1996; Wauters et al., 2010). A negative example of the close connections between 
citizens and councillors could be the excesses of clientelism, corruption and favouritism 
(symbolically referred to as “Belgian affairs” in Thomassen & Esaiasson, 2006: 229). 
Nonetheless, it is argued that the extremes of this system are decreasing over time (André 
et al., 2010). Following from the above, our first general descriptive hypothesis states: 
 DH1: ‘Political representation in Belgian local governance tends towards the 
ideal-type of delegation (i.e. representation ‘from below’ and ‘ex ante’).’ 
Yet other elements of the Belgian local context could evoke the opposite hypothesis, 
indeed rendering political representation more elitist – as Pitkin contends. Also in the 
Belgian local system, there is often talk of a gap between citizens and politics (Verlet et 
al., 2007; Wauters et al., 2010). The growing technicality and formality of decision-
making could contribute to this. Multi-annual and strategic planning, expanding local 
tasks and central supervision: these elements probably call for a technocratic and 
entrepreneurial style of governance. So do numerous governance networks in which some 
councillors engage (e.g. inter-municipal co-operations, autonomous agencies, municipal 
companies, etc.). These networks are spreading fast in order to compensate for 
municipalities’ lack of autonomous capacity, and the need to tailor various services and 
provisions to alternating areas beyond that of the municipality. Additionally, local 
councillors are allowed to hold multiple offices at the provincial, regional, national and 
European level, as long as they do not combine two executive mandates simultaneously. 
This practice occurs fairly often in Belgium (De Winter & Dumont, 2006). Finally, and 
probably related to the above, the professionalization of the local councillor emerges as 
one of the paramount longitudinal evolutions in Belgian local politics (Reynaert et al., 
2006). On the basis of these evolutions, it also seems plausible to generally hypothesize 
that: 
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 DH2: ‘Political representation in Belgian local governance tends towards an 
elitist/entrepreneurial style (i.e. representation ‘from above’ and ‘ex post’).’ 
Lastly, we should mention the impact of political parties in the Belgian (local) system. 
There is no doubt that the strong and omnipresent influence of political parties is a typical 
feature of the latter. According to De Winter and Dumont (2006: 972), “the Belgian 
partitocracy violates the ideal-type chain of parliamentary delegation in many ways, 
insofar as political parties play a predominant role at each stage.” Party politics is an 
integral part of local council business as well. In fact, research has shown how the local 
councils are marked by a strong and steep divide between the majority and the opposition 
(Verhelst et al., 2011). In this political landscape, the influence of (branches of) national 
political parties is rising steeply, even though local lists remain typical of the local system 
as well (Steyvers et al., 2008b). The following descriptive hypothesis concerning the 
impact of political parties on political representation seems thus probable too: 
 DH3: ‘Political representation in Belgian local governance tends to be embedded 
in the party sphere (i.e. representation ‘from above’).’ 
 
5.6. DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSIS: REPRESENTATIVE ATTITUDE AND BEHAVIOUR OF 
BELGIAN LOCAL COUNCILLORS 
The first step of our analysis is to interpret the general outlook of political representation 
in Belgian local governance at the attitudinal and behavioural level (research questions a 
and b). The combination of the three basic categories on our theoretical dimensions 
representative direction (i.e. ‘from above’, ‘neutral’ and ‘from below’) and representative 
control (i.e. ‘ex ante’, ‘neutral’ ‘and ex post’) yields a basic matrix of nine cells. 
Accordingly, we distinguish nine modes of political representation: the four ideal-types 
proposed by the Andeweg/Thomassen typology, one completely neutral mode which 
represents the all-round councillor who values (and/or claims to contribute to) the four 
items under study in equal measure, and four intermediate positions. Each cell in the 
matrix displays the percentage of respondents that correspond to this particular style of 
political representation. 
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Table 5.3. Representative attitude of Belgian local councillors 
 Control 
Ex Ante  
(explanation < debate) 
Neutral 
(explanation = debate) 
Ex Post  
(explanation > debate) 
 
 
 
Direction 
From Above 
(program > 
society) 
 
① 
3.9 %   
 
 
 
4.2 %   
 
② 
3.5 %   
Neutral 
(program = 
society) 
 
10.7 %  
 
③ 
22.9 %   
 
7.5 %   
From Below 
(program < 
society) 
④ 
16.7 %   
 
 
22.5 %   
⑤ 
8.1 %   
(1: Authorization, 2: Accountability, 3: All-round, 4: Delegation, 5: Responsiveness) (N = 839) 
 
Table 5.3 maps out the distribution of response at the attitudinal level. Which styles of 
political representation are deemed most important by Belgian local councillors? The 
largest group of respondents attributes equal importance to the four items of the 
representative system (i.e. position 3). These councillors aim at being all-round 
representatives who equally and simultaneously incorporate the styles of delegation, 
authorization, accountability and responsiveness. Hence, most Belgian councillors feel it 
is equally important to represent local issues bottom-up, implement the party program 
top-down, publicize debate on local policy issues beforehand and explain council 
decisions afterwards. Amongst the remaining councillor population, the largest group 
clearly prefers delegation (i.e. position 4) and its surrounding neutral positions as the 
dominant style(s) of representation. Generally, more Belgian local councillors thus prefer 
representing issues from local society from below over implementing their party program 
from above. And likewise, they choose to publicize debate on local issues before 
decisions are taken over explaining those decisions afterwards. Only a minority of 
Belgian councillors adhere to responsiveness (i.e. position 5) and particularly 
authorization (i.e. position 1) and accountability (i.e. position 2) as the dominant style(s) 
of representation11. 
In summary, we would argue that on a general level, the population of Belgian local 
councillors holds a rather popular view on the representative role. Principally, they 
                                                             
11 The dominance of ‘delegation’ contradicts the result from our classic analysis of representative style, in 
which only a minority of the councillors claimed to be delegates. This confirms the claim and intention of 
Andeweg and Thomassen (2005), namely developing a typology that is constructed on different grounds 
than the classic orthodoxy. 
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foremost consider themselves as delegates of the local community that translate 
important constituency issues in public policy whilst seeking to obtain broad public 
support via debate before concrete decisions are taken. Such a conclusion confirms the 
theoretical claim which posits that delegation is the ideal-typical style of representation. 
It also underlines the prevalence of community representation as a cornerstone of the 
Belgian local system. Thus at the attitudinal level, the analysis leads us to confirm 
hypothesis 1 while we find less evidence to support hypothesis 2 and 3. Nevertheless, we 
must nuance these conclusions by the fact that most councillors aim at being all-round 
councillors. Furthermore, the preference for representation from below and ex ante does 
not imply a strict and strong reticence for representation from above and ex post either 
since we find positive correlations between the scores on all the items (see Table 5.8 in 
Appendix E). In the eyes of the councillors, representation does not entail a strict choice 
of one particular style that excludes the other complementary styles. Rather, it is about 
finding the most appropriate nuance in being a democratic and effective elected 
representative of the citizens. 
 
Table 5.4. Representative behaviour of Belgian local councillors 
 Control 
Ex Ante 
(explanation < debate) 
Neutral 
(explanation = debate) 
Ex Post 
(explanation > debate) 
 
 
 
Direction 
From Above 
(program > 
society) 
 
① 
 4.6 %   
 
 
 
7.9 %   
 
② 
7.3 %   
Neutral 
(program = 
society) 
 
7.3 %   
 
③ 
23.5 %   
 
 
13.9 %   
From Below 
(program < 
society) 
 
④ 
10.2 %   
 
 
 
14.8 %   
 
⑤ 
10.6 %   
(1: Authorization, 2: Accountability, 3: All-round, 4: Delegation, 5: Responsiveness) (N = 840) 
 
Can we find a similar pattern on the behavioural level? Table 5.4 demonstrates that this 
is not exactly the case. At first sight, the overall picture of response seems more balanced 
compared to the analysis of the attitudes. A majority of respondents still think of 
themselves as all-round representatives who contribute equally to every aspect of their 
role (i.e. position 3). In their opinion, following the party line does not hold them back 
from defending constituency issues in practice whilst publicizing debate on council 
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business beforehand does not deter them from communicating its outcome afterwards, 
and vice versa. Accordingly, in practice, political representation is not a strict zero-sum 
game in which councillors act according to the principles of one mode or style, rejecting 
the other styles. 
Yet simultaneously, the table takes account of some clear shifts in representation from the 
attitudinal to the (acclaimed) behavioural level. Generally and in line with theoretical 
expectations, the nature of representation shifts away from delegation (i.e. position 4) as 
the ideal-type towards a more entrepreneurial style in practice. This entrepreneurial style 
entails more representation from above and, particularly, representation ex post. Parties 
thus steer councillors’ behaviour in office more than councillors principally prefer, 
underlining the fact that parties are important, but not all-embracing, actors of political 
representation in Belgian local democracy. In fact, the centre of the representative 
direction is still situated ‘below’. Second, councillors acknowledge that in practice, 
control on the representative relation predominantly takes place ‘ex post’. By 
communicating the outcome of the process of decision-making rather than stimulating 
debate on it beforehand, councillors mainly encourage, or perhaps rather allow, citizens 
to judge their merits at the end of the representative process. As a result, councillors 
indicate that authorization (i.e. position 1) and especially accountability (i.e. position 2) 
and responsiveness (i.e. position 5) are more important in practice than in principle. Table 
5.5 reiterates this discrepancy between representative attitude and behaviour12. 
 
Table 5.5.  Discrepancy between representative attitude and behaviour in Belgian 
local governance 
 Control 
Ex Ante 
(explanation < debate) 
Neutral 
(explanation = debate) 
Ex Post 
(explanation > debate) 
 
 
 
Direction 
From Above 
(program > 
society) 
 
① 
+ 0.7 %   
 
 
 
+ 3.7 %   
 
② 
+ 3.8 %   
Neutral 
(program = 
society) 
 
- 3.4 %   
③ 
+ 0.6 %   
 
 
+ 6.4 %   
From Below 
(program < 
society) 
 
④ 
- 6.5 %   
 
 
 
- 7.7 %   
 
⑤ 
+ 2.5 %   
(1: Authorization, 2: Accountability, 3: All-round, 4: Delegation, 5: Responsiveness)   
                                                             
12 This discrepancy is also graphically presented in Appendix E. 
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In summary, councillors argue that representation indeed takes a more elitist twist in 
practice, stressing the impact of political parties and an entrepreneurial style of 
governance. Nevertheless, the overall distribution of response is still quite balanced over 
the different theoretical modes of representation. We can, therefore, not truly accept any 
of our basic descriptive hypotheses at the behavioural level. Furthermore, we find 
positive correlations between the four items under study again as well (see Table 5.9 
Appendix E). This demonstrates that representative styles are not mutually exclusive in 
practice either. 
 
5.7. EXPLANATORY ANALYSIS: DETERMINANTS OF POLITICAL REPRESENTATION IN 
BELGIAN LOCAL GOVERNANCE 
Our findings thus far have concerned the population of Belgian local councillors as a 
whole. The next goal of our study is to refine these descriptive insights by searching for 
underlying factors that account for variation in the representative attitudes and 
(acclaimed) behaviour (research question c). For this purpose, we draw on the varied 
insights from the literature and the specificities of the Belgian context to select a wide 
variety of possible determinants of political representation in Belgian local governance. 
All variables from this extensive analytical model were included in the mail survey. We 
have arranged them in four broad categories and offer several corresponding explanatory 
research hypotheses. 
 
5.7.1. Political profile 
We consider the political profile of the local councillors as a first possible determinant of 
political representation via a selection of independent variables13. First, several elements 
of councillors’ position in the political system might call for, or further enhance, a 
particular style of representation. In the Belgian context, for instance, a steep divide 
exists between the political majority and the opposition in the council (Steyvers et al., 
2010; Verhelst et al., 2011). When it comes to representation, particularly the majority 
might be expected to act according to the mode of authorization, following the mandate 
they received from their constituency to run the municipality (Andeweg & Thomassen, 
                                                             
13 All these independent variables are dummies: ‘Position’: majority party (N=518 or 63.7%); ‘Executive 
function’ : yes, now or before (N=277 or 33.3%); ‘Multiple office-holding’: yes, now or before – a 
legislative or executive mandate at the provincial, regional or federal level (N=75 or 9.3%); ‘Formal local 
network’: yes, now or before – a position in a municipal company or co-operative body of local 
authorities (N=434 or 53.9%); ‘Party list’: national (N=616 or 72.9%); ‘Party’: socialist or communist 
(N=165 or 21.5%); ‘Experience’: newcomer (N=309 or 36.4%); ‘Ideology’: pronounced – values 0 to 2 
and 8 to 10 on a 0-10 scale for councillors’ ideological self-placement (N=232 or 27.1). 
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2005)14. Additionally, professional office-holding might foster more elitist ways of 
representation (Herrick, 2011). In this respect, it is widely acknowledged that there is a 
huge gap in terms of entrepreneurialism between councillors in executive functions and 
the other councillors (De Rynck & Wayenberg, 2010; Wayenberg et al., 2010). Likewise, 
we expect that councillors who develop a professional career by combining offices at 
different political levels are more likely to adopt an entrepreneurial style, just as 
councillors who participate in specific formal governance networks (e.g. inter-municipal 
cooperation, municipal agency). These expectations are expressed in our first (set of) 
explanatory research hypotheses: 
 EH1: ‘Councillors from the majority (EH1a) tend more towards authorization (i.e. 
representation ‘from above’ and ‘ex ante’). Councillors with experience in an 
executive mandate (EH1b), at another government level (EH1c) and/or in a formal 
local governance network (EH1d) tend more towards the entrepreneurial style of 
political representation (i.e. representation ‘from above’ and ‘ex post’).’ 
Furthermore, councillors’ representative style could be determined by the characteristics 
of the party or political movement they belong to as well. We thereby distinguish, first, 
between the typical national party lists (or local branches of national party lists) and the 
typical local lists or groups. Both have their distinct dynamics and organization (Boogers, 
2007). In terms of representative style, the local lists are often characterized by their 
bottom-up perspective, even called clietelism or populism (Boogers, 2007). As such, they 
still somehow reflect the non-political or non-partisan side of local politics (Steyvers et 
al., 2008b). National lists, on the other hand, are more professionalized and organized. 
Councillors from these lists would thus be more inclined to govern top-down. Second, 
there are theoretical and empirical grounds to assume that party ideology could be a 
factor for councillors’ representative style. Strict party organization, support and 
discipline have been typically attributed to the parties on the left side of the political 
spectrum (Eliassen & Pedersen, 1978; Garraud, 1989). Consequently, socialist and 
(formerly) communist councillors more often qualify as loyal partisans (Jewell, 1983). 
The possible impact of the party is summarized in the following hypotheses: 
 EH2: ‘Councillors elected on national party lists (EH2a) and councillors from 
socialist/communist parties (EH2b) tend more towards representation as service 
to the party (i.e. representation ‘from above’).’ 
  
                                                             
14 Even though this claim was not corroborated in the Dutch study of Andeweg and Thomassen (2005). 
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Finally, empirical evidence suggests two other hypotheses regarding councillors’ political 
profile (Andeweg & Thomassen, 2005; Cooper & Richardson, 2006). The first holds that 
newcomers or novices (i.e. councillors who are elected for the first time) stay closer to the 
views of their constituency because of electoral uncertainty, as well as the probability that 
an independent representational style grows throughout the legislature. Hence, 
newcomers would adopt a bottom-up approach to representation in particular. The second 
hypothesis states that councillors with a pronounced ideological profile are more likely to 
adopt an elitist, top-down style of representing their constituency. Indeed, such 
councillors have clear policy views of their own to pursue and rely on15. Our final 
explanatory hypotheses with regard to councillors’ political profile consequently state: 
 EH3: ‘Newcomers in the council (EH3a) tend to stay closer to the views of the 
electorate (i.e. representation ‘from below’). Councillors with a pronounced 
ideological profile (EH3b), on the other hand, tend to rather follow their own 
ideas (i.e. representation ‘from above’).’ 
 
5.7.2. Contact profile 
In addition to councillors’ political profile, we have also included their contact profile 
with a group of relevant stakeholders in local governance as a possible determinant in the 
analysis. Communication/information has always been regarded as a fundamental aspect 
of the circular proceeding of political representation (Pitkin, 1967; Vieira & Runciman, 
2008). Moreover, in the context of modern local governance, communication with a wide 
array of new actors involved in the process of decision-making has become even more 
important (Bekkers & Edwards, 2007). In our analysis, we have introduced a list of six 
actors or institutions that councillors possibly interact with: ‘municipal government’, ‘the 
party group’, actors from the ‘political and economic society’, actors from the ‘civil 
society’, ‘individual citizens’ and ‘journalists’16. We can broadly divide these actors into 
two groups: inward-looking contacts (i.e. municipal government, the party group and the 
political/economic society) and more outward-looking counterparts (i.e. civil society, 
                                                             
15 We addressed councillors’ ideological pronunciation directly, i.e. in terms of their self-placement on a 
0-10 left/right scale, instead of using the party as the overarching determinant of councillors’ ideological 
profile. 
16 These variables are based on the original question: “How frequently do you have contact with the 
following individuals or groups?”, scaled 0 (almost never) to 3 (a few times a week). Three variables are 
comprised of different individual variables, forming one factor with sufficient internal reliability: 
‘Municipal government’ (consists of the mayor, members of the executive board, municipal CEO and 
civil servants; Cronbach’s Alpha=.86); ‘Political/economic society’ (consists of representatives of private 
business, upper level government, public agencies at the local level; Cronbach’s Alpha=.78) and ‘Civil 
society’ (consists of representatives of unions, voluntary associations, women organizations, 
organizations of an ethnic minority; Cronbach’s Alpha=.70). The other items are single variables. 
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citizens and journalists). Theoretically, we can expect that councillors who frequently 
engage with political insiders might be inclined towards a more entrepreneurial/elitist 
representative style. Councillors who keep close contacts with the outsiders, on the other 
hand, would then rather prefer a popular style of representation (Herrick, 2011). As such, 
our fourth explanatory hypothesis states: 
 EH4: ‘Councillors who have frequent inward-looking contacts with political 
insiders (EH4a) tend more towards an entrepreneurial style (i.e. representation 
‘from above’ and ‘ex post’), while councillors who have frequent outward-looking 
contacts with political outsiders (EH4b) tend more towards a popular style of 
representation (i.e. representation ‘from below’ and ‘ex ante’).’ 
 
5.7.3. Personal profile 
As the third independent level of our analysis, we examine the effect of a number of 
characteristics in councillors’ personal profile17. It has often been stated that an exclusive 
social profile leads towards an elitist view on political representation (Jewell, 1983; 
Cooper & Richardson, 2006; Herrick, 2011). Hence, we have introduced the variables 
gender, age and education as possible determinants in the analysis. The corresponding 
hypothesis reads: 
 EH5: ‘Councillors with an exclusive social profile (i.e. male, elder and highly 
educated) tend more towards an entrepreneurial style (i.e. representation ‘from 
above’ and ‘ex post’).’ 
Furthermore, since professionalization is claimed to spur entrepreneurial or elitist 
conceptions of representation (Herrick, 2011), we also analyze the impact of councillors’ 
initial motivations to run for office. These may theoretically range from typical layman 
motives (i.e. citizen duty, representing a particular group) to more professional 
counterparts (i.e. party duty, establishing a political career). Whereas the typical layman 
conception of the local councillor corresponds most to the ideal-type of delegation, the 
modern professionalized councillor is more likely to act on the basis of the modern 
                                                             
17 Dummy variables: ‘Gender’: male (N=612 or 72.4%); ‘Education’: university (N=543 or 64.3%); 
‘Ambition’: static (N=323 or 42.6%); ‘Ambition’: progressive (N=241 or 31.8%). Continuous variables: 
‘Age’ (N=844, mean=49.8); Motivations, based on the question: “When you first accepted to become a 
candidate, how important were the following reasons”, scaled 0 (not important at all) to 4 (of utmost 
importance): ‘Citizen duty’ (N=834, mean=2.1), ‘Group duty’ (N=836, mean=2.7), ‘Party duty’ (N=837, 
mean=2.4), ‘Political career’ (N=835, mean=1.1); ‘Citizen participation’, based on the question: “Please 
indicate how important for local democracy you feel the following requirements are: Residents should 
participate actively and directly in making important local decisions”, scaled 0 (not important at all) to 4 
(of utmost importance), N=837 , mean=2.3. 
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entrepreneurial variant, i.e. accountability. According to this hypothesis, therefore, we 
expect that: 
 EH6: ‘Councillors who were inspired by layman motives (EH6a) tend more 
towards a popular style of representation (i.e. representation ‘from below’ and ‘ex 
ante’), while councillors who were inspired by professional motives (EH6b) tend 
more towards an entrepreneurial style (i.e. representation ‘from above’ and ‘ex 
post’).’ 
Additionally, we have incorporated councillors’ ambitions for the future as a possible 
determinant of their representative style. Concerning this matter, some studies have found 
that static or progressive political ambitions predict popular styles of representation 
(Herrick, 2011)18. Indeed, a politician who does not wish to continue in office will 
probably have less incentives to follow the popular instructions of his or her constituency. 
Yet for councillors who are keen to stay (or move up) in office, it is less profitable to 
govern in a strictly independent and elitist way because the need the support of their 
constituency to get re-elected. The seventh hypothesis subsequently states: 
 EH7: ‘Councillors who hold static or progressive political ambitions tend more 
towards a popular style of representation (i.e. representation ‘from below’ and ‘ex 
ante’).’ 
Lastly, we examine the impact of councillors’ attitude towards the active involvement of 
citizens in the process of local decision-making. Representation and participation have 
often been regarded as two conflicting regimes of democracy. Yet scholars nowadays 
agree that modern democratic governance entails a hybrid mix of representative and 
participative democracy (De Rynck, 2002; Steyver et al., 2007). Steyvers et al. (2007) 
thereby argue that an open mind for active citizen input probably leads towards an open 
style of political representation which resembles delegation as the ideal-type. 
Consequently, hypothesis eight reads: 
 EH8: ‘Councillors who champion the active involvement of citizens in local 
decision-making tend towards the ideal-typical style of delegation (i.e. 
representation ‘from below’ and ‘ex ante’).’  
                                                             
18 Even though other studies have come to an opposite conclusion as well, i.e. with progressive ambitions 
corresponding to decreasing consideration of constituency views (Jewell, 1983). 
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5.7.4. Institutional context 
As the final independent level of analysis, we take into account three variables from the 
wider institutional context of Belgian local governance that could facilitate an 
entrepreneurial representative style19. The variable ‘region’ refers to the regionalization 
of Belgian local government by the fifth state reform of 2001. Ever since, it is expected 
that an entrepreneurial and  managerial logic has spread faster in the Flemish region in 
particular, while Wallonia and Brussels Capital remain more reminiscent of the 
traditional value of community representation (Steyvers et al., 2006; Pilet, 2008). Further, 
‘size’ is a variable that has been included and examined often in studies on political 
representation (Thomassen & Esaiasson, 2006; Herrick, 2011). On a smaller scale, it is 
seemingly easier for politicians to collect and reckon with constituency demands. Larger 
government units imply more heterogeneity, which makes it more difficult for politicians 
to convey community demands into public policies. A final useful distinction in the 
institutional context of the municipality discerns between coalition governments and 
municipalities that are run by an absolute majority (Urbinati & Warren, 2008). Such 
municipalities, which still occur fairly often at the Belgian local level, could be more 
likely to encourage an entrepreneurial style since their councillors might feel more 
empowered to express and impose their viewpoints in the policy-making process. 
Accordingly, our hypothesis on the institutional context states: 
 EH9: ‘Flemish councillors (EH9a), councillors from larger municipalities (EH9b) 
and councillors from a municipality that is governed by an absolute majority 
(EH9c) tend more towards an entrepreneurial style of governance (i.e. 
representation from above and ex post).’ 
 
  
                                                             
19 All variables are dummies: ‘Region’: Flanders (N=565 or 66%); ‘Size’: large municipality – i.e. 20.000 
inhabitants or more (N=280 or 33.2%); ‘Political balance’: absolute majority (N=282 or 32.9). 
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5.7.5. Explanatory analysis 
The explanatory analysis assesses the variation in councillors’ representative style 
according to the interplay of these variables. We use a multiple linear regression analysis 
(see Table 5.6) to reveal the relative impact of each independent variable on the 
representative attitude and behaviour of the councillors, as well as the predictive value of 
the entire model (i.e. the Adjusted R² value). The dependent variables represent the 
constituting dimensions of our theoretical model on political representation: 
representative direction and representative control20. Positive scores in the analysis 
indicate that the independent variable predicts representation ‘from above’ and/or ‘ex 
post’. Negative scores indicate that the independent variable predicts representation ‘from 
below’ and/or ‘ex ante’. 
  
                                                             
20 In order to obtain a more nuanced analysis, we do not use the three broad categories of the descriptive 
analysis as dependent variables (i.e. from above, neutral, from below; ex ante, neutral and ex post). 
Instead, we have constructed two indices, i.e. representative ‘direction’ and representative ‘control’, by 
subtracting the respondents’ score (range 0-4) on item 2 from item 1 (constituting the index 
‘representative direction’) and their score (range 0-4) on item 4 from item 3 (constituting the index 
‘representative control’). Hence, the indices used as dependent variables in the analysis vary from -4 
(from below and/or ex ante) to 4 (from above and/or ex post). 
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Table 5.6. Determinants of political representation in Belgian local governance:  
a multiple linear regression analysis 
 Attitude Behaviour 
 Direction Control Direction Control 
Political profile 
Position: majority party 
Executive function: yes 
Multiple office holding: yes 
Formal local network: yes 
Party list: national 
Party: socialist 
Experience: newcomer 
Ideology: pronounced 
 
-.05 
  .06 
-.04 
-.03 
  .00 
-.01 
  .01 
  .01 
 
  .08 
  .00 
-.06 
-.01 
-.10 ** 
  .07 
  .06 
  .00 
 
  .06 
  .01 
-.03 
-.02 
  .07 
-.02 
  .03 
  .06 
 
  .06 
  .01 
-.06 
-.06 
  .04 
  .04 
  .03 
  .04 
Contact profile 
Municipal government 
Party group 
Political/economic society 
Civil society 
Individual citizens 
Journalists 
 
  .11 * 
  .11 ** 
-.08 
-.01 
-.13 ** 
  .00 
 
  .12 * 
  .01 
-.07 
-.01 
  .07 
  .00 
 
  .00 
  .09 * 
  .06 
-.12 ** 
-.10 * 
-.03 
 
-.07 
-.04 
  .01 
-.06 
  .13 ** 
  .05 
Personal profile 
Gender: male 
Age 
Education: university 
Citizen duty 
Group duty 
Party duty 
Political career 
Ambition: static 
Ambition: progressive 
Citizen participation 
Institutional context 
Region: Flanders 
Size: large municipality 
Political balance: absolute majority 
 
  .00 
  .06 
-.09 * 
-.01 
  .02 
  .26 *** 
-.01 
-.11 * 
-.08 
-.02 
 
  .11 ** 
  .01 
-.01 
 
-.03 
  .06 
-.09 * 
-.18 *** 
-.01 
  .04 
  .13 ** 
-.04 
  .04 
-.07 
 
-.11 ** 
-.10 ** 
-.02 
 
  .07 
  .06 
-.01 
  .02 
  .07 
  .09 * 
-.03 
  .07 
  .04 
-.04 
 
  .04 
  .11 ** 
  .05 
 
-.04 
-.01 
-.09 * 
-.11 ** 
  .06 
  .09 * 
-.03 
-.09 
-.03 
-.14 *** 
 
  .03 
  .00 
  .06 
Model 
N 
Adjusted R² 
 
537 
.09 *** 
 
538 
.10 *** 
 
536 
.04 ** 
 
536 
.04 ** 
(Level of Significance: *** p<.01, ** p<.05, * p<.10) 
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Which factors determine councillors’ attitude towards political representation? For both 
direction and control, our model is highly significant. Its explanatory power, however, is 
only moderate, predicting nearly 10% of the variance at the dependent level of analysis. 
As Table 5.6 shows, councillors’ ‘political profile’ does not systematically determine 
their representative attitude. Only one significant result emerges. Councillors who were 
elected on a national party list prefer ex ante control on the representative relation. They 
pay more importance to publicizing debate on local issues than explaining council 
decisions afterwards. However, none of the hypothesized relations is confirmed in our 
analysis. An exclusive position in the political system, the nature of the party or the 
experience and ideological profile do not significantly determine councillors’ attitude 
towards political representation. 
Second, councillors’ ‘contact profile’ clearly produces more explanatory effects. As 
hypothesized, councillors who frequently interact with other actors inside the political 
sphere are more prone to an entrepreneurial representative style. We find the clearest 
effect from the contact pattern with the actors of traditional municipal government such 
as the executive board, the municipal CEO and civil servants. Councillors who have close 
ties with traditional government prefer representation from above and ex post, hence the 
entrepreneurial mode of accountability is their dominant style. Further, councillors who 
often deliberate with their party group tend to prefer representation from above. Contacts 
with actors of the political/economic society that are increasingly involved in local 
governance (e.g. other political levels, business representatives, public agencies) have no 
significant effect on the representative attitude. On the other hand, the relationship with 
the world outside the political system has less impact on councillors’ representative style. 
One significant result emerges: as expected, it seems that councillors who keep in touch 
with individual citizens frequently have a clear preference for representation from below.  
Third, councillors’ ‘personal profile’ has a significant impact on their representative 
attitude as well. Our data do not confirm the acclaimed impact of an exclusive social 
background, however. Gender and age produce no significant effects and the effect of 
education is even opposite to our expectations. Councillors who are highly educated 
support the most popular and idealistic style of representation, namely delegation (i.e. 
representation from below and ex ante). Additionally, the initial motivation to run for 
office has some impact as well. In line with our theoretical expectations, we find that 
councillors who were inspired by citizen duty prefer citizen control ex ante (the popular 
variant) whilst councillors who aspired a political career prefer citizen control ex post 
(the entrepreneurial variant). Councillors whose candidacy was underpinned by a strong 
sense of party duty obviously lean towards representation from above. The last 
significant result stems from councillors’ ambitions for the future. As expected, we notice 
that councillors who wish to remain in office pay more importance to the opinion of the 
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locality, i.e. advocating representation from below. Councillors who agree that citizens 
should play an active role in decision-making do not hold different attitudes towards their 
own role as elected representative than councillors who are less fond of citizen 
participation. 
Finally, what about the ‘institutional context’? The impact of region is striking: Flemish 
councillors clearly think of authorization (i.e. representation from above and ex ante) as 
the best way to act as elected representative. Councillors from Wallonia and Brussels thus 
rather support the responsive style. Size matters too. Yet councillors from larger 
municipalities prefer ex ante controls by citizens rather than the expected ex post 
controls. Size has no significant impact on the representative direction, while an absolute 
majority has no significant effect at all. 
On the behavioural level, we find a different pattern of explanation. Generally, our 
model predicts less variation at the dependent level. Furthermore, less variables exert a 
significant impact. Which are the significant determinants of our model? First, it is 
surprising to see how councillors’ ‘political profile’ does not appear to influence 
representative behaviour in any direct, significant way. On the other hand, councillors’ 
‘contact profile’ again has significant impact. This impact is particularly felt in the 
direction of the representative relation. Councillors who keep close contacts with their 
party group claim to be more preoccupied with the implementation of their party program 
in practice too. Councillors who frequently communicate with actors from outside the 
political system, such as the civil society, contribute more to representing the issues from 
local society – as expected. Besides, councillors who have close ties with individual 
citizens clearly tend more towards representation from below as well. Still, unlike our 
expectations, they also indicate that they contribute more to representation ex post, 
putting more efforts in explaining decisions afterwards than publicizing debate 
beforehand. Hence, for these councillors responsiveness seems the dominant style of 
representation. Other contact patterns have no significant (direct) impact on 
representative behaviour. 
Third, councillors’ ‘personal profile’ predicts most variation in the control on the 
representative relation. Councillors who are highly educated contribute more to 
publicizing the debate on local issues than explaining them afterwards. Councillors who 
were driven by citizen duty facilitate such ex ante controls as well. The strongest 
predictor is councillors’ opinion on citizen participation. Councillors who support the 
active inclusion of citizens in policy-making appear to bring this view into practice by 
publicizing debate on local issues, rather than explaining decisions that already have been 
taken. Lastly, councillors who motivated their candidacy in terms of party duty claim to 
champion accountability as the dominant style of representation. In their opinion, they 
contribute more to entrepreneurial representation from above and ex post. 
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Finally, effects of the ‘institutional context’ are less outspoken in comparison with their 
impact at the attitudinal level. The only significant result points out that councillors from 
larger municipalities contribute more to representation from above. Apparently, (this part 
of) party politics is (still) less vibrant in smaller municipalities in comparison with the 
larger cities. 
In summary (see also Table 5.7 and Box 5.1), our analysis suggests that the 
representative style of Belgian local councillors is substantially determined by the 
individual councillors’ personal profile. First, the initial motivation that inspired 
councillors to run for office determines their fundamental role orientation later on. 
Whereas layman motives predict more popular variants of representation, professional 
motives often lead towards an entrepreneurial conception and implementation of the 
representative role. Second, future ambitions, but also a higher education and support for 
active citizen participation, might prompt councillors to have more popular orientations 
towards their representative role as well. Additionally, once councillors are installed in 
office, their contact pattern with other actors in governance affects their representative 
style. The general pattern is that outward-looking contacts correspond more with popular 
styles of representation. Councillors who are mainly directed to the internal sphere of the 
local system are more inclined to an entrepreneurial style of representation. Finally, the 
institutional context affects political representation to a certain extent. Flemish 
councillors prefer authorization as dominant style, but act not accordingly. Larger 
municipalities spur councillors to prefer ex ante control on the representative relation via 
public debate, but mainly foster representation from above in practice. 
On the other hand, it is remarkable that some variables appear to have no direct influence 
in explaining the variation in (councillors’ orientation towards) political representation at 
all. Most surprisingly, this is mainly the case for the political profile of our local 
councillors. Councillors from the majority, as well as councillors who have gained 
additional governance experience (in the executive board, at other government levels, in 
formal networks) do not hold different attitudes from their less experienced and 
professionalized counterparts, nor do they claim to behave any differently. Furthermore, 
the hypothesized effects from socialist alignment, experience and ideology were not 
corroborated either. In terms of councillors’ contact profile, it seems that contacts with 
the political/economic society and journalists do not significantly affect political 
representation. Representative attitudes and behaviour take shape regardless of 
councillors’ gender and age also. Additionally, councillors who ran for office in order to 
highlight the needs of a particular group do not differ systematically with regard to their 
representative style, just as councillors who hold progressive political ambitions. Finally 
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at the contextual level, whether or not councillors have a seat in a municipality that is 
governed by an absolute majority does not significantly affect representation21. 
 
Table 5.7. Political representation: strength of the individual predictors 
Predictor Analytical Level Significant relations 
[X/4] 
Individual citizen contact 
Education 
Party duty motive 
Municipal government contact 
Party group contact 
Citizen duty motive 
Region 
Size 
Party list 
Civil society contact 
Political career motive 
Ambition 
Citizen participation 
All other variables 
Contact profile 
Personal profile 
Personal profile 
Contact profile 
Contact profile 
Personal profile 
Institutional context 
Institutional context 
Political profile 
Contact profile 
Personal profile 
Personal profile 
Personal profile 
 
3 
3 
3 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
0 
 
  
                                                             
21 Perhaps, this is also due to the fact that many of these research hypotheses have originally been framed 
in the classic orthodoxy on political representation. 
POLITICAL REPRESENTATION IN LOCAL GOVERNANCE  |  175 
 
Box 5.1. Representative attitude and behaviour: overview of the research hypotheses 
Hypothesis 
 
Descriptive hypotheses: 
 
DH1      Representation is mainly from below/ex ante 
DH2      Representation is mainly from above/ex post 
DH3      Representation is mainly from above 
 
Explanatory hypotheses: 
 
Political profile 
EH1a    Majority more from above/ex ante 
EH1b    Executive more from above/ex post 
EH1c    Multiple office more from above/ex post 
EH1d    Local network more from above/ex post 
EH2a    National party list more from above 
EH2b    Socialist party more from above 
EH3a    Newcomer more from below 
EH3b    Pronounced ideology more from above 
 
Contact profile 
EH4a    Inward contacts more from above/ex post 
EH4b    Outward contacts more from below/ex ante 
 
Personal characteristics 
EH5      Exclusive profile more from above/ex post 
EH6a    Layman motives more from below/ex ante 
EH6b    Professional motives more from above/ex post 
EH7      Ambitious more from below/ex ante 
EH8      Citizen participation more from below/ex ante 
 
Institutional context 
EH9a    Flemish more from above/ex post 
EH9b    Large municipality more from above/ex post 
EH9c    Absolute majority more from above/ex post  
Attitude 
 
 
 
/ 
/ 
 
 
 
 
 
/ 
/ 
/ 
/ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/() 
()/ 
 
 
()/() 
/() 
()/() 
()/ 
/ 
 
 
/ 
/ 
/ 
Behaviour 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/ 
/ 
/ 
/ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
()/ 
/() 
 
 
/() 
/() 
()/() 
/ 
/ 
 
 
/ 
/ 
/ 
(: hypothesis confirmed, : no significant result, : hypothesis reversed) 
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5.8. CONCLUSION 
Among the most apparent evolutions in contemporary political science is the renewed 
attention for political representation. At the local level, the role as elected representative 
is often considered to be an increasingly daunting task. On one hand, social evolutions 
such as fading political trust and growing electoral apathy call for a renewed and stronger 
bond between citizens and their representatives. Yet on the other hand, the complexity 
and technicality of modern decision-making in local governance encourage an intense 
professionalization of the political mandate. Meanwhile, citizens and local stakeholders 
search for new ways to participate in the political process beyond the mere passive act of 
voting or party membership. In this setting of competing claims, representatives ought to 
function as a lever for transparent and legitimate decision-making and, ultimately, 
democracy. Some observers hold a pessimistic view on this evolution: representation is 
then claimed to have become elitist and even undemocratic. Others, however, are more 
optimistic. They argue that the contemporary context rather fosters popular ways of 
representing the locality. 
This chapter has sought to empirically underscore the debate by studying councillors’ 
view on political representation in Belgian local governance, both on the attitudinal and 
the behavioural level. Generally, it seems that a majority of Belgian local councillors 
attribute equal importance to delegation, authorization, responsiveness and accountability 
whilst claiming to be such all-round representatives in practice too. Moreover, 
differences in terms of the preferred style seldom drastically oppose, or exclude one 
another. Party politics might thus be an important impetus for political representation, as 
is conveying requests and issues from the local community into the political system. 
Similarly, ex post control on the representative relation via policy communication does 
not exclude ex ante controls via public debate. Hence, we did not find strong evidence for 
a straightforward elitist style of political representation in Belgian local governance. 
Given the fact that councillors’ overall impact in local governance could be on the wane 
(De Rynck & Wayenberg, 2010; Verhelst et al., 2011), this tenacity for an all-round, 
inclusive style of representation might not come as a total surprise. In fact, by stretching 
their role as elected representatives to the extreme, councillors might seek to preserve 
their role in the local system. 
Yet over and above this general picture, we did come across significant variation amongst 
our research population. On the attitudinal level, more councillors prefer the popular 
mode of delegation. This vision stems mainly from their personal characteristics (e.g. 
political motives, education and ambition), contacts with several actors in the governance 
arena (e.g. municipal government, the party group and citizens) and the institutional 
context (e.g. region and size). Nevertheless, principles do not always align with practice. 
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On the behavioural level, the distribution of response is more equally dispersed over 
delegation, authorization, responsiveness and accountability. This means that in the daily 
proceedings of governance, representation does take an entrepreneurial twist, albeit not 
overwhelmingly so. Considering the complex policy challenges ahead, we might foresee 
a further increase of this style in the future. Still even if governance might inflict an 
entrepreneurial style, it requires enhanced links between politicians and society alike. Our 
analysis suggests that within local governance, the contact pattern with a wide array of 
actors in- and outside government (e.g. the party group, civil society and individual 
citizens) fundamentally determines representative behaviour, just as councillors’ personal 
characteristics (e.g. attitude towards citizen participation, education and political 
motives). Traditional institutional features such as the municipal context and, above all, 
the representative’s position in the political constellation have a less profound, or an 
indirect, impact. 
To conclude, we can raise the question: How could research proceed from here? Even 
though our analysis has attempted to offer a dynamic conception of political 
representation in local governance, its quantitative research design has its limits. 
Complementary research could therefore help to arrive at a more comprehensive 
understanding of political representation. First, it is key to consider our study as a cross-
sectional benchmark that needs follow-up to interpret future evolutions and long-term 
trends in political representation. Second, the study could be widened and deepened in 
order to arrive at better insights on the impact of different structural and cultural contexts. 
Whilst the former approach implies comparative research, both within Belgium’s multi-
level polity and between different countries, the latter entails detailed in-depth analyses 
of councillors’ representative style in particular settings (e.g. intricate governance 
networks versus standard service provision, participatory arrangements, specific dossiers, 
etc.). The final recommended line of research is probably the most challenging and 
important one from a democratic perspective. Indeed, any political regime is only truly 
legitimate insofar as its political views and practices match the expectations and 
judgements of the community it is meant to serve (Beetham, 1991). In terms of political 
representation, this implies that there should at least be some congruency between the 
views of representatives and the views of the represented (Andeweg & Thomassen, 2005; 
Saward, 2010). Consequently, we suggest examining the congruency between the views 
of citizens and politicians to address the quality of democratic representation in 
contemporary local governance. 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 6 
REGIONAL DIVERGENCE, CONVERGENCE OR PATH-DEPENDENCY? 
ANALYZING THE ROLE AND POSITION OF LOCAL COUNCILLORS  
IN FLANDERS AND WALLONIA IN COMPARISON WITH  
THE NETHERLANDS AND FRANCE 
 
 
Abstract 
It is frequently stated that the local political system in Belgium has diverged on both 
sides of the language border. While Flanders would have adopted the Northern style of 
its Dutch neighbour, Wallonia is claimed to have incorporated the Southern style of 
France. This chapter investigates this claim by systematically comparing the role and 
position of non-executive councillors in both regions with councillors of the acclaimed 
reference countries the Netherlands and France. Based on survey data, the chapter 
tackles several aspects of the research subject: political recruitment, role orientation, 
influence, relation with citizens and citizen participation, future ambitions and turnover 
motives. It demonstrates that there is some differentiation in the political system of the 
Belgian state (e.g. motivations, role attitude, party group, relation with citizens). Yet 
simultaneously, the international comparison places these results in a broader 
perspective. Compared to the Netherlands and France, the Belgian regions still have 
many characteristics in common while the Netherlands and France exhibit many signs of 
their typical state traditions as well (e.g. the importance of political parties, the local 
hierarchy). Furthermore, many aspects of councillors’ role and position are currently 
even convergent across state boundaries and government traditions (e.g. 
professionalization, role discrepancy, the subordination to the political leaders). 
 
Key Words 
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6.1. INTRODUCTION 
Federalization and the subsequent rise of meso-government have been two of the most 
important evolutions in the history of Belgian post-war politics (Hooghe, 2004; De 
Ceuninck et al., 2005; Plees, 2005; Wayenberg et al., 2010). These processes were, and 
still are, mainly nourished by the ethnic and cultural tension between the Flemish 
population in the North of the country and the Walloon population in the South. Also 
with regard the local political system, scholars often report a diverging reality on both 
sides of the Belgian language border: 
“Repeatedly, the hypothesis has been put forward that Belgium’s main 
linguistic divide also functions as the demarcation line between two types 
of local government system. The ‘Franco’ or Southern European type tends 
to prevail in Wallonia and Brussels as the primarily French-speaking parts 
of the country, while the Northern European type appears in the Dutch-
speaking area, Flanders” (De Rynck & Wayenberg, 2010: 14-15, see also 
De Ceuninck et al., 2005; Plees, 2005; Steyvers, 2006; Block et al., 2007). 
According to Wayenberg et al. (2010: 75), therefore, “one of the most intriguing 
questions is whether the country’s stories of sub-national politics should be told as a tale 
of regional divergence.” Thus far, some particular stories have already been told. They 
focused mainly on the formal and structural arrangements of the political system in the 
wake of the transfer of the constitutive framework on local government to the regions 
Flanders, Wallonia and Brussels Capital in 20011. This transfer empowered the regions to 
tailor their local systems to specific needs and preferences. Both Flanders (2005) and 
Wallonia (2006) also used this competence to promulgate a new local government act. 
Pilet (2008) notes that these acts indeed diverge in scope and outlook. Whereas the 
Flemish act is clearly interlaced with an efficiency-oriented and administrative logic, the 
Walloon act expresses the persistence of political primacy as its main device, thus 
enhancing the democratic capacity of local government (see also Wayenberg et al., 
2010)2. De Ceuninck et al. (2005) argue, however, that despite this divergent discourse, 
the Flemish system is still strongly indebted to its typical Belgian (i.e. Franco) legacy in 
practice. Also De Rynck and Wayenberg (2010) and Wayenberg et al. (2010) came to the 
conclusion that even though Flanders diverges from Wallonia in certain domains (e.g. 
stressing NPM-arrangements, different local taxation, a management-oriented 
governance style), many elements of their common path-dependent legacy persist. 
                                                             
1 The transfer was a part of the fifth state reform, settled by the Lambermont Agreements in 2001. 
Previously, the supervision over municipalities (1980), the municipal fund (1988) and the competency for 
inter-municipal cooperation had already been transferred to the regions (Wayenberg et al., 2010). 
2 This is reflected in the name of the respective acts as well: the Municipal Decree in Flanders versus the 
Code of Local Democracy and Decentralization in Wallonia. 
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Hence, the formal structure of the local system endorses the divergence hypothesis to 
some extent. Yet simultaneously, it corroborates elements of the opposite hypothesis as 
well, implying that both systems reflect their common legacy in a path-dependent way. 
The goal of this chapter is to tell a new story of Belgian sub-national politics by tackling 
these basic comparative research hypotheses from a different, actor-centred perspective. 
On the basis of their self-evaluation, we namely examine the contemporary role and 
position of Flemish and Walloon councillors in the political system at the local level3. At 
least formally, councillors are considered to be the key actors of the political system 
(Mouritzen & Svara, 2002). In this capacity, councillors’ role and position are important 
determinants of the system’s performance. Yet likewise, both are determined by the 
political system as well. In fact in Belgium and beyond, many authors have expressed 
their concern on the local councillor in modern governance due to a series of 
interconnected evolutions in the local system (Larsen, 2005; Wayenberg et al., 2010; 
Verhelst et al., 2011). Consequently, our study contributes to the regionalization debate 
through its endeavour to gain an understanding of a specific, relevant and topical aspect 
of the political system in the field. 
Still in order to test the divergence and path-dependent hypotheses more profoundly, we 
will not only compare the councillors from Wallonia and Flanders to each other. We 
include councillors from the (acclaimed) referential local systems in the comparison as 
well. Accordingly, we study French councillors as theoretical examples of the Southern 
(i.e. Franco) style. Councillors from the Netherlands, on the other hand, serve as the 
(ideal-typical) examples of the Northern (i.e. North-Middle European) style4. In the 
meantime, this international perspective also raises a third fundamental research 
hypothesis. In fact, it is plausible that general trends in local democracy have led local 
systems to converge beyond traditional stereotypes and typologies too (Goldsmith & 
Page, 2010). In our study, this would imply that traditional comparative schemes no 
longer suffice to explain and classify councillors’ roles and positions in the political 
system. Rather, they would be contingent upon broad general trends in local politics. In 
summary, the aim of our study is thus to verify three general research hypotheses: 
  
                                                             
3 The region Brussels Capital is not included in our analysis due to its distinct character as Capital region 
without full constitutive autonomy, 19 influential mayors and in-built mechanisms of linguistic balance 
between French-speakers and Dutch-speakers (Pilet et al., 2005; Wayenberg et al., 2010). 
4 Additionally, France and the Netherlands share strong linguistic and historical roots with the Belgian 
regions. 
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 GH1: ‘The role and position of Flemish and Walloon local councillors diverge, 
resembling the Northern style of the Netherlands and the Southern style of France 
respectively (i.e. the divergence hypothesis).’ 
 
 GH2: ‘Compared to the typical system of the Netherlands and France, Flemish 
and Walloon local councillors still bear more similarities than differences in the 
wake of their common Belgian path-dependent legacy (i.e. the path-dependent 
hypothesis).’ 
 
 GH3: ‘The role and position of local councillors in Flanders, Wallonia, the 
Netherlands and France has converged beyond traditional country systems and 
classifications due to universal evolutions in the political systems (i.e. the 
convergence hypothesis).’ 
 
The next section of the chapter (Section 6.2) sets out our comparative research 
framework. More specifically, it focuses on those elements that might determine the role 
and position of local councillors in the three countries under study. Thereafter, we present 
our empirical data and research method (Section 6.3). The ensuing sections analyze and 
interpret the survey data. These seek to paint a nuanced and multifaceted picture of the 
councillors by examining several aspects of their role and position. Taken together, these 
aspects span a substantial part of the (political) life of the modern local councillor. The 
first component of the analysis reconstructs councillors’ recruitment process to the 
council, paying special attention to the trend of professionalization within (Section 6.4). 
The centre of the analysis scrutinizes councillors’ classic role orientation (Section 6.5), 
their influence in the local authority (Section 6.6) and their relation with the citizens of 
the locality (Section 6.7). Councillors’ future political ambitions and turnover motives are 
dealt with in the final component of the analysis (Section 6.8). Finally, the concluding 
section summarizes the results in response to the three broad research hypotheses raised 
above (Section 6.9). 
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6.2. COMPARATIVE FRAMEWORK: SAME PLAYERS ON A DIFFERENT STAGE5 
 
6.2.1. Organizing perspective 
The three countries in our comparative framework share the dominant tradition of 
representative local democracy. In this system, local councillors are formally the 
foundation of local democracy (Stewart, 1991; Mouritzen & Svara, 2002; Berg & Rao, 
2005). Yet in contrast with this formal stipulation, many authors have depicted 
councillors’ political primacy as largely fictitious in practice (Denters & Klok, 2003; 
Kalk & De Rynck, 2003; Denters & Rose, 2005). Moreover, in recent decades a general 
belief has grown that particularly the impact of non-executive councillors has (further) 
declined, if not totally vanished in twenty-first century local governance (Caulfield & 
Larsen, 2002; Berg & Rao, 2005; Larsen, 2005; Guérin & Kerrouche, 2008). 
On one hand, this acclaimed strain on the role and position of local councillors may stem 
from several universal trends in local politics (Daemen & Schaap, 2000; Caulfield & 
Larsen, 2002; Kersting & Vetter, 2003; Berg & Rao, 2005; Denters & Rose, 2005; 
Reynaert et al, 2005; Wollmann, 2008; Goldsmith & Page, 2010). Amongst the most 
salient ones, a professionalized administration, NPM-techniques and market 
principles/practices on the output side of the system have come to accompany new ways 
of citizen participation on the input side. Meanwhile internally, many systems undergo 
personalized and strengthened forms of political leadership by the executive councillors 
and/or the mayor. Furthermore, also externally the pressure is piling on the councillors. 
This happens, amongst others, through multi-level governance and media influence 
(Jacobsen, 2009), party politics (Copus, 2004) and growing political apathy or distrust 
(Daemen & Schaap, 2000). 
On the other hand, councillors’ roles and positions may result from their specific 
governance context as well. This is why we will elaborate on several aspects of the 
overarching context of the political systems that could affect the councillors’ role and 
position. This theoretical basis will help measure our basic research hypotheses against 
the different aspects of the empirical analysis further on. Throughout the contextual 
description we implicitly draw on a new institutionalist perspective. The latter is 
“concerned with the informal conventions of political life as well as with formal 
constitutions and organizational structures” (Lowndes, 2010: 71). This means that we 
expect that formal-institutional rules (i.e. legal provisions and procedures) and common 
                                                             
5 All ratio’s and official statistics are calculated on the basis of figures (from 2011 for the Netherlands and 
Belgium, from 2012 for France – including the overseas departments and territories) that have been 
consulted on the official country websites (www.dgcl.interieur.gouv.fr; www.legifrance.gouv.fr; 
www.decentraalbestuur.nl; www.cbs.nl; statbel.fgov.be). 
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practice (i.e. the implementation of local government in practice) determine the way in 
which councillors function in their local authorities. Indeed, “by including informal 
conventions as well as formal procedures, the new institutionalists are able to build a 
more fine-grained and realistic picture of what really constrains political behaviour and 
decision-making” (Lowndes, 2010: 71). 
 
6.2.2. France 
France is the first country in our comparison. The French local system is typically 
considered an example of the Southern/Franco style (Page & Goldsmith, 1987; Hesse & 
Sharpe, 1991; Goldsmith, 1996). This implies that the main function or raison d’être of 
French local government is political. Municipalities first and foremost represent and 
express the place-bound community identity of their inhabitants (i.e. communitarianism). 
In addition to the extensive system of multiple office-holding that gives local politicians 
(i.e. often mayors) a strong voice in the regulation of local government at the national 
level, this place-bound solidarity is key to understand (the persistence of) the unique and 
enormous number and variety of French municipalities (Wollmann, 2000; Kerrouche, 
2005; Pinson, 2010). The total municipal mosaic consists of 36.700 municipalities that 
count just 1.757 inhabitants on average. Consequently, it does not come as a surprise that 
many municipalities seek to overcome their lack of autonomous functional capacity by 
engaging in inter-municipal cooperation(s) (Borraz & Le Galès, 2005; Kerrouche, 2005)6. 
Further, only 943 municipalities (or 2.6%) have a population above 10.000. Yet these 
municipalities represent nearly half (49.3%) of the total French population. As many 
authors argue, the gap between this urban France and the remaining rural areas has 
widened over the past decades (Borraz & Le Galès, 2005; Drouin, 2006; Knapp & 
Wright, 2006). For some it has even resulted in “two clearly differentiated systems of 
local government” (Pinson, 2010: 86). 
Every six years, more than half a million local councillors are elected in France (at the 
last elections in 2008, this figure amounted to 519.417). In municipalities counting less 
than 3.500 inhabitants, candidates are elected in a two-round majority system, with 
panachage allowed. In municipalities equal to or above this threshold, the winning party 
receives a 50% vote bonus whilst the remaining votes are distributed proportionally over 
the party lists that obtained at least 5% of the votes (Drouin, 2006). Even though this 
system was designed to assure at least some municipal opposition in larger 
                                                             
6 These inter-municipal structures develop their policies quite autonomously, despite compulsory reports 
to the council. Since the majority of the local councillors are excluded from these structures, doubts can 
be raised on the democratic quality of decision-making in such systems (Drouin, 2006). Furthermore, also 
internally a differentiation arises between the participants – as often mayors of the strongest municipality 
in the co-operative structure take the upper hand (Kerrouche, 2005). 
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municipalities, it (still) strongly propels the underrepresentation of the latter in the 
council (Kerrouche, 2005; Knapp & Wright, 2006). The council meetings are held at least 
once per trimester. Additionally, councils are entitled to organize standing committees. 
Decisions are also prepared in preceding plenary meetings and party groups behind 
closed doors (Drouin, 2006). 
The number of councillors per council varies between 9 and 69 according to the 
municipal size7. An average councillor in France represents just 124 inhabitants, even 
though the huge spread of municipal size causes considerable differences regarding this 
figure. Still as Drouin (2006) notes, the proximity and resulting familiarity between 
citizens and councillors contributes to the popularity of local government in larger 
municipalities too. Indeed, the démocratie de proximité, impersonated by the 
municipalities, forms one of the pillars of French democracy (Knapp & Wright, 2006; 
Pinson, 2010). Citizens also frequently approach councillors in their capacity as 
representative of the municipality and advocate of the community – an intervention that 
sometimes threatens to blur the lines with plain clientelism (Drouin, 2006). Moreover as 
a complement to councillors’ representative task, French municipalities have started to 
experiment (cautiously) with participative arrangements to actively include citizens in 
decision-making (e.g. neighbourhood councils, advisory committees, referenda, etc.) 
(Borraz & Le Galès, 2005; Kerrouche, 2005; Drouin, 2006). Still it seems that these 
experiments have not been able to overturn what Pinson (2010: 85) calls “the traditional 
mistrust of politicians towards any form of citizen participation.” As Vetter and Kersting 
(2003b) point out, such hesitations seem typical for the Southern tradition of local 
government as such. 
On the other hand, Pinson (2010) also observes a shift from input legitimacy stemming 
from the electoral process to output legitimacy that is founded on politicians’ policy 
results. In fact, councillors’ room for manoeuvre has been markedly enhanced by the 
reduced tutelage of the prefect (Borraz & Le Galès, 2005). In functional and formal 
terms, the local council(lor)s are entitled to handle all matters of local interest – a 
principle which is interpreted quite broadly (Pinson, 2010). Nevertheless in practice, it is 
typically the mayor that implements these competences instead of the councillors. Indeed, 
French local government is observed as the outstanding example of the strong-mayor 
type (Mouritzen & Svara, 2002; Kerrouche, 2005), sometimes even depicted as municipal 
presidency or municipal monarchy (Mabileau, 1995). The power of the mayor stems first 
of all from legal stipulations (Borraz & Le Galès, 2005; Kerrouche, 2005; Drouin, 2006; 
Knapp & Wright, 2006; Wollmann, 2008). As representative of the state and leading 
                                                             
7 An exception is made for the three largest cities Paris (163 seats), Lyon (73 seats) and Marseille (101 
seats), who fall under a specific legal framework (the PLM-Act), and where municipal district councils 
seek to bridge the gap between citizens and government (www.legifrance.gouv.fr). 
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executive officer of the council, the mayor holds extensive responsibilities (e.g. 
implementation of central laws, police force, representing the municipality, implementing 
council decisions). Further, he/she heads and controls the local administration and the 
cabinet, presides over the council and sets the local agenda. The position as majority 
leader is strengthened even more by the electoral system in the larger municipalities and 
the fact that the council cannot recall the mayor. Additionally, the system of multiple 
office-holding ensures visibility and impact at the central level. 
Informal practice further adds to this incredible position of power (Kerrouche, 2005; 
Drouin, 2006). Whereas council(lor)s formally elect the mayor and the executives 
(adjoints), reality works the other way around. It is the mayor who composes his/her 
electoral list, tying councillors hand and foot to their political leader. He/she also picks 
the executives who may gain considerable expertise in a certain policy field, but remain 
subordinate in the end – as the mayor can withdraw their portfolio at any time8. 
Sometimes competences are delegated to non-executive councillors of the majority as 
well (conseillers délégués), albeit this role is often confined to mere representational 
tasks. Given the strong position of the mayor, and the image of the municipality as 
representative of the community as a whole, the role of political parties and party politics 
seem inferior in the political process too (Kerrouche, 2005). Basically, this role comes 
down to selecting and assigning candidates for the election (Borraz & Le Galès, 2005)9. 
Finally, the mayor is paid more, is better informed and is more accessible for 
professionals and local interest groups. Often a notable and popular person, he/she is 
identified with the municipality. 
According to Kerrouche (2005), such mayoral omnipresence challenges the very 
democratic quality of the French local system because its favours strong governance over 
public transparency. Meanwhile, it inevitably reduces the impact of the local councillors. 
According to Knapp and Wright (2006: 354), “it is no very great exaggeration to claim 
that in most cases, the task of the (...) municipal councillors is to elect the (...) mayors 
and to ratify their decisions.” Others agree on this marginalized position: “the local 
councils have become largely sidelined, if not dwarfed, as political players” (Wollmann, 
2008: 288; see also Kerrouche, 2005). Particularly councillors from the opposition find it 
very hard to leave their mark on the political process, despite modest attempts to improve 
their position by the proximity democracy act in 2002 (e.g. introducing the right to inform 
                                                             
8 Executives have no personal competences, only competences delegated by the mayor. The number of 
executives varies between one and 30% of the council, except for municipalities with more than 80.000 
inhabitants, where supplementary district executives can be appointed (up to 10% of the council) 
(www.legifrance.gouv.fr). 
9 Drouin (2006) notes that political parties are more important for councillors from the opposition – as 
these have to organize themselves more to be able to oppose the powerful mayor. 
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citizens in the municipal newsletter, granting the opposition a place of their own in the 
town hall) (Borraz & Le Galès, 2005; Kerrouche, 2005; Drouin, 2006)10. 
 
6.2.3. The Netherlands 
Compared to the French system, the local system in the Netherlands follows a totally 
different pattern. As an example of the Northern/North-Middle European style, the 
purpose of Dutch local government is more functional than political, i.e. providing a wide 
range of public services as an integral part of the welfare state (Hesse & Sharpe, 1991; 
Goldsmith, 1996). In search for efficiency gains to this end, the Netherlands are 
characterized by an ongoing, almost yearly and centrally encouraged reduction of the 
municipal landscape through amalgamations (Denters & Klok, 2005; De Ceuninck et al, 
2010). With an average population of 39.846, Dutch municipalities are also considerably 
larger than French ones. Amongst the 418 municipalities, 90.7% surpassed the 10.000-
threshold in 2011. Meanwhile since the 1990s, the functional public discourse on local 
government has also been complemented with increasing efforts to enhance the 
democratic quality of local government. As a result, several forms of participatory 
democracy, such as referenda and advisory boards, have been introduced (Vetter & 
Kersting, 2003b; Denters & Klok, 2005; Boogers, 2007). Leyenaar (2007) argues 
nevertheless that local actors and governments should become even more aware of the 
democratic surplus of such processes. 
Dutch councillors are elected every four years in a proportional open party list system. 
The councils count 9 to 45 members depending on the municipal size11. Council meetings 
are held more frequently than in France (averagely 8 to 12 times per year), whilst almost 
every week a committee meeting is planned (Boogers, 2007). Given the total number of 
councillors (9.358 after the 2010 elections), the representative ratio in the Netherlands 
(1:1.780) is much larger as well. Along these lines, the governance culture in the Dutch 
councils is often considered to be more inward-looking and professional (Denters & De 
Jong, 1992; Denters & van der Kolk, 1998; Kalk & De Rynck, 2003; Denters et al., 
2005). Such professionalization is fostered by the extensive functional demands for local 
government (Boogers, 2007). However, this functional earmark also places stress on the 
accountability of the local councillors towards their constituents (Denters et al., 2005). 
                                                             
10 In 1992, councillors from the opposition had already acquired the right to be represented in the 
municipal committees, the right to ask formal questions to the mayor and the right to approve an internal 
code of conduct for the council at the start of the legislature (Drouin, 2006). 
11 The two largest municipalities, Amsterdam and Rotterdam, have formal decentralized councils as well 
(i.e. district or borough councils). 
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On the organizational plan, Dutch local government differs from the French one as well. 
Whereas the French system is known as the strong-mayor form, the Dutch system 
qualifies as a collective form (Mouritzen & Svara, 2002). This means that executive 
powers are exercised by an institutionalized collective body, the Board of Mayor and 
Aldermen. This collegiate body is presided over by the mayor. The latter is not an elected 
politician but is appointed by the Crown for six years on advice from the council (Denters 
et al., 2005). This system envisages a neutral or independent mayor who rises above the 
political twists in the council and acts as the ombudsman of all citizens in the 
municipality (Derksen, 1998). The mayor has some personal competencies (e.g. police, 
implementation of national laws) and presides over the council, but as an appointed 
administrator, he/she has no political legitimacy, hence voting rights or political role to 
play (Tops & Korsten, 1998)12. The aldermen (varying from two up to 20% of the 
council) are elected by the council (Steen & Toonen, 2010). They formally implement the 
council’s decisions, run the daily operation of the local system and organize the 
municipal administration (Denters et al., 2005). Meanwhile, the formal and ultimate 
primacy of the council expresses the institutionalized dominance of the layman rule over 
political leadership and the professional administration (Mouritzen & Svara, 2002). The 
council is thus placed at the head of local government, representing the people while 
determining local policies and controlling the executive board (Denters & van der Kolk, 
1998). 
Nevertheless, over time a strong discrepancy has grown between these formal stipulations 
and daily practice (Denters & van der Kolk, 1998; Denters et al., 2005; Steen & Wille, 
2005). In fact, the monistic system, in which aldermen were elected (and potentially 
recalled) by and from the council whilst retaining a seat in the council and the 
committees, has turned the power relations upside down. Formally, the executive was 
designed to prepare and implement council decisions, organize the administration and run 
daily affairs under the council’s direction and control. Yet in practice, the BMA overtook 
the council as the dominant actor in local government. Aldermen have monopolized their 
policy field, working in close harmony with the administrative department to implement 
an ever expanding task package. They have held the final say in their party group as well. 
The latter, and party politics generally, are indeed an important facet of Dutch democracy 
(Denters & van der Kolk, 1998; Denters et al., 2005; Boogers, 2007; Denters et al., 
2011). For the amateur, non-executive councillors, it used to be very hard to oppose this 
all-embracing executive supremacy, particularly in a context of expanding municipal 
tasks, increasing municipal size and growing social and political complexity (Denters et 
al., 2005). Accordingly: “the prime role in the policy process of amateur part-time 
                                                             
12 In the executive body, the mayor has a voting right “in the event of a tie” (Steen & Toonen, 2010: 146). 
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councillors both in policy development and in policy implementation [was] largely 
illusory” (Denters et al., 2005: 20). 
In 2002, the introduction of the Dualism Act entailed a drastic institutional revolution 
which aimed at reversing this established informal practice (Denters et al., 2005 and 
2008; Steen & Wille, 2005; Boogers, 2007; Steen & Toonen, 2010). Dualism radically 
separated the executive board and the council in personal and functional terms. It 
transferred all the administrative powers and responsibilities to the BMA. The council, on 
the other hand, is still entitled to elect and recall the aldermen, but not necessarily from 
amongst its ranks any longer13. Aldermen automatically lose their seat and vote in the 
council, committees and often even the party group. Additionally, the Dualism Act aimed 
to strengthen the position of the local councillors as (a) representative of their locality in 
policy matters (i.e. adopting a more outward-looking orientation as representative of the 
locality) and (b) scrutinizer of the BMA. To that end the act has made new instruments 
available at the council’s disposal (e.g. a clerk for administrative support; an audit court; 
annual citizen reports; agenda setting, information, inquiry and interpellation rights). 
These instruments are also intended to reduce the need for professionalized councillors in 
local government. 
At present, it might still be too early to draw unanimous conclusions from the reform. On 
one hand, it seems that local councillors’ self-awareness and position vis-à-vis the 
executive in terms of policy and control has indeed been reinvigorated (Denters et al., 
2008; De Groot et al., 2010). Yet simultaneously, some authors describe the new 
relations within Dutch local government as duelism between the council and the 
executive, rather than the dualism called for (Steen & Wille, 2005; Steen & Toonen, 
2010). Effects on the input side of local government are less pronounced too (Denters et 
al., 2008; De Groot et al., 2010). 
 
6.2.4. Belgium 
Belgium completes our international comparative research framework. The typical (i.e. 
unitary) Belgian system has long been considered a mixture between the systems of its 
neighbours the Netherlands and France. Like France, Belgium is traditionally seen as an 
example of the South European/Franco type (Goldsmith, 1996; De Ceuninck et al, 2010; 
Wayenberg et al., 2010). Municipalities thus rather express the communal identity of 
their citizens than functionally providing public services for them in the most optimal 
                                                             
13 According to Denters et al. (2005), this could invoke more professionalism in the local system because 
it could create a national group of political managers who systematically aspire to these executive 
functions. 
190  |  CHAPTER 6 
 
way. Considering its small size, Belgium counts relatively many (589) and small 
municipalities (average size 18.404, still with 59.1% exceeding the 10.000-threshold). 
And in order to meet the growing public service demands, municipalities prefer to engage 
in a booming network of inter-municipal cooperation(s) (Plees, 2005; De Rynck & 
Wayenberg, 2010). 
Belgian local councillors are elected every six years in a proportional free list system14. 
Councils are obliged to meet at least 10 times per year, and their composition varies from 
7 members to 55 depending on the municipal size15. Standing committees are installed in 
about half of the municipalities (Ackaert, 2005). In the 2006 elections, 13.281 councillors 
were elected. This means that the representative ratio in Belgium is rather small too 
(1:797). What Belgian councillors further have in common with French councillors is 
their close bond with local society (Plees, 2005). Such outward-oriented attitude 
distinguishes them from (the typical image of) Dutch councillors (Kalk & De Rynck, 
2003). Nevertheless over the recent decades, scholars also notice a growing 
professionalization of the Belgian local office in order to meet the growing functional 
requirements for local government (Reynaert et al., 2006; Verhelst et al., forthcoming). 
Regarding its internal organization, however, Belgian local government bears more 
similarities with the Dutch (pre 2002) system. Indeed, Belgium is placed under the header 
of the collective form as well (Mouritzen & Svara, 2002). Formally, the council is the 
heart of local government (Ackaert, 2005). It holds responsibility for all matters of 
municipal interest, steering the actions of the executive board and the administration. The 
council elects the aldermen, who constitute the Board of Mayor and Aldermen16. The 
main role of the BMA is to run the municipality as a collegiate body, and execute policy 
proposals under supervision of the council. It is presided over by the mayor. In the 
unitary system, the latter was nominated by the council from its ranks and officially 
appointed by central government (even though this appointment was usually just a 
formality, see Pilet et al., 2005). Unlike his/her Dutch colleague, the Belgian mayor is 
thus an elected politician, and probably even the most important one in the city hall 
                                                             
14 In an open list system, citizens can only cast their vote for (an) individual candidate(s) on a party list. In 
a free list system (e.g. Belgium), citizens can vote for the party, as well as for single candidates on a party 
list (if panachage is not allowed, like in Belgium, citizens can only vote for candidates of the particular 
party they voted for). In a closed list system, citizens can only cast their vote for a party (Van der Kolk, 
2007). 
15 Belgium’s largest municipality Antwerp has also formal district councils. 
16 The BMA counts two to ten members, plus the president of the Public Social Services Centre and the 
mayor. In Wallonia, the executive board is called the Municipal College. 
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(Ackaert, 2005). He/she is the leader of the political majority and has some additional 
competences as well (e.g. police, implementation of central laws)17. 
Yet on the other hand, the Dutch (pre 2002) anomaly is reproduced in the Belgian scene 
in practice too (Ackaert, 2005; De Rynck & Wayenberg, 2010; Verhelst et al., 2011). 
Policy domains are de facto distributed personally amongst the aldermen, who usually 
belong to (a party of) the political majority. These aldermen steer the administrative 
department of the policy domain in their portfolio and define local policies together with 
the mayor and the municipal CEO. Additionally, the executive politicians outweigh non-
executive councillors in the council, committees and the party group. The culture of 
strong party influence and discipline, respect for the authorities and executive dominance 
seems even stronger than in the Netherlands, rendering council meetings mere formalized 
pieces of cabaret (Kalk & De Rynck, 2003; also Mouritzen & Svara, 2002). In sum: 
“Party loyalty and discipline, the growing complexity of local administration and policy, 
combined with the lack of organizational and financial support needed for policymaking 
(...) put the council in a weak position relative to the board” (Ackaert, 2005: 169; see 
also De Rynck & Wayenberg, 2010; Wayenberg et al., 2010; Verhelst et al., 2011). 
The largest transformation of the Belgian local system was carried out by the fifth state 
reform (2001), granting the regions Flanders, Wallonia and Brussels Capital the 
responsibility over the constitutive framework on local government from 2002 onwards. 
As stated in the introduction, this transfer formalized the claim that two diverging local 
systems have emerged in Belgium (Goldsmith, 1996; Steyvers, 2006; Steyvers, 2010a). 
Whereas Wallonia would resemble the typical Franco-system, Flanders would seem to be 
drifting towards the North-Middle European, efficiency-oriented style of its Dutch 
neighbour (De Ceuninck et al., 2005; Block et al., 2007; De Rynck & Wayenberg, 2010). 
At least in formal terms, some differences exist between Flanders and Wallonia with 
regard to their local system. Flemish municipalities (average size 20.299, 72.1% above 
10.000, ratio 1:830) are for instance larger on average than their Walloon counterparts 
(average size 13.353, 40.8% above 10.000, ratio 1:655). Nevertheless also in Flanders, no 
new amalgamations were carried out since the last general (and federal) round of 1976-
1982. Rather, and despite the encouragement from central government to increase 
municipal size and efficiency, Belgian municipalities still prefer to join the rich tapestry 
of inter-municipal cooperation(s). Like in France, the extensive practice of multiple 
office-holding, which results in a central (i.e. regional) parliament studded with local 
(mostly executive) politicians, is one of the main reasons for this (De Ceuninck et al., 
2010). On the other hand, the Flemish Municipal Decree clearly centres more around the 
                                                             
17 Only exceptionally, the mayor is not an elected councillor or the leader of the political majority. Like in 
France, he/she is often the most well-known figure in the municipality (see Chapter 1). 
192  |  CHAPTER 6 
 
Northern NPM-style, stressing professionalization, efficiency, functional capacity and 
management (e.g. introducing strategic planning, a management team, financial planning, 
public-private partnerships, municipal agencies, auditing, etc.) (Ackaert, 2005; De 
Ceuninck et al., 2005; Wayenberg et al., 2010). The typical primacy of politics remains 
more prevalent in Wallonia (Pilet, 2008; Wayenberg et al., 2010). 
Both regions introduced different political renovations as well18. As a result of a series of 
political scandals at the local level, the Walloon Code has placed more emphasis on 
democratic requirements (Pilet, 2008). For instance, Walloon councils got empowered 
with a constructive motion of distrust against (a member of, or the entire) BMA. Walloon 
councillors can thus recall the aldermen and/or mayor as long as a majority agrees on (a) 
replacement(s). Furthermore, the semi-direct election of the mayor was introduced 
simultaneously. This implies that the candidate who obtains most preferential votes for 
the biggest party of the municipal majority, is automatically appointed as mayor (Pilet et 
al., 2007b). Such a system could pave the way towards a stronger position of the mayor 
in practice, tending towards the French Southern, quasi-presidential governance culture 
(Pilet, 2008). The Flemish decree did foresee some new arrangements as well, such as the 
possibility to support the party groups in the council, additional delegation and 
information rights for councillors and the option to elect a genuine council president 
(instead of the mayor who automatically presided over the council before). Still, despite a 
lively debate on the direct election of the mayor, the Flemish decree did not alter the 
designation of the most important political office in the municipality (Reynaert & 
Steyvers, 2006; Wayenberg et al., 2010). 
On the other hand, the democratic earmark of the Walloon Code is not reflected in a 
fundamental improvement of participatory democracy. Whereas the Walloon Code 
adheres more to traditional, consultative ways of citizen participation in the political 
process (e.g. advisory bodies and referenda, citizen appeals in the council), it is the 
Flemish decree that introduced more active possibilities such as citizen initiatives or 
participatory budgeting (Wayenberg et al., 2010 – still, see footnote 18). We could 
interpret this as a sign of the typical Southern reticence towards actively involving 
citizens in decision-making (Vetter & Kersting, 2003b). Nonetheless, scholars notice that 
local politicians on both sides of the language border remain quite sceptic about the value 
of these possibilities (Pilet et al., 2007d; Wayenberg et al., 2010). Finally, it is remarkable 
that no region has opted to give councillors a genuine statute (De Rynck & Wayenberg 
2010; Wayenberg et al., 2010). Hence, generally, it still looks like “the dominance of the 
political executive in local politics remains the corner stone of Belgian local democracy” 
(Wayenberg et al., 2010: 87). 
                                                             
18 Even though recent reforms have started to level out some of these differences, see Chapter 1. 
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6.3. DATA AND METHODS 
To what extent do councillors from Flanders, Wallonia, the Netherlands and France feel 
that their current role and position in the political system diverge, converge or reflect a 
path-dependent legacy? We will search for an answer to this question by interpreting 
cross-sectional empirical data that have been collected in the context of the European 
comparative research project Municipal Assemblies in European Local Governance (see 
Egner et al., forthcoming)19. The goal of this project was to systematically and 
comparatively investigate local councillors in Europe – as this group was often neglected 
in political research until recently (see Egner et al., forthcoming in general; Drouin, 2006 
for France; Reynaert et al., 2006 for Belgium; Denters et al., 2011 for the Netherlands). 
In each participating country a standard questionnaire was sent to a selection of local 
councillors by a team of national scholars during the period 2007-2009. Our country and 
case selection from the project for this study constitutes a comparative design that 
triangulates a most different approach with a most-similar complement (Landman, 2008). 
First, the country descriptions have shown that the reference countries France and the 
Netherlands (theoretically) represent two opposing systems in terms of the formal local 
government system (i.e. most different)20. Meanwhile, the typical unitary Belgian system 
combines elements of both referential systems (i.e. most similar in certain domains). The 
basic elements of this framework are summarized in Table 6.1 below. 
 
  
                                                             
19 The cross-sectional design of the study does not allow us to verify the basic research hypotheses in a 
longitudinal way. 
20 Even though some trends and reforms could have reduced these differences. 
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Table 6.1. The formal comparative research framework 
 France the Netherlands Belgium 
Local government type 
Raison d’être local government 
Local government organization 
N municipalities 
Average population 
Municipalities > 10.000 
N councillors (last elections) 
Term length 
N council meetings 
Representative ratio 
N councillors per council 
N executives per council 
Mayor 
 
 
 
Franco 
More political 
Strong-mayor  
36.700 
1.757 
2.6% 
519.417 
6 years 
Once/trimester 
1:124 
9-69 
1-30% council 
Elected by & from 
council 
 
 
North-Middle Europe 
More functional 
Collective 
418 
39.846 
90.7% 
9.358 
4 years 
8-12 times/year 
1:1.780 
9-45 
2-20% council 
Appointed by Crown  
(on advice council) 
 
 
Franco 
More political 
Collective 
589 
18.404 
59.1% 
13.281 
6 years 
10 times/year 
1:797 
7-55 
2-10 
Semi-dir. elected/ 
proposed by & from 
council, centrally 
appointed 
 
 
Second, our research subjects within these countries are most similar to each other. In 
fact, the MAELG group confined the scope of the research-project to the local councillors 
from an urban context in order to maximize the comparability of the data. Consequently, 
the project covered municipalities with at least 10.000 inhabitants only. This choice 
obviously excludes the singularity of small-town councillors in our analysis and 
conclusions – thus, for instance, a large share of the French municipal landscape. 
Nevertheless, the size threshold seems justified in our research context as the discussion 
on the possible strain on municipal councillors is (claimed to be) particularly high in the 
urban political system – where there are more professional executives and 
administrations, intricate governance networks and different actors involved in policy-
making, a higher workload, etc. (Gabriel et al., 2000; Haus et al., 2005; Drouin, 2006; 
Reynaert & Steyvers, 2006). Furthermore, we only use data from local councillors who 
were not members of the executive board at the moment of response. Indeed, given the 
dualistic structure of its local system, executive councillors were not surveyed in the 
Netherlands. Yet also on this point literature expects that functional problems regarding 
councillors’ roles and positions would particularly arise among the non-executive part of 
the local councillor population (Berg & Rao, 2005; Larsen, 2005). 
The survey procedure of the MAELG project and our purposive case selection has 
resulted in a total research population of 2007 single cases (441 French councillors, 1121 
Dutch councillors and 445 Belgian councillors, of which 344 Flemish and 101 Walloon 
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councillors)21. The structural figures for this population show that even if the size 
threshold diminishes the inter-country variance to a considerable extent, the ratio’s 
between the countries under study still persist. Also in our uniform urban research data 
set, Dutch councillors (average municipal size 51.718, representative ratio 1:1.736) 
represent a larger hinterland than French councillors (average size 28.784, representative 
ratio 1:735). Belgium holds the middle between both, whilst the distance between 
Walloon councillors and their citizens (average size 27.408, representative ratio 1:879) is 
smaller than in Flanders (average size 33.804, representative ratio 1:1.000). 
The questionnaire comprises 5 parts: (a) questions about the council and the actors in 
local democracy, (b) questions about the role as a councillor, (c) questions about the view 
on local democracy and local policy, (d) questions about the political career and political 
party and (e) questions about the (personal) background. From these five parts we have 
been able to extract different aspects of councillors’ roles and positions for our analysis. 
These aspects are: the recruitment process to the council, councillors’ orientation towards 
their classic role-set (combining role attitude and role behaviour), councillors’ self-
placement in the local hierarchy, councillors’ relation with the citizens (in the 
representative and participatory setting) and councillors’ political ambitions for the future 
and possible turnover motives. 
Per aspect, we have systematically compared the results from the French, Dutch, Flemish 
and Walloon respondents. The standardized survey method (each question was asked, 
measured and coded in the same way in every country) allows us to quantify the 
differences and similarities between the countries/regions and test our general research 
hypotheses. More specifically, a bivariate table presents the figure of the total research 
population per research theme, as well as the figure for the four councillor groups22. The 
general figure in the table is calculated on the basis of weighted response in order to 
guarantee that each country and region is represented by an equal share of respondents. 
The table further presents the difference between the figure per country/region and this 
general figure. The final column of the table reports on the significance and strength of 
the difference between the four countries/regions under study. The latter is expressed by 
the Cramer’s V-value23.  
                                                             
21 The respective response rates for the countries are 38.6% (the Netherlands), 22.4% (Belgium) and 
12.1% (France). 
22 Graphical presentations of the comparative results are also added in Appendix F. 
23 Cramer’s V is frequently used to interpret the strength of the association between variables with more 
than two categories that are measured at the nominal or ordinal level (George & Mallery, 2010). Values 
between .01 and .09 indicate that the difference between the regions/countries for the variable under study 
is just ‘trivial’. From .10 to .29, the strength of this difference is ‘low’ to ‘moderate’, whilst scores from 
.30 to .49 indicate that the difference between the regions/countries is ‘moderate’ to ‘substantial’ (de 
Vaus, 2002). 
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6.4. THE PROCESS OF POLITICAL RECRUITMENT TO THE COUNCIL 
The first part of our analysis is concerned with councillors’ political recruitment, defined 
as “the process by which individuals are selected for inclusion among political elites” 
(Brady et al., 1999: 153). Political studies have frequently shown that representative 
assemblies seldom mirror their community at large (Judge, 1999). The path to the council 
is thus far from neutral. In recent decades, the selectivity in recruitment has been 
identified as a tendency towards professionalization (Steyvers & Verhelst, 2012). 
Professionalization refers to (a) the growing importance of particular personal 
characteristics (i.e. a higher education, selective professional background and an 
advantageous period in one’s life), but also (b) councillors’ inclusion in the party 
machinery (ranging from the motivation to serve the party to the actual support in the 
election). These area-specific assets and routines gain importance in the selection process 
because they fuel the expectation of empowering councillors in an increasingly complex 
and demanding office. Accordingly, professional(ized) councillors could be better suited 
to administer local affairs and stand their ground against other influential actors in 
governance (e.g. the mayor, aldermen, administration, etc.). However on the other hand, 
it is often argued that the professionalization trend contradicts the principle of layman 
politics. It reduces the intake of average or common citizens who are mandated by their 
peers to represent the common public views in the political arena (Denters & Klok, 
2005). Professionalization’s political component could lay the foundations of stringent 
party discipline in the council as well. Simultaneously, some trends are also perceived to 
democratize the councils to some extent (Steyvers & Verhelst, 2012). The feminization of 
the councils, in some countries triggered by official gender quota (e.g. France and 
Belgium), and the increase of councillors with foreign roots, are two examples of 
contemporary evolutions that could compensate for ancient and modern recruitment bias. 
Table 6.2 reconstructs the recruitment process of our respondents in four elementary 
phases (see e.g. Norris, 1997): (a) the social base (% councillors with a higher education, 
a selective profession before their first office, middle-aged at the start of the first office, 
female councillors, councillors with foreign roots), (b) political motivations (the lay 
motivations ‘citizen duty’ and ‘highlight the needs of a particular group’ versus the 
professional motives ‘party duty’ and ‘enter on a political career)24, (c) apprenticeships 
(% members of a local association, members of a political party before the first office) 
and (d) the election (support from local associations, support from the local party, elected 
on a national party list). For each stage a distinction is drawn between the professional 
pole and its layman pendant.  
                                                             
24 Expressed by the percentage of respondents who indicated that the motive was ‘of great or utmost 
importance’ when they first accepted to become a candidate. 
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• According to the path-dependent hypothesis, we could expect a higher degree of 
democratization in local systems that are mainly founded on communitarianism and 
have, for instance, installed formal gender quota (i.e. France and the Belgian regions). 
Personal professionalization would be more notable in systems that are more inward-
looking, placing more stress on the functional earmark of local government (i.e. the 
Netherlands). The impact of parties would be reflected in the degree of political 
professionalization in recruitment as well (i.e. prevailing in the Netherlands and the 
Belgian regions). 
 
• The divergence hypothesis implies that Flanders would bear more similarities to the 
Dutch system in terms of personal professionalization, considering its stronger 
emphasis on functional and professional local government.  
 
• Finally, the convergence hypothesis expects that the typical difference(s) between the 
four countries/regions would diminish. Due to the growing complexity of local 
government across Europe, professionalization would then characterize councillors’ 
recruitment process across the four countries/regions.  
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Table 6.2. The political recruitment process of local councillors in  
the Netherlands, Flanders, Wallonia and France (in percentages) 
 General Netherlands Flanders Wallonia France Cramer’s 
V (a) 
Social Base 
Higher education  
(N=1989) 
Selective profession  
(N=1810) 
Middle-aged (40-59 years) 
(N=1932) 
Female councillors 
(N=1991) 
Foreign roots 
(N=1970) 
Political Motivation 
Citizen duty 
(N=1958) 
Highlights needs of particular 
group 
(N=1914) 
Party duty 
(N=1914) 
Enter on a political career 
(N=1928) 
Apprenticeships 
Member local association(s) 
(N=1941) 
Member political party before 
mandate 
(N=1843) 
Election 
(Very) strong support local 
association(s) 
(N=1905) 
(Very) strong support local 
party 
(N=1920) 
Elected on a list of a national 
party 
(N=1978) 
 
66.2 
 
44.5 
 
53.1 
 
32 
 
12.4 
 
 
47.8 
 
54.1 
 
 
49.1 
 
8.8 
 
 
98 
 
77.2 
 
 
 
18.5 
 
 
68.4 
 
 
65.8 
 
66.9  
(+0.7) 
49.8  
(+5.3) 
65 
(+11.9) 
27 
(-5) 
8.4  
(-4) 
 
43.8  
(-4) 
48.7  
(-5.4) 
 
62.7  
(+13.6) 
8.8  
(=) 
 
98 
(=) 
97.8  
(+20.6) 
 
 
18.3  
(-0.2) 
 
85.2  
(+16.8) 
 
74.7  
(+8.9) 
 
66.9  
(+0.7) 
34.6  
(-9.9) 
44 
(-9.1) 
29.5  
(-2.5) 
7.2  
(-5.2) 
 
28.6  
(-19.2) 
68 
(+13.9) 
 
45.9  
(-3.2) 
12.2 
(+3.4) 
 
97.6  
(-0.4) 
76.6  
(-0.6) 
 
 
19 
(+0.5) 
 
71.9 
(+3.5) 
 
82.1 
(+16.3) 
 
61 
(-5.2) 
47.3 
(+2.8) 
49.5 
(-3.6) 
23.9  
(-8.1) 
14.4 
(+2) 
 
61.6 
(+13.8) 
62.2 
(+8.1) 
 
57.1 
(+8) 
4.1  
(-4.7) 
 
97 
(-1) 
84.6 
(+7.4) 
 
 
11.3  
(-7.2) 
 
65.3  
(-3.1) 
 
75.8 
(+10) 
 
69.8 
(+3.6) 
46 
(+1.5) 
54.7  
(+1.6) 
47.2 
(+15.2) 
19.6 
(+7.2) 
 
58.2 
(+10.4) 
34.6  
(-19.5) 
 
28.2  
(-20.9) 
9.7 
(+0.9) 
 
99.3 
(+1.3) 
47.3  
(-29.9) 
 
 
26.1 
(+7.6) 
 
48.7  
(-19.7) 
 
29.6  
(-36.2) 
 
.07 
 
.12 
 
.15 
 
.20 
 
.15 
 
 
.23 
 
.19 
 
 
.29 
 
.10 
 
 
.08 
 
.32 
 
 
 
.14 
 
 
.25 
 
 
.31 
(a) All associations are significant at the .05 level 
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Table 6.2 shows that the recruitment process of French, Dutch and Belgian councillors 
combines convergent, divergent and path-dependent patterns. Based on the weak 
reciprocal differences, we can conclude that personal professionalization occurs in all 
countries/regions under study. Nearly half of the respondents boast a selective social 
background in terms of starting age, profession at the start of the first mandate (i.e. 
professional politician, civil servant, business manager, teacher, liberal profession) and 
particularly education. This suggests that the recruitment process advantages candidates 
with the necessary capacities to administer local affairs indeed – even though the degree 
of personal professionalization is slightly weaker in the Belgian regions than in the 
Netherlands, for instance. The two other convergent patterns in the table are typical of 
layman politics. In each country/region, no more than a small minority of the councillors 
entered the council with a clear professional career plan in mind. Further and regardless 
of the local context, a councillor is nearly always recruited from the organized local 
community, i.e. being member of at least one association. 
From here on, the differences between the regions/countries enlarge, particularly in terms 
of the impact of political parties in recruitment. The results from the French and Dutch 
councillors basically reflect the path-dependent legacy of their local systems. Whereas 
the recruitment process of the former leans most towards the lay model, the latter take a 
far more selective and professionalized route to the council in personal and political 
terms. In France, gender quota have almost placed female councillors on equal terms 
whilst the proportion of councillors with foreign roots (i.e. born, or having parent(s) born 
abroad) is twice as large as in the Netherlands. French councillors were also more 
inspired by citizen duty, conceiving their mandate as a service to the community. 
Particularistic needs and party duty mattered less. The ranking of the motivations in the 
Dutch system is reversed, showing more signs of professionalization. The particular 
importance of the political party in the recruitment process recurs in the near unanimity 
with which Dutch councillors are recruited, supported and elected as party members. 
Such a pattern is less common in France, where we find more independents/candidates 
from local lists (i.e. councillors that were not elected on a list of a national party), and the 
role of local associations in the electoral process is more important from a comparative 
viewpoint. 
The results from the Belgian respondents combine elements of their path-dependent 
legacy with some divergent nuances. Both Flanders and Wallonia still have some work 
ahead regarding the democratization of their councils in descriptive terms, despite the 
introduction of formal gender quota and some differences between the regions. As 
expected, parties keep a tight grip on the recruitment process of both groups as well. In 
Wallonia this is somewhat more apparent during the apprenticeship phase, in Flanders it 
occurs more during the election afterwards. Yet it is particularly the motivational pattern 
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that diverges most between the regions. Citizen duty, service to a particular group and 
party duty were nearly equally important for local councillors in Wallonia. For Flemish 
councillors, citizen duty and party duty mattered seemingly less when they decided to 
stand for office. Particularly the opportunity to highlight the needs of a specific group 
tops their list of political motivations. Moreover, the professional motive to develop a 
political career was more important in Flanders as well. Still generally, the regions do not 
seem to systematically resemble their reference country as expected by the diverging 
hypothesis. 
 
6.5. ROLE ORIENTATION 
Once installed in office, councillors ought to assume their role as protagonists of local 
democracy. Their formal and classic role-set comprises three components (De Rynck, 
2000; Denters et al., 2008). As elected citizens, councillors should represent the interests, 
requests and issues from local society in the political arena. Complementary to this input 
role, they are expected to define the main goals of municipal policy whilst scrutinizing its 
implementation afterwards on the output side of the political system. This ideal-typical 
role-set, however, does not exclusively direct councillors’ actions in practice. Indeed in 
office, the party (group) tends to serve as a major focus of representation and action as 
well (Judge, 1999; Copus, 2004). For this reason we include the implementation of the 
party (or political movement) program as a fourth part of the councillor role-set. 
The empirical analysis seeks to grasp councillors’ role orientation on two levels. First, it 
addresses the importance attached to the four components of the role-set (i.e. the 
attitudinal level). Subsequently, councillors rate their contribution to the same items (i.e. 
the behavioural level). Scores varied from 0 (no importance/contribution) to 4 (very high 
importance/contribution). For each item Table 6.3 presents the percentages (very) high 
importance/contribution.  
• The path-dependent hypothesis implies that the representative role would prevail in 
the local systems of the Franco type (i.e. France and Belgium), since these are 
basically conceived as the expression of a place-bound local identity. Local systems 
of the North-Middle European type (i.e. the Netherlands), that place more emphasis 
on the functional side of local government, would require more administrative output 
roles. Party politics, an influential but invisible factor in some systems, would 
particularly guide the actions of the local councillors in Belgium and the Netherlands. 
 
• The divergence hypothesis, on the other hand, suggests that the Flemish governance 
culture shifts towards the Dutch model, and Flemish councillors would thus display a 
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more output oriented and functional role orientation than their colleagues in Wallonia. 
The role orientation of the latter would remain similar to the French (and former 
Belgian) style. 
 
• Finally, according to the convergence hypothesis, the mutual differences between the 
countries would decline due to the compelling and universal claims for local 
government to maximize both its democratic and functional capacity. Councillors 
would consequently try to fulfil representation, policy and control in the best possible 
way. Meanwhile, the professionalization of the local office could also enhance the 
impact of political parties across the political systems. 
 
Table 6.3. Role orientation of local councillors in the Netherlands, Flanders, 
Wallonia and France (percent (very) high importance/contribution) 
 General Netherlands Flanders Wallonia France Cramer’s 
V (a) 
Role attitude 
Representation 
(N=1968) 
Policy 
(N=1964) 
Control 
(N=1966) 
Party program 
(N=1954) 
Role behaviour 
Representation 
(N=1982) 
Policy 
(N=1977) 
Control 
(N=1979) 
Party program 
(N=1964) 
 
87.5 
 
81.1 
 
77.6 
 
60.4 
 
 
60.7 
 
40 
 
44.9 
 
44 
 
84.4  
(-3.1) 
96.6  
(+15.5) 
91 
(+13.4) 
71.5  
(+11.1) 
 
50.1  
(-10.6) 
52 
(+12) 
49.7  
(+4.8) 
49.9  
(+5.9) 
 
87.2  
(-0.3) 
77.3  
(-3.8) 
81.1  
(+3.5) 
66.8  
(+6.4) 
 
63.2  
(+2.5) 
22.7  
(-17.3) 
43.3  
(-1.6) 
54.7  
(+10.7) 
 
87.6  
(+0.1) 
68.4  
(-12.7) 
71.4  
(-6.2) 
68.4  
(+8) 
 
59.1  
(-1.6) 
29.7  
(-10.3) 
41.1  
(-3.8) 
41.5  
(-2.5) 
 
91.2  
(+3.7) 
82 
(+0.9) 
66.4  
(-11.2) 
33.7  
(-26.7) 
 
70.9  
(+10.2) 
55.7 
(+15.7) 
45.5  
(+0.6) 
28.8  
(-15.2) 
 
.08 
 
.21 
 
.16 
 
.29 
 
 
.11 
 
.21 
 
.13 
 
.28 
(a) All associations are significant at the .05 level 
 
The analysis of councillors’ role orientation yields a compound conclusion as well. Two 
general converging patterns come to the fore. First, at the attitudinal level, almost every 
councillor acknowledges that he/she should represent the requests and issues from the 
locality in the political arena. Additionally, a large majority of the councillor population 
supports the output roles of their classic role-set as well. Hence, councillors do not 
202  |  CHAPTER 6 
 
distinguish systematically between representation on the input side of their mandate and 
policy/control on the output side. They are convinced of their privileged task as link 
between citizens and government on the one hand, and central actors inside the political 
system on the other. The second convergent pattern is less optimistic though. A large 
portion of the councillors feel that their room for manoeuvre within the contours of this 
classic role-set is quite strongly curtailed in practice. Indeed, at the behavioural level, the 
percentage of respondents who indicate to contribute (very) much to the classic roles 
drops with 20-50% compared to the initial role attitude in each country/region under 
study. The discrepancy between the role attitude and role behaviour in terms of the 
implementation of the party program is less pronounced. 
 
The nuances below this surface, however, show apparent signs of the acclaimed path-
dependent legacy of each local system. The strongest and most eye-catching figure 
underlines the importance of political parties in the Netherlands and Belgium, whilst the 
implementation of the party (or political movement) program is only important for a 
minority of the councillors in France – just as the party was less important in the route to 
their office on beforehand. Besides, the contrasting raison d’être of French and Dutch 
local government is reflected (to some extent) in the role orientation of their councillors 
as well. The analysis shows that French councillors put most emphasis on representation, 
even though they consider policy-making to be an integral part of their job too. Policy 
control is ranked third. On the behavioural level, this order is even more pronounced. It 
confirms the claim that the representational role of French municipalities traditionally 
outweighs its functional counterpart – as the impact of the councillors on the output side 
of the system is largely contained by the mayor anyway. We find a different picture in the 
Netherlands. Albeit councillors rate all three classic roles very high, the overall balance 
leans slightly more towards the output side, and policy-making in particular. This 
complies with the rationale of Dutch local government as a functional service provider, 
and the councillor as its main governor. Nevertheless, this nuance fades away in 
councillors’ perceived behaviour, where the Dutch role system turns out to be the most 
balanced one. Dutch councillors claim to contribute to every role equally. 
For Belgium, we find a different pattern on the attitudinal and behavioural level. The 
hypothesis that Flanders diverges from Wallonia through the adaptation of a more output 
directed and management-oriented governance style applies to councillors’ role attitude 
only, and just to a certain extent. Flemish councillors indeed pay more importance to the 
output roles policy and control than Walloon councillors. Still in both regions, 
representation remains the main focus for the local councillors. Furthermore, Flemish 
councillors do not claim to behave much differently from Walloon councillors in 
practice. In both regions, councillors’ main contribution to the local system lies in 
representing the issues and needs from their community. Such blueprint is typical for 
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countries of the Franco type. Additionally, both Flemish and Walloon councillors fail to 
exert a strong influence on municipal affairs, particularly in terms of local policy 
definition. Given the proportion of councillors that claim to contribute highly to the 
output roles, we might even conclude that the strain on non-executive councillors is 
stronger in Belgium than in the Dutch or French system. Lastly, the implementation of 
the party program appears slightly more important in Flanders than in Wallonia. 
 
6.6. THE CLASSIC POWER TRIANGLE: COUNCILLORS’ SELF-PLACEMENT IN THE 
LOCAL AUTHORITY 
How do councillors assess their influence in the local authority? Probably, councillors’ 
self-placement in the local hierarchy provides the most direct indication of their position 
in the political system within the reach of our survey analysis. To operationalize this 
question, we have built on the work of Mouritzen and Svara (2002). According to these 
authors, the internal organization of the local system takes shape through the structural 
relation of three universal principles: the layman rule (i.e. the effective and intensive 
involvement of elected citizens in decision-making), political leadership (i.e. the political 
steering and inspiration of government) and professionalism (i.e. the expertise and 
strategic thinking in/of the administration). In our research design, each point of the 
power triangle is represented by two items: single councillors and the party groups in the 
council (i.e. the layman rule); the mayor and the executive board (i.e. political 
leadership); the secretary/municipal chief executive officer (CEO) and the heads of 
department in the municipality (i.e. professionalism). We asked our respondents to rate 
the influence of these six actors, independent from the formal procedures in the system, 
on a scale from 0 (no influence) to 4 (very high influence). Table 6.4 shows the 
proportion of respondents that perceive the influence of the actors as (very) high. 
• Our path-dependent hypothesis would label France as the eminent example of the 
strong-mayor type. In such a system, the power balance is in favour of the mayor to 
the detriment of the other actors. The Netherlands and Belgium are (theoretically) 
characterized as a collective type of government in which executive powers are shared 
between the mayor and the executive board. Meanwhile, the layman rule takes a 
prominent place in the local constellation and parties play an important role in 
supporting these laymen. The functional earmark of Dutch municipalities could result 
in a stronger position of the professional administrative branch in local government 
too. The typical political primacy of the Franco countries (i.e. France and Belgium) 
would render their administrative branch more subordinate. 
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• On the other hand, if the divergence hypothesis comes closest to the empirical reality, 
the Flemish system should lean more towards the Dutch collective and functional 
system (i.e. incorporating the collective type with a stronger impact of 
professionalism too) whilst Wallonia would have more in common with the French 
point of reference (i.e. with a stronger personal dominance of the quasi-presidential 
mayor and a more subordinate position of the professional administration). 
 
• Lastly, the dominant governance culture could bear out to support the convergence 
hypothesis as well. This would imply that non-executive councillors hold a 
subordinate position across the different local systems under study. In the complex 
context of twenty-first century government, strong political leadership and a 
professionalized administration would then be indispensable to effectively and 
efficiently manage local affairs. 
 
Table 6.4. Councillors’ perception of the influence of local government actors in 
the Netherlands, Flanders, Wallonia and France (percent (very) high 
influence) 
 General Netherlands Flanders Wallonia France Cramer’s 
V (a) 
Mayor 
(N=1985) 
Executive board 
(N=1951) 
CEO 
(N=1961) 
Heads of 
department 
(N=1949) 
Single 
councillors 
(N=1968) 
Party groups 
(N=1947) 
84.6 
 
77.4 
 
57 
 
40.1 
 
 
17.3 
 
 
34.9 
60.3  
(-24.3) 
94.6  
(+17.2) 
49.8  
(-7.2) 
54.8  
(+14.7) 
 
36.9  
(+19.6) 
 
72.3  
(+37.4) 
91.6  
(+7) 
93.6  
(+16.2) 
67.2  
(+10.2) 
43.3  
(+3.2) 
 
5.3  
(-12) 
 
15.7  
(-19.2) 
88.9  
(+4.3) 
84.6  
(+7.2) 
51 
(-6) 
25.3  
(-14.8) 
 
10.2  
(-7.1) 
 
32.7  
(-2.2) 
98 
(+13.4) 
34.2  
(-43.2) 
59.8  
(+2.8) 
36.1  
(-4) 
 
16.3  
(-1) 
 
17 
(-17.9) 
.34 
 
.39 
 
.13 
 
.15 
 
 
.26 
 
 
.31 
(a) All associations are significant at the .05 level 
 
From Table 6.4 we can infer two broad convergent patterns in the internal organization of 
the political systems again. First, on the most general level, the principle of political 
leadership clearly outweighs professionalism and the layman rule in the city hall, even in 
those countries that are formally organized on a different footing. Second, the position of 
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single councillors poses most problems, as they come across as the weakest actors in the 
local authority by far. In France, the Netherlands, Wallonia and Flanders, only a minority 
of the non-executive councillors feel empowered to exert real influence as individual 
actors. 
Still based on these broad patterns, it would be premature to place the position of the 
local councillors in France, the Netherlands and Belgium on the same level. Indeed, if we 
look at the further inter and intra-country differences, the local hierarchies exhibit clear 
and strong patterns of path-dependency again. France and the Netherlands largely 
correspond to the theoretical picture painted at the outset. For France, the results confirm 
the classic stereotype of municipalities that are headed, even dominated, by a strong 
mayor. According to the councillors, the latter overshadows all other actors in local 
government. The CEO ranks second but in practice, he/she tends to work in close 
harmony with the municipal monarch too. The impact of the executive board and the 
heads of department is less pronounced, but still considered as high by one third of the 
councillors (and also these collective bodies fall under the auspices of the mayor). Local 
councillors turn out to be the main victims of this system. They feel as if they are minor 
players in the local authority, both on the individual plan and in the collective sphere of 
the party group. In the Netherlands, we find the most equilibrated local system again. 
Results validate the Dutch system in its conception as an entity of collective decision-
making. If the French political and administrative leaders outweigh their collective 
counterparts, the latter are deemed more influential in the Dutch power triangle. The 
executive board is the most powerful actor according to the majority of the councillors, 
but not in an all-embracing way. The mayor, who is not an elected politician, seems less 
dominant than in the other countries. Furthermore, the most striking result is the 
perceived influence of the local councillors. Particularly in the ranks of their party group, 
Dutch councillors feel that they can gain control over local affairs. The layman rule even 
exceeds professionalism in terms of the acclaimed influence in the local authority. For 
single councillors this is less the case. Still even here, Dutch councillors are far more 
optimistic about their individual impact than councillors from France and Belgium. 
Finally, the functional device of local government in the Netherlands does not seem to 
grant excessive powers to its administrative branch – even though half of the Dutch 
councillors reckon that the municipal CEO and the heads of department have (very) much 
influence in the local system. 
The results for the Belgian system are remarkable too. Despite the formal conception of 
Belgian local government as a collective form based on the layman rule, non-executive 
councillors feel outplayed by the political leaders on the local stage. This anomaly arises 
both in Flanders and Wallonia, reflecting their common Belgian legacy. In fact, 
councillors feel that both the mayor and the executive board have the strongest say in 
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local government on both sides of the language border. The professional branch of local 
government comes next in the power hierarchy. Particularly the CEO is often considered 
as an important figure in the municipality. The most striking corollary is found in the 
devaluation of the council, and the single councillors in particular. In Belgium, the latter 
appear to be side-lined even more than in France – a system that seems explicitly 
designed to produce a strong mayor (see Kerrouche, 2005). On the other hand, we do 
perceive some divergence between the regions within this broad picture as well. In 
Flanders, the anomaly of the inverted power relation seems even worse than in Wallonia. 
Walloon councillors, for instance, estimate the power of political leadership (slightly) 
less overwhelming than Flemish councillors. Accordingly, the Walloon system seems not 
quasi-presidential, even though councillors in Wallonia are more inclined to think that the 
mayor dominates the executive. Furthermore, single councillors and, above all, the party 
groups are deemed more influential in Wallonia. We could interpret this as a signal of 
stronger political primacy. It is also likely that councillors’ constructive motion of 
distrust, which Flemish councillors have to do without, proves an effective instrument for 
that purpose. The Flemish system, on the other hand, exhibits more signs of a functional 
culture, underpinned by the stronger impact of the professional administrative branch. 
 
6.7. COUNCILLORS, CITIZENS AND CITIZEN PARTICIPATION 
The next part of our analysis tackles the relation between councillors and citizens. On the 
most formal level, this relation is evaluated over a fixed period of time via free and 
democratic elections. Through these elections citizens pass their authority on to a 
selection of commons who will run the municipality on their behalf. Yet more and more 
the awareness has grown that these elected representatives should also carefully maintain 
their relation with the citizens throughout the legislature (Alonso et al., 2011). 
Consequently, councillors should constantly inform and communicate with the locality 
during their time in office (Klausen & Sweeting, 2005; Benz & Papadopoulos, 2006). 
Such contacts would, then, provide the opportunity for councillors to pick up input from 
the community. They are also the perfect opportunity to give feedback of local policies to 
the citizens. Over and above the typical relation between citizens and councillors in this 
representative setting, many local democracies seek for new and stronger ways to 
actively involve citizens in the political system in order to enhance its democratic quality 
(Daemen & Schaap, 2000; Delwit et al., 2007). Many authors believe that councillors 
will therefore have to assume a new role as mediator in participatory processes in the 
future (Borraz & Le Galès, 2005; Denters et al., 2005; Plees, 2005; Drouin, 2006). This 
role should help to preserve the harmony between the representative setting and its 
participatory complement. 
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Table 6.5 analyzes both sides of the coin. First, it pictures councillors’ relations with 
citizens in the representative setting, either by informal contacts (as a councillor) on a 
weekly basis or formal public meetings and/or debates25. Thereafter, it outlines 
councillors’ principal support for the participative model26, as well as their support for 
specific participatory practices that are ranked in terms of their descending impact on the 
policy process (i.e. decision, co-production, advice, consultation and information). 
• The path-dependent hypothesis suggests more intensive contacts between councillors 
and citizens in the Franco system (i.e. France and Belgium), but, simultaneously, 
more reluctance towards active citizen involvement in it as well. The typical inward-
looking governance culture of the Netherlands would result in less frequent contacts 
between representatives and represented. This North-Middle European style, on the 
other hand, would be more receptive towards citizen participation. 
 
• According to the divergence hypothesis, Wallonia would remain illustrative of the 
Franco style, but Flanders would bear more characteristics of the Dutch model (e.g. 
due to the more radical provisions for citizen participation or the functional rationale 
of the Municipal Decree). 
 
• Finally, the convergence hypothesis expects the differences between the different 
systems to have declined. For instance, Dutch efforts in the wake of the Dualism Act 
sought to bring elected representatives closer to the citizens too. And even though 
citizen participation is introduced (to some extent) in all countries/regions under 
study, it is still the representative variant that remains the dominant, hence perhaps 
preferred, model of local democracy in the countries across our comparative design. 
 
  
                                                             
25 The table shows the percentage of councillors who have weekly contacts with citizens, as well as the 
percentage of councillors who spend at least 20% of their total time in office on public debates and 
meetings with citizens (in relation to other activities as a councillor such as council/committee meetings, 
desk work, party meetings, meetings with the local administration and field visits to local institutions). 
26 This principle was captured by the quote: “citizens should participate actively and directly in making 
local decisions”; the table shows the percentages of (very) high support for the quote. 
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Table 6.5. Councillors’ relation with citizens in the Netherlands, Flanders, 
Wallonia and France (in percentages) 
 General Netherlands Flanders Wallonia France Cramer’s 
V (a) 
Citizen contact 
Individual contacts on 
weekly base 
(N=1971) 
Public debates/meetings 
(at least 20% of mandate) 
(N=1811) 
Participation principle 
Active/direct participation 
(N=1974) 
Participation practice 
Binding referenda 
(N=1926) 
Co-decision 
(N=1957) 
Advisory referenda 
(N=1940) 
Consultation 
(N=1973) 
Survey 
(N=1964) 
 
39.2 
 
 
11.3 
 
 
 
50.5 
 
 
33.6 
 
40.9 
 
55.7 
 
78.6 
 
59.8 
 
47 
(+7.8) 
 
10.3  
(-1) 
 
 
41.8  
(-8.7) 
 
25.4  
(-8.2) 
26.3  
(-14.6) 
37.9  
(-17.8) 
93.4  
(+14.8) 
61.8  
(+2) 
 
30.6  
(-8.6) 
 
5.1  
(-6.2) 
 
 
43.3  
(-7.2) 
 
31.5  
(-2.1) 
39.7  
(-1.2) 
45.2  
(-10.5) 
73.4  
(-5.2) 
54 
(-5.8) 
 
48.4 
(+9.2) 
 
12.5 
(+1.2) 
 
 
48.4  
(-2.1) 
 
49.4 
(+15.8) 
57.2 
(+16.3) 
63.9 
(+8.2) 
70.7  
(-7.9) 
68.4 
(+8.6) 
 
30.4  
(-8.8) 
 
17.4 
(+6.1) 
 
 
68.6 
(+18.1) 
 
28.9  
(-4.7) 
41.1 
(+0.2) 
76.6 
(+20.9) 
76.6  
(-2) 
55.2  
(-4.6) 
 
.13 
 
 
.13 
 
 
 
.16 
 
 
.20 
 
.20 
 
.21 
 
.21 
 
.09 
(a) All associations are significant at the .05 level 
 
First, if we consider councillors’ contact with citizens in the traditional representative 
setting, we notice divergent results for the councillors from Flanders and Wallonia. The 
results bear out the initial hypothesis. Both on the formal and informal plan, Walloon 
councillors seem to maintain closer relations with their grassroots than Flemish 
councillors. This might reflect a more outward-looking perspective that is typical of the 
Southern or Franco government style. Yet on the other hand, the results for France and 
the Netherlands do not endorse the typical path-dependent pattern for these reference 
countries. More Dutch than French councillors even claim to have frequent informal 
contacts with citizens. The latter, for their part, spend more time on formal(ized) contacts 
with citizens in public debates and/or meetings. This result proves that Dutch councillors 
no longer consider themselves as the archetypical inward-looking regents of their 
municipality. Nevertheless, a convergent pattern across our countries/regions is that 
despite councillors’ preferences for the representational role, many local councillors 
spend only a limited fraction of their mandate to formal contacts with the local 
community. The percentage of respondents who meet with citizens on a weekly basis in 
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their official capacity as a councillor is not that large either27. Consequently, councillors 
do not claim to rely systematically and frequently on the input from the citizens they 
ought to represent in order to fulfil their mandates. Perhaps, this could imply that the 
complexity of the office calls for a rather inward-looking perspective generally. 
Second, which patterns emerge from the analysis of councillors’ support for the more 
active inclusion of citizens in decision-making? In every country/region, at least 40% of 
the councillors (strongly) agree with the general principle that citizens should somehow 
participate actively and directly in the process of local decision-making. Moreover, 
regarding the specific participative practices, the overall hierarchy converges between the 
countries and regions as well. At the lowest rank of our participation ladder, a majority of 
the councillors endorse frequent surveys to monitor the local public opinion. Moving up 
one rank from information to consultation, even more councillors support citizen 
consultation procedures, where citizens are informed about and can support or criticize 
municipal proposals. From then on, however, councillors’ enthusiasm clearly decreases 
with every step on the ladder, moving from citizen advice over co-production (i.e. co-
decisions procedures) to the ultimate step of decision-making. In fact, a majority of the 
councillors still seems reluctant to actually share their ultimate decision-making power – 
which is already curtailed inside the local authority – with actors outside the city hall. 
Nevertheless, there are clear differences in support for the principle and the practices of 
citizen participation between the countries and regions again. Perhaps surprisingly, 
Walloon councillors turn out to be stronger advocates of participatory democracy at the 
local level than Flemish councillors. A possible explanation is that in the aftermath of a 
series of political scandals, public distrust had risen much stronger in Wallonia than in 
Flanders (Pilet, 2008). Engaging citizens in the policy process could be seen as the 
appropriate way to enhance the democratic quality of local government then. 
Furthermore, and opposed to the theoretical claim, French councillors declare to be 
stronger champions of active citizen participation than Dutch councillors. The latter 
appear to have a clear preference for the representative model in which councillors form 
the link between citizens and governance. They maintain frequent contacts with citizens 
whilst showing strong support for public information and consultation at the lowest sports 
of the participation ladder. But from this point onwards, they prefer to transmit the input 
into policy decisions personally, as shown by their scepticism or reserve towards binding 
referenda or co-decision procedures. 
 
  
                                                             
27 Obviously, this does not exclude informal contacts with citizens outside this formal capacity (e.g. in the 
associational life of the municipality). 
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6.8. COUNCILLORS’ FUTURE POLITICAL AMBITIONS AND TURNOVER MOTIVES 
The final part of our analysis deals with the question: ‘How do local councillors envisage 
their political future at the end of their current mandate?’ Bearing the above insights in 
mind, do councillors intend to leave the political stage disillusioned (- and if so, for 
which reasons), or are they looking forward to an encore? To answer this question Table 
6.6 presents an overview of the classic political ambitions (see Schlesinger, 1966): 
discrete ambitions (i.e. quit politics), static ambitions (i.e. continue as a councillor) and 
progressive ambitions (i.e. continue in a higher political office at the local level and/or 
continue in a higher political office at another political level). Additionally, Table 6.6 
lists a number of possible exit motives that explicitly relate to (the stress on) councillors’ 
roles and positions: a lack of influence, a lack of time or the accomplishment of one’s 
duty towards the local community28. 
• With regard to these analyses, the path-dependent hypothesis suggests that 
professionalized local systems (e.g. the Netherlands) foster long(er) and more stable 
careers. A lack of time could be the most plausible exit motive in such systems, given 
the high functional demands and the required personal investments from the 
councillors. In systems that are theoretically underpinned by the earmark of 
community representation (i.e. France and Belgium), discrete ambitions and the 
motive ‘accomplishment of one’s citizen duty’ could occur more readily. Lastly, a 
lack of influence would be mentioned more as a possible exit motive in the strong-
mayor system (i.e. France) – where the layman rule is accommodated to political 
leadership – than in its collective counterpart (i.e. the Netherlands and Belgium). 
 
• According to the divergence hypothesis, Flemish councillors would lean more 
towards the theoretical expectations for the Dutch councillors (e.g. by the stronger 
emphasis on professionalization and functional demands). Walloon councillors would 
stay closer to the acclaimed French model (e.g. resembling the typical layman-
archetype). 
 
• Finally, the convergence hypothesis suggests that many councillors could intend to 
leave the political stage due to their perceived lack of influence in the local system, 
caused by universal trends in the local context. On the other hand, the broad trend 
towards professionalization might spur longer and stable careers in the local office. 
 
                                                             
28 ‘Future ambitions’ is one variable that consists of four categories, represented in Table 6.6. 
Additionally, councillors who indicated that they considered leaving office, could thick several of the 
‘turnover reasons’ listed in Table 6.6. Other possible turnover reasons that are not included in the table 
were ‘age’ and ‘removal from the municipality’. 
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Table 6.6. Councillors’ future ambitions in the Netherlands, Flanders, Wallonia  
and France (in percentages) 
 General Netherlands Flanders Wallonia France Cramer’s 
V (a) 
Future ambitions 
(N=1835) 
Discrete 
 
Static 
 
Progressive local 
 
Progressive other 
 
Turnover reason 
Lack of influence 
(N=526) 
Citizen duty 
accomplished 
(N=577) 
Lack of time 
(N=567) 
 
 
28.7 
 
42.1 
 
24.7 
 
4.5 
 
 
31.6 
 
60.4 
 
 
47.8 
 
 
32.3  
(+3.6) 
43.2  
(+1.1) 
20 
(-4.7) 
4.5  
(=) 
 
17.3  
(-14.3) 
42.7  
(-17.7) 
 
51.6  
(+3.8) 
 
 
21.7  
(-7) 
46 
(+3.9) 
27.7  
(+3) 
4.6  
(+0.1) 
 
45.3  
(+13.7) 
56.3  
(-4.1) 
 
50 
(+2.2) 
 
 
31.9  
(+3.2) 
36.3  
(-5.8) 
28.5  
(+3.8) 
3.3  
(-1.2) 
 
50 
(+18.4) 
95.2  
(+34.8) 
 
30 
(-17.8) 
 
 
28.4  
(-0.3) 
42.9  
(+0.8) 
23.2  
(-1.5) 
5.5  
(+1) 
 
36.9  
(+5.3) 
65.5  
(+5.1) 
 
52.3  
(+4.5) 
.07 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
.29 
 
.39 
 
 
.17 
(a) All associations are significant at the .05 level 
 
At first sight, the differences in the future political ambitions of French, Dutch and 
Belgian councillors are trivial, and the overall pattern is thus convergent. Most non-
executive councillors simply wish to renew their mandate – although nearly 30% express 
the intention to leave office after the current mandate as well (in Belgium, more Flemish 
councillors intend to continue their office while more Walloon councillors intend to 
leave). Moreover, a considerable part of the respondents also aim for higher office at the 
local level as an alderman or mayor, even if such career motive did not spur their political 
motivations initially. Perhaps, councillors’ experiences in office lead them to realize that 
in order to stand one’s ground in the local authority, a councillor should move to the 
higher echelons of the local system. This pattern occurs slightly more in both Belgian 
regions – where non-executive councillors feel they indeed have the least influence in the 
system. Hence, we cannot confirm the claim that limited impact results in more turnover 
straightforwardly. Lastly, the proportion of non-executive councillors that aim for higher 
office at the regional or national/federal level is minimal. Few layman-politicians thus 
purposively use their local mandate as a steppingstone towards a political career on the 
supra-local level. This is also the case in those countries where multiple office-holding is 
allowed and common practice (i.e. Belgium and France). 
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If we look at the possible exit reasons, the differences between the regions and countries 
are much larger. The differences between France and the Netherlands basically 
correspond to the expectations of our path-dependent hypothesis. In the French system, 
marked by the weak position of the councillors vis-à-vis the mayor and the interpretation 
of the office as a layman’s affair, councillors mention the lack of influence and, above all, 
the accomplishment of one’s citizen duty more often as a possible turnover motive. 
Additionally, a lack of time also frequently contributes to the possible exit of many 
councillors. In the Netherlands, where councillors have more impact in the local system 
and the professionalization of the office is more apparent, a lack of influence and citizen 
duty are mentioned less as possible exit motives. The time investment that the office 
requires is more decisive for Dutch councillors when quitting the council. 
Finally, what about the Belgian regions? As it was the case in the previous analyses, the 
figures in the table point to some path-dependent and divergent patterns. Their 
subordinate position in the local authority is very likely to explain the relatively high 
number of Flemish and Walloon councillors who mention a lack of influence as possible 
turnover motive. Yet the distribution of response for the other motives could underline a 
different approach to the office too. Walloon councillors (intend to) quit more often 
because they feel they have accomplished their duty towards the local community. Like 
in France, such typical layman motive already triggered their candidacy (more) in the 
first place. For local councillors in Flanders, a lack of time is mentioned more often as a 
possible reason to leave the council. 
 
6.9. CONCLUSION 
Should we tell the story of contemporary sub-national politics in Belgium as a tale of 
regional divergence? Ever since the federalization process and the formal regionalization 
of local government in particular, this question has come to figure prominently on the 
agenda of Belgian political science. Its main hypothesis holds that Flanders would shift 
towards the Northern (or North-Middle European) governance style that is typical of the 
Dutch neighbour. Wallonia would shift more to the Southern (or Franco) style, claimed to 
characterize local government in France. To oppose this hypothesis, one could also 
imagine that Flanders and Wallonia still bear more signs of their common Belgian path-
dependent legacy, however. This chapter has been devoted to this contraposition. It has 
applied both fundamental research hypotheses to the role and position of non-executive 
local councillors in the twenty-first century – a subject that has been discussed with much 
scepticism in the academic literature lately. In order to verify the basic hypotheses and 
interpret the differences between both regions more profoundly, we have compared 
councillors from Flanders and Wallonia regarding their acclaimed reference points, i.e. 
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councillors from the Netherlands and France. This comparative approach also introduced 
a third fundamental research hypothesis. It states that the local systems in contemporary 
European local governance have rather converged, moving beyond traditional styles and 
typologies. 
We have tested the three basic research hypotheses in an actor-centred and empirical 
way. On the basis of standardized cross-sectional survey data from a uniform urban 
setting, we systematically compared the notion of Flemish, Walloon, Dutch and French 
non-executive local councillors on their role and position in the local system. The 
analysis incorporated different aspects of the life as a councillor: the recruitment process 
to the council, the general role orientation in office, the self-placement in the local 
hierarchy, the relation with citizens and citizen participation and, lastly, the future 
political ambitions and turnover reasons. We can summarize our conclusions in three 
broad categories. 
On the most general level, the patterns often converge across the countries and regions 
under study. First and foremost, councillors acknowledge that they are not protagonists 
on the local scene. They systematically place political leaders at the helm of their local 
government and rank themselves as the least influential actors. Besides, the fundamental 
discrepancy between the importance that councillors pay to their role and the way in 
which they (are able to) implement it, adds to the image of the councillor as a subordinate 
actor in the political system. Non-executive councillors are not always very enthusiastic 
to open up the policy-making process for non-elected citizens as real decision-makers 
either. Furthermore, the complex and challenging interpretation of the modern office 
leaves its marks on the pathway to and in the council as well. Both pre-council and in-
council experience show strong signs of professionalization. As such, the intake of local 
citizens with a selective personal background (further) reduces the diversity of the 
councils. And afterwards, councillors do not particularly appear to communicate on a 
very frequent basis with their grassroots in their formal capacity either. 
On a more positive note, we have noticed that clear signs of lay politics persist across the 
systems as well. For most councillors, the task as representative of the locality remains 
the cornerstone of their political mandate. And to fulfil this task most councillors are in 
favour of using citizen consultation schemes. Councillors do not principally distinguish 
between the representative task and the output side of their mandate as governor of local 
affairs either. Furthermore, in the preceding recruitment process, the inclusion in the 
associational life remains a prerequisite for council work while few councillors enter the 
council with a clear professional career plan in mind already. Finally at the curtain call, it 
does not seem as though the possible frustration about the lack of impact leads 
councillors to renounce their faith in the office completely. A considerable portion of the 
councillor population seeks re-election, or even promotion to a higher local office. 
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Meanwhile, the lack of influence is not mentioned as the most important turnover motive 
either. Accordingly, the following quote on French councillors might aptly convey the 
current role and position of local councillors in the political system: “Admittedly as 
second-class actors but also as privileged observers, they learn how democracy works 
from within. As such, they play an irreplaceable role in promoting and, hopefully, 
renovating the latter, and so they will keep doing” (Drouin, 2006: 207, translated quote 
from French). This is why council work could remain the most exciting and versatile 
hobby in the end, even if not every councillor would agree (Tops & Zouridis, 2002). 
Underneath this general converging surface, however, we also find clear patterns of path-
dependency in each particular country setting. They stem as much from informal and 
cultural customs as from formal local rules. The strongest difference is found between the 
roles of political parties. In the Netherlands and Belgium, parties are clearly more 
important than in France. The parties cross-cut the entire pre-council and in-council 
experience in both countries. This influence ranges from motivating, selecting and 
supporting candidates to the development of political attitudes and behaviour in office 
whilst empowering councillors in their party group – even though Belgian parties are 
clearly less successful on this final point29. 
Further, results for France and the Netherlands largely correspond to the theoretical 
expectations. The French Southern culture of communitarianism is reflected in the 
preference of its councillors for the representative role and a recruitment path that has 
more in common with the neutral and open layman-type. In fact, French councils count 
more women and members from foreign descent. Their councillors were more often 
inspired by citizen duty and supported by the associational life. When they intend to 
leave office, this is often because councillors feel they have fulfilled their citizen duty. 
Yet from a comparative perspective, the lack of influence is a regular exit motive too. 
Indeed, French councillors acknowledge that their political system is a strong-mayor 
type. This system seems largely dominated by a powerful mayor, and a CEO who works 
in close harmony with the municipal monarch. Lastly, and perhaps surprisingly, French 
councillors tend to endorse citizen participation more than on average. 
                                                             
29 We could probably consider this to be one of the effects of the dualistic political system in the 
Netherlands. In Appendix F, we further specify the differences in the performances of the party groups 
(Table 6.6 and Table 6.7). The analyses clearly indicate that Dutch party groups have more emancipatory 
potential. They are nearly always led by a co-operative leader. And even though the party groups are 
influenced by the local party, they often succeed in exerting influence on this party too. Not surprisingly, 
most Dutch councillors feel that they should follow their own opinions when they have to cast their votes 
in the council (and their opinions deviate from the official party line). This is less the case in Belgium. 
Fewer party groups are led by a co-operative leader. Furthermore in Flanders, councillors are more 
inclined to vote according to the party line in the event of conflicting views. In Wallonia, the party group 
seems less independent from (and influential vis-à-vis) the local party organization. 
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Many figures on the Dutch councillors are in line with the path-dependent theory as well. 
Accordingly, the Dutch system often contrasts with the French system. Dutch councillors 
seem more professionalized in order to assume their functional role in local government. 
They have the most selective social profile and a (slight) preference for the output side of 
their mandate – even though they keep close contacts with citizens to gather the 
necessary policy input also. A lack of time is their most common exit motive. 
Meanwhile, both formal-structural (e.g. the Dualism Act) and informal-cultural rules (e.g. 
the organization of the party groups) are likely explanations behind the fact that Dutch 
councillors place themselves higher in the local hierarchy. They characterize the Dutch 
system as a collective type in which the impact of collective actors (i.e. the executive 
board, the heads of department, the party groups) outweighs the impact of single figures 
such as the mayor, the CEO or the councillors. Lastly, citizen duty and the lack of 
influence are mentioned less as possible exit motives in the Netherlands. 
In comparison with these two reference countries, the results for the local councillors in 
Flanders and Wallonia bear out many similarities. The key role of political parties as 
focal point was mentioned before. Further, councillors on both sides of the language 
border claim to fulfil their role analogously. Indeed, the Southern culture results in the 
dominance of the representative input role whilst the discrepancy between role attitude 
and role behaviour is substantial amongst both groups. It is not surprising that councillors 
subsequently depict their place in the local constellation as inferior to the professionals 
and, above all, the political leaders. This pattern is even stronger than in France. There is 
a fair chance that such subordination is partly caused by the dominant position of the 
executives in the political parties as well. But above all, it shows that the functioning of a 
local system in practice might differ substantially and systematically from its theoretical 
conception. This is perhaps why the lack of influence is mentioned more often by the 
Belgian councillors as a potential exit motive at the end of their mandate. 
Nevertheless on the third and most detailed level, our conclusions bring some nuances 
and divergences between Flanders and Wallonia to the surface. Basically, these seem to 
support the claim that the Flemish region adopts a more functional and professional 
approach to local government indeed, whilst Wallonia has more in common with the 
French system. Flemish councillors place more emphasis on their administrative output 
roles. They are also under the impression that the professional administrative branch of 
local government has more influence than in Wallonia and mention a lack of time more 
often as a possible exit motive. Flemish councillors even feel more powerless than their 
colleagues across the language border. In Wallonia, more signs of the typical 
communitarianism persist. Citizen duty matters more to enter and leave the council for 
instance. Walloon councillors keep closer informal and formal contacts with the citizens 
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of their locality as well. And lastly, they seem stronger advocates of the principal and 
practical involvement of citizens in local decision-making. 
In summary, our analysis has thus demonstrated that in terms of councillors’ role and 
position, there is some degree of internal differentiation in the political system of the 
Belgian state. Yet simultaneously, the international comparative approach has allowed us 
to present these results in a wider perspective. Compared to the Netherlands and France, 
the Belgian regions still have many characteristics in common. Moreover, many facets of 
councillors’ roles and positions are even convergent across traditional state boundaries 
and typical government traditions nowadays. Follow-up research could now help to 
further grasp and frame the range of these patterns over the long haul. Besides, 
complementary research could also widen our perspective by (a) including councillors 
from municipalities below the 10.000-threshold, (b) testing our insights in different 
settings via qualitative in-depth analyses and (c) scrutinizing new actors or domains of 
the political system. 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 7 
GENERAL CONCLUSION 
 
 
7.1. RESEARCH GOAL, STRATEGY AND OUTLINE 
In his book on elected representatives in French municipalities, Drouin (2006: 5) refers to 
the local councillors as the “Fantassins de la République”, the infantrymen or foot 
soldiers of the republic. The place of these councillors in the French political system is 
quite paradoxical. Usually well-known to the electorate, they are largely neglected as 
political actors. When journalists, scientists or politicians mention the extraordinary 
figure of the 500.000 French local councillors, it is usually to immediately turn their 
attention to the top 7% among them, namely the mayors. According to the author, the 
army of local councillors is therefore comprised of infantrymen that are of little interest 
to their general command. 
To a large extent, this metaphor also seems valid in the context of Belgian local 
democracy. Local councillors form the largest group of elected politicians in the Belgian 
political system by far. Given the small scale of municipal politics, councillors are 
typically firmly rooted in, and familiar with, their locality. Nevertheless, few people are 
truly aware of the role and position of these citizen-politicians in the local authority – as 
they are often outshined by the mayor and the aldermen too. Meanwhile, political science 
has also overlooked these infantrymen of the Belgian state for some time. 
During the past decade, however, things have cautiously started to change around. 
Central government, in the capacity of local governments’ general command, has 
initiated a wave of reforms that has sought to empower local councils and local 
councillors as the bedrock and key actors of the local system. This formal policy line 
was, and still is, accompanied by an emerging debate on the role and position of local 
councillors in academic circles. The starting point of this debate is the theoretical notion 
of councillors as the foundation of local democracy. In the representative local system, 
councillors personify the democratic rule of the people, bearing the responsibility to 
convey citizens’ input in optimal policy output in a transparent and accountable manner. 
In doing so, councillors form the dominant institution of the local authority. Yet many 
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scholars feel that stress might have rendered local councillors mere fragments of current 
local democracy. Within the Belgian setting, this stress stems from causes that include 
some ingrained obstacles of the political system (e.g. the need to reconcile the outward-
looking part of the councillor office with its inward-oriented complement), the informal 
rules of the game (e.g. party discipline and the supremacy of the executive branch) and 
recent evolutions in the environment of the political system (e.g. demand overload, 
output failures, decreasing public support, adaptation of the local regime through 
professionalization and the evolution towards local governance, etc.). 
Prompted by the problem of the friction between these perspectives, the goal of our study 
has been to shed an empirical light on the role and position of local councillors in the 
political system in Belgium. The fundamental research question thereby reads: ‘Should 
we consider Belgian local councillors as the foundation of local democracy, or rather as 
a fragment of it?’ In the introductory chapter (Chapter 1) and the methodological chapter 
(Chapter 2), we have indicated that it is impossible to answer such a question with a 
simple yes or no. This is why our fundamental research question has been operationalized 
in several thematic analyses that have entailed different applied research questions. These 
thematic analyses are:  
• councillors’ political recruitment process and political career (Chapter 3),  
• councillors’ classic role orientation (Chapter 4),  
• councillors’ interpretation of their mandate as elected representative of the locality 
(Chapter 5) and  
• councillors’ role and position placed in a broader, international comparative frame 
(Chapter 6).  
Every theme contributed some particular pieces to the general puzzle, helping to arrive at 
a balanced and multifaceted answer to our fundamental research question. 
To achieve this goal, we have chosen to conduct our research on a quantitative, cross-
sectional and actor-centred basis via descriptive and explanatory analysis. This implies 
that we have focussed directly on the current population of Belgian local councillors as 
prime subjects of interest. In 2008, we requested a selection of councillors, including 
aldermen and mayors who theoretically remain councillors too, to answer a standard mail 
questionnaire. This selection represents the Belgian municipal landscape in terms of 
region, size and socio-economic profile. Councillors could fill in and return the 
questionnaire anonymously. Despite a rather disappointing response rate and a slight 
over-representation of Flemish councillors and councillors from larger municipalities in 
our final data set, we have managed to assemble valid empirical data from 856 cases. 
This figure equals 1/16 of the total councillor population in the country while covering 
approximately 30% of all Belgian municipalities. 
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The questions in the survey deal with a wide range of topics. Per research theme, such 
broad pallet has enabled us to take many facets of the political system into account, such 
as councillors’ personal opinions, personal characteristics, contact patterns, elements of 
the political culture, structural features, the role of political parties and the surrounding 
environment of Belgian local government. In doing so, we have been able to examine 
councillors’ role and position from a new institutional perspective. This perspective 
reckons with both formal and informal rules of the political regime, as well as with its 
wider opportunity structure. 
This conclusive chapter forms the seventh and final phase of our research cycle. It 
generalizes the results of the study in three steps. First, the chapter summarizes the 
thematic conclusions, discerns transversal patterns and interprets them in light of our 
research problem and fundamental research question. Then, it links these conclusions to 
the normative soil of the debate on local councillors that underpins the research. Which 
implications do our empirical insights yield in response to the initial research problem 
and the discussion on councillors’ role and position in the Belgian local system more 
generally? Which future perspectives might seem plausible and/or viable with regard to 
councillors’ role and position to obtain a local system that functions both democratically, 
transparently and efficiently? Finally, we discuss the implications of our study for the 
scientific state of the art. What are the main merits of our study, but above all: How could 
or should further empirical research proceed from here? Which new research cycles could 
originate from ours? 
 
7.2. THEMATIC AND TRANSVERSAL CONCLUSIONS 
In the first step of our conclusion, we will tackle the four operational themes of the study. 
Per theme, we outline the relation to our fundamental research problem, and we assemble 
and interpret the different insights from the applied research questions. Subsequently, we 
will discern some transversal patterns that cut across these analyses and blend them 
together in a general response to our fundamental research question. 
 
7.2.1. Professionalization in political recruitment and career: necessary asymmetry or 
undemocratic imbalance? 
The first theme has tackled councillors’ recruitment path to the council and their career 
development once they had been elected. Both components were analyzed in terms of 
their degree of professionalization. Professionalization is often defended as a practical 
tool for the political system to cope with its increasing demands and overcome output 
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failures in a complex environment. The concept refers to the growing importance of (a) 
personal skills (i.e. the personal or intellectual component) and party ties and incentives 
(i.e. the political component) in the recruitment process; as well as (b) a political career 
marked by comprehensive time dedication and multiple office-holding (i.e. the focus), 
extensive experience and strong ambitions (i.e. the perspective). The growing number of 
professionalized councillors is then claimed to be no more than a necessary asymmetry in 
the council, but also between the council and its community, needed to efficiently run the 
political system of the municipality. 
Opponents of this view, however, argue that professionalization creates an undemocratic 
balance. The symbolic and normative side of this argument states that in our 
representative democracies, the political regime is based on equality and openness, not on 
selectivity and isolation. Professionalized representatives would enhance the gap between 
citizens and politics, challenge the core principles of the system (e.g. amateurism, 
equality) and, therefore, accelerate its loss of public support. Additionally, the functional 
side of the argument holds that the typical lay politicians, who are (more) grounded in 
their locality, have far better chances of picking up signals from the community on the 
input side of the system, and convert these signals into corresponding policies on the 
output side. 
The aim of our analysis has not been to settle this debate from a normative perspective, 
but to apply it to the current degree of professionalization in the recruitment (ARQ1) and 
career (ARQ2) of the councillors in the Belgian local system. Additionally, we have 
verified whether both aspects of professionalization relate in a path-dependent way 
(ARQ3). Regarding professionalization in the recruitment process, the result was 
ambiguous. Typical recruitment bias (e.g. gender, age, roots) have remained in place – 
even though this trend goes slightly downwards over an extended period of time. 
Additionally, personal/intellectual and political professionalization are apparent. This 
could confirm the claim that the political system has indeed adapted itself to cope with 
the increasing demands in a complex environment. Taken together, the Belgian 
councillor population thus definitely do not form a representative cross-section of the 
locality. On the other hand, typical layman characteristics (e.g. the inclusion in the local 
community, initial motivations) are still very important in the process. At least initially, 
councillors have enough channels and incentives to pick up and voice signals from 
society in the political system. And while the impact of the political party rather adds to 
the classic stereotypes in recruitment, personal/intellectual professionalization could also 
emancipate less privileged groups to move to the political office. 
Subsequently, what about councillors’ career in office? The large majority of Belgian 
councillors still fulfil their mandate as typical laymen in terms of career focus and 
duration, even though future ambitions tend towards the professional type. Accordingly, 
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the council does not seem to create a sphere strictly separate and exclusive from society. 
Yet simultaneously, the principle of equality in the council might already have become 
obsolete. Indeed, a group of councillors hold office in a rather professional way both in 
terms of career focus and perspective. These professionalized office-holders are not 
always the products of a professionalized route to the council, however. The part of the 
career that is exclusively local (i.e. the time dedication and incumbency), is mainly 
determined by the general opportunity structure of the Belgian local system and 
councillors’ personal characteristics. The part of the career that exceeds the local system 
(i.e. multiple office-holding and future ambitions), on the other hand, is stimulated by a 
professional route to the council beforehand. Meanwhile, above all councillors who move 
(or had moved) to the executive functions in the council develop a professional career in 
office. Because this group tends to benefit more from classic recruitment bias and 
professionalization in recruitment as well, we could understand this result as an 
indication of a strong imbalance in the Belgian local system. 
 
7.2.2. Role orientation: foundation or fragment of local democracy? 
The second thematic chapter has addressed the classic role orientation of the Belgian 
councillors. The classic role-set consists of representation on the input side of the system 
and policy and control on the output side. From inside the core of the local system, 
councillors’ role fulfilment should theoretically and formally contribute to its democratic 
and efficient performance. Consequently, every councillor holds the principal 
responsibility to convert community needs and demands into congruent policy outputs. 
We have analyzed councillors’ self-reported role attitude (ARQ4) and role behaviour 
(ARQ5), as well as the discrepancy between both (ARQ6). Subsequently, we have 
ascertained the determinants of this role orientation (ARQ7). 
First, the analysis has shown that Belgian local councillors generally recognize the 
importance of their triple role-set. In line with the typical image of the councillor as an 
elected layman-politician, Belgian councillors conceive their mandate above all as a 
means to represent the demands from the locality in the political arena. Additionally, the 
articulation of the strategic goals of the municipal policy and the control on its 
implementation afterwards are deemed quite important as well. Councillors are thus well 
aware of their important role as engine of the political system that conveys public input 
into congruent policy output. As such, there is at least a broadly supported basis in place 
whereupon a democratic and vigorous local system might lean. The variation in 
councillors’ role attitude is mainly determined by councillors’ experience (i.e. 
experienced councillors tending to endorse their role-set slightly more), region (i.e. 
Flemish councillors adopting a more output oriented perspective) and the informal rules 
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of the game. While councillors from the political majority particularly support their role 
as policy-makers, councillors from the opposition mainly focus on policy control. Such 
balance might work as a healthy scheme of checks and balances in the local system. 
Further, representation seems the preferred interpretation of the councillor office by the 
typical laymen who have no experience in the executive board. Considered the other way 
around, however, this result might also hint at a possible weakening of the bond between 
citizens and their representatives once the latter have moved to an executive office in the 
system. 
Second, when councillors were asked to evaluate their actual contribution to the same 
role-set, less positive results emerged. Representation appears to be the main focus of 
councillors’ activities in practice too. It is probably the domain in which councillors can 
make the most tangible and/or rewarding impact from a personal point of view, for 
instance by very specific casework, the inclusion in the local community, debates in the 
council or simply the politics of presence1. Nonetheless, the group of councillors who 
feel that they make a real meaningful contribution to voicing citizens’ demands in the 
political system decreased substantially compared to the initial role attitude. Furthermore, 
this pattern was even more pronounced in the analysis of councillors’ complementary 
tasks as architects and scrutinizers of the local system. Only half of the Belgian local 
councillor population claims to truly succeed in controlling local policies. Even less 
manage to define its broad contours beforehand. Clearly, this could evoke questions 
about the democratic control on local policies in some municipalities, and the public 
support that should legitimize strategic policy choices in the first place. 
Moreover, it points out that many local councillors are unable, rather than unwilling, to 
assume their role in the political system. Such role discrepancy is probably more 
problematic than the gap between the formal rules of the game and the way in which they 
are implemented in practice. In fact, it could bring about many disillusions and/or 
frustrations amongst the group of toothless councillors. It is mainly the decision-making 
culture of the Belgian system, i.e. the informal rules of the game, that accounts for these 
deficits. Councillors from the majority feel that they contribute much more to policy-
making, but also representation, than councillors from the opposition. Additionally, the 
latter do not believe that they are the prime scrutinizers either. Furthermore, the 
councillors with executive experience contribute much more to every role of the classic 
role-set. Such result corroborates the description of the Belgian local system as an 
example of inversed monism in practice – even though professionalization in terms of 
education and experience, as well as an open mind to active citizen participation in the 
policy process, might empower councillors in office too.  
                                                             
1 Tops and Zouridis (2002) call this the anticipating power of the councillors. 
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7.2.3. Political representation: people’s delegate or system entrepreneur? 
Whereas the previous theme has addressed councillors’ tasks in the political system, the 
third theme has focused more broadly on the way in which they implement these tasks. In 
political science, how councillors interpret and fulfil their mandate as representative of 
the citizens is usually captured in the concept representative style. Some authors are quite 
pessimistic about the nature of contemporary political representation generally. They 
claim that elected representatives act more and more independently from the (wishes of 
the) citizens. Such representatives run the system as personal and political professionals 
or entrepreneurs who lose touch with the daily lives of the people they ought to represent. 
An elitist style could stem from the increasing functional demands of the system, as well 
as the resulting professionalization of the councillor office. According to the sceptics, 
then, the perceived gap between citizens and politics is symptomatic for the elitist style of 
political representation in the modern system. Nevertheless, other authors are far more 
optimistic about the nature of contemporary political representation at the local level. 
Partly in response to the waning public support for the system, but also precisely due to 
the qualities of local politics as such (e.g. the closer distance between represented and 
representatives), these authors feel that political representation might come closer to the 
popular ideal of delegation – according to which councillors act mainly on the initiative 
of the locality. Simultaneously, the new regime of local governance adds to the 
theoretical complexity between both positions. On one hand, the strategic and long-term 
perspective of decision-making in governance might call for a(n) (further) 
entrepreneurial/elitist style. On the other hand, the close interactions in this regime could 
also foster more popular ways of political representation. 
We have analyzed political representation on the basis of a theoretical model that 
combines the direction of the representative relation (i.e. from above, neutral or from 
below) with the control on this relation (i.e. ex ante, neutral or ex post). Consequently, 
the model discerns four basic modes or styles of representation (i.e. the idealistic/popular 
variant delegation; authorization; responsiveness and the entrepreneurial/elitist variant 
accountability), as well as one neutral, all-round style and four intermediate styles. Each 
respondent was asked to evaluate his/her representative attitude (ARQ8) and behaviour 
(ARQ9). In addition to the descriptive analysis of these components and the relation 
between both (ARQ10), explanatory analyses searched for possible determinants of 
councillors’ representative attitude and behaviour (ARQ11). 
On the attitudinal level, we have found that the majority of the councillors favours the all-
round style of political representation. The all-round style holds the middle between 
delegation, authorization, responsiveness and accountability. Moreover, all aspects of the 
representative style were deemed quite important. This suggests that Belgian local 
councillors at least wish to make the most of their task as elected representative. The 
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idealistic/popular style of delegation turns out to be the preferred style amongst the other 
councillors. Such a finding supports the positive hypothesis on the current state of 
political representation. On the local level in Belgium, many councillors feel that it is 
their job to voice citizen’s requests and demands in the political system and publicize the 
debate on local issues before they are decided upon. These aspects of their office are 
deemed more important than implementing the party program and explaining decisions 
afterwards. Councillors’ representative attitudes are mainly determined by their personal 
characteristics (e.g. highly educated councillors preferring delegation; professional 
motivations leading to more elitist conceptions of the office; lay motivations and the 
desire to continue in office predicting more popular conceptions), their contact pattern in 
the governance arena (e.g. inward-looking contacts leading to an entrepreneurial vision 
on representation, outward-looking contacts corresponding to the more popular variant) 
and the wider institutional context of the system (e.g. Flemish councillors preferring 
authorization as the dominant mode of representation). 
Councillors’ self-reported representative behaviour was even more balanced between 
authorization, delegation, accountability and responsiveness. Yet this does also imply that 
councillors act more entrepreneurial than they would principally prefer. More 
specifically, the councillors contribute more to implementing the party program and, 
above all, explaining decisions afterwards in relation to the transmission of public views 
and the publication of debate on policy issues beforehand. However, as the relation 
between the modes is still quite balanced, such a finding does not straightforwardly 
confirm the claim that political representation is outright elitist or entrepreneurial 
nowadays. Besides, it is surprising that councillors’ (selective) political profile (e.g. 
function or position in the council, experience in other offices or formal networks) is not 
a major determinant of the way they claim to fulfil their mandate. Rather, the latter stems 
from individual personal characteristics and contact patterns. Councillors’ representative 
style thus seems more contingent upon personal and often subjective mechanisms than 
structural features of the local system as such. Highly educated councillors, councillors 
inspired by citizen duty and councillors who are supportive of active citizen participation 
take a more popular approach to their mandate. So do councillors who have frequent 
contacts with civil society. Councillors who entered the council to serve their party more 
often follow the entrepreneurial style of accountability. Frequent contacts with citizens 
tend to correspond with responsiveness as the dominant mode in practice, while frequent 
contacts with the party group encourage representation from above. 
 
  
GENERAL CONCLUSION  |  225 
 
7.2.4. Comparative frame: regional divergence, convergence or path-dependency? 
The fourth and final thematic analysis has deepened and widened the research scope of 
the study hitherto. On one hand, it has focused solely on the non-executive councillors 
from an urban context. This choice was a consequence of the functional limitations of our 
international dataset. On the other hand, the analysis has broadened the research scope in 
a dual way. Many of the above analyses were synthesized, while some additional 
elements (i.e. councillors’ self-placement in the local hierarchy, councillors’ relation with 
citizens and possible turnover motives) were introduced as well. Moreover, the Belgian 
results were compared to the results from councillors in the Netherlands and France. The 
value of such international comparison for our study is threefold. First, it allows us to 
generalize and/or contextualize the specific findings from the Belgian context. Second, it 
provides an operational frame to verify (a particular application of) the often-stated 
hypothesis that the local systems in the Belgian regions Flanders and Wallonia diverge 
towards the model of the Netherlands and France respectively. Third and lastly, the 
insights from these contexts might offer us some clues to predict possible future 
perspectives concerning the role and position of the local councillors in Belgium (see 
further in Section 7.3). 
The analysis has systematically compared a wide array of indicators of councillors’ roles 
and positions. It commenced with the recruitment process that steers councillors to office. 
Then, it addressed their role and acclaimed position inside the local system. The fourth 
part looked across the border of the political system by scrutinizing councillors’ relations 
with citizens and citizen participation. Finally, the analysis dealt with councillors’ 
ambitions and turnover motives at the end of their mandate. This cycle was interpreted on 
the basis of three broad research hypotheses: the role and position of councillors from 
Flanders and Wallonia have diverged towards the respective systems of the Netherlands 
and France (ARQ12); the role and position of the councillors still reflect the path-
dependent legacy of the three countries (ARQ13); and the role and position of the 
councillors in France, the Netherlands and the two Belgian regions have generally 
converged (ARQ14). 
The analysis has shown that some of the Belgian trends are also present in the 
neighbouring countries. For instance, councillors’ recruitment process is marked by a 
strong selectivity in personal terms (e.g. intellectual professionalization). Typical layman 
assets (e.g. the inclusion in the associational life of the community, the absence of a clear 
political career plan initially) occur in the four local systems too. Moreover, 
representation is a popular role for almost every councillor in every system. Two other 
convergent patterns point in the direction of councillors’ subordinate position in the local 
authority, however: many councillors face a strong role discrepancy, and political leaders 
generally dominate non-executive councillors in the political system. A majority of the 
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councillors are not truly enthusiastic about welcoming citizens as additional decisive 
policy-makers in the local system either – albeit most are prone to welcome some form of 
consultation. Contacts with citizens (as a councillor in function) take place regularly, but 
not on a daily or weekly basis. Finally, at the end of their current mandate most 
councillors wish to simply renew it. Others intend to leave office or aspire to become an 
alderman or mayor. Few councillors seek to use their current office as a steppingstone to 
a political career at the supra-local level. 
In addition to these convergent patterns, councillors from Belgium, France and the 
Netherlands also mirror their typical path-dependent legacy. French councillors rather 
correspond to the ideal-type of the layman: their recruitment process is more open and 
less professional (e.g. gender, foreign roots, the sense of citizen duty, support local 
associations) and councillors contribute more to the input role. They are also stronger 
advocates of citizen participation, and are bound less by their political party. When these 
councillors intend to leave office, this is more often because they feel that they have 
accomplished their citizen duty, or because they lack influence in the system. In fact, 
most French councillors acknowledge their system as a strong-mayor type. The Dutch 
councillors have more in common with the professional type. Political parties determine 
their recruitment process, which is more selective too. Councillors place more emphasis 
on the functional output roles and label the Dutch system as a collective type. Particularly 
in the party group, Dutch councillors feel that they have more impact in the local system. 
A lack of time is their most common exit motive. 
Belgian councillors, for their part, have some typical characteristics in common with their 
French colleagues (e.g. the preference for the input side of the mandate, the lack of 
influence as a frequent exit motive), and others with the councillors from the Netherlands 
(e.g. the influence of political parties in recruitment and the council). Nevertheless, the 
results also underscore some divergence between councillors from Flanders and 
Wallonia. The direction of this divergence (partly) confirms that Flanders takes a more 
functional approach to the councillor office while Wallonia stays closer to the Southern 
culture of communitarianism. For instance, the output side of the mandate is considered 
to be more important in Flanders, just as the impact of the professional administrative 
branch in the local authority. The latter could partly explain the smaller impact of single 
councillors and party groups in the Flemish councils (in addition, for instance, to the 
possible effect of the constructive no-confidence vote in Wallonia). In Wallonia, we have 
found more signs of the typical primacy of politics  (e.g. the stronger influence of 
councillors to the detriment of the municipal administration) and the classic layman 
patterns (e.g. the importance of citizen duty as initial and turnover motive). Walloon 
councillors also have more frequent contacts with citizens, and are the strongest 
advocates of active and direct citizen participation.  
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7.2.5. Summary and transversal patterns 
Following from these results, should we conclude that Belgian local councillors form the 
foundation or a fragment of local democracy? As it is often the case with such broad and 
metaphorical research questions, the answer lies somewhere in between. Let us, 
therefore, assemble the different pieces of our puzzle. The first piece is the process by 
which citizens select their peers to make up the representative assembly, henceforth 
ruling the municipality on their behalf. The democratic ideal of the political system posits 
equality, openness and, consequently, representativeness as the core values on this 
subject. A broad and diverse council composition is seen as the best guarantee to voice all 
relevant input from society (i.e. the functional argument). It also enhances public support 
based on general feelings of equity and fairness (i.e. the symbolic argument). In the 
Belgian system, however, the local councils are not a cross-section of their locality at 
large. Particular segments of society are still strongly overrepresented, albeit some 
ancient bias seems to be slowly on the decline. At the same time, the increasing degree of 
professionalization, in the form of councillors’ personal calibre and party ties, introduces 
a new form of selectivity into the process. These trends could validate that the local 
system has gradually, and perhaps subconsciously, adapted itself in order to augment 
public support on the one hand while, above all, seeking to handle its increasing and 
complex demands on the other. 
Meanwhile, the broader implications of such trends have yet to come to the surface. Even 
if it challenges the very principles of the system and possibly narrows down or colours 
the input of needs and demands, (a certain degree of) selectivity could be required to 
prevent the system from producing output failures altogether. Being a local councillor 
might be a layman’s ideal, it undeniably requires craftsmanship nowadays (Tops and 
Zouridis, 2002). Our analysis shows that the impact of professionalization is at least 
ambivalent. It does not run counter to the almost imperative condition for local 
councillors to be firmly embedded in the local community, for instance. Since most 
councillors have lived a considerable part of their lives in the municipality and are 
members of its organized community, they are still well-placed to pick up and voice 
inputs from society. And at least initially, councillors do not correspond to the image of 
the professional office-seeker who is in it for the money or power either. Besides, 
professionalization, as the emerging form of selectivity, seems to relate to the ancient 
recruitment bias in a double way. The intellectual component through education or 
profession could help traditionally underprivileged groups to find their way to the 
council. The political component, i.e. the impact of political parties as selection agents or 
gatekeepers, however, rather adds to the other stereotypes. This gives parties a reactive 
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role in the recruitment process, placing more focus on those persons from the already 
established pool of privileged candidates (see Rallings et al., 2010)2. 
What should we think of such party roles in recruitment – arguably one of the most 
determining features of the recruitment process in Belgium? The recruitment to political 
office is one of the classic functions of the political party. We can expect that this 
function will become both more necessary and challenging in the future. While we have 
seen that most Belgian councillors were asked to stand for office, and thus were actively 
recruited, it is also often heard in the corridors of the parties that this quest becomes more 
arduous every time. Looking for candidates from the different layers and subgroups of 
society then obviously further adds to the complex task of finding and convincing 
motivated candidates. Nevertheless, compared to the other selectorates (e.g. individual 
influential persons, associations, local lists), parties still have the advantage of being able 
to rely on ample expertise, networks and financial means to this end. As Rallings and his 
colleagues (2010) note, we should therefore probably look at the parties as possible 
solutions to the problem of unrepresentative councils, rather than as a part of the problem 
in itself. Such a claim, however, suggests that Belgian parties still have plenty of room 
for improvement. They should become even more aware of their crucial task in the 
recruitment process and, above all, take a more proactive approach in trying to enhance 
the representativeness of their lists and, ultimately, the councils. Yet there is more to this 
discussion. Indeed, by recruiting and supporting candidates in their race to office, parties 
(might) also lay the foundation for strict party discipline in office later on. This brings us 
to the other pieces of our puzzle: councillors’ role and position in the system once they 
have been elected. 
According to another academic line of thought, the lack of socio-demographic 
representativeness in the council does not necessarily have to pose that much of a 
problem, as long as it gives way to a democratic interpretation of the mandate in office. 
From this perspective, who governs is less important than how this is done. The 
theoretical/normative starting point on this matter is usually that the councillor office 
should remain a layman’s affair. It is occupied by citizen-politicians who are firmly 
rooted in the locality. This asset allows them to collect and voice the relevant local 
demands (i.e. real-life problems) and make the proper policy choices (i.e. avoid output 
failures). Representation on the input side of the office is therefore paired with the 
definition of strategic policy goals and scrutiny on the output side. Theoretically, every 
councillor also holds the responsibility of contributing to this role-set. The principle is 
engrafted in the one man-one vote principle. Meanwhile, an open and transparent way of 
                                                             
2 According to Rallings et al. (2010), an opposite theoretical explanation for the lack of representativeness 
in party recruitment could be that parties are proactively trying to recruit different types of candidates, but 
fail to do so in the end. 
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implementing these roles (i.e. the throughput side) should provide maximum guarantees 
for public support. Lastly, the principle of the electoral chain of command in the 
representative system implies a functional differentiation in this system between council, 
executive board and administration. Councillors’ unique position as democratically 
elected actors should thereby place them at the helm of the local authority structure. 
The situation in the Belgian setting seems twofold again. In terms of a political career, 
the image of the layman still stands firm for most councillors. Few local councillors are 
politicians in the true professional sense of the word. The continuous link with the 
locality through one’s profession and the associational life assures that many channels 
and incentives are at least available to transfer inputs to the system. Councillors’ role 
attitude complies with the theoretical postulates as well. A large majority of the 
councillor population thinks it is important to implement the three basic tasks as a 
councillor. This means that councillors do not seem to face a fundamental democratic 
dilemma between representation, i.e. being a familiar councillor, and good governance in 
principal terms. Moreover, the variance in role attitudes between the councillors is largely 
in accordance with prevailing ideas of checks and balances between majority and 
opposition, between executives and non-executives. The other dilemma dances are not 
echoed in councillors’ perceptions of the way in which they ought to fulfil their mandate 
either. Indeed, most councillors prefer a representative style that unites delegation, 
authorization, responsiveness and accountability as fundamental building blocks of a 
transparent and democratic system. In addition to such an all-round style, they clearly 
wish to focus on the interests of their municipality as a whole. The latter does not mean 
that some councillors have no additional interests of particular groups in mind, however. 
And not every councillor aims at being an all-round representative. Yet when councillors 
have a preference for one representative style in particular, they choose the idealistic 
variant of delegation, which considers themselves as instructed advocates from the 
constituency. So far, so good, it seems. 
Nevertheless, other pieces of the puzzle make up a less optimistic picture. One indication 
is that councillors claim to fulfil their role in more entrepreneurial, top-down and political 
ways than they would prefer to. This shift implies that councillors are bound more by 
their party programs in relation to the requests and issues from the locality whilst 
explaining policies gains importance compared to publicizing debate beforehand. Yet in 
spite of this trend, councillors’ representative styles are still balanced overall. The results 
of councillors’ self-reported implementation of their classic role-set are more 
problematic. Here councillors’ dilemma dance is clearly settled in favour of their role as 
popular representatives. But even in this most elementary task, many councillors are 
under the impression that they fail to exert true impact on the political system. And 
despite the preference for representation, councillors still allocate most of their time to 
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council (and party) business. Formal and informal contacts with citizens in the official 
capacity as a councillor do not take place on a daily basis either. Taken together, this 
pattern of political representation, role behaviour and concrete action suggests that the 
political system probably relies quite often on withinputs that are put forward by the 
representatives, underpinned by their personal experience and the party as an influential 
gatekeeper. 
Councillors’ role fulfilment is most worrisome in terms of the strategic definition of the 
general policy goals and the control on their implementation afterwards. We might 
imagine that councillors are still better caseworkers than strategic thinkers indeed. Yet 
considering the fact that more than half of the councillor population fails to have a 
significant impact on the output side of the political system, we might conclude that it is 
seemingly hard for many councillors to meet the formal, but also their personal, 
expectations concerning local office. In the words of Stewart (1991: 30 and 26), 
councillors thus are hardly “responsible for anything that happens in the authority” and 
many have no “rich and reinvigorating contribution” to make at all. 
The main causes of this anomaly are two informal rules of the game that seem 
widespread and ingrained in the Belgian system: the impact of political parties and the 
dominance of the executive branch. Results of the former are seen in the strong divide 
between councillors from the majority and councillors from the opposition – who often 
lack influence to make meaningful contributions to the political process. Party discipline 
is also felt when votes are cast, while a professionalized political recruitment process and 
frequent contacts in the party sphere lead towards a professional career and a more 
entrepreneurial view on the mandate as well. Regarding the second informal rule, our 
study shows that councillors who have gained experience in an executive function in 
local government dominate the system by and large. They take the initiative in every 
basic role of the political process. If we consider the fact that these councillors establish 
many signs of a professional career, have a selective personal profile and a strong 
position in the party (group) as well, the informal rules turn out to be strong signals of the 
professionalization and selectivity of the Belgian local system. They indicate that the 
council’s internal dilemma dances are basically settled in favour of an authoritative 
executive structure and an opposition that is left to oppose the majority in place, rather 
than actively contributing to the policy-making process. And even on this subject, 
opposition councillors often fail to exert real control on local policies. It is telling, for 
instance, that executives and councillors from the majority are more convinced of the 
effectiveness of the typical instruments that councillors have been attributed to fulfil their 
duty (e.g. voting, interpellations, inquiry and information). Not surprisingly, Belgian non-
executive councillors place themselves on the lowest rank of the classic local power 
hierarchy. They feel subordinate to the mayor, the executive board as well as the 
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influential administration. Accordingly, the Belgian political system indeed bears many 
marks of inversed monism. 
Our analyses also demonstrate that this picture does not apply to every councillor in equal 
measure though. Education, for instance, might not only compensate for traditional 
recruitment bias, it turns out to be a frequent determinant of the role and position of 
councillors in office too. Albeit having less experience in the office generally, highly 
educated councillors feel they have more impact in scrutinizing local affairs. They are 
more ambitious at the same time and hold more popular views on their mandate as 
representative of the people. Further, the positive impact that experience has on 
councillors’ role orientation suggests that it probably takes time to master council 
business. Both elements imply that some form of professionalization could be required to 
stand one’s ground in the political system as a councillor. The effects of having a 
selective professional background prior to the office are less outspoken. 
On the other hand, councillors who keep an open mind about the active participation of 
citizens in the policy process seem to have more impact in the system too. Meanwhile, 
they often prefer to disclose the process of policy-making before the actual decisions are 
taken – thereby allowing popular control on the local policies. Councillors’ personal 
network and motivations also determine their representative style. Councillors who have 
many contacts outside the city hall prefer a more popular interpretation of their mandate, 
as do councillors who were inspired by lay motives. Councillors who tend to mingle with 
the actors inside the city hall, and councillors who were driven by professional motives, 
adopt a more elitist style of representation. 
Somehow surprisingly, the size of the municipality does not impact systematically upon 
the role and position of councillors in the system. More variance stems from the region of 
the municipality, be it often in terms of councillors’ attitude towards the office, rather 
than their (acclaimed) behaviour. Meanwhile in Flanders, the non-executive councillors 
experience their situations as even more problematic than in Wallonia. Party groups 
succeed less in emancipating the councillors and the municipal administration is deemed 
to have more impact in the system.  
Moving one step further, we might ask ourselves whether such results are unique to the 
Belgian setting per se. Again, the answer to the question is double. For instance, the 
discrepancy between what councillors aspire to do in office and what they subsequently 
engage in, has been documented by Rao (1998) as a common and historical pattern in the 
political system of the United Kingdom as well. It is by no means exceptional, Rao 
(1998) contends, that councillors have to adopt a more pragmatic attitude in office – 
despite preferring the representative role over the complementary role as policy-maker. 
Indeed, for many councillors, the practical focus of the office lies on mere council 
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business as such. Furthermore, we have to realize that a certain degree of differentiation 
within the political system seems to have become inevitable in the current intricate and 
demanding governance context. From this follows that the ordinary, lay councillors will 
always find it hard in any system to occupy the top spot in the local hierarchy. In this 
sense, it is not a coincidence that also in the Netherlands and France, councillors reckon 
that political leadership, and often even the municipal administration, outweigh laymen-
politicians in the local authority. The role discrepancy that many of these non-executive 
councillors have to endure is a further signal of the complexity of the office for that 
matter. So too is the trend of increasing personal calibre and the apparent reluctance to 
share true decision-making powers with citizens outside the political arena. 
Nevertheless, what is unique to the Belgian situation is the magnitude and the 
significance of the discrepancy between the formal rules of the game and their informal 
application in practice. In fact, a seemingly large group of councillors are systematically 
placed outside the established circles of authority. Particularly in the role as policy-
maker, the average local councillor in Belgium falls short of formal expectations. This 
means that in practice, the layman rule is largely fictitious. And even though this does not 
automatically seem to induce higher levels of turnover as such, it is reflected in the 
frequency with which councillors mention a lack of influence as a possible reason to turn 
their back on the council. This is even more the case than in France, a country in which 
“everything seems to have been designed to ensure the continuity of the mayor’s power” 
(Kerrouche, 2005: 150), and laymen are consequently subjected to the dictates of the 
latter (Mouritzen & Svara, 2002). Meanwhile, the pattern sharpens in the contrast with 
the Netherlands, a country that formally shares the collective-form and corresponding 
layman rule with Belgium, but in which these principles seem to accord clearly more 
with the situation in the field. 
Such a conclusion gives food for thought. First of all, it holds obvious consequences for 
the councillors as actors on the micro-level of the political system. On one hand, they are 
not complete fragments of local democracy. Many elements (e.g. motivations, social 
connections, the conception of the mandate and the role attitudes) still support the image 
of the councillors as vital elements of a democratic system at the outset. Yet on the other 
hand, a large majority of the councillors are definitely not a foundation of democracy 
either. These councillors are placed in situations in which they are often compelled to 
ritually legitimize or criticize decisions that have already been made elsewhere and 
beforehand (Reynaert et al., 2010). Referring back to the metaphor of the general 
introduction in Chapter 1: councillors are perhaps seated in the Kokpit of their 
municipality, but it is very likely that this is just the cockpit of the flight simulator. The 
real decisions are often taken in the meetings of the executive board, the party 
headquarters and even the municipal administration behind the scenes. 
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Under these circumstances, joining the inner circle of the municipality might actually be 
the best guarantee for ordinary councillors to increase their impact on local affairs. On 
the pretext of the age-old saying if you can’t beat them, joint them, this is probably why 
as many councillors aspire to higher office as there are councillors who wish to abandon 
the council. The prospect, or sometimes even the explicit or implicit promise, of an 
executive function in the future might work as a motivation for councillors to fulfil their 
office in the best possible way – but also to oblige them to toe the party line. Nonetheless, 
such practice is hard to reconcile with the basic, present principles of our system that 
place the role of the average lay councillors first. It seems unfair and frustrating for 
councillors who are deprived of such prospects, or who simply wish to be the best 
councillor that they can be too. Moreover, the practice evokes the image of politics as the 
typical art of wheeling and dealing, needed to rise in the local power hierarchy. 
As stated in the introduction, this standpoint was aptly reiterated by the director of the 
Flemish association of cities and municipalities: “The main goal of one’s political 
commitment should be to become a strong councillor, not an alderman. We should, 
therefore, revalue this role and function instead of conceiving it as a steppingstone to an 
executive office” (Suykens, 2012: 9, translated quote from Dutch). Meanwhile, Suykens 
(2012) emphasizes the crucial responsibility of political parties on this subject. Belgian 
parties have collectively reduced their efforts to train and support councillors in recent 
decades. Such cutbacks contrast sharply with the parties’ massive financial investments 
during the electoral campaigns. According to the author, therefore, it is imperative that 
parties assume their responsibility for the counsel and support of councillors once they 
have been elected3. 
A second, and at least equally important, question is how our conclusions on the micro-
level bear more generally upon the state of the political system on the macro-level. 
Basically, we have sketched the latter as the set of structures and procedures designed to 
convert input from the locality into policy output in the most democratic, transparent and 
efficient way. De Rynck (2007) describes the prevalent representative system as a funnel 
that clusters, reduces and simplifies demands from the locality. It thereby steers the 
(political) mobilization of the masses. Our study underlines that in the Belgian system, 
this funnel tends to work by means of three fundamental, in-built filters. 
The first filter refers to the selectivity in the recruitment process. The selection of elected 
representatives in the council is certainly not a perfect mirror of the locality. And the 
cracks in the mirror (see Andeweg, 2003) do not have a random pattern either. 
Consequently at the outset, the expression of local voice and the exercise of local choice 
                                                             
3 The Dutch case, for instance, shows that the party group might be the first and proper step to empower 
councillors vis-à-vis the executive branch. Meanwhile, this responsibility adds to the necessity of parties 
to raise their efforts in the recruitment process.  
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(could) already narrow down the focus of the council. Second, these elected councillors 
do not act as strict agents from the locality, merely conveying their inputs into the 
system. In practice, councillors and political parties regularly set the local agenda. Such 
withinputs leave their mark on both the process and its outputs. Whereas these may still 
originate from the aggregation and selection of particular inputs from society, they may 
as well stem from the sheer personal initiative of councillors and parties. Third, it is 
foremost the executive board, working in close harmony with the municipal 
administration, that decides which inputs ultimately complete the policy process. Often, 
the actual policy outputs even result from the initiative of the latter via withinputs too. 
Considering the extra degree of selectivity in this group of actors (in numerical, but also 
socio-demographic and professional terms), we can imagine that the representative funnel 
becomes quite narrow at the end. 
We have attempted to visualize this process in Figure 7.1 below. The figure illustrates 
how citizen input is processed via the three critical filters into policy output. It also 
indicates how the funnel narrows at every stage. Meanwhile, the impact of each filter, 
expressed by the size and colour of the central arrows, intensifies as the process proceeds. 
Such a process clearly disrupts the balance of the political regime as it has been formally 
designed. First, some fundamental principles and values (e.g. equality, layman rule, 
representativeness) have become largely obsolete. Second, formal rules (e.g. councillors 
running the system by means of their triple role-set) give way to informal counterparts 
(e.g. parties leaving their mark on the process, executives taking command in co-
operation with the administration). Third and as a consequence, the authority structure of 
the local regime has been turned upside down. In the end, this situation confirms the 
following claim of Larsen (2005: 200), posed in the introduction of our study: 
“Sometimes, only a handful of politicians have enough information and oversight to be 
able to exert real influence.”  
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Figure 7.1. The political system in Belgium 
 
 
What could be the further implications of this situation for the system? Arguably, it could 
place the democratic and functional performance of the system under pressure. Indeed, 
much power is concentrated in the hands of a very particular, selective and professional 
local elite. At the same time, this elite is not directly elected by the people in the first 
place, nor firmly kept in check by the representative body later on. Apart from the 
informal rules of the game, the power base of this elite can also thrive on some structural 
features of the system such as the length of the term in office and the unlimited number 
of terms in office allowed. The closed character of decision-making, in combination with 
reduced popular input and a lack of popular control, may end up in creating output 
failures. Over the long haul, it could also lead to citizens challenging the legitimacy of 
the local outputs, or even the legitimacy of the political system on the whole. According 
to Keane (2009), this is exactly what is happening in many democratic systems at present. 
For Keane, the quintessence of democracy is that it prevents undemocratic rule by a small 
elite that wields abundant power. In other words, the concept is understood as 
“government of the humble, by the humble, for the humble” (Keane, 2009: vii). The 
representative variant of democracy was not just the practical solution to the impossibility 
of systematically involving every citizen in the political process. It was also an 
ideological means of creating humble and good government by rotating political 
leadership. However, the author feels that “democracies as we know them are 
sleepwalking their way into deep trouble” (Keane, 2009: xxxii). If people are disgruntled 
with politics nowadays, then this is basically directed at typical party government and its 
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machinations. Instead of serving the people, parties and their politicians are perceived as 
mainly pursuing their own agenda, holding the representative process in a stranglehold. 
The result is a system under strain, as outlined in the introductory chapter: social 
inequality and market failure are combined with declining support in terms of party 
membership, turnout and disrespect for politicians and the system. 
This is exactly what seems to have gone wrong in the Belgian system. Local government 
is no longer government by the humble. A small and selective elite has gained excessive 
power whilst the councillors, forming the institution that has been appointed to preserve 
the balance between democratic and efficient governance, do not succeed in living up to 
their high formal and normative standards. This is why the discussion about councillors’ 
role and position in the system matters from a democratic point of view. A healthy local 
system forms the basis of our democracy. It is the political arena in which people place 
the most trust while it deals with matters that affect their daily lives. And in its current 
plan, councillors are conceived as the infantrymen of this system. Becoming a councillor 
is also still the shortest way to a systematic personal commitment to the political system. 
To put it in the words of Stewart (1991: 26), therefore: “The case for the councillors’ role 
as an elected representative rests on the need for local democracy.” 
Nonetheless, it seems necessary to somehow nuance the general picture painted above. If 
we borrow Laswell’s definition of politics as deciding on “who gets what, when and 
how” (quoted in Devos, 2006a: 18), it goes without saying that the result of this process 
can never be everybody gets everything, immediately, in the most optimal way. So policy 
outputs are bound to be the answer to a particular selection of policy inputs anytime. This 
selection is also determined by the general context, the available means and possible 
constraints in place. Besides, the multitude, and often inconsistency, of contemporary 
values and demands, the unpredictable nature of the political agenda, the time it takes for 
inputs to pass through the process: these elements all lead to outputs that are seldom 
perfectly in tune with the initial inputs. The function of the political system is exactly to 
make the most appropriate choices then. And even if the Belgian system works quite 
selectively indeed, we must not a priori dismiss its value and capacity. For instance, it is 
possible that a selective group of people actually make the best decisions from an 
objective and/or technical point of view. Withinputs such as party programs or councillor 
standpoints might concur with the needs from the locality too. In this sense, it is 
important that most councillors remain embedded in the social life of their local 
community. Moreover, informal contacts and formal structures (e.g. advisory boards) still 
provide input to the system. This is why a selective policy-making process could end up 
producing outputs that meet the initial policy needs and demands after all. 
Furthermore, councillors’ subordination to the political leaders and professional 
administration does not necessarily imply that they have no impact at all. The central path 
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that we have drawn in Figure 7.1 leaves some room for input to pass from society over 
the council and the BMA and administration to the output end of the process. 
Additionally, the central path is no blueprint that fits every context or every process of 
decision-making either. In fact, Figure 7.1 also shows that there are possible deviations 
from the typical, central path of decision-making. Via these alternative routes councillors 
can give a meaningful contribution to the system. Simultaneously, they offer alternative 
ways to the citizens to advocate their needs and demands in the system. In each of these 
alternative paths, which could obviously intermingle in practice, one or more of the 
classic filters are bypassed. 
Path A and B are probably the most common alternatives to the central way of decision-
making. In these paths, the withinputs from the elected representatives or parties are 
bypassed as a filter in the process. Path A suggests that it might be more rewarding for 
citizens to influence policy outputs by turning directly to the executive board and/or 
administration with demands or requests4. In path B, citizen input is processed by the 
system with the council acting as a mere conduit between the locality and the executive 
board and administration. The latter, then, dominate the elaboration and implementation 
of the policy outputs as they are used to do in the central path. 
As indicated by the striped lines, the next two paths could be less likely to occur in 
practice. Path C and D propose a more active role for the council and the councillors. In 
path C, councillors take the initiative to transpose demands from the locality in policy 
outputs without the BMA or administration dominating the process. Path D sees 
councillors as even more active players who develop and administer the policy agenda 
quite autonomously. Arguably, these paths bear closer resemblance to the ideal-typical 
conception of the Belgian representative local system driven by the layman rule. They 
emphasize the actions, initiative and preponderance of the councillors to the detriment of 
the executive board and the administration as strong filters in the process. Councillors can 
follow these paths, for instance, by setting the agenda, convening the council, voting and 
appointing members to certain positions against the will of the executives. They might 
also overrule the aldermen in the party group. In Wallonia, the use of the constructive no-
confidence vote could be the most drastic example of councillors’ direct impact in the 
system. 
Path E, finally, represents the shortest and most direct way of transmitting input into 
output. In this path, the three classic filters are eliminated, and citizens exert a direct 
impact on the policy outputs. Possible examples are neighbourhood committees, forms of 
participatory budgeting or advisory referenda that might have the moral authority of 
                                                             
4 Many executives organize or institutionalize this path by holding office hours in order to stay in touch 
with the local community. When stretched to the extremes, however, this path could lead to excesses of 
clientelism.  
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binding decisions in practice. This path does not exclude the fact that at some point in the 
process, the intervention or contribution of the BMA, council and/or administration could 
be required (e.g. setting the framework and conditions of the procedures; facilitating, 
counselling, organizing and implementing the outputs, etc.). The path does not 
necessarily have to occur completely on its own either – as it may be used to complement 
other forms of decision-making. Nonetheless, the main emphasis of the path lies on the 
direct link between citizens and policy outputs. Accordingly, path E blurs the boundaries 
of the traditional political system and represents a hybrid form of democracy in which 
representative and participative elements blend together. 
 
7.3. DISCUSSION: REFLECTIONS ON SOME FUTURE PERSPECTIVES 
In the previous section, we have drawn a mixed picture of the Belgian local councillors. 
Despite positive signals at the outset and alternative paths later on, the common way of 
decision-making tends to neglect or side-line many of them as fundamental players in the 
political system. The next step in this conclusive chapter is to link our conclusions to the 
normative debate that underpinned the study in the first place. On the basis of what we 
now know, we may ask: What are the most plausible and/or viable perspectives with 
regard to the role and position of local councillors in the Belgian local system? We have 
selected and wish to explore three broad, tentative perspectives. Albeit we will discuss 
them separately, they can obviously (partly) co-exist or overlap in practice. Basically, the 
perspectives range from the current line of thought over a more radical variant to a 
fundamental revision of the role and position of the local councillors in the political 
system. We hint at the possible advantages and drawbacks of each perspective, their rate 
of success or failure. It is obvious, however, that such reflections can neither be 
exhaustive nor generally valid and/or predictive. This is why our discussion does not 
aspire to propound the ultimate or best solution in the end. 
 
7.3.1. The incremental path: institutional renovation 
A first possible perspective is the incremental path forward. Incrementalism is a safe way 
of decision-making in which policies build step by step on existing practice (Lindblom in 
De Rynck, 2006). The goal of this method is not so much to reach the ultimate solution as 
it is to reach the most possible or most feasible solution. The method is often applied 
when information and/or resources are scarce, or when excessive risks need to be 
avoided. Other advantages of the method include faster processes of decision-making 
combined with lower levels of political opposition or controversy. 
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In the context of our research, an incremental path implies that central governments 
continue their current attempts at institutional renovation. They hold on to the classic 
values and principles of the political system and install new formal rules in order to take 
the edge off the informal rules of the game and restore the formal authority structure in 
the local regime. Going back to the metaphor of the local councillors as infantrymen of 
local democracy, the perspective involves a rearmament of the troops on the ground to 
improve their strike power. According to this metaphor, modern soldiers are no longer 
equipped with swords, spears, helmets or bayonets anymore. The contemporary G.I. uses 
modern information techniques, long-distance weapons and high-tech material. 
Simultaneously, ancient marching columns have been replaced with agile platoons that 
are internally diversified and specialized. 
If we transpose this metaphor to the more peaceful setting of the current local system in 
Belgium, we see that the different regions have already taken a number of steps in this 
direction. Both local councillors and local councils are equipped with several instruments 
that could improve their impact in the system. These vary from individual agenda setting 
rights, (electronic) information and inspection rights, delegation rights, inquiry rights, 
visitation of municipal services and institutions, to the collective organization of standing 
committees, a (more) flexible regulation to convene the council, citizen consultation 
procedures, a committee to organize the (scrutiny on the) policies of formal governance 
arrangements5, support for party groups, an ethical code of conduct, the election of a 
council and committee president, reducing the number of aldermen, a constructive no-
confidence vote, a procedure to restore the governability when there is a permanent 
conflict in the executive board, etc. Councillors thus (may) have modern instruments at 
their disposal. There is a possibility to consult, study and prepare dossiers from home. 
They may also focus on certain policies in-depth via committees and the internal 
organization of their party group6. 
For the moment, however, it is difficult (and, given the recent introduction of some 
instruments, probably still too early) to assess the true impact of these provisions. If we 
assemble the scattered evidence that is available, it turns out that many of the collective 
instruments are not always used that frequently (yet). In Flanders, for instance, research 
shows that there are still (often smaller) municipalities that do not even succeed in 
organizing the minimal number of council meetings, i.e. ten per year (Vlabest, 2011). 
Approximately 60% of the municipalities have established standing committees, yet only 
seldom is a member of the opposition entitled to preside over these committees 
(Olislagers et al., 2008). An ethical code of conduct and delegation rights were found in 
                                                             
5 These are the so-called municipal satellites that include, for example, inter-municipal co-operations, 
municipal agencies, etc. 
6 At the same time, however, Heywood (2002) points at a possible disadvantage of standing committees 
as a further degree of internal selectivity. 
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60-70% of the municipalities (Olislagers et al., 2008) while personal support for the party 
groups is the exception rather than the rule (Olislagers & Ackaert, 2010). In Wallonia, 
both the individual and collective constructive no-confidence votes have been applied 
just about ten times thus far (Matagne et al., 2011). The motives and consequences (e.g. 
replacing one alderman, replacing the mayor, replacing the entire BMA, installing a new 
political majority) of this intervention were usually quite divergent and context-bound. 
Lastly, the number of municipalities in which the mayor no longer presides over the 
council had amounted to well over one-third of the total landscape by the end of the 
legislature7. Still this new institution might lack a genuine statute and sufficient support 
and visibility to make a real difference (Suykens, 2010; Vlabest, 2011). Whereas it is 
used to empower the council in some municipalities, others have included the office in 
the typical package of wheeling and dealing between and within parties of the majority 
during the coalition formation. The presidency is offered, then, as a consolation prize to 
councillors who missed out on an executive mandate (Suykens, 2010). Nevertheless, this 
does not exclude the fact that the council presidency is a position with at least some 
prestige. Some presidents have also clearly grown in their function. And it seems that 
mainly councillors from the opposition are satisfied with a strong council president 
(Vlabest, 2011). 
Other studies have mapped out councillors’ personal evaluations of their instruments and 
the political situations. Flemish councillors do not seem to believe that the Municipal 
Decree has truly enforced the impact of the council in the political system already 
(Olislagers & Ackaert, 2010). Some of the instruments (e.g. oral questions, information) 
are used more frequently than others (e.g. written questions, visiting municipal 
institutions, agenda-setting). Yet councillors are not under the impression that the 
Municipal Decree has led to a substantial increase in the use of these instruments too 
(Olislagers & Ackaert, 2010). Our study has shown that the evaluation of the 
effectiveness of these instruments, which is fairly positive in general, is also related to the 
classic power hierarchy between the executive board, majority and opposition. 
Hence, it remains to be seen whether the current set of instruments will prove sufficient 
to re-invigorate the councils and councillors in the political system. Time is always a 
crucial variable when assessing the true impact of such structural reforms (Putnam in 
Steen & Wille, 2005). This is why authors expect that the effects of the institutional 
reforms in Belgium could become more clear over time (Steen & Wille, 2005; Pilet, 
2008; Olislagers & Ackaert, 2010; Suykens, 2010). Indeed, old habits do not change 
overnight. 
                                                             
7 In the new legislature, this ratio is even 2:3 in Flanders. 
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Yet if government would choose to elaborate on this incremental path, some further 
measures seem advisable, and perhaps even imperative (Suykens, 2010; Vlabest, 2011): 
the use of brief and accessible documents in the council; a better statute and support for 
the council president (in terms of remuneration, social statute, logistic help, personal 
assistance, etc.); increasing the efforts of recruiting and training councillors, etc. In 
addition to these instruments, the introduction of a full-blown social and political statute 
for the councillors is often believed to be the most necessary lever for change (Steen & 
Wille, 2005; Suykens, 2010; Vlabest, 2011). The underlying idea is that strong and 
competent councillors would be able to stand their ground vis-à-vis the mayor, aldermen 
and administrators in the system. The councillor statute could include more possibilities 
for political leave, standard personal and logistic support, a part-time statute in larger 
municipalities, a diversified remuneration system depending, for instance, on permanent 
formation and education, etc8. In the current context of economic and financial austerity, 
however, it is doubtful whether there is enough financial room to implement and sustain 
such reforms on a large scale. 
What are the further odds that such changes will or would achieve the intended outcome? 
In short: “effective institutional change requires more than merely changing the rules of 
the game” (De Groot, 2009: 198)9. Denters and Klok (2003) apply the model of Kiser and 
Ostrom to single out the different steps in the process of effective institutional change. 
The first and basic step is the permeation of the formal reforms in the minds of the actors 
involved. Councillors should understand the reforms while being willing and able to 
adapt their behaviour in the proposed direction. If institutional reforms are not 
accompanied by widespread information and uniform elucidation of the new rules and 
their expected outcomes, the implementation of the reforms will often be “a self-directed 
organizational learning process”, in which every actor makes up his own mind over the 
intended effects (Steen & Wille, 2005: 462)10. Central government should pay careful 
attention to this precondition. It should also try to maximize councillors’ willingness to 
change their behaviour (De Groot, 2009). This part of the attitude can be determined by 
taking into account the concerns of the councillors in the first place and emphasizing 
subjective norms (i.e. the perceived social pressure to adapt behaviour, resulting from the 
questions “How should I behave?”, but also “Do I care?”, see Ajzen in De Groot, 2009: 
                                                             
8 In practice, regional governments also have to take it into account that substantial parts of this statute 
(e.g. pension, social security, tax law) still fall within the jurisdiction of federal government (Steen & 
Wille, 2005; Reynaert & Steyvers, 2006). 
9 According to the author, the first step of effective reform is always thoroughly considering the specific 
behavioural aspects that a government seeks to change, before carefully selecting instruments that can 
help to achieve this goal. 
10 Flemish councillors generally claim that they understand the basic ideas of the Municipal Decree. 
Nevertheless, the scholars feel that social desirability and biased response might partly account for this 
result (Olislagers et al., 2009). 
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56). As regards this component, we have found that councillors at least endorse their role 
and position in the system. Still it is doubtful, for instance, whether they are willing to 
completely give up the very specific and often rewarding casework (from a personal and 
electoral point of view) to the detriment of strategic, general policy-making (see also De 
Rynck, 2002; Olislagers & Ackaert, 2010). Meanwhile, formation, education and the 
introduction of complementary resources could help councillors to develop the necessary 
capacities or ability to transpose their attitude into analogous behaviour11. Our analysis 
suggests that education and experience can indeed be potential triggers for effective role 
behaviour. Yet at the same time, these capacities could bring about a further degree of 
selectivity in the overall council composition12. This is why educating and, above all, 
supporting councillors in office might be a good way of empowering the ordinary 
councillors who, then, do not need to be and/or become genuine politicians or 
professionalized councillors (see also Vlabest, 2011)13. 
The second step in the process is that the actors must actually change their behaviour. 
Our results imply that there is still a long way to go before councillors (are able to) 
systematically adapt their behaviour. This also affects the third and final step of effective 
institutional change. Changes of the individual behaviour should produce different 
results, thereby altering the political system. In order to restore the authority structure of 
the Belgian local system, the key question is whether the present and proposed 
instruments will be sufficient to fundamentally alter the dominant and deep-seated 
informal decision-making culture (see also Steen & Wille, 2005; Pilet, 2008; De Rynck 
& Wayenberg, 2010; Dezeure & De Rynck, 2010; Wayenberg et al., 2010). Indeed, while 
councillors might be informed, willing and capable to change their behaviour, the 
informal rules of the game could still stand in their way to effectively do so. 
Without a doubt, cutting across typical party discipline and executive dominance will be 
an exhaustive work. In this sense, the fact that the statute of mayors and aldermen has 
already been improved further underlines “the Belgian tradition of marginalizing the role 
of the councillors and the council” (Wayenberg et al., 2010: 87; see also De Rynck & 
Wayenberg, 2010). And combining the re-invigoration of the council(lors) with the 
reinforcement of political leadership and administrative management, might actually lead 
towards a form of Matteüs-effect. This implies that those who already wield much power 
                                                             
11 This was framed by Ajzen (in De Groot, 2009: 56) as the “perceived behaviour control”, i.e. the 
perception of the councillor that he/she has (powerful) instruments at his/her disposal to change 
behaviour. 
12 Accordingly, reducing the gap between councillors and executives/officers might enlarge the gap 
between the council and the local community at large. 
13 In the Netherlands, for example, the administrative support for the councillors was explicitly intended 
to empower the councillors as policy makers while leaving enough room for representative task fulfilment 
as lay politicians (Steen & Wille, 2005). 
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profit more from the reforms than those who were less influential at the outset14. Besides, 
it is important to realize that many of the council instruments (e.g. establishing 
committees, electing a council president, formation programs, support for party groups) 
are merely facultative – and thus depend on the goodwill of the political majority, i.e. the 
parties and the executive board. Others fall at least partly under the responsibility of the 
political parties too (e.g. recruiting and training candidates and councillors). 
Once again, this confirms the ambivalent role of the political parties in the system. They 
are at the same time part of the problem and part of the solution. Parties may actively 
recruit, train and support candidates. They may empower councillors and alleviate the 
pressure on their individual shoulders by working as a close party group. But on the other 
hand, parties should leave enough space for individual initiative, free debate and 
independent vote. Indeed, excessive party politics is exactly the object of much public 
dissatisfaction and mistrust with the political system (De Rynck, 2002 and 2012; Keane, 
2009)15. Concerning this discussion, the Flemish advisory council for interior affairs has 
expressed its concern that the support for party groups, instead of single councillors or 
the council as a whole, might actually enhance party discipline even more (Steen & 
Wille, 2005; Reynaert & Steyvers, 2006). And in Wallonia, scholars point out that the 
system of the constructive no-confidence vote also secures the influence of parties. First, 
executive councillors who speak or act (too) independently from the official party line 
face the constant threat of retaliation through the no-confidence vote of their party (Pilet, 
2008). Second, this is underpinned by the stipulation in the Walloon Code that 
councillors who are elected on a party list are considered to be members of the party 
group for the entire legislature when casting a no-confidence mode (hence, even if they 
have resigned from their party group). This renders the constructive no-confidence vote a 
powerful tool for party groups, rather than for single councillors (Matagne et al., 2011). 
Matagne et al. (2011) feel that this logic is hard to reconcile with the very nature of local 
politics, in which coherent party programs are less important than individual 
personalities16. 
                                                             
14 In the same line of thinking, many Flemish councillors are reluctant to delegate matters of daily 
governance to the executive board (Olislagers & Ackaert, 2010). Another example is the management-
oriented style of the Flemish Municipal Decree (De Rynck, 2012). Whereas control and report 
mechanisms, audits and strategic planning could spur councillors to become modern policy-makers, the 
management model (e.g. the Policy-and-Management-Cycle) could also exacerbate the pressure on these 
lay politicians, creating more space for professional administrators and political leaders to step in, and 
dominate, the process. 
15 According to De Winter and Dumont (2006), excessive party government ultimately leads to output 
failure as well. 
16 Still, the authors admit that this does not impede that party groups can oppose internally. In this case, 
the most influential part of the party group is pulling the strings. 
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This last point brings us to our final remark on the incremental path. In the end, politics 
remains a form of social action, led and determined by personalities and interpersonal 
relations. Such highly subjective, cultural and context-bound traits were difficult to 
scrutinize via our large-scale standard survey17. Still we did find that councillors’ contact 
pattern impinges on the way in which they conceive, and subsequently claim to fulfil, 
their mandate. Going one step further, it is likely that personal styles and relationships 
delineate the contours of councillors’ room for manoeuvre as well. Probably more than 
any other government level, the local political system thrives on personal contacts: 
contacts in the BMA, contacts between the BMA and the council, contacts between 
journalists and councillors, the mayor and executives, contacts between councillors 
across party boundaries, contacts with citizens and social groups, contacts with the CEO 
and the administration, etc. Obviously, this adds further to the unpredictability of the 
modest institutional renovation path (and by extension any other path of reform). 
 
7.3.2. The ‘municipal big bang’: institutional revolution 
The second future perspective pursues the same basic goal, namely empowering 
councillors as key actors in the political system through institutional reform. Yet the way 
to get there differs substantially from the previous one. For some, incrementalism or the 
art of “muddling through” (Lindblom in De Rynck, 2006: 444) might take too much time, 
or might even not suffice at all, to achieve this basic goal. As long as executives remain 
an integral part of the council, meanwhile pulling the strings in the influential party 
(group), the solution might not be to rely solely on the instruments outlined above. What 
could be needed, instead, is a municipal big bang, a drastic reform or revolution. 
For an example of such a drastic attempt to remedy the skewed or even inverted power 
balance in the council, we can turn to the Dutch case. Before 2002, the Netherlands were 
considered to be a classic case of reversed monism too (Bakker et al., 1999, see also 
Elzinga, 1998; Tops & Zouridis, 2002; Denters & Klok, 2003; Steen & Wille, 2005 and 
Denters et al., 2005; see also Chapter 6). The presence of the aldermen in the council and 
the party groups had turned the local authority structure upside down. As a result, the 
formal layman rule was overruled by executive and professional dominance. These traits 
made the Dutch system highly reminiscent of the current Belgian one. Yet in contrast 
with the Belgian incremental path, the Netherlands chose to take drastic measures by 
altering the fundamentals of the system. One of the main objectives was to increase 
councillors’ operational room for manoeuvre and reduce the excesses of party 
                                                             
17 This is, for instance, probably a reason why our analytical regression models seldom wielded very 
strong explanatory power. 
GENERAL CONCLUSION  |  245 
 
government and executive supremacy18. Indeed, the Dualism Act of 2002 radically and 
formally separated the executive board from the council as legislative authority. 
Aldermen are now potentially recruited from outside the council while being appointed 
and, if necessary, dismissed by the council. They no longer take part in council (or 
council committee) debates (unless they are inquired by the council). They are no longer 
allowed to vote on local policies. And often, aldermen no longer attend the meetings of 
their party group either. In addition to this structural separation of authorities, the council 
received new instruments such as an administrative clerk, an audit court and annual 
citizen reports. Taken together, this reform was intended to reinvigorate the council and 
its councillors in the three classic roles of representing local issues and demands, 
determining the main goals of the local policy, and controlling the latter’s 
implementation. 
The effects of the reforms seem divergent. Some authors underline the democratic 
problems caused by the difficult relation between council and executive (i.e. the so-called 
duelism, Steen & Wille, 2005; Steen & Toonen, 2010). Besides, Denters et al. (2008) and 
De Groot (2009) have found that councillors have not (yet) fundamentally improved their 
representative input role thus far. On the other hand, the authors did perceive an 
amelioration of their output roles, and their position in the local authority. The authors 
consequently conclude that the impact of the council has increased. In any case, the 
reform has clearly separated the roles in the local system (Pruim, 2010). Executives no 
longer take their supremacy in the council, coalition or party group for granted. The 
council, on its turn, can steer the municipality, but in order to do so, it has to act more as 
a collective body in some cases to oppose the BMA and the administration (Pruim, 2010). 
In our comparative analysis, the Dutch councillors also emerged as the most optimistic 
ones in terms of their impact in the system. So from the standpoint of the councillors, we 
might (carefully) call the Dutch reform a success (see also Pruim, 2010). 
Let us now return to the Belgian setting. Under the above assumption, copying a similar 
reform in a similar context could produce similar results. This means that in addition to 
the existing instruments, new and radical reforms could be more effective to re-empower 
councils and councillors vis-à-vis the executives and political parties. Such reforms 
imply: a formal and radical (i.e. functional and personal) separation of the council and the 
executive board; inviting aldermen as mere guests (to illuminate policies) in the meetings 
of the party group; support for the council and councillors (instead of the party groups) 
by an independent office and officer; the systematic right to recall aldermen who lose the 
council’s confidence; forbidding mayors or aldermen to preside over the council. Other 
possible instruments are: allowing the council to elect the mayor – as this would align 
                                                             
18 Simultaneously, the Dualism Act aimed at strengthening the executive board in its administrative 
responsibility (Steen & Toonen, 2010). 
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with the idea of formal council primacy (Reynaert & Steyvers, 2006); and electing less 
councillors who can be better trained and supported (De Rynck, 2012). 
A final point concerns the impact and the contradictory role of the political parties. As 
part of the problem and part of the solution, parties could be strengthened and weakened 
at the same time (De Rynck, 2012). The first component entails investing in the local 
party branches in terms of recruitment, formation and support; and coupling party grants 
to party membership figures in order to promote the party’s bond with the local 
community. In this way, parties could become the breeding ground for strong councillors 
in office. The second component should alleviate the pressure on the councillors to 
follow the dictates of their parties in the council. Ethical/deontological codes and internal 
council regulations are soft rules that can raise consciousness of democratic performance 
and role fulfilment. Yet they could also be accompanied by new formal rules of the game 
which seek to reduce party politics (e.g. allowing panachage, changing the electoral 
procedure in order to further decrease the impact of list votes, etc.). Meanwhile, 
systematically involving citizen input in the council (e.g. by advisory councils, public 
hearings, organizing neighbourhood information sessions, etc.) could help to reduce party 
government as well19. The plenary council meeting could then function as an open forum 
for broad public debate on all relevant social topics between the parties, stakeholders and 
citizens (De Rynck in Steyvers & Reynaert, 2003)20. 
Would this perspective be the optimal solution? Its radical approach has at least the 
advantage of formal and symbolic clarity. It would make an end to the current practice 
that holds the middle between decapitated dualism and schizophrenic monism (Steyvers 
& Reynaert, 2003; Reynaert & Steyvers, 2006). Indeed, while there are some dualistic 
clues at present (e.g. council president, delegation, constructive no-confidence vote), the 
core of the system has remained monistic (i.e. executives retaining their seat and vote in 
the council). Besides, this path also hands councillors more effective instruments to 
exercise their rights as key actors in the system. 
On the other hand, we might think of some reasons to reject such a drastic revolution too. 
First, we should put our own empirical findings in the right perspective. At the moment 
of response (2007-2008), the Dutch reform had been implemented for some years 
already. Belgian reforms were more fresh. This means that time-effects might explain to 
some extent why Dutch councillors believe that they have more impact than Belgian 
                                                             
19 This function represents a broad interpretation of the classic input role of the councillors as bridgehead 
(i.e. mere spokespersons of the community), resembling a more proactive role as democratic auditor 
(Denters et al., 2008: 68). 
20 In fact, the council is, and should be, the arena for opposing and conflicting interests and visions of the 
local society. Council debates should therefore function as a gradual and mutual search for the common 
good. In this way, local policies will be able to build on broader public support afterwards (Pruim, 2010). 
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councillors. Furthermore, also Dutch councillors feel to be less influential than their 
executive board in the end. And like in Belgium, there is still a considerable group 
amongst them who fail to implement their role-set as they would wish to. 
Second, there are some theoretical arguments against simply copy-pasting the Dutch 
model over onto the Belgian setting. Some might question the desirability of this 
practice. The Dutch example has shown how the system went through a period of duelism 
after the introduction of the Dualism Act21. This situation, along with the enhanced 
probability of turnover in the executive board, could form a risk for the stability of the 
local system. Besides, it could come at a high cost not just from a financial perspective, 
but from a democratic perspective too. In the Netherlands, dualism has drastically 
increased the amount of aldermen who are not popularly elected by the locality (Denters 
et al., 2005). Hence, restoring one link of the representative chain could simultaneously 
weaken another one. If the councillors would (still) fail to effectively steer and control 
the executive, dualism might further boost the technocratic and elitist character of local 
government. Another argument in the Belgian context is that the disconnection of the 
BMA and the council could lead to high levels of absenteeism amongst the aldermen in 
the council (Steen & Wille, 2005). 
In addition to the above argument, one could also wonder if the Dutch institutional 
revolution is feasible in the Belgian context. Steen and Wille (2005) see the overarching 
contextual setting as one of the most important conditions for effective institutional 
change. As we have stated before, the Belgian and Dutch local context bear many 
similarities. However, they also differ in a number of traits. Unlike the Netherlands, the 
political culture of Belgian local government is, for instance, characterized by its political 
localism. The concept implies that the municipalities’ lack of autonomy in functional 
public service delivery is compensated for by immediate access to the central level(s) of 
decision-making via multiple office-holding and political parties colonizing the centre 
(Wayenberg et al., 2010; Steyvers, 2012)22. In Belgium, the central governments that 
have the discretion to modify the local system (e.g. in a dualistic direction) are 
consequently studded with councillors who hold an executive office at the local level on 
the side23. This could explain why there is no broad basis (or willingness) to support a 
dualistic local government structure in Belgium. Indeed, the decision to empower 
councillors (partly at the expense of the executives) has to be taken by actors who are 
often directly involved in, or would be strongly affected by, the reform. Therefore, one 
                                                             
21 On the other hand, this was not the case in every municipality either. Moreover, this duelism could fade 
away over time. Pruim (2010), for example, compares duelism with the necessary phase of puberty on the 
system’s road to maturity. 
22 In the Netherlands, such multiple office holding is prohibited. 
23 Many councillors even explicitly justify their supra-local mandate by claiming that it allows them to 
better advocate the interests of their municipality on a higher level. 
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thing seems for sure: the institutional big bang would not come without political 
controversy. 
Furthermore, there are some other cultural differences between the Netherlands and 
Belgium. On the cultural plan, for instance, Dutch councils already boasted a stronger 
tradition of debate before the reform (Kalk & De Rynck, 2003). This reflects a political 
culture in the Netherlands which is marked by more horizontal power relations, and 
which is underpinned by a tradition of systematic and transparent public governance (De 
Rynck, 2012)24. Accordingly, scholars reckon that the introduction of dualism entailed a 
less drastic censure with the past in the Netherlands than it would do in Belgium 
(Steyvers & Reynaert, 2003; Steen & Toonen, 2010). In Belgium, dualism would in fact 
require a radical change of mind and culture, which could be “far too drastic to be 
realistic” (Steen & Wille, 2005: 464). Belgium scores higher on Hofstede’s uncertainty 
avoidance index than the Netherlands too (Mouritzen & Svara, 2002; Steen & Wille, 
2005). Hence, Belgian councillors should be more inclined to adhere to the (in casu: 
informal) rules of the game than Dutch councillors. This obedient nature probably 
explains another difference between both countries: the higher degree of party 
government and, particularly, party discipline in Belgium (Kalk & De Rynck, 2003; 
Steyvers & Reynaert, 2003; De Rynck, 2012)25. Some authors doubt if dualism would be 
a watertight guarantee for the decrease of party discipline in Belgium (Steyvers & 
Reynaert, 2003). Regarding the latter, our analyses suggest that while Dutch parties 
succeed more in empowering their councillors in office, Belgian parties rather use their 
impact to keep councillors under the thumb as loyal party soldiers (see Chapter 6)26. 
Our final remark relates to the structural differences between the two countries. A 
democratic and effective dualistic system requires capable councillors and financial 
strength to sustain the accompanying instruments. Given the larger scale of its local 
government and the emphasis on governmental power (bestuurskracht), the Dutch system 
seems to rely on a more fertile soil and a larger recruitment pool for this27. Lastly, there is 
an important difference with regard to the figure of the mayor (Mouritzen & Svara, 
2002). In the Netherlands, the mayor (who is appointed instead of elected) is expected to 
maintain the relations between the council and the BMA (Steen & Wille, 2005). Such a 
neutral or mediating role is difficult to imagine in the Belgian setting, where the mayor is 
                                                             
24 Still both countries score quite high on Hofstede’s index of power distance (i.e. the acceptance of the 
power hierarchy in an organization) (Mouritzen & Svara, 2002; Steen & Wille, 2005). 
25 In the Netherlands, on the other hand, the impact of the professional administration is believed to be 
stronger (Kalk & De Rynck, 2003). This has been confirmed in our comparative analysis in terms of the 
impact of the heads of departments (but not the CEO). 
26 However, executives might not only profit from party discipline, but could (partly) impose it as well. 
27 The structural and systematic approach to the councillor office in the Netherlands is exemplified by the 
genuine councillor profiles that have been developed (e.g. Vernieuwingsimpuls Dualisme en lokale 
democratie). 
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the political forerunner, the face of the municipality and the leader of the political 
majority28. 
 
7.3.3. Alternative scenarios: rethinking the role and position of local councillors in the 
twenty-first century 
The third and final perspective takes a different approach. Essentially, both the 
incremental path and its drastic alternative pursue the noble goal of restoring (or, perhaps 
from a more realistic standpoint: introducing) the layman rule. In the current state of 
affairs, however, one could wonder if it is realistic at all to expect layman politicians to 
steer the semi-professional political leaders and the professional administration in a 
system that is driven by party government, professionalization and executive supremacy. 
Aiming at harmonizing these informal rules with the formal rules of the game is, then, 
like fighting a losing battle. Moreover, is this goal not outdated in the current context of 
local democracy altogether? Many of the instruments and reforms of the previous 
perspectives are products of the classic, normative line of thinking about the political 
system. This vision stems from the heydays of representative democracy, which rested on 
the premise that the local system was to run democratically, transparently and efficiently 
on the basis of representative principles (e.g. free and fair elections, political 
representation, layman rule, equality), a local regime comprised of hierarchical local 
government and in-house service provision, and a clearly defined authority structure 
(political primacy, electoral chain of command). In this system, each institution held a 
typical position and had a classic role to play (see Chapter 1). 
Yet this situation has evolved over the past decades. To clarify our point, we can fall back 
on the metaphor of the local councillors as infantrymen of democracy again. From its 
earliest conception to the present day, the nature of warfare has almost taken a complete 
u-turn. The days of all-out man-to-man combat are largely in the past now. So is war 
between single nations with their traditional armies and strategies. More and more, the 
latter have made way for modern missions, tactics and techniques. Warfare as we 
presently know it entails information struggle, deployment of elite groups, air strikes and 
powerful long-distance weapons; training and supplying local militias; peacekeeping 
missions; building and maintaining strategic alliances with other states, organizations or 
local groups, etc. In this new context the typical image of the infantryman, marching 
courageously ahead to defend his nation’s interests, seems a romantic idea of the past. 
Instead, soldiers play various roles depending on the demands of the situation in place: 
                                                             
28 This exemplifies how the Belgian system (still) has many traits in common with the French system in 
terms of its local government structure (e.g. multiple office holding) and culture – which explains why it 
might be harder to introduce a drastic institutional reform such as dualism. 
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they are trainer, data assembler, tactical unit, negotiator, guard, peacekeeper, etc. And 
often just as a last resort, a smaller but optimally trained, equipped and supported army of 
infantrymen is called into action. 
Arguably, we can draw a parallel between this image and the contemporary world of 
local democracy. As Keane (2009: xiv) argues, “every turn of phrase, every custom and 
every institution of democracy as we know it is time-bound.” No single democratic model 
was ever set in stone, or has built-in historical guarantees to remain the fixed, dominant 
paradigm. The very quality of the political system is that it can adapt itself to changing 
conditions in order to survive (Easton in Deschouwer, 1993). In recent decades, the 
political system has adapted itself indeed. The changes sought to both process the 
increasing demands and deal with the decreasing support from the modern community 
and wider environment (see Chapter 1). The result is that the dominant classic model of 
representative democracy has been called into question as the only and/or ultimate way to 
achieve democratic and efficient popular self-government. Several complementary forms 
(e.g. participatory democracy, network democracy, market democracy) have been added 
to blend together in a modern hybrid or pluralistic democratic system. According to 
Keane (2009), the end of the dominance of representative democracy even marks a major 
shift in the system. He distinguishes monitory democracy as the main paradigm for the 
future. This paradigm entails that power and the political order are publically monitored 
and scrutinized through a wide, diverse and variable range of public devices and 
institutions29. 
These new or complementary forms of democracy have one thing in common: they imply 
the inclusion of new authorities and rules in the political system and, ultimately, even 
create a new political regime. The fixed ways of the old regime of local government and 
its in-house service production, underpinned by (formal) layman rule and a clear electoral 
chain of command, are in the past. The new regime of local governance builds on 
different and/or additional principles and practices (see also Chapter 1). Hierarchy and 
standardization give way to flexibility and custom-made policies in networks that 
comprise several (types of) actors. Consequently, in the words of Hansen (2001: 119), we 
might wonder “whether (...) efforts of ‘reinventing government’ are what is needed to 
meet the new challenges of political democracy and decision making at the local level.” 
Should we not turn to alternative scenarios that might work better in the modern regime 
of local governance? Should councillors not operate as modern soldiers, adopting a 
variety of roles that are tailored to the requirements of the given context? In this modern 
                                                             
29 As such, the old democratic paradigm of “one person, one vote” makes way for the modern variant 
“one person, as many votes as interests, but only one vote in relation to each interest” (Keane, 2009: 
861). For Keane (2009), this is an effective way of humbling the dominant party-led model of the 
representative political system – as in fact the parties and their institutions remain a part of the new 
system too. 
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context, the macro-goals of the political system have remained unchanged, but the 
(understanding of the) best way to achieve them at the micro-level has not. 
In such a pluralistic context, the main question is not how to restore the traditional 
political primacy of the local councillors, but how to reposition them in the new regime. 
Tuning the actions of the councillors in line with institutional renovations that respond to 
current public expectations may yield two major benefits (Tops & Zouridis, 2002). On 
one hand, it is likely to enhance the credibility and authority of the council(lors) – and 
consequently, increase public support for the system on the macro-level. On the other 
hand, it paves the way for a more productive, recognizable and interesting role fulfilment 
by the councillors on the micro-level too. What this comes down to in practice, is that the 
typical political primacy of the councillors (which is largely illusory at present anyway) 
is replaced by political ultimacy (Tops & Zouridis, 2002). Councillors should not be the 
sovereign rulers, but the servants of society in the contemporary and flexible political 
regime (see also Sörensen, 2006; De Rynck, 2012). In this way, democracy returns to 
being democracy by the humble again (Keane, 2009). 
Our third perspective is an umbrella for such alternative (or complementary) scenarios. 
Many of them can be placed under the common denominator of metagovernance. 
Metagovernance (literally the governance of governance) qualifies as “an indirect form of 
governing that is exercised by influencing various processes of self-governance” 
(Sörensen, 2006: 100). The concept refers to the different roles that councillors can play 
in the new local governance regime, which in fact includes local government plus all 
sorts of governance networks that are part of the contemporary pluralistic democratic 
system. We can define such governance networks, therefore, quite broadly as “public 
policy making and implementation through a web of relationships between government, 
business and civil society actors” (Klijn, 2008: 511). They may include public-private 
partnerships, inter-municipal co-operations, networks of citizen participation, etc. 
According to the academics, councillors’ metagovernance role is an important (although 
not sufficient)30 precondition for, above all, the democratic proceedings of network 
decision-making (Sörensen & Torfing, 2005 and 2009)31. This need stems from the 
                                                             
30 Other conditions for the democratic proceedings of governance networks may include incorporating 
more participants in the network; maximizing the publicity on the network; monitoring and, if necessary, 
sanctioning the governance process by representative authorities outside the network; accepting common 
norms on good governance by the other actors in the network; accountability of the other actors in the 
process, etc. (Aars & Fimreite, 2005; Hovik & Vabo, 2005; Sörensen & Torfing, 2009). 
31 Originally, governance networks (and its literature) focused strongly on their capacity to improve 
efficiency and effectiveness on the output side of the system. However, the participative value and 
capacity of this regime has been brought stronger under the attention as an inherent condition and surplus 
(Sörensen & Torfing, 2003, 2005 and 2009; Wälti et al., 2004; Aars & Fimreite, 2005; Bogason & Musso, 
2006; Nyholm & Haveri, 2009). 
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participatory and deliberative criticism on governance (Wälti et al., 2004; also Aars & 
Fimreite, 2005; Hansen, 2005; Sörensen & Torfing, 2009). In fact, network decision-
making tends to only incorporate actors who have a direct stake in the policy-making 
process (in contrast with the basic equality principle of the classic government model). 
There is no open competition for the inclusion in the networks either. In addition to this 
limitation on the input side, network governance could lack clear accountability on the 
throughput side of the system32. 
A part of the solution to these problems is thus to link governance networks to the 
democratic institutions of traditional government, in casu the local councillors (Klijn & 
Koppenjan, 2000; Wälti et al., 2004; Hansen, 2005; Hovik & Vabo, 2005; Sörensen & 
Torfing, 2005 and 2009; Nyholm & Haveri, 2009). Councillors can profit from their 
democratic legitimacy, formal authority and resources to this end (Klijn & Koppenjan, 
2000; Sörensen & Torfing, 2009). As such, they create representative network 
governance (Hansen, 2005) and evolve from sovereign rulers to modern metagovernors 
(Sörensen, 2006). Arguably, the introduction of metagovernance might slow down the 
process of decision-making in governance networks. Yet by balancing proactive 
leadership with democratic feedback and support, metagovernance is an important 
condition for its success (Steyvers, 2012). 
The metagovernance-umbrella encompasses an extensive and diversified toolkit for the 
councillors. Sörensen and Torfing (2009: 248) discern four broad sets of instruments: 
network design (e.g. set the objectives and deadlines, ensure broad participation, install 
different networks, ensure publicity, terminate the network, etc.); network framing (e.g. 
shape the fiscal and legal context, set the goals and joint mission, promote coordination 
and interdependencies, monitor the performance, impose sanctions or adjustments, etc.), 
network management (e.g. provide resources, reduce tensions, promote equality, ensure 
transparency through communication, monitor the accountability of other actors, etc.) and 
network participation (e.g. facilitate cooperation, build trust, create democratic attitudes, 
learn from failure and institutionalize success, pursue a broad agenda, safeguard open and 
responsive deliberation, evaluate the performances, etc.). Clearly, with the cumulative 
use of these tools comes a stronger role in the governance network. This role differs in 
terms of distance to the network (i.e. standing outside the network versus being 
embedded in the network) and engagement in the network (i.e. hands-off versus hands-on 
                                                             
32 This criticism follows from a particular dilemma in governance networks (Sörensen & Torfing, 2003). 
Whereas the actors involved should enjoy a certain degree of freedom to reach spontaneous decisions, 
they also need to be kept in check by the organization or group they represent. Moreover, many actors in 
governance networks have not been popularly authorized beforehand and/or are not controlled afterwards 
(Papadopoulos, 2007). 
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approach) (Sörensen, 2006). Councillors may, consequently, act as spectators, facilitators 
(or enablers), playmakers or arbitrators in the network (Steyvers, 2012)33. 
Metagovernance thus entails a shift from councillors’ traditional primacy to a new role in 
the initiation and guidance of network processes, which gradually seek to discover the 
common interest of the actors involved (Klijn & Koppenjan, 2000). This might end up 
significantly improving the democratic quality of the political system on the macro-level. 
Sörensen (2006) explains why a political system based on metagovernance could be 
worth striving for. For her, such a system multiplies the channels of possible citizen input 
and simultaneously increases the possibility that citizens can influence policies that are of 
particular or direct interest to them. The variety of possible decision-making paths also 
enhances the plurality of citizen input and helps citizens to develop participatory skills. 
Taken together, this form of decision-making might bring citizens closer together and 
reduce the gap between citizens and politicians34. When considering the irreversibility of 
local governance, the conclusion for Bogason and Musso (2006: 13) is clear: councillors 
should “metagovern or perish.” 
Metagovernance could give a new dimension to the councillor office in Belgium too. 
Citizen-legislators would no longer have to chase an unattainable ideal of the past. 
Instead, they can turn to a pragmatic, more realistic and versatile new function. Like 
modern soldiers, councillors can engage in particular networks and use different tools to 
play various roles depending on the circumstances, their capacities and interests. As such, 
the council and the councillors are no longer the engines that drive the political system, 
but are more the oil that runs it. Given the typical qualities of local politics, as well as its 
nature as a laboratory for reform (see Vetter & Kersting, 2003b; Pilet et al., 2005; De 
Rynck, 2007), local councillors might be the appropriate actors to try out and refine this 
new metagovernor role. The implementation of metagovernance in practice will, 
therefore, also be one of the major challenges for Belgian local governments in the future 
(Steyvers, 2012). 
Still metagovernance alone might not provide the ultimate solution, and neglecting or 
dismissing the current attempts of institutional renovation could be to throw out the baby 
                                                             
33 Other roles that are frequently associated with metagovernance are the guardian role (e.g. guarding the 
democratic proceedings of, or the common interest in, governance networks; see Hansen 2001 and 2005; 
Denters et al., 2008; Nyholm & Haveri, 2009) or the role as spokesmen of non-included citizens and their 
interests (Hansen, 2001 and 2005; Hovik and Vabo, 2005). Another way of organizing the metagovernor 
toolkit is to follow the policy process (Klijn & Koppenjan, 2000: 384). Councillors’ toolkit then consists 
of: initiating and legitimizing at the start, supporting and being actively involved during the process, and 
reconciling and selecting alternatives in the end. 
34 These benefits add to the classic output functionality of governance networks in solving complex 
contemporary problems in an effective and efficient way (Hovik & Vabo, 2005; Sörensen & Torfing, 
2005 and 2009; Bogason & Musso, 2006; Papadopoulos, 2007). 
254  |  CHAPTER 7 
 
with the bathwater. Indeed, it is likely that the old ways of decision-making will not 
disappear completely because some problems will keep requiring classic processes of 
decision-making (Jacobsen, 2009; Steyvers, 2012). Metagovernance could then represent 
an improvement to just a particular aspect of the political system. In the meantime, it 
seems therefore reasonable to assume that the system would still benefit from strong(er) 
councillors in the typical government setting too. 
Furthermore, we can also raise some doubts about the feasibility and desirability of this 
third perspective. First, are the necessary conditions in place for councillors to assume the 
metagovernance attitude? Hitherto, the metagovernor role seems to have evolved rather 
organically, and particularly in the Scandinavian and Anglo-Saxon world. Nyholm and 
Haveri (2009) argue, however, that a solid institutionalized basis is necessary to make 
metagovernance effective. In Belgium, the current emphasis of central government (still) 
lies on the classic councillor roles35. It is also unlikely that the average local councillor 
already understands his/her potential role as metagovernor, let alone that he or she would 
know how to use its specific tool kit. And metagovernance could be too abstract and 
elusive to enthuse (potential) councillors. With regard to this remark, our results indicate 
that councillors are not willing to give up their traditional political primacy and classic 
role-set yet – even if they admit that modern decision-making should evolve in 
interaction with the relevant stakeholders in society36. Authors generally recognize that 
councillors’ perception of their own role could be an obstacle for effective 
metagovernance (Klijn & Koppenjan, 2000; Sörensen, 2006; Dezeure & De Rynck, 
2010). Besides, insofar as councillors understand their new role and they are willing to 
adopt it, they still have to possess the necessary capacities to do so (Nyholm & Haveri, 
2009; Dezeure & De Rynck, 2010)37. Metagovernance not only requires a change of 
mind, but also many strategic capacities such as negotiating, managing, alliance-seeking, 
planning, etc. These traits might be quite remote from the typical image of the layman 
citizen-legislator, and consequently, call for a new type of politician. 
Second, what are the chances that councillors (will) adapt their behaviour to the new 
metagovernance standards? The scientific evidence at hand suggests that this could be 
easier said than done in the Belgian setting. Verhoest and De Meu (2008), for instance, 
have underscored the limited involvement of the council in the policies of inter-municipal 
co-operations. In less formal, ad hoc policy networks (in casu spatial planning and city 
                                                             
35 Even though there is a legal basis for councillors to engage in governance networks too (e.g. citizen 
participation devices, representation in formal governance networks, the mandatory discussion of formal 
network policies in a council committee, etc.). 
36 In our dataset, 64% of the respondents (strongly) agree with the statement that “political decisions 
should not only be taken by representative bodies but be negotiated together with the concerned local 
actors” (Q19). 
37 As Nyholm and Haveri (2009) indicate, it is for instance a fine line between directing and dominating 
decision-making processes. 
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development), similar conclusions have emerged (De Rynck & Voets, 2006; Block & 
Steyvers, 2011). And at the other end of the network spectrum, Dezeure and De Rynck 
(2010) have found that councillors seldom use the available tools to engage in different 
forms of citizen participation too. The latter could nevertheless form an interesting 
complement to councillors’ classic input function and a realistic alternative to make a 
meaningful contribution to the local system (Denters et al., 2008). 
A final objection that we could raise relates to the question: ‘Will metagovernance 
eventually change the system for the better?’ Despite its obvious democratic (and 
functional) potential, the answer is not a straightforward yes. Sörensen (2006) also lists 
some possible caveats of network governance: it reduces the ability of politicians to 
control the process of decision making, as well as the level of publicity on the process. 
Besides, the communality within the network could also lead the network to separate or 
alienate from the community at large (Sörensen, 2006). This is why governments will 
have to face the challenge of balancing tailored policies with the municipalities’ general 
goals and integral policies (Steyvers, 2012). Ad hoc networks might produce effective 
and democratic results for the particular group of stakeholders involved, yet it is the task 
of the councillors to pursue policies that serve the community as a whole. A final caveat 
is that governance opens up new ways of influencing the policy-making process which 
are particularly suited to those actors that already possessed many participatory skills 
beforehand (Sörensen, 2006). For the councillors, this Matteüs-effect would probably 
mean that metagovernance is mainly suited to the likes of the executives (Tops & 
Zouridis, 2002; Nyholm & Haveri, 2009). Meanwhile, the administrative leaders could 
consolidate their position in the networks as skilled professionals as well (Sörensen, 
2006). 
In Belgium, the aforementioned research confirms that these groups are the traditional 
spiders in the functional network web (De Rynck & Voets, 2006; Block & Steyvers, 
2011). The ordinary councillor is often just a spectator, or a facilitator at best. 
Furthermore, also the main reasons for councillors’ absence in networks of citizen 
participation sound familiar: a lack of awareness of the (legal) possibilities, the 
supremacy of the executive board and party discipline (Dezeure & De Rynck, 2010). The 
success of the role as metagovernor thus seems liable to the same mechanisms as the 
success of its classic counterpart. Consequently, without accompanying formal rules, we 
may doubt that metagovernance will produce a more efficient, transparent and 
democratic political system in the end. And if metagovernance would fail, there should 
be something to fall back on, or make the proper corrections. This is why none of the 
three broad perspectives that we have discussed in this section can be regarded as the 
holy grail of local politics. No single perspective is likely to yield the ultimate solution. 
However, each in their own capacity, the perspectives hold at least some potential to re-
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empower the councillors, and contribute to an efficient, transparent and democratic 
political system at the local level. 
 
7.4. SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
To conclude our study, we devote this final section to the interpretation of our results in 
light of the scientific state of the art. Our aim has been to offer an empirical 
understanding of the contemporary role and position of the local councillors in Belgium. 
We thereby sought to bring some structure to an academic wasteland. On the basis of a 
standardized cross-sectional and actor-centred analysis, we have interpreted councillors’ 
auto-evaluations to develop an answer on our fundamental research question. In so doing, 
our analysis is the first to have systematically analyzed a large group of local councillors 
across the whole country on such a wide variety of themes. Furthermore, the comparative 
complement has placed these insights in a broader, international perspective. However, 
we also realize that our study could only focus on some aspects of a complex reality. 
Indeed, it had to take practical and theoretical limitations into consideration along the 
way. Therefore, our empirical generalization is not an end point, but, hopefully, a 
benchmark and trigger for new empirical research cycles. Below, we single out some 
possible and/or recommended lines of research to this end. 
The first suggestions relate to the practical limitations of our research method. The 
quantitative technique has allowed us to sketch a general picture with different 
underlying patterns. Yet our results are obviously not a template that fits every 
councillor, every municipality, or every situation. To capture the complex reality in a 
particular place-bound, well-defined context, qualitative research techniques could prove 
to be better instruments38. In-depth interviews with different actors (councillors, but also 
administrators, citizens, other stakeholders, etc.), focus groups and participant 
observations could then apply and refine the existent knowledge to the situation in place. 
Many authors feel that the methodological triangulation of quantitative and qualitative 
insights could indeed be a fruitful research approach (Frankfort-Nachmias & Nachmias, 
1996; Burnham et al., 2008; Hopkin, 2010). And in addition to such contextual 
diversifications, these instruments might also be more appropriate to analyzing the role 
and position of the councillors in less formally institutionalized settings such as 
governance networks. Another suggestion would be to extend the scope of analysis from 
the individual micro-level to more aggregate counterparts. This could imply assessing the 
impact and functioning of the councils and/or committees and party groups as collective 
                                                             
38 As De Rynck (2000) argues, the power relations in every municipality are dependent upon the interplay 
between different actors (councillors, executives, administrators, political parties, citizens en civil actors), 
and are subject to constant change. 
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institutions (on the meso-level), or even looking into the macro-context of the political 
system as such. In the latter approach, councillors are studied as part of a more 
comprehensive setting, including citizens, networks, the administration, policy outputs, 
etc. Finally, a longitudinal perspective seems indispensable to interpret the value of our 
thematic conclusions more profoundly. In terms of recruitment and career development 
(the professionalization and/or democratization trend), as well as role and position (an 
noting improvement or degradation in both), the interpretation of the mandate (the 
entrepreneurial shift), and the internal trend in the country (divergence, convergence or 
path-dependency), we have found that follow-up research is required to fully grasp the 
meaning of the results. 
The other suggestions follow from the theoretical research approach that we have 
followed. In the introductory chapter, we have indicated how our research fits in the 
scientific tradition that holds the middle between problem-driven and theory-driven 
research (Baldersheim & Wollmann, 2006). The aim was thus neither to test the impact 
of institutional reforms (for such an example, see e.g. Pilet et al., 2007b; Olislagers et al., 
2008 and 2009; De Groot, 2009; Olislagers & Ackaert, 2010; Matagne et al., 2011) nor to 
construct general theories on the role and position of local councillors. Rather, we have 
aimed to test theories on our research data to gain an understanding of a practical 
problem in Belgian local democracy. Future research might, therefore, complement our 
insights by tending (more) to one of the ends of this continuum. For instance, problem-
driven research can further evaluate the effects of existing and the new institutional 
reforms in the Belgian setting. It could also compare the Belgian reforms and their 
outcomes to reforms in other countries. Detailed and solid explorations of the basis for 
the alternative scenarios and councillor roles could be a valuable part of this line of 
inquiry too. 
Lastly, in the other direction of the continuum our thematic analyses may be further 
elaborated in depth, generalized, and/or complemented with new aspects to enhance 
theoretical rigour. Often, these research lines require more sophisticated analytical 
techniques and/or qualitative complements. Regarding the recruitment and career theme, 
path models could provide more insight in the mechanisms as such. Supplementary 
analysis might tackle the perspective of the voters and the selectorates as blind spots in 
our research. A systematic analysis of the impact of recruitment and career upon the 
actual behaviour in office would be another further step to take. Second, the analysis of 
councillors’ role-sets could profit from the connection between the classic orthodoxy and 
the new discourse about the roles of the councillors as metagovernors. Another aspect 
that deserves more attention concerning this theme is the relation between the councillors 
and the local administration. Indeed, councillors’ functioning not only depends upon the 
openness of the BMA and the party groups. The growing impact of the professional 
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municipal administration in the present exigent governance context is similarly an 
important element of the story39. Third, councillors’ notion of political representation 
could be compared to the other political levels and the notions of the citizens at the other 
end of the representative chain. This could tell us more about the nature of local politics 
and the congruence between the political system and the community it is to serve. It 
would also be interesting to systematically analyze councillors’ notion on the different 
other elements of the contemporary pluralistic political system. Finally, the comparative 
analysis could be replicated in a broader setting, including different countries as well as 
councillors from the smaller municipalities. And regarding the internal state of Belgian 
local government, our hypotheses could be tested in different contexts, focussing on 
different actors and/or more aspects of the political system. 
                                                             
39 Regarding this subject, Pruim (2010) aptly states how the elections are often perceived as annoying 
interruptions in the municipal management process by the administrators. 
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APPENDIX A. ORIGINAL QUESTIONNAIRE 
 
A Questions about the council and actors in the local democracy 
1. Which influence has the Council in your municipality concerning the following tasks? 
  
Very 
high 
influ-
ence 
High 
influence 
Some 
in-
fluence 
Little 
influence 
No in-
fluence 
Not an 
activity 
for the 
muni-
cipality 
1 Defining administrative procedures 4  3  2  1  0  99  
2 Financial programming/evaluation 4  3  2  1  0  99  
3 Urban planning 4  3  2  1  0  99  
4 Industrial and economic development 4  3  2  1  0  99  
5 Environment protection 4  3  2  1  0  99  
6 Strategic planning 4  3  2  1  0  99  
7 Relations with other local authorities 4  3  2  1  0  99  
8 Organisation of collective services  4  3  2  1  0  99  
9 Appoint local chief executives  4  3  2  1  0  99  
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2. Who is in your municipality mainly serving the following functions - the committees or the council?  
  Only 
the 
commit
-tees 
Mostly 
the 
commit
-tees 
Both, to 
equal 
extent 
Mostly  
the 
council 
Only 
the 
council 
Neither 
of them 
10 To represent the interests of local people 4  3  2  1  0  99  
11 
To enable the participation of people other than 
politicians in deliberations 
4  3  2  1  0  99  
12 
To allow in-depth discussion of particular 
issues 
4  3  2  1  0  99  
13 To represent the interests of parties 4  3  2  1  0  99  
14 To oversee the work of a department 4  3  2  1  0  99  
15 To make strategic policy decisions 4  3  2  1  0  99  
16 To make day-to-day management decisions 4  3  2  1  0  99  
17 To allow politicians to develop specialisms 4  3  2  1  0  99  
18 To propose or develop new policies 4  3  2  1  0  99  
 
3. Please indicate the political balance of your council: 
19    
20 1    A single party with an overall majority Please state which party: ……………………………. 
21 2    A single party without an overall majority Please state which party: …………………………… 
22 3    A coalition Please describe: ……………………………………… 
23 4    Other Please describe: ……………………………………… 
 
4. If your municipality is governed by a coalition, how would you characterise the agreement? 
24 There is a distribution of posts 1   Yes    0   No 
25 There is an agreement on policies 1   Yes    0   No 
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5. On the basis of your experience as a local councillor in this City, and independently of the formal 
procedures, please indicate how influential each of the following actors are over the Local Authority 
activities. 
  Very 
high in-
fluence 
High 
influence 
Some 
in-
fluence 
Little 
influence 
No in-
fluence 
Not 
relevant 
26 The Mayor 4  3  2  1  0  99  
27 The President of the Council 4  3  2  1  0  99  
28 The Presidents of Council Committees 4  3  2  1  0  99  
29 The Executive board 4  3  2  1  0  99  
30 Single councillors  4  3  2  1  0  99  
31 Myself 4  3  2  1  0  99  
32 
The Heads of Departments in the 
Municipality 
4  3  2  1  0  99  
33 The Municipal Chief Executive Officer  4  3  2  1  0  99  
34 Professional Consultants/Experts  4  3  2  1  0  99  
35 Local MPs or Ministers 4  3  2  1  0  99  
36 Local trade unions 4  3  2  1  0  99  
37 Journalists 4  3  2  1  0  99  
38 Local businessmen 4  3  2  1  0  99  
39 National and international firms 4  3  2  1  0  99  
40 The Church 4  3  2  1  0  99  
41 Local (voluntary) associations 4  3  2  1  0  99  
42 Local single issue groups 4  3  2  1  0  99  
43 Quarter decentralised institutional bodies 4  3  2  1  0  99  
44 Party leaders 4  3  2  1  0  99  
45 The party groups in the council 4  3  2  1  0  99  
46 Party organisations  4  3  2  1  0  99  
47 Region and upper levels of government 4  3  2  1  0  99  
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6. If a firm wants to enforce a project in the locality and expects that the council will not approve of the 
project, what actors would it have to win over to its side in order to influence the council? 
  Yes  No 
48 The leaders of the party groups in the council  1  0  
49 The leader of one or more committees  1  0  
50 The Mayor  1  0  
51 The Members of the executive body  1  0  
52 The Heads of Departments in the Municipality 1  0  
53 Professional Consultants/ Experts  1  0  
54 Local businessmen, shop-owners, etc.   1  0  
55 Local Chambers of commerce 1  0  
56 Local MPs or Ministers  1  0  
57 Local trade unions 1  0  
58 Journalists 1  0  
59 The Church  1  0  
60 Local (voluntary) associations 1  0  
61 Local single issue groups 1  0  
62 Region/Upper levels of Government  1  0  
63 Other        1  0  
 
B Questions about your role as councillor 
7. 
 
64 
For how many years have you been a councillor in total? 
For ……………. years 
 
8. Were you elected as a candidate  
65 1    of a list of a national party.  Please state which party: ………………………………………… 66 
 2    of a local list 
 3    as an individual or independent candidate 
 
9. 
67 
How did you become a candidate the first time you were nominated? 
1   I proposed myself 
2   I was asked by others 
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10. In your experience as a councillor, how important are the following tasks for you as a councillor:  
  Very 
great 
Great Moderate Little None 
68 Defining the main goals of the municipal activity  4  3  2  1  0  
69 Controlling the municipal activity  4  3  2  1  0  
70 
Representing the requests and issues emerging 
from the local society 4  3  2  1  0  
71 
Publicising the debate on local issues before 
decisions are taken 4  3  2  1  0  
72 
Explaining decisions of the council to the citizens 
4  3  2  1  0  
73 
Implementing the program of my political party/ 
movement  4  3  2  1  0  
74 Reinforcing the executive 4  3  2  1  0  
75 In mediating conflicts in the local society 4  3  2  1  0  
76 
Promoting the views and interests of minorities in 
the local society 4  3  2  1  0  
77 
Promoting the views and interests of women in 
the local society 4  3  2  1  0  
 
11. Do you get a satisfying amount of information from the municipal administration to perform your job 
as a councillor?  
 
Fully satisfying Satisfying Neither satisfying nor unsatisfying 
Mainly unsatis-
fying 
Fully unsatis-
fying 
78 5  4  3  2  1  
 
12. Do you receive an allowance as a councillor? 
79                                            Yes 1                        No   0  
 
13. Considering the corresponding responsibilities, do you think your allowance as a councillor is adequate 
or not?   
80                                      Not Adequate 1  2 3 4 5 6 7   Adequate 
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14. How much time do you spend on the following activities?   
  Average number of 
hours per month 
 
81 Council and committee meetings  ……………………  
82 Meetings with the party’s council group ……………………  
83 Other party meetings and activities ……………………  
84 Public debates, meetings with citizens, etc. ……………………  
85 Meetings with administrative staff ……………………  
86 Field visits to municipal institutions ……………………  
87 Desk work preparing your activity in the Council ……………………  
88 Other important activity as councillor,  ……………………  
89 -   please specify………………………………   
 
15. 
 
How frequently do you have contact with the following individuals or groups? 
  A few 
times a 
week 
A few 
times a 
month 
A few 
times a 
year 
(Almost) 
never 
90 The mayor 3  2  1  0  
91 Members of the executive board  3  2  1  0  
92 Committee Leaders 3  2  1  0  
93 The President of the council  3  2  1  0  
94 Members of my party group 3  2  1  0  
95 Members of other party groups 3  2  1  0  
96 The leaders of my own local party organisation  3  2  1  0  
97 The Municipality Chief Executive Officer 3  2  1  0  
98 Civil servants in the municipality 3  2  1  0  
99 Union representatives 3  2  1  0  
100 Leading actors from voluntary associations 3  2  1  0  
101 Women organisations 3  2  1  0  
102 Organisations of ethnic minorities  3  2  1  0  
103 Representatives of upper levels of government 3  2  1  0  
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104 Representatives of public agencies at the local level  3  2  1  0  
105 Private business representatives  3  2  1  0  
106 Journalists  3  2  1  0  
107 Individual citizens in your role as a councillor 3  2  1  0  
 
16. How important is it for you as a local councillor to represent the following groups or interests? 
  
Of utmost 
import-
ance 
Of great 
import-
ance 
Of 
moderate 
import-
ance 
Of little 
import-
ance 
Not 
important 
at all 
108 The whole locality 4  3  2  1  0  
109 Ethnic minority(ies) 4  3  2  1  0  
110 Women 4  3  2  1  0  
111 Workers 4  3  2  1  0  
112 The middle class 4  3  2  1  0  
113 Local business groups 4  3  2  1  0  
114 Farmers 4  3  2  1  0  
115 Religious group/the Church 4  3  2  1  0  
116 Some particular local government service 4  3  2  1  0  
117 Less resourceful citizens 4  3  2  1  0  
118 A particular geographic part of the locality 4  3  2  1  0  
 
17. 
 
 
119 
If there should be a conflict between a member’s own opinion, the opinion of the party group in the 
council or the opinion of the voters, how should, in your opinion, a member of the council vote? 
1  Vote according to his/her own conviction 
2  Vote according to the opinion of the party group 
3  Vote according to the opinion of the voters 
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C Questions about your view on local democracy and local policy 
18. How important are in your opinion the following goals for your local authority  
  Of ut-
most 
import-
ance 
Of great 
import-
ance 
Of mod-
erate 
import-
ance 
Of little 
import-
ance 
Not 
import-
ant at all 
120 To attract economic activities in the city  4  3  2  1  0  
121 To develop highly qualified activities  4  3  2  1  0  
122 To regenerate or rebuild the city-centre  4  3  2  1  0  
123 To improve infrastructures and services for mobility  4  3  2  1  0  
124 To improve the aesthetics of the city 4  3  2  1  0  
125 To develop leisure services and cultural offer  4  3  2  1  0  
126 To develop housing offer 4  3  2  1  0  
127 To defend the traditional cohesion of the local society 4  3  2  1  0  
128 To emphasise diversity and tolerance in the local society 4  3  2  1  0  
129 To improve the level of services and well-being in the city 4  3  2  1  0  
130 To reduce pollution 4  3  2  1  0  
131 To improve the external image of the city 4  3  2  1  0  
132 To attract new population 4  3  2  1  0  
133 To attract a wealthier population  4  3  2  1  0  
134 To improve the position of women in the local society 4  3  2  1  0  
135 To fight against marginality and poverty  4  3  2  1  0  
136 Other 4  3  2  1  0  
137 -   please specify…………………………………….. 
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19. How much do you agree or disagree with the following statements? 
  
Strongly 
agree 
Agree 
Neither 
agree 
nor 
disagree 
Dis-
agree 
Strongly 
disagree 
138 
Political parties are the most suitable arena for citizen 
participation 
4  3  2  1  0  
139 
An important task of a councillor is to defend the 
interests of  under-represented groups 
4  3  2  1  0  
140 Local referenda lead to high quality of public debate 4  3  2  1  0  
141 
Competition between service providers facilitates citizen 
choice in public services 
4  3  2  1  0  
142 
Decentralisation of local government is necessary to 
involve citizens in public affairs 4  3  2  1  0  
143 
Public-private partnerships are more effective in solving 
problems than public administration and representative 
bodies 
4  3  2  1  0  
144 
Political decisions should not only be taken by 
representative bodies but be negotiated together with the 
concerned local actors  
4  3  2  1  0  
145 
Female representatives can better than men look out for 
women’s interests 
4  3  2  1  0  
146 
Local bureaucrats should as far as possible stick to 
politically defined goals. 4  3  2  1  0  
147 
Women councillors often cooperate in the council, 
irrespective of party membership   4  3  2  1  0  
148 
The integrity of the leading councillors is high and it is 
not possible to get a favourable decision by offering 
benefits to the councillors.  
4  3  2  1  0  
149 
Politicians should only define objectives and control 
outputs, and never intervene into the task fulfilment of 
local administration. 
4  3  2  1  0  
150 
The need for changes and reorganisation of the local 
government sector has been greatly exaggerated. 4  3  2  1  0  
151 
There are few benefits from contracting out or privatising 
services in the municipality  4  3  2  1  0  
152 
Male and female councillors put forward different 
questions in local politics 
4  3  2  1  0  
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20. There is often talk about a left-right dimension in [Belgian] politics.  
Where would you place yourself on a left-right dimension?  
  Left  Right 
  0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
153             
 
21. People have different ideas about how local democracy should function. Please indicate how important 
for local democracy you feel the following requirements are:  
  Of 
utmost 
import-
ance 
Of great 
import-
ance 
Of 
moderate 
import-
ance 
Of little 
import-
ance 
Not 
import-
ant at 
all 
154 
Residents should participate actively and directly in 
making important local decisions. 
4  3  2  1  0  
155 
Residents should have the opportunity to make their 
views known before important local decisions are 
made by elected representatives. 
4  3  2  1  0  
156 
Apart from voting, citizens should not be given the 
opportunity to influence local government policies 
4  3  2  1  0  
157 
Council decisions should reflect a majority opinion 
among the residents. 
4  3  2  1  0  
158 
Political representatives should make what they think 
are the right decisions, independent of the current 
views of local people. 
4  3  2  1  0  
159 
Local politicians should try to generate consensus and 
shared values among local citizens/groups. 
4  3  2  1  0  
160 
The results of local elections should be the most 
important factor in determining municipal policies 
4  3  2  1  0  
 
22. How effective are the following instruments in letting local politicians know public opinion irrespective 
of whether such reforms have been introduced in your own country or municipality? 
  
Very 
effective 
Effective 
Modera-
tely 
effective 
Not suffi-
ciently 
effective 
Not  
effective  
161 Voting 4  3  2  1  0  
162 Party meetings 4  3  2  1  0  
163 Petitions 4  3  2  1  0  
164 Citizens juries  4  3  2  1  0  
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165 Public meetings 4  3  2  1  0  
166 Satisfaction surveys 4  3  2  1  0  
167 Complaints schemes 4  3  2  1  0  
168 Referenda 4  3  2  1  0  
169 Consultation with local agencies 4  3  2  1  0  
170 Consultation with community groups 4  3  2  1  0  
 
23. How effective do you consider the use made by the council and the councillors of the instruments 
available to them? 
  
Very 
effective Effective 
Moderately 
effective 
Not suffi-
ciently 
effective 
Not  
effective  
171 Questions 4  3  2  1  0  
172 Interpellation  4  3  2  1  0  
173 Motion (Declaration of agreement with 
decision of Municipality)  4  3  2  1  0  
174 Resolution  4  3  2  1  0  
175 Agenda  4  3  2  1  0  
176 Inquiry right  4  3  2  1  0  
177 Information right    4  3  2  1  0  
178 Scrutiny  4  3  2  1  0  
179 Local referenda 4  3  2  1  0  
 
24. In your experience as a councillor, how would you define your contribution regarding the following tasks?   
  Very 
great 
Great Moderate Little None 
180 Defining the main goals of the municipal activity  4  3  2  1  0  
181 Controlling the municipal activity  4  3  2  1  0  
182 
Representing the requests and issues emerging 
from the local society 
4  3  2  1  0  
183 
Publicising the debate on local issues before 
decisions are taken 4  3  2  1  0  
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184 
Explaining decisions of the council to the citizens 
4  3  2  1  0  
185 
Implementing the program of my political party/ 
movement  4  3  2  1  0  
186 Reinforcing the executive 4  3  2  1  0  
187 In mediating conflicts in the local society 4  3  2  1  0  
188 
Promoting the views and interests of minorities in 
the local society 4  3  2  1  0  
189 
Promoting the views and interests of women in 
the local society 4  3  2  1  0  
 
25. Below you find a number of reforms that have been introduced in municipalities in different European 
countries. Irrespective of whether such reforms have been introduced in your own country or 
municipality how desirable or undesirable do you consider the following reforms: 
  
Highly 
desirable 
Desirable 
Neither 
desirable 
nor 
undesirable 
Un-
desirable 
Highly 
undesirable 
190 An advisory (non-binding) referendum 4  3  2  1  0  
191 A decisive (binding) referendum 4  3  2  1  0  
192 
Frequent surveys to monitor local public 
opinion 
4  3  2  1  0  
193 Direct elections of mayors 4  3  2  1  0  
194 
Co-decision procedures, where –citizens can 
discuss and make binding decisions on certain 
local issues.    
4  3  2  1  0  
195 
Devolution of responsibilities to neighbourhood 
organizations 4  3  2  1  0  
196 
Citizen consultation procedure, where citizens 
are informed about and can support or criticize 
municipal proposals 
4  3  2  1  0  
197 
Transferring the powers of scrutiny over 
municipal services to user boards 
4  3  2  1  0  
198 
Reducing the number of members of the 
Council 4  3  2  1  0  
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D Questions concerning your political career and your party 
26. Do you presently hold any of the following elective or executive offices? Have you previously held any 
of these offices? 
  Yes, 
today 
Not now, 
but 
before 
No, Never 
199 Member of Parliament 2  1  0  
200 Minister 2  1  0  
201 Councillor in another municipality 2  1  0  
202 Mayor in another municipality 2  1  0  
203 Member of regional (or provincial) executive board 2  1  0  
204 Parish council 2  1  0  
205 Member of board of council-owned joint stock 
company or foundation 
2  1  0  
206 Member of a council committee 2  1  0  
207 President of a council committee 2  1  0  
208 Member of the executive board 2  1  0  
209 President of the council 2  1  0  
210 Delegate of the mayor 2  1  0  
211 Regional councillor  2  1  0  
212 Provincial councillor 2  1  0  
213 Member of a co-operative body of Local Authorities 2  1  0  
 
27. Are you, or have you previously been, a member or holding a position in the following types of 
organisations?   
  At present Not now, but before Never 
been a 
member   Elected or 
appointed 
position 
Only  
member 
 
Elected or 
appointed 
position 
Only  
member 
214 215 Trade union 2  1  2  1  0  
216 217 Business/professional association 2  1  2  1  0  
218 219 Humanitarian organisation 2  1  2  1  0  
220 221 Sport/athletic organisation 2  1  2  1  0  
222 223 Women organisation 2  1  2  1  0  
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224 225 Environmental organisation 2  1  2  1  0  
226 227 Ethnic minority organisation 2  1  2  1  0  
228 229 Religious organisation 2  1  2  1  0  
230 231 Neighbourhood organisation 2  1  2  1  0  
232 233 Other organisation   
– please specify: 
 
2  1  
 
2  1  0  
234        
 
28. Are you presently a party member?  
235   0  No         1  Yes,           Please specify which party:  …………………………… 236 
 
29.  When did you first become a party member:  
237                         Year:………..  Please specify which party .......………………………...  
                       0   I have never belonged to any party 
238 
 
 
30. Do you presently have, or have you previously had, a position (board member etc.) in your party’s 
organisation (beside the party’s council group)? 
  
Yes, 
presently 
Yes, 
previously 
No, 
never 
Not applicable.  My party does not 
have such an organisation or I’m 
not a member of a party 
239 In the local party organisation 3  2  1  0  
240 
 
Upper level party organisations 3  2  1  0  
 
31. What is your opinion on the following statements about your party? 
  
Agree 
totally 
Partly 
agree 
Neither 
agree 
nor 
disagree 
Partly 
dis-
agree 
Disagree 
totally 
Not 
applicable 
241 The local party organisation has much in-
fluence over the decisions of the party’s 
council group  
4  3  2  1  0  99  
242 The party’s council group has much in-
fluence over the decisions of the local party 
4  3  2  1  0  99  
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243 The leader of the party group usually 
informs and seeks the support of the party 
group when decisions are taken 
4  3  2  1  0  99  
 
32. Have you got a seat in the council due to the preferential voting system, i.e. although you have not been 
placed in  higher positions of your party or local list? 
244    1  Yes     0  No 
 
33. As a candidate in the last election, to what extent did you have the support of the following groups: 
  Very 
great 
Great Some Little Not at all 
245 National organ(s) of your party 4  3  2  1  0  
246 Your party wing/fraction 4  3  2  1  0  
247 Your party at the local level 4  3  2  1  0  
248 National politician(s) 4  3  2  1  0  
249 Local prestigious person(s) 4  3  2  1  0  
250 Trade union(s) 4  3  2  1  0  
251 Local business group(s) 4  3  2  1  0  
252 Women organisation(s) 4  3  2  1  0  
253 Local media 4  3  2  1  0  
254 The church 4  3  2  1  0  
255 Local (voluntary) association(s) 4  3  2  1  0  
256 Ethnic group(s) 4  3  2  1  0  
 
34. When you first accepted to become a candidate, how important were the following reasons?   
Please indicate the importance of each motive. 
  
Of utmost 
importance 
Of great 
importance 
Of 
moderate 
importance 
Of little 
importance 
Not 
important 
at all 
257 General interest in politics  4  3  2  1  0  
258 Possibility to highlight the needs of 
the group I represent 
4  3  2  1  0  
259 It is a chance to learn how the 
political system functions 
4  3  2  1  0  
260 As a councillor I can do a good job 4  3  2  1  0  
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for the party I represent 
261 It is an opportunity to control the 
administration 
4  3  2  1  0  
262 The allowances tempted me to 
become a councillor  
4  3  2  1  0  
263 As a councillor I have the 
opportunity to make social contacts 
4  3  2  1  0  
264 As a councillor I will be held in high 
esteem 
4  3  2  1  0  
265 It is an opportunity to enter into a 
political career 
4  3  2  1  0  
266 As a councillor I have the 
opportunity to influence specific 
issues 
4  3  2  1  0  
267 It is a citizen duty to engage oneself 
in municipal affairs 
4  3  2  1  0  
268 
 
269 
Other reasons (specify) 
………………………………. 
4  3  2  1  0  
 
35. For the time being, what are you planning to do at the end of the present mandate?  
Please select one of the following alternatives 
 270 1  I would like to continue as a councillor 
  2  I would like to continue my political career in a higher political office at the local level 
  3  I would like to continue my political career in a higher political office at the regional or 
national level 
  4  I would like to quit politics 
 
36. If you want to quit politics, could you please state why?   
  Yes No 
271 I want to concentrate on my profession 1  0  
272 I want to work for a voluntary organisation 1  0  
273 I have done my citizen duty 1  0  
274 I think political work is too time-consuming in relation to family or occupation 1  0  
275 I lack influence (of myself, my party or municipalities in general) 1  0  
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276 I am too old 1  0  
277 I will move from the municipality 1  0  
 
E Questions about your background 
   37. 
278 
 
How old are you?                       ……………………years 
 
   38. 
279 
 
Are you male or female?           1  Male      2  Female 
 
   39. 
280 
For how many years have you lived in your municipality? 
……………………years  
 
   40. 
281 
What is your highest completed education? 
1   Elementary school 
2   Secondary school or equivalent 
3   University / college or equivalent. 
 
   41. In the two last generations, were any of your close relatives elected for a political function? 
 282     1  Yes         0  No  
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42. 
 
 
283  
284 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
To which occupational category did you belong before your first mandate as a councillor? And to which 
occupational category do you belong today? 
 
  Before         Now 
Professional politician (or the like, e.g. cabinet or party function)  1   1  
Civil servant   2    2  
Business manager   3    3  
Teacher   4    4  
 Liberal profession (e.g. lawyer, doctor)   5    5  
 Engineer (or the like, e.g. computer specialist, technician)   6    6  
 Clerk   7    7  
 Shopkeeper (or the like, e.g. salesman)   8    8  
Labourer   9    9  
Farmer or fisher 10  10  
Student 11  11  
Retired 12  12  
Housewife/-man 13  13  
Other, please specify…………………………………………………… 14  14  
 
43. 
285 
In your present occupation are you 
        1   An employee         2   Self-employed       3   Unemployed/student/retired 
 
44. If you are an employee – Are you employed by a public sector organisation or by a private firm? 
 Public sector Private firm/Voluntary 
organisation 
Employed in both 
public and private 
sector 
Neither/Not employed 
286 3  2  1  0  
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45. How much time do you spend on the following activities per week?  
287 Gainful employment ……………………..hours/week  
288 Unpaid care and household work ……………………..hours/week  
 
46. Where were you and your parents born? 
  [Belgium] Another 
country 
Specify which country: 
289 I was born in: 1  2  290……………………………… 
291 My mother was born in: 1  2  292……………………………… 
293 My father was born in: 1  2  294……………………………… 
 
47. To what extent do you feel that you belong to the following groups in society?  
 
  To a high 
degree 
To some  
degree 
Neither high 
nor low degree 
To a low  
degree 
Not at 
all 
295 The working classes 4  3  2  1  0  
296 The middle classes 4  3  2  1  0  
297 The upper classes 4  3  2  1  0  
298 The [Belgian] people 4  3  2  1  0  
299 A religious group 4  3  2  1  0  
300 An ethnic minority group 4  3  2  1  0  
 
48. How many persons live in your household? 
301 
302 
………….persons older than 12 years and ……….. under-aged children (under the age of 12) 
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49. Do you have any help with handling the household /care work, except from your 
husband/wife/partner? 
  Yes  No 
303 Relatives (for ex  grandparents) 1  0  
304 Nanny/au pair or equivalent 1  0  
305 Service Company 1  0  
 
50. Do you, apart from your own children, have any care responsibilities for other persons due to illness, 
age, handicap or else? 
306                                                                                             1  Yes         0  No 
 
51. Thank you for taking time to answer the questionnaire. If you have any more comments about the 
questionnaire or the issues raised in it, please feel free to write them down: 
307 ……………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
……………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
……………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
……………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
……………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
……………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
……………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
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APPENDIX B. THE 180 MUNICIPALITIES OF THE RESEARCH SAMPLE 
 
Aalter, Amay, Andenne, Anderlues, Ans, 
Antwerpen, Anzegem, Asse, Assenede, 
Assesse;  
Balen, Beauvechain, Beernem, Beersel, 
Beringen, Berlaar, Bever, Binche, 
Bièvre, Bilzen, Blankenberge, Blégny, 
Bonheiden, Boortmeerbeek, Bornem, 
Bouillon, Boutersem, Braives, 
Brunehaut;  
Chapelle-lez-Herlaimont, Chastre, 
Châtelet, Chimay, Comblain-au-Pont;  
Damme, Deerlijk, Dentergem, De Pinte, 
Dessel, Diepenbeek, Dinant, Diksmuide, 
Donceel;  
Ecaussinnes, Ellezelles, Enghien, 
Esneux, Etterbeek, Estaimpuis;  
Faimes, Ferrières, Fexhe-le-Haut-
Clocher, Florenville, Fontaine-l’Evêque, 
Fosses-la-Ville;  
Gedinne, Genk, Gent, Gingelom, Gooik;  
Haaltert, Halle, Ham, Harelbeke, 
Havelange, Hemiksem, Herbeumont, 
Herentals, Herstal, Hoegaarden, 
Hoogstraten, Huy;  
Ichtegem;  
Kapellen, Kapelle-op-den-Bos, 
Keerbergen, Kinrooi, Koekelare, 
Koekelberg, Komen-Waasten;  
Laakdal, La Bruyère, La Louvière, La 
Roche en-Ardenne, Lebbeke, Léglise, 
Lens, Le Roeulx, Lichtervelde, Lier, 
Limbourg, Lint, Lochristi, Lokeren;  
Machelen, Maldegem, Manage, Manhay, 
Mechelen, Meise, Meix-devant-Virton, 
Melle, Merksplas, Messancy, Mettet, 
Middelkerke, Moerbeke, Musson;  
Namur, Nassogne, Nevele, 
Nieuwerkerken, Nivelles;  
Opglabbeek, Oreye, Oudergem, 
Overijse, Overpelt;  
Paliseul, Pepingen, Péruwelz, Pittem, 
Plombières, Putte, Puurs;  
Ramillies, Ranst, Rendeux, Retie, 
Rijkevorsel, Rochefort, Roeselare, 
Ronse, Roosdaal, Rouvroy, Ruiselede, 
Rumes;  
Saint-Georges-sur-Meuse, Schaarbeek, 
Scherpenheuvel, Schilde, Schoten, 
Seraing, Silly, Sint-Gillis-Waas, Sint-
Joost-ten-Noode, Sint-Lambrechts-
Woluwe, Sint-Martens-Latem, 
Soumagne, Spiere-Helkijn, Sprimont, 
Staden, Stoumont;  
Tervuren, Theux, Thimister-Clermont, 
Tielt;  
Villers-la-Ville, Villers-le-Bouillet, 
Vorselaar, Vosselaar;  
Waarschoot, Wanze, Waremme, 
Wasseiges, Wavre, Wellen, Welkenraedt, 
Wemmel, Wetteren, Wichelen, 
Wuustwezel;  
Yvoir;  
Zandhoven, Zelzate, Zomergem, 
Zottegem, Zutendaal, Zwalm, 
Zwevegem.  
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APPENDIX C. POLITICAL RECRUITMENT AND POLITICAL CAREER (CHAPTER 3) 
 
Analysis of the time spent on the different aspects of the councillor office  
As a supplement to the analysis of their political career in Chapter 3, Figure 3.2 below 
specifies the time that Belgian local councillors spend on different activities of their 
office. The analysis is based on the following question: 
• “How much time do you spend on the following activities? (in average numbers of 
hours per month): council and committee meetings; meetings with the party’s 
council group; other party meetings and activities; public debates, meetings with 
citizens, etc.; meetings with administrative staff; field visits to municipal 
institutions; desk work preparing your activity in the council; other important 
activity as a councillor” (Q14). 
The figure presents the proportion of each activity, expressed in percentages. 
 
Figure 3.2. Time spent on the activities of the local councillor office in Belgium 
 
(N=799, 806, 804, 805, 811, 808, 802 – numbers presented in the original order of the items) 
 
23%
16%
14%11%
9%
7%
6%
14%
Council and committee meetings
Desk work preparation
Party meetings and activities
Meetings with the party's council 
group
Public debates, meetings with 
citizens, etc.
Meetings with administrative 
staff
Field visits to municipal 
institutions
Other important activities
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On an average total of 41.1 hours per month, councillors spend most time on council and 
committee meetings (23%). Desk working preparing those meetings is also an important 
activity (16%). Third, councillors spend a large part of their mandate on the political 
party, be it the party in general (14%) or the party group in particular (11%). On average, 
public debates and meetings with citizens only account for 9% of the formal councillor 
activities. Two other activities that do not seem very important for the average councillor 
are meetings with the administrative staff (7%) and field visits to the municipal 
institutions or agencies (6%). 
Finally, councillors spend much time (14%) on other activities of the office – in their 
capacity as a councillor. Nearly half of the research population (N=385) has further 
specified these other activities. We can broadly classify them in four groups: 
• Representational activities (N=238): 
This is the group of activities which seem to be most important. Councillors have 
listed a large number of possible representational activities: attending all sorts of 
festivities and inaugurations (i.e. what De Winter and Dumont (2006: 968) call the 
“flower pot” function of the politicians), house visits, citizen contacts, attending 
activities of local associations, holding office hours, acts of service, political 
favouring, etc. 
 
• Activities in governance networks (i.e. the municipal satellites) (N=70): 
A second group of supplementary activities relate to councillors’ mandates in all 
kinds of formal governance networks (e.g. advisory councils, police councils, 
inter-municipal co-operations, municipal agencies, etc.). 
 
• Political activities in local government (N=26): 
In the third group, we find councillors who have listed their supplementary 
political activities in local government (i.e. being a mayor, alderman, council or 
committee president). 
 
• Various activities (N=74): 
The final group of supplementary activities as a councillor is quite diverse: study 
and training (plus examinations, lectures, information sessions, etc.), monitoring 
policy dossiers, organizing the municipal services, communication (press contacts, 
websites, public relations, party communication, etc.), and ... completing 
questionnaires. 
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APPENDIX D. ROLE ORIENTATION (CHAPTER 4) 
 
(A) Councillors’ role discrepancy: attitude versus behaviour 
The first annex to Chapter 4 represents a graphic overview of the role attitude and role 
behaviour of the Belgian local councillors. These variables were measured by the 
following questions: 
• “In your experience as a councillor, how important are the following tasks for you 
as a councillor? Representing the requests and issues emerging from the local 
society; Defining the main goals of the municipal activity; Controlling the 
municipal activity” (Q10). 
• “In your experience as a councillor, how would you define your contribution 
regarding the following tasks? Representing the requests and issues emerging 
from the local society; Defining the main goals of the municipal activity; 
Controlling the municipal activity” (Q24). 
Per role, the graph presents the percentages of respondents who gave a score ‘0’ or ‘1’ 
(i.e. little or no importance/contribution), ‘2’ (i.e. moderate importance/contribution) and 
‘3’ or ‘4’ (i.e. great or very great importance/contribution) to the roles on a 0-4 scale. 
 
Figure 4.1. Role attitude and role behaviour of local councillors in Belgium 
 
(Representation: N=844, 842; Policy: N=836, 841; Control: N=839, 846) 
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The second graph of this appendix (Figure 4.2) further underlines the role discrepancy 
between councillors’ attitudes and self-reported behaviour in terms of representation, 
policy and control. The graph presents the mean scores for role attitude and role 
behaviour on a 0-4 scale per role. 
 
Figure 4.2. Role discrepancy of local councillors in Belgium 
 
(Representation: N=844, 842; Policy: N=836, 841; Control: N=839, 846) 
 
(B) The supremacy of the political majority and the executive function 
The second supplementary analysis to Chapter 4 seeks to underscore the stringent 
dominance of the informal rules of the game in the Belgian local system. We analyze the 
supremacy of the councillors from the political majority and the councillors with 
experience in executive office in 5 tables (Table 4.4 to Table 4.8). 
Table 4.4 and Table 4.5 assess councillors’ evaluation of their instruments in office 
according to their function (i.e. experience in the BMA or not) and their position (i.e. 
being member of the political majority or the opposition). The analysis is based on the 
following question (with response categories being contextualized): 
• “How effective do you consider the use made by the council and the councillors of 
the instruments available to them? Interpellation; Voting; Set the council agenda 
and convene the council; Inquiry of the BMA; Information from the 
administration; Inspection of policy documents; Referenda” (Q23). 
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The tables present the percentages of councillors who gave a score of ‘0’ or ‘1’ (not 
effective/not effective enough), ‘2’ (moderately effective) and ‘3’ or ‘4’ (effective/very 
effective) on a 0-4 scale per instrument. The results are split up on the basis of the 
councillor function and position. Additionally, the tables show the strength and 
significance of the differences between the categories executive/non-executive on the one 
hand and the categories majority/opposition on the other hand (Cramer’s V). 
Table 4.4 demonstrates that councillors with executive experience are generally more 
optimistic about the effectiveness of the classic councillor instruments (i.e. voting, setting 
the agenda and convening the council, inquiry and information) than lay councillors. The 
differences in the evaluation of the interpellation and inspection rights are not significant. 
One other result is remarkable: the executive councillors are less convinced of the 
effectiveness of citizen referenda as a possible instrument. Amongst the non-executive 
councillors, the opinions on this instrument are more balanced (even though only one-
third of the councillors believe that referenda are an effective policy instrument). 
 
Table 4.4.  Councillors’ evaluation of their instruments according to their function 
  in the council 
 Executive Non-executive Cramer’s 
V (Sign) 
Instrument Not 
effective 
(enough) 
Moderately 
effective 
(Very) 
effective 
Not 
effective 
(enough) 
Moderately 
effective 
(Very) 
effective 
 
Interpellation 
Voting 
Agenda and 
convocation  
Inquiry 
Information 
Inspection 
Referenda 
18.1 
10.2 
14.3 
 
7.3 
4.7 
7.6 
45.5 
21 
16 
25.7 
 
19.3 
16.4 
14.6 
29.8 
60.9 
73.8 
60 
 
73.4 
78.9 
77.8 
24.7 
23.3 
23.6 
23.5 
 
16.2 
6.7 
9.1 
33.8 
24.6 
20.3 
22 
 
20.8 
24.1 
19.4 
29.3 
52.1 
56.1 
54.5 
 
63 
69.2 
71.5 
36.9 
.09 (.14) 
.19 (.00) 
.12 (.03) 
 
.14 (.00) 
.11 (.04) 
.07 (.41) 
.14 (.00) 
(N=276, 275, 272, 275, 274, 275, 275 for executives and 549, 547, 541, 549, 551, 548, 545 for non-executives) 
 
Table 4.5 analyzes the same instruments on the basis of the position of the councillors in 
the council. Except for the inspection of policy documents, which is considered to be an 
effective instrument by most councillors, we see that all the differences between the 
councillors from the majority and the councillors of the opposition are significant. The 
pattern is quite clear: 60 to 70% of the councillors from the majority are largely 
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convinced that their instruments are effective. This percentage is much lower in the group 
of councillors from the opposition. Only with regard to local referenda, opposition 
councillors are more optimistic. 
 
Table 4.5.  Councillors’ evaluation of their instruments according to their position  
in the council  
 Majority Opposition Cramer’s 
V (Sign) 
Instrument Not 
effective 
(enough) 
Moderately 
effective 
(Very) 
effective 
Not 
effective 
(enough) 
Moderately 
effective 
(Very) 
effective 
 
Interpellation 
Voting 
Agenda and 
convocation  
Inquiry 
Information 
Inspection 
Referenda 
17.7 
8.8 
15.9 
 
8.4 
4.5 
6.6 
41.2 
23.4 
18.8 
21.6 
 
18.9 
20.3 
18.4 
29.8 
58.9 
72.4 
62.5 
 
72.7 
75.2 
75 
29 
29.2 
37.6 
28.8 
 
20.4 
8.3 
10.7 
33.1 
23.3 
19.9 
27.4 
 
24.2 
25.2 
17.2 
31.4 
47.5 
42.5 
43.8 
 
55.4 
66.5 
72.1 
35.5 
.17 (.00) 
.37 (.00) 
.19 (.00) 
 
.20 (.00) 
.11 (.04) 
.08 (.31) 
.15 (.00) 
(N= 515, 512, 505, 513, 513, 512, 510 for majority and 288, 287, 285, 289, 290, 290, 287 for opposition) 
 
In Table 4.6 we interpret councillors’ evaluation of the information that they receive from 
the municipal administration. The original question runs as follows: 
• “Do you get a satisfying amount of information from the municipal administration 
to perform your job as a councillor?” (Q11). 
Table 4.6 presents the percentages of councillors that gave a score of ‘0’ or ‘1’ 
(fully/mainly unsatisfying), ‘2’ (neither satisfying nor unsatisfying) and ‘3’ or ‘4’ 
(satisfying/fully satisfying). The results are split up on the basis of councillors’ function 
(i.e. executive experience or not) and position (i.e. majority or opposition) in the council. 
Additionally, the table presents the strength significance of the differences between these 
groups (Cramer’s V). 
Table 4.6 shows that councillors with experience in the executive board and councillors 
from the political majority are substantially and significantly more satisfied with the 
information that they receive from the municipal administration to do their job. 
Particularly councillors from the opposition feel that this is not always the case. 
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Table 4.6.  Councillors’ evaluation of the information by the municipal  
administration according to their function and position in the council 
 Function Position 
 Executive Non-executive Majority Opposition 
Fully/mainly 
satisfying 
77.2 57.6 77.1 44.9 
Neither satisfying 
nor unsatisfying 
11.6 20.7 13.3 24.5 
Fully/mainly 
unsatisfying 
11.2 21.7 9.6 30.6 
Cramer’s V (Sign) .25 (.00) .37 (.00) 
(N= 277 for executive and 547 for non-executive; 512 for majority and 294 for opposition) 
 
Finally, we also verify if the executives and/or councillors from the majority are more 
embedded in their political parties. To analyze this item we draw on two following 
question: 
• “Do you presently have, or have you previously had, a position (board member, 
etc.) in your party’s organization (beside the party’s council group)? In the local 
party organization; In upper level party organizations” (Q30). 
Table 4.7 presents the results for the local party, Table 4.8 focuses on the political party 
on the supra-local level. Obviously, councillors are more involved in their local party 
organization than in the organization of their party on the supra-local level. Furthermore, 
both tables demonstrate that there is no significant difference between councillors from 
the majority and councillors from the opposition in terms of the involvement in the party 
organization. However, the differences between councillors with experience in the BMA 
and lay councillors are significant (but not very strong either). The tables confirm that 
executives are more likely to occupy strong positions in their political parties. 
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Table 4.7. Councillors’ position in the local party organization according to their 
function and position in the council 
 Function Position 
 Executive Non-executive Majority Opposition 
Yes, presently 70 61.8 65.3 66.3 
Yes, previously 13 10.1 12.2 10.1 
No, never 
Not applicable 
13.7 
3.3 
23.5 
4.6 
20.9 
1.6 
19.4 
4.2 
Cramer’s V (Sign) .12 (.01) .09 (.12) 
(N= 270 for executive and 545 for non-executive; 508 for majority and 288 for opposition) 
 
Table 4.8.  Councillors’ position in the upper party organization according to  
their function and position in the council 
 Function Position 
 Executive Non-executive Majority Opposition 
Yes, presently 31.2 24.6 27.7 28.8 
Yes, previously 20.3 11 14.3 14.6 
No, never 
Not applicable 
41.1 
5.4 
58.2 
6.2 
55.1 
2.9 
50.7 
5.8 
Cramer’s V (Sign) .17 (.00) .08 (.28) 
(N= 260 for executive and 517 for non-executive; 481 for majority and 274 for opposition) 
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APPENDIX E. POLITICAL REPRESENTATION (CHAPTER 5) 
 
(A) The classic notion of the representative ‘focus’ of the local councillors 
In addition to the analysis of councillors’ representative style in Chapter 5, this annex 
presents an analysis of its theoretical complement, the representative focus. The concept 
refers to the (particular group of) people whose interest(s) a councillor seeks to defend in 
office (Rao, 1998). We build our analysis on the following question: 
• “How important is it for you as a local councillor to represent the following 
groups or interests? The whole locality; A particular geographical part of the 
area; Ethnic minority(ies); Women; Religious group/the Church; Less resourceful 
citizens; Farmers; Workers; The middle class; Local business groups” (Q16). 
Figure 5.2 presents the results of the analysis, expressed in the percentages of councillors 
that have evaluated the importance of each item with a score of ‘0’ or ‘1’ (not important 
at all/of little importance), ‘2’ (of moderate importance) and ‘3’ or ‘4’ (of great 
importance/of utmost importance). 
 
Figure 5.2. Representative focus of local councillors in Belgium 
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Figure 5.2 demonstrates that nearly every local councillor wishes to represent his or her 
local community at large (as they are formally expected to). In addition to this general 
focus, the councillors also hold interests of particular subgroups in mind. A majority of 
the councillors (63.8%) claim to advocate the interests of less resourceful citizens. The 
interests of the workers and the middle class are important for approximately half of the 
councillor population too. The interests of the remaining subgroups (a particular 
geographical part of the municipality, ethnic minorities, women, farmers and local 
business groups) are almost all advocated by one-third to 40% of the councillors. 
Religious groups are the exception. Only a minor part of the Belgian councillors keep the 
interests of a religious group (or the Church) in mind for council business. For the large 
majority of the councillor population, religion is no substantial focus of political 
representation at all. 
 
(B) Correlation matrices of the items comprising our model of political representation 
The second annex to Chapter 5 presents the correlation matrices of the items that we 
have used to operationalize the concept representative style. They are based on the 
following questions: 
• “In your experience as a councillor, how important are the following tasks for you 
as a councillor? Representing the requests and issues emerging from the local 
society; Implementing the program of my political party/movement; Publicizing 
the debate on local issues before decisions are taken; Explaining decisions of the 
council to the citizens” (Q10). 
• “In your experience as a councillor, how would you define your contribution 
regarding the following tasks? Representing the requests and issues emerging 
from the local society; Implementing the program of my political party/movement; 
Publicizing the debate on local issues before decisions are taken; Explaining 
decisions of the council to the citizens” (Q24). 
The tables include (a) the Spearman correlation coefficients to address the strength and 
significance of the relationships between the items, as well as (b) the mean scores of the 
items on a 0-4 scale (i.e. little or no importance/contribution; moderate 
importance/contribution; great or very great importance/contribution). Table 5.8 indicates 
that the mean scores for the four items on the attitudinal level are fairly high. Moreover, 
all items correlate significantly, positively and moderately/substantially to each other. 
The lower mean scores in Table 5.9 suggest that councillors can not entirely represent the 
people as they would wish to. However, all the items again correlate significantly, 
positively and moderately/substantially to each other.  
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Table 5.8. Correlation matrix of the items comprising the representative attitude 
 Representing 
issues of locality 
Implementing 
party program 
Publicizing debate 
on local issues 
Explaining 
council decisions 
Implementing party 
program 
.246 
(.000) 
   
Publicizing debate on 
local issues 
.511 
(.000) 
.249 
(.000) 
  
Explaining council 
decisions 
.410 
(.000) 
.290 
(.000) 
.402 
(.000) 
 
N, Mean score (0-4), 
standard deviation 
844 
3.31 (.70) 
846 
2.79 (.89) 
844 
3.11 (.78) 
845 
2.96 (.82) 
 
 
Table 5.9. Correlation matrix of the items comprising the representative behaviour 
 Representing issues 
of locality 
Implementing party 
program 
Publicizing debate 
on local issues 
Explaining 
council decisions 
Implementing party 
program 
.320 
(.000) 
   
Publicizing debate on 
local issues 
.547 
(.000) 
.359 
(.000) 
  
Explaining council 
decisions 
.471 
(.000) 
.348 
(.000) 
.436 
(.000) 
 
N, Mean score (0-4), 
standard deviation 
842 
2.78 (.76) 
846 
2.53 (.91) 
846 
2.58 (.89) 
847 
2.70 (.86) 
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(C) Graphical depiction of the entrepreneurial shift in political representation 
The third and final annex to Chapter 5 presents a graphical depiction of the 
entrepreneurial shift in political representation from the attitudinal to the behavioural 
level. For this purpose, Figure 5.3 shows the frequency distributions of the response in 
terms of councillors’ representative attitude and their representative behaviour organized 
according to the Andeweg/Thomassen typology. 
 
Figure 5.3. Discrepancy in the representative style of local councillors in Belgium 
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APPENDIX F. COUNCILLORS’ ROLE AND POSITION IN A COMPARATIVE FRAME 
(CHAPTER 6) 
Our final appendix includes the annexes to the international comparison of the role and 
position of the local councillor (Chapter 6). Per theme of the chapter, we present a 
graphical picture of the frequency distributions of the included variables for each 
country/region (in percentages). The values and the number of cases per variable are not 
displayed in order to contain the information overload on the graphs (- they are included 
in the original tables in Chapter 6). 
 
(A) The recruitment process of Belgian local councillors in a comparative frame 
 
Figure 6.1. Social base of local councillors in the Netherlands, Flanders, Wallonia  
and France 
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Figure 6.2. Political motivations of local councillors in the Netherlands, Flanders, 
Wallonia and France 
 
 
Figure 6.3. Apprenticeships of local councillors in the Netherlands,  
Flanders, Wallonia and France 
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Figure 6.4. The election of local councillors in the Netherlands, Flanders,  
Wallonia and France 
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(B) The role orientation of Belgian local councillors in a comparative frame 
 
Figure 6.5. Role attitude of local councillors in the Netherlands, Flanders,  
Wallonia and France 
 
 
Figure 6.6. Role behaviour of local councillors in the Netherlands, Flanders,  
Wallonia and France 
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(C) The power balance of the Belgian local authorities in a comparative frame 
 
Figure 6.7. Councillors’ position in the local power triangle in the Netherlands, 
Flanders, Wallonia and France 
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(D The relations of Belgian local councillors with citizens in a comparative frame 
 
Figure 6.8. The representative contacts of local councillors with citizens 
in the Netherlands, Flanders, Wallonia and France 
 
 
 
Figure 6.9. The attitude towards citizen participation of local councillors  
in the Netherlands, Flanders, Wallonia and France 
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(E) The future political ambitions of Belgian local councillors in a comparative frame 
 
Figure 6.10. The future political ambitions of local councillors in the Netherlands, 
Flanders, Wallonia and France 
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Figure 6.11. Turnover motives of local councillors in the Netherlands, 
Flanders, Wallonia and France 
 
 
(F) The party group of Belgian local councillors in a comparative frame 
The final annex of this study concerns the functioning of the party groups in the 
respective local systems under study. Chapter 6 has shown that there is a considerable 
difference in the influence of political parties between France on the one hand and the 
Netherlands and the Belgian regions on the other. In this annex, we present an insight 
into how these party groups function according to the councillors. 
First, Table 6.6 analyzes the bond between the party group and the local party. Is the 
party group influenced by the party (i.e. top-down relation), and/or can the party group 
exert influence on the party (i.e. bottom-up relation)? Furthermore, has the party group a 
co-operative leader or not? To answer these questions we draw on the following question 
from the survey: 
• “What is your opinion on the following statements? The local party organization 
has much influence over the decisions of the party’s council group; The party’s 
council group has much influence over the decisions of the local party; The leader 
of the party group usually informs and seeks the support of the party group when 
decisions are taken” (Q31). 
Councillors could give a score of ‘0’ or ‘1’(disagree totally, partly disagree), ‘2’ (neither 
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Table 6.7 presents the percentage of councillors who partly agree or totally agree with the 
statement, as well as the strength of the differences between the countries/regions 
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The table shows that the party group functions most autonomously from the local party in 
France, both in terms of top-down and bottom-up relations. In the Belgian regions this 
connection is more pronounced. In Wallonia, more councillors feel that the top-down 
influence is strong while in Flanders, more councillors agree that the party group can also 
exert influence on the local party. In the Netherlands, many councillors are under the 
impression that the party group has a bottom-up impact on the local party too. Finally, the 
most striking result relates to the leader of the party group. In the Netherlands, almost 
every councillor feels that his or her party leader works in a co-operative way. In France 
and the Belgian regions, only 50 to 60% of the councillors agree with this statement. 
 
Table 6.7. The party group in the council in the Netherlands, Flanders, Wallonia  
and France (in percentages) 
 General Netherlands Flanders Wallonia France Cramer’s V 
(a) 
Influenced by local 
party organization 
(N=1886) 
 
Influence on local 
party organization 
(N=1896) 
 
Co-operative leader 
party group 
(N=1909) 
 
 
55.5 
 
 
 
62.7 
 
 
 
70.4 
 
 
 
54.7 
(-0.8) 
 
 
74.9 
(+12.2) 
 
 
93.1 
(+22.7) 
 
 
59.6 
(+4.1) 
 
 
72.3 
(+9.6) 
 
 
63.7 
(-6.7) 
 
 
64.2 
(+8.7) 
 
 
60.8 
(-1.9) 
 
 
56.8 
(-13.6) 
 
 
41.1 
(-14.4) 
 
 
41.1 
(-21.6) 
 
 
66.9 
(-3.5) 
 
 
.17 
 
 
 
.21 
 
 
 
.31 
 
 
(a) All associations are significant at the .05 level 
 
Lastly, we compare the degree of party discipline in the different countries/regions when 
votes are to be cast. We use the following question as a proxy for this subject: 
• “If there should be a conflict between a member’s own opinion, the opinion of the 
party group in the council or the opinion of the voters, how should, in your 
opinion, a member of the council vote? Vote according to his/her own conviction; 
Vote according to the opinion of the party group; Vote according to the opinion of 
the voters” (Q17). 
Councillors could only choose one of the three possible options. Table 6.8 presents the 
frequency distributions of the answers per country/region, as well as the strength of the 
differences between the countries/regions. Generally, a majority of the councillors reckon 
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that the councillor should follow his or her own conviction, hence vote against the party 
whip. A minority thinks that the councillor should vote according to the opinion of the 
voters. Only in Flanders, a majority of the councillors feel that the councillor should obey 
the party orders after all. Again, we see that the impact of the party group is less strong in 
France. French councillors would also be (slightly) more inclined to follow the opinion of 
the voters.  
 
Table 6.8.  Voting discipline in the council in the Netherlands, Flanders, Wallonia  
and France (in percentages) 
 General Netherlands Flanders Wallonia France Cramer’s V 
(a) 
Voting conflict 
(N=1916) 
Own conviction 
 
Opinion of party 
group 
 
Opinion of voters 
 
 
 
57.2 
 
32.8 
 
 
10 
 
 
 
60.8 
(+3.6) 
31.1 
(-1.7) 
 
8.1 
(-1.9) 
 
 
36.8 
(20.4) 
52.9 
(+20.1) 
 
10.3 
(+0.3) 
 
 
57.5 
(+0.3) 
37 
(+4.2) 
 
5.5 
(-4.5) 
 
 
73.8 
(+16.6) 
10 
(-22.8) 
 
16.2 
(+6.2) 
.24 
 
(a) The associations are significant at the .05 level 
 
 
